1
/* crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c */
2
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
5
* This package is an SSL implementation written
6
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
7
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
9
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
10
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
11
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
12
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
13
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
14
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
16
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
17
* the code are not to be removed.
18
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
19
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
20
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
21
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
23
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
24
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
26
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
27
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
28
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
29
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
30
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
31
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
32
* must display the following acknowledgement:
33
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
34
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
35
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
36
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
37
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
38
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
39
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
41
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
42
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
43
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
44
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
45
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
46
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
47
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
48
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
49
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
50
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
53
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
54
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
55
* copied and put under another distribution licence
56
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
60
#include <openssl/err.h>
61
#include <openssl/bn.h>
62
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
63
#include <openssl/rand.h>
64
#include <openssl/fips.h>
66
#if !defined(RSA_NULL) && defined(OPENSSL_FIPS)
68
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
69
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
70
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
71
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
72
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
73
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
74
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
75
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,int padding);
76
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa);
77
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa);
78
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa);
79
static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth={
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"Eric Young's PKCS#1 RSA",
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RSA_eay_public_encrypt,
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RSA_eay_public_decrypt, /* signature verification */
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RSA_eay_private_encrypt, /* signing */
84
RSA_eay_private_decrypt,
86
BN_mod_exp_mont, /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery if e == 3 */
95
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(void)
97
return(&rsa_pkcs1_eay_meth);
100
static int RSA_eay_public_encrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
101
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
104
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
105
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
111
if(FIPS_selftest_failed())
113
FIPSerr(FIPS_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,FIPS_R_FIPS_SELFTEST_FAILED);
117
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
118
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
119
if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
121
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
127
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
128
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf,num,from,flen);
130
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
131
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
132
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf,num,from,flen,NULL,0);
135
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
136
i=RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf,num,from,flen);
139
i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
142
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
145
if (i <= 0) goto err;
147
if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
149
if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
151
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
152
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
156
if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
158
BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
159
if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
161
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
163
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
166
if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
168
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
169
if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
171
rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
174
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
177
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
180
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
181
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
183
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
184
* length of the modulus */
185
j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
186
i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
187
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
192
if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
197
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
203
static int rsa_eay_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
206
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
207
/* Check again inside the lock - the macro's check is racey */
208
if(rsa->blinding == NULL)
209
ret = RSA_blinding_on(rsa, ctx);
210
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
214
#define BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, err_instr) \
216
if((!((rsa)->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) && \
217
((rsa)->blinding == NULL) && \
218
!rsa_eay_blinding(rsa, ctx)) \
222
static BN_BLINDING *setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
225
BN_BLINDING *ret = NULL;
227
/* added in OpenSSL 0.9.6j and 0.9.7b */
229
/* NB: similar code appears in RSA_blinding_on (rsa_lib.c);
230
* this should be placed in a new function of its own, but for reasons
231
* of binary compatibility can't */
235
if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL && rsa->d->d != NULL)
237
/* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as unpredictable seed */
238
RAND_add(rsa->d->d, rsa->d->dmax * sizeof rsa->d->d[0], 0);
239
if (!BN_pseudo_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
243
if (!BN_rand_range(A,rsa->n)) goto err;
245
if ((Ai=BN_mod_inverse(NULL,A,rsa->n,ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
247
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(A,A,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,rsa->_method_mod_n))
249
ret = BN_BLINDING_new(A,Ai,rsa->n);
257
static int RSA_eay_private_encrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
258
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
261
int i,j,k,num=0,r= -1;
262
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
264
int local_blinding = 0;
265
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
270
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
271
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
272
if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
274
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
280
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
281
i=RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf,num,from,flen);
284
i=RSA_padding_add_none(buf,num,from,flen);
286
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
288
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
291
if (i <= 0) goto err;
293
if (BN_bin2bn(buf,num,&f) == NULL) goto err;
295
if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
297
/* usually the padding functions would catch this */
298
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
302
BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
303
blinding = rsa->blinding;
305
/* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
306
* But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
307
* (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
308
* lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
309
* thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
311
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
313
if (blinding == NULL)
315
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
320
if (blinding != NULL)
322
if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
324
/* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
326
blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
327
if (blinding == NULL)
334
if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
336
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
339
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
340
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
341
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
342
{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
345
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
349
if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
351
/* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the
352
* length of the modulus */
353
j=BN_num_bytes(&ret);
354
i=BN_bn2bin(&ret,&(to[num-j]));
355
for (k=0; k<(num-i); k++)
360
if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
364
BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
367
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
373
static int RSA_eay_private_decrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
374
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
379
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
381
int local_blinding = 0;
382
BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
387
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
389
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
391
if ((buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
393
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
397
/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
398
* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
401
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
405
/* make data into a big number */
406
if (BN_bin2bn(from,(int)flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
408
if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
410
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
414
BLINDING_HELPER(rsa, ctx, goto err;);
415
blinding = rsa->blinding;
417
/* Now unless blinding is disabled, 'blinding' is non-NULL.
418
* But the BN_BLINDING object may be owned by some other thread
419
* (we don't want to keep it constant and we don't want to use
420
* lots of locking to avoid race conditions, so only a single
421
* thread can use it; other threads have to use local blinding
423
if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING))
425
if (blinding == NULL)
427
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
432
if (blinding != NULL)
434
if (blinding->thread_id != CRYPTO_thread_id())
436
/* we need a local one-time blinding factor */
438
blinding = setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
439
if (blinding == NULL)
446
if (!BN_BLINDING_convert(&f, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
449
if ( (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
452
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) &&
453
(rsa->dmq1 != NULL) &&
454
(rsa->iqmp != NULL)) )
455
{ if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa)) goto err; }
458
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL))
463
if (!BN_BLINDING_invert(&ret, blinding, ctx)) goto err;
466
j=BN_bn2bin(&ret,p); /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
470
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
471
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to,num,buf,j,num);
473
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
474
case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
475
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,num,buf,j,num,NULL,0);
478
case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
479
r=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,num,buf,j,num);
482
r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,j,num);
485
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
489
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
492
if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
496
BN_BLINDING_free(blinding);
499
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
505
/* signature verification */
506
static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(FIPS_RSA_SIZE_T flen, const unsigned char *from,
507
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
512
unsigned char *buf=NULL;
518
if (ctx == NULL) goto err;
520
num=BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
521
buf=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
524
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
528
/* This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
529
* and chops off the top '0' bytes */
532
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
536
if (BN_bin2bn(from,flen,&f) == NULL) goto err;
538
if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
540
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
545
if ((rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) && (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC))
547
BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
548
if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
550
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->n,ctx))
552
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
555
if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
557
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
558
if (rsa->_method_mod_n == NULL)
560
rsa->_method_mod_n = bn_mont_ctx;
563
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
566
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
569
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&ret,&f,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,
570
rsa->_method_mod_n)) goto err;
577
case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
578
r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num);
581
r=RSA_padding_check_none(to,num,buf,i,num);
584
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
588
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
591
if (ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(ctx);
596
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,num);
602
static int RSA_eay_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
611
if ((ctx=BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err;
613
if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE)
615
if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
617
BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
618
if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
620
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->p,ctx))
622
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
625
if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
627
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
628
if (rsa->_method_mod_p == NULL)
630
rsa->_method_mod_p = bn_mont_ctx;
633
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
636
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
639
if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
641
BN_MONT_CTX* bn_mont_ctx;
642
if ((bn_mont_ctx=BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL)
644
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(bn_mont_ctx,rsa->q,ctx))
646
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
649
if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL) /* other thread may have finished first */
651
CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
652
if (rsa->_method_mod_q == NULL)
654
rsa->_method_mod_q = bn_mont_ctx;
657
CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA);
660
BN_MONT_CTX_free(bn_mont_ctx);
664
if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
665
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&m1,&r1,rsa->dmq1,rsa->q,ctx,
666
rsa->_method_mod_q)) goto err;
668
if (!BN_mod(&r1,I,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
669
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,&r1,rsa->dmp1,rsa->p,ctx,
670
rsa->_method_mod_p)) goto err;
672
if (!BN_sub(r0,r0,&m1)) goto err;
673
/* This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does
674
* affect the multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size */
676
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
678
if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->iqmp,ctx)) goto err;
679
if (!BN_mod(r0,&r1,rsa->p,ctx)) goto err;
680
/* If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of
681
* adding 'p' if r0 is negative above to leave the result still
682
* negative. This can break the private key operations: the following
683
* second correction should *always* correct this rare occurrence.
684
* This will *never* happen with OpenSSL generated keys because
685
* they ensure p > q [steve]
688
if (!BN_add(r0,r0,rsa->p)) goto err;
689
if (!BN_mul(&r1,r0,rsa->q,ctx)) goto err;
690
if (!BN_add(r0,&r1,&m1)) goto err;
692
if (rsa->e && rsa->n)
694
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(&vrfy,r0,rsa->e,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
695
/* If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation
696
* will be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of
697
* the verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check
698
* for absolute equality, just congruency. */
699
if (!BN_sub(&vrfy, &vrfy, I)) goto err;
700
if (!BN_mod(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n, ctx)) goto err;
702
if (!BN_add(&vrfy, &vrfy, rsa->n)) goto err;
703
if (!BN_is_zero(&vrfy))
704
/* 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
705
* miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower)
706
* mod_exp and return that instead. */
707
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0,I,rsa->d,rsa->n,ctx,NULL)) goto err;
713
BN_clear_free(&vrfy);
718
static int RSA_eay_init(RSA *rsa)
720
rsa->flags|=RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC|RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
724
static int RSA_eay_finish(RSA *rsa)
726
if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
727
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
728
if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
729
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
730
if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
731
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
added
removed
fips/rsa/fips_rsa_eay.c
