Audit Report for PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS
Proportion of the total number of votes for this contest that were cast within this county: 100.0%
- Overall margin of victory: %
- Margin of victory in this county: 10.667%
- Number of audit units in this county: 3
- Number of audit units to audit (NEGEXP, 75% confidence, WPM < 20%): 2.5
See additional statistical information below...
Batch Seq | Threshold | Random | Priority | Type | Batches | Ballots | Contest Ballots | Alan Keyes / Brian Rohrbough America's Independent | Barack Obama / Joe Biden Democratic | Bob Barr / Wayne A. Root Libertarian | Bradford Lyttle / Abraham Bassford U.S. Pacifist | Brian Moore / Stewart A. Alexander Socialist, USA | Charles Jay / Dan Sallis, Jr. Boston Tea | Chuck Baldwin / Darrell L. Castle Constitution | Cynthia McKinney / Rosa A. Clemente Green | Frank Edward McEnulty / David Mangan Unaffiliated | Gene C. Amondson / Leroy J. Pletten Prohibition | Gloria La Riva / Robert Moses Socialism and Liberation | James Harris / Alyson Kennedy Socialist Workers | John McCain / Sarah Palin Republican | Jonathan E. Allen / Jeffrey D. Stath HeartQuake '08 | Over | Ralph Nader / Matt Gonzalez Unaffiliated | Thomas Robert Stevens / Alden Link Objectivist | Under |
Totals | 0 | 16 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 24 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | |||||||
000001 | 0.823223 | ED | p008_lat_ed_001 | None | 25 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | ||
000002 | 0.823223 | ED | p014_lat_ed_002 | None | 25 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | ||
000005 | 0.823223 | ED | p011_lat_ed_003 | None | 25 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 18 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
Audit statistics
The "Number of audit units to audit" is based on the NEGEXP method, which is very efficient and requires selecting larger audit units with higher probability than smaller ones. The numbers given here are based on a confidence level of 75%. I.e. they are designed so the audit will either 1) find a discrepancy and call for an escalation or full hand recount, or 2) reduce the risk of confirming an incorrect outcome to (100 - 75)%, even if the tally system has been manipulated. A maximum "within-precinct-miscount" of 20% is assumed. See On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes, by Javed A. Aslam, Raluca A. Popa and Ronald L. Rivest
Contest: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS Number of precincts: 3 Total number of votes cast: 75 Average number of votes/precinct: 25.0 Median number of votes/precinct: 25 Maximum number of votes/precinct: 25 Minimum number of votes/precinct: 25 Ratio of max/min: 1.0 margin = 10.6666666667 percent, 8.0 votes s = 0.2 (maximum within-precinct-miscount) alpha = 0.25 (confidence is 1 - alpha: 0.75 ) Rule of Thumb says: 5.1986038542 precincts. expected workload = 250.0 votes counted. APR says: b = 0.8 precincts needed to hold corruption u = 3 precincts to audit expected workload = 75.0 votes confidence level to find one of b = 0.912 bmin = 1 confidence level to find one of bmin = 1.0 SAFE says: bmin = 1 Number of precincts to audit = u = 3 Confidence level achieved = 1.0 expected workload = 75.0 Negexp says: w = 5.77078016356 largest probability = 0.823223304703 smallest probability = 0.823223304703 expected number of precincts audited = 2.46966991411 expected workload = 61.7417478528 votes counted PPEBWR says: t = 5 largest total probability = 0.868312757202 smallest total probability = 0.868312757202 expected number of precincts audited = 2.6049382716 expected workload = 65.1234567901 votes counted. max difference from negexp = 0.0450894524983