~ubuntu-branches/ubuntu/raring/linux-ppc/raring-proposed : contents of crypto/ansi

~ubuntu-branches/ubuntu/raring/linux-ppc/raring-proposed : (revision 19)

/*
 * PRNG: Pseudo Random Number Generator
 *       Based on NIST Recommended PRNG From ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 using
 *       AES 128 cipher
 *
 *  (C) Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
 *
 *  This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
 *  under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
 *  Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
 *  any later version.
 *
 *
 */

#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/string.h>

#include "internal.h"

#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY "0123456789abcdef"
#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ 16
#define DEFAULT_BLK_SZ 16
#define DEFAULT_V_SEED "zaybxcwdveuftgsh"

/*
 * Flags for the prng_context flags field
 */

#define PRNG_FIXED_SIZE 0x1
#define PRNG_NEED_RESET 0x2

/*
 * Note: DT is our counter value
 *	 I is our intermediate value
 *	 V is our seed vector
 * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf
 * for implementation details
 */


struct prng_context {
	spinlock_t prng_lock;
	unsigned char rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	unsigned char last_rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	unsigned char DT[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	unsigned char I[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	unsigned char V[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	u32 rand_data_valid;
	struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
	u32 flags;
};

static int dbg;

static void hexdump(char *note, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
{
	if (dbg) {
		printk(KERN_CRIT "%s", note);
		print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
				16, 1,
				buf, len, false);
	}
}

#define dbgprint(format, args...) do {\
if (dbg)\
	printk(format, ##args);\
} while (0)

static void xor_vectors(unsigned char *in1, unsigned char *in2,
			unsigned char *out, unsigned int size)
{
	int i;

	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
		out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i];

}
/*
 * Returns DEFAULT_BLK_SZ bytes of random data per call
 * returns 0 if generation succeeded, <0 if something went wrong
 */
static int _get_more_prng_bytes(struct prng_context *ctx, int cont_test)
{
	int i;
	unsigned char tmp[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	unsigned char *output = NULL;


	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Calling _get_more_prng_bytes for context %p\n",
		ctx);

	hexdump("Input DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
	hexdump("Input I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
	hexdump("Input V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);

	/*
	 * This algorithm is a 3 stage state machine
	 */
	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {

		switch (i) {
		case 0:
			/*
			 * Start by encrypting the counter value
			 * This gives us an intermediate value I
			 */
			memcpy(tmp, ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
			output = ctx->I;
			hexdump("tmp stage 0: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
			break;
		case 1:

			/*
			 * Next xor I with our secret vector V
			 * encrypt that result to obtain our
			 * pseudo random data which we output
			 */
			xor_vectors(ctx->I, ctx->V, tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
			hexdump("tmp stage 1: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
			output = ctx->rand_data;
			break;
		case 2:
			/*
			 * First check that we didn't produce the same
			 * random data that we did last time around through this
			 */
			if (!memcmp(ctx->rand_data, ctx->last_rand_data,
					DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)) {
				if (cont_test) {
					panic("cprng %p Failed repetition check!\n",
						ctx);
				}

				printk(KERN_ERR
					"ctx %p Failed repetition check!\n",
					ctx);

				ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
				return -EINVAL;
			}
			memcpy(ctx->last_rand_data, ctx->rand_data,
				DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);

			/*
			 * Lastly xor the random data with I
			 * and encrypt that to obtain a new secret vector V
			 */
			xor_vectors(ctx->rand_data, ctx->I, tmp,
				DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
			output = ctx->V;
			hexdump("tmp stage 2: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
			break;
		}


		/* do the encryption */
		crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tfm, output, tmp);

	}

	/*
	 * Now update our DT value
	 */
	for (i = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
		ctx->DT[i] += 1;
		if (ctx->DT[i] != 0)
			break;
	}

	dbgprint("Returning new block for context %p\n", ctx);
	ctx->rand_data_valid = 0;

	hexdump("Output DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
	hexdump("Output I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
	hexdump("Output V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
	hexdump("New Random Data: ", ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);

	return 0;
}

/* Our exported functions */
static int get_prng_bytes(char *buf, size_t nbytes, struct prng_context *ctx,
				int do_cont_test)
{
	unsigned char *ptr = buf;
	unsigned int byte_count = (unsigned int)nbytes;
	int err;


	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);

	err = -EINVAL;
	if (ctx->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET)
		goto done;

	/*
	 * If the FIXED_SIZE flag is on, only return whole blocks of
	 * pseudo random data
	 */
	err = -EINVAL;
	if (ctx->flags & PRNG_FIXED_SIZE) {
		if (nbytes < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
			goto done;
		byte_count = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
	}

	err = byte_count;

	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "getting %d random bytes for context %p\n",
		byte_count, ctx);


remainder:
	if (ctx->rand_data_valid == DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
		if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx, do_cont_test) < 0) {
			memset(buf, 0, nbytes);
			err = -EINVAL;
			goto done;
		}
	}

	/*
	 * Copy any data less than an entire block
	 */
	if (byte_count < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
empty_rbuf:
		for (; ctx->rand_data_valid < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
			ctx->rand_data_valid++) {
			*ptr = ctx->rand_data[ctx->rand_data_valid];
			ptr++;
			byte_count--;
			if (byte_count == 0)
				goto done;
		}
	}

	/*
	 * Now copy whole blocks
	 */
	for (; byte_count >= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; byte_count -= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
		if (ctx->rand_data_valid == DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
			if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx, do_cont_test) < 0) {
				memset(buf, 0, nbytes);
				err = -EINVAL;
				goto done;
			}
		}
		if (ctx->rand_data_valid > 0)
			goto empty_rbuf;
		memcpy(ptr, ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
		ctx->rand_data_valid += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
		ptr += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
	}

	/*
	 * Now go back and get any remaining partial block
	 */
	if (byte_count)
		goto remainder;

done:
	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "returning %d from get_prng_bytes in context %p\n",
		err, ctx);
	return err;
}

static void free_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx)
{
	crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm);
}

static int reset_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx,
			      unsigned char *key, size_t klen,
			      unsigned char *V, unsigned char *DT)
{
	int ret;
	unsigned char *prng_key;

	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
	ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;

	prng_key = (key != NULL) ? key : (unsigned char *)DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY;

	if (!key)
		klen = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ;

	if (V)
		memcpy(ctx->V, V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
	else
		memcpy(ctx->V, DEFAULT_V_SEED, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);

	if (DT)
		memcpy(ctx->DT, DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
	else
		memset(ctx->DT, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);

	memset(ctx->rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
	memset(ctx->last_rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);

	ctx->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;

	ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->tfm, prng_key, klen);
	if (ret) {
		dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "PRNG: setkey() failed flags=%x\n",
			crypto_cipher_get_flags(ctx->tfm));
		goto out;
	}

	ret = 0;
	ctx->flags &= ~PRNG_NEED_RESET;
out:
	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
	return ret;
}

static int cprng_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
	struct prng_context *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);

	spin_lock_init(&ctx->prng_lock);
	ctx->tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
	if (IS_ERR(ctx->tfm)) {
		dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Failed to alloc tfm for context %p\n",
				ctx);
		return PTR_ERR(ctx->tfm);
	}

	if (reset_prng_context(ctx, NULL, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, NULL, NULL) < 0)
		return -EINVAL;

	/*
	 * after allocation, we should always force the user to reset
	 * so they don't inadvertently use the insecure default values
	 * without specifying them intentially
	 */
	ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
	return 0;
}

static void cprng_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
	free_prng_context(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
}

static int cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata,
			    unsigned int dlen)
{
	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);

	return get_prng_bytes(rdata, dlen, prng, 0);
}

/*
 *  This is the cprng_registered reset method the seed value is
 *  interpreted as the tuple { V KEY DT}
 *  V and KEY are required during reset, and DT is optional, detected
 *  as being present by testing the length of the seed
 */
static int cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
	u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
	u8 *dt = NULL;

	if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
		return -EINVAL;

	if (slen >= (2 * DEFAULT_BLK_SZ + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ))
		dt = key + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ;

	reset_prng_context(prng, key, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, seed, dt);

	if (prng->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET)
		return -EINVAL;
	return 0;
}

#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
static int fips_cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata,
			    unsigned int dlen)
{
	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);

	return get_prng_bytes(rdata, dlen, prng, 1);
}

static int fips_cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
	u8 rdata[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
	int rc;

	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);

	if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* fips strictly requires seed != key */
	if (!memcmp(seed, key, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ))
		return -EINVAL;

	rc = cprng_reset(tfm, seed, slen);

	if (!rc)
		goto out;

	/* this primes our continuity test */
	rc = get_prng_bytes(rdata, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ, prng, 0);
	prng->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;

out:
	return rc;
}
#endif

static struct crypto_alg rng_algs[] = { {
	.cra_name		= "stdrng",
	.cra_driver_name	= "ansi_cprng",
	.cra_priority		= 100,
	.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG,
	.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct prng_context),
	.cra_type		= &crypto_rng_type,
	.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
	.cra_init		= cprng_init,
	.cra_exit		= cprng_exit,
	.cra_u			= {
		.rng = {
			.rng_make_random	= cprng_get_random,
			.rng_reset		= cprng_reset,
			.seedsize = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2*DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
		}
	}
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
}, {
	.cra_name		= "fips(ansi_cprng)",
	.cra_driver_name	= "fips_ansi_cprng",
	.cra_priority		= 300,
	.cra_flags		= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG,
	.cra_ctxsize		= sizeof(struct prng_context),
	.cra_type		= &crypto_rng_type,
	.cra_module		= THIS_MODULE,
	.cra_init		= cprng_init,
	.cra_exit		= cprng_exit,
	.cra_u			= {
		.rng = {
			.rng_make_random	= fips_cprng_get_random,
			.rng_reset		= fips_cprng_reset,
			.seedsize = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2*DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
		}
	}
#endif
} };

/* Module initalization */
static int __init prng_mod_init(void)
{
	return crypto_register_algs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
}

static void __exit prng_mod_fini(void)
{
	crypto_unregister_algs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
}

MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Software Pseudo Random Number Generator");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>");
module_param(dbg, int, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(dbg, "Boolean to enable debugging (0/1 == off/on)");
module_init(prng_mod_init);
module_exit(prng_mod_fini);
MODULE_ALIAS("stdrng");

1 by Ben Collins, Ben Collins [ Ben Collins ]	1	/*
	2	* PRNG: Pseudo Random Number Generator
	3	* Based on NIST Recommended PRNG From ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 using
	4	* AES 128 cipher
	5	*
	6	* (C) Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
	7	*
	8	* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
	9	* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
	10	* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
	11	* any later version.
	12	*
	13	*
	14	*/
	15
	16	#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>
	17	#include <linux/err.h>
	18	#include <linux/init.h>
	19	#include <linux/module.h>
	20	#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
	21	#include <linux/string.h>
	22
	23	#include "internal.h"
	24
	25	#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY "0123456789abcdef"
	26	#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ 16
	27	#define DEFAULT_BLK_SZ 16
	28	#define DEFAULT_V_SEED "zaybxcwdveuftgsh"
	29
	30	/*
	31	* Flags for the prng_context flags field
	32	*/
	33
	34	#define PRNG_FIXED_SIZE 0x1
	35	#define PRNG_NEED_RESET 0x2
	36
	37	/*
	38	* Note: DT is our counter value
	39	* I is our intermediate value
	40	* V is our seed vector
	41	* See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/rng/931rngext.pdf
	42	* for implementation details
	43	*/
	44
	45
	46	struct prng_context {
	47	spinlock_t prng_lock;
	48	unsigned char rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	49	unsigned char last_rand_data[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	50	unsigned char DT[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	51	unsigned char I[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	52	unsigned char V[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
	53	u32 rand_data_valid;
	54	struct crypto_cipher *tfm;
	55	u32 flags;
	56	};
	57
	58	static int dbg;
	59
	60	static void hexdump(char note, unsigned char buf, unsigned int len)
	61	{
	62	if (dbg) {
	63	printk(KERN_CRIT "%s", note);
	64	print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET,
65	16, 1,
66	buf, len, false);
67	}
68	}
69
70	#define dbgprint(format, args...) do {\
71	if (dbg)\
72	printk(format, ##args);\
73	} while (0)
74
75	static void xor_vectors(unsigned char in1, unsigned char in2,
76	unsigned char *out, unsigned int size)
77	{
78	int i;
79
80	for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
81	out[i] = in1[i] ^ in2[i];
82
83	}
84	/*
85	* Returns DEFAULT_BLK_SZ bytes of random data per call
86	* returns 0 if generation succeeded, <0 if something went wrong
87	*/
88	static int _get_more_prng_bytes(struct prng_context *ctx, int cont_test)
89	{
90	int i;
91	unsigned char tmp[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
92	unsigned char *output = NULL;
93
94
95	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Calling _get_more_prng_bytes for context %p\n",
96	ctx);
97
98	hexdump("Input DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
99	hexdump("Input I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
100	hexdump("Input V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
101
102	/*
103	* This algorithm is a 3 stage state machine
104	*/
105	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
106
107	switch (i) {
108	case 0:
109	/*
110	* Start by encrypting the counter value
111	* This gives us an intermediate value I
112	*/
113	memcpy(tmp, ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
114	output = ctx->I;
115	hexdump("tmp stage 0: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
116	break;
117	case 1:
118
119	/*
120	* Next xor I with our secret vector V
121	* encrypt that result to obtain our
122	* pseudo random data which we output
123	*/
124	xor_vectors(ctx->I, ctx->V, tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
125	hexdump("tmp stage 1: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
126	output = ctx->rand_data;
127	break;
128	case 2:
129	/*
130	* First check that we didn't produce the same
131	* random data that we did last time around through this
132	*/
133	if (!memcmp(ctx->rand_data, ctx->last_rand_data,
134	DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)) {
135	if (cont_test) {
136	panic("cprng %p Failed repetition check!\n",
137	ctx);
138	}
139
140	printk(KERN_ERR
141	"ctx %p Failed repetition check!\n",
142	ctx);
143
144	ctx->flags \|= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
145	return -EINVAL;
146	}
147	memcpy(ctx->last_rand_data, ctx->rand_data,
148	DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
149
150	/*
151	* Lastly xor the random data with I
152	* and encrypt that to obtain a new secret vector V
153	*/
154	xor_vectors(ctx->rand_data, ctx->I, tmp,
155	DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
156	output = ctx->V;
157	hexdump("tmp stage 2: ", tmp, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
158	break;
159	}
160
161
162	/* do the encryption */
163	crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->tfm, output, tmp);
164
165	}
166
167	/*
168	* Now update our DT value
169	*/
170	for (i = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
171	ctx->DT[i] += 1;
172	if (ctx->DT[i] != 0)
173	break;
174	}
175
176	dbgprint("Returning new block for context %p\n", ctx);
177	ctx->rand_data_valid = 0;
178
179	hexdump("Output DT: ", ctx->DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
180	hexdump("Output I: ", ctx->I, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
181	hexdump("Output V: ", ctx->V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
182	hexdump("New Random Data: ", ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
183
184	return 0;
185	}
186
187	/* Our exported functions */
188	static int get_prng_bytes(char buf, size_t nbytes, struct prng_context ctx,
189	int do_cont_test)
190	{
191	unsigned char *ptr = buf;
192	unsigned int byte_count = (unsigned int)nbytes;
193	int err;
194
195
196	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
197
198	err = -EINVAL;
199	if (ctx->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET)
200	goto done;
201
202	/*
203	* If the FIXED_SIZE flag is on, only return whole blocks of
204	* pseudo random data
205	*/
206	err = -EINVAL;
207	if (ctx->flags & PRNG_FIXED_SIZE) {
208	if (nbytes < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
209	goto done;
210	byte_count = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
211	}
212
213	err = byte_count;
214
215	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "getting %d random bytes for context %p\n",
216	byte_count, ctx);
217
218
219	remainder:
220	if (ctx->rand_data_valid == DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
221	if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx, do_cont_test) < 0) {
222	memset(buf, 0, nbytes);
223	err = -EINVAL;
224	goto done;
225	}
226	}
227
228	/*
229	* Copy any data less than an entire block
230	*/
231	if (byte_count < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
232	empty_rbuf:
233	for (; ctx->rand_data_valid < DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
234	ctx->rand_data_valid++) {
235	*ptr = ctx->rand_data[ctx->rand_data_valid];
236	ptr++;
237	byte_count--;
238	if (byte_count == 0)
239	goto done;
240	}
241	}
242
243	/*
244	* Now copy whole blocks
245	*/
246	for (; byte_count >= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ; byte_count -= DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
247	if (ctx->rand_data_valid == DEFAULT_BLK_SZ) {
248	if (_get_more_prng_bytes(ctx, do_cont_test) < 0) {
249	memset(buf, 0, nbytes);
250	err = -EINVAL;
251	goto done;
252	}
253	}
254	if (ctx->rand_data_valid > 0)
255	goto empty_rbuf;
256	memcpy(ptr, ctx->rand_data, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
257	ctx->rand_data_valid += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
258	ptr += DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
259	}
260
261	/*
262	* Now go back and get any remaining partial block
263	*/
264	if (byte_count)
265	goto remainder;
266
267	done:
268	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
269	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "returning %d from get_prng_bytes in context %p\n",
270	err, ctx);
271	return err;
272	}
273
274	static void free_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx)
275	{
276	crypto_free_cipher(ctx->tfm);
277	}
278
279	static int reset_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx,
280	unsigned char *key, size_t klen,
281	unsigned char V, unsigned char DT)
282	{
283	int ret;
284	unsigned char *prng_key;
285
286	spin_lock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
287	ctx->flags \|= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
288
289	prng_key = (key != NULL) ? key : (unsigned char *)DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY;
290
291	if (!key)
292	klen = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ;
293
294	if (V)
295	memcpy(ctx->V, V, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
296	else
297	memcpy(ctx->V, DEFAULT_V_SEED, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
298
299	if (DT)
300	memcpy(ctx->DT, DT, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
301	else
302	memset(ctx->DT, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
303
304	memset(ctx->rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
305	memset(ctx->last_rand_data, 0, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ);
306
307	ctx->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
308
309	ret = crypto_cipher_setkey(ctx->tfm, prng_key, klen);
310	if (ret) {
311	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "PRNG: setkey() failed flags=%x\n",
312	crypto_cipher_get_flags(ctx->tfm));
313	goto out;
314	}
315
316	ret = 0;
317	ctx->flags &= ~PRNG_NEED_RESET;
318	out:
319	spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
320	return ret;
321	}
322
323	static int cprng_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
324	{
325	struct prng_context *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
326
327	spin_lock_init(&ctx->prng_lock);
328	ctx->tfm = crypto_alloc_cipher("aes", 0, 0);
329	if (IS_ERR(ctx->tfm)) {
330	dbgprint(KERN_CRIT "Failed to alloc tfm for context %p\n",
331	ctx);
332	return PTR_ERR(ctx->tfm);
333	}
334
335	if (reset_prng_context(ctx, NULL, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, NULL, NULL) < 0)
336	return -EINVAL;
337
338	/*
339	* after allocation, we should always force the user to reset
340	* so they don't inadvertently use the insecure default values
341	* without specifying them intentially
342	*/
343	ctx->flags \|= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
344	return 0;
345	}
346
347	static void cprng_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
348	{
349	free_prng_context(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
350	}
351
352	static int cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng tfm, u8 rdata,
353	unsigned int dlen)
354	{
355	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
356
357	return get_prng_bytes(rdata, dlen, prng, 0);
358	}
359
360	/*
361	* This is the cprng_registered reset method the seed value is
362	* interpreted as the tuple { V KEY DT}
363	* V and KEY are required during reset, and DT is optional, detected
364	* as being present by testing the length of the seed
365	*/
366	static int cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng tfm, u8 seed, unsigned int slen)
367	{
368	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
369	u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
370	u8 *dt = NULL;
371
372	if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
373	return -EINVAL;
374
375	if (slen >= (2 * DEFAULT_BLK_SZ + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ))
376	dt = key + DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ;
377
378	reset_prng_context(prng, key, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ, seed, dt);
379
380	if (prng->flags & PRNG_NEED_RESET)
381	return -EINVAL;
382	return 0;
383	}
384
385	#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
386	static int fips_cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng tfm, u8 rdata,
387	unsigned int dlen)
388	{
389	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
390
391	return get_prng_bytes(rdata, dlen, prng, 1);
392	}
393
394	static int fips_cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng tfm, u8 seed, unsigned int slen)
395	{
396	u8 rdata[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
397	u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
398	int rc;
399
400	struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
401
402	if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
403	return -EINVAL;
404
405	/* fips strictly requires seed != key */
406	if (!memcmp(seed, key, DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ))
407	return -EINVAL;
408
409	rc = cprng_reset(tfm, seed, slen);
410
411	if (!rc)
412	goto out;
413
414	/* this primes our continuity test */
415	rc = get_prng_bytes(rdata, DEFAULT_BLK_SZ, prng, 0);
416	prng->rand_data_valid = DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
417
418	out:
419	return rc;
420	}
421	#endif
422
423	static struct crypto_alg rng_algs[] = { {
424	.cra_name = "stdrng",
425	.cra_driver_name = "ansi_cprng",
426	.cra_priority = 100,
427	.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG,
428	.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct prng_context),
429	.cra_type = &crypto_rng_type,
430	.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
431	.cra_init = cprng_init,
432	.cra_exit = cprng_exit,
433	.cra_u = {
434	.rng = {
435	.rng_make_random = cprng_get_random,
436	.rng_reset = cprng_reset,
437	.seedsize = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2*DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
438	}
439	}
440	#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
441	}, {
442	.cra_name = "fips(ansi_cprng)",
443	.cra_driver_name = "fips_ansi_cprng",
444	.cra_priority = 300,
445	.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG,
446	.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct prng_context),
447	.cra_type = &crypto_rng_type,
448	.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
449	.cra_init = cprng_init,
450	.cra_exit = cprng_exit,
451	.cra_u = {
452	.rng = {
453	.rng_make_random = fips_cprng_get_random,
454	.rng_reset = fips_cprng_reset,
455	.seedsize = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2*DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
456	}
457	}
458	#endif
459	} };
460
461	/* Module initalization */
462	static int __init prng_mod_init(void)
463	{
464	return crypto_register_algs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
465	}
466
467	static void __exit prng_mod_fini(void)
468	{
469	crypto_unregister_algs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
470	}
471
472	MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
473	MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Software Pseudo Random Number Generator");
474	MODULE_AUTHOR("Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>");
475	module_param(dbg, int, 0);
476	MODULE_PARM_DESC(dbg, "Boolean to enable debugging (0/1 == off/on)");
477	module_init(prng_mod_init);
478	module_exit(prng_mod_fini);
479	MODULE_ALIAS("stdrng");