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/* NetBSD: rm.c,v 1.49 2009/02/14 08:05:04 lukem Exp */
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* Copyright (c) 1990, 1993, 1994, 2003
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* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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#include <sys/cdefs.h>
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__COPYRIGHT("@(#) Copyright (c) 1990, 1993, 1994\
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The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.");
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static char sccsid[] = "@(#)rm.c 8.8 (Berkeley) 4/27/95";
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__RCSID("$NetBSD: rm.c,v 1.49 2009/02/14 08:05:04 lukem Exp $");
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <rump/ukfs.h>
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#include <fts2fsufts.h>
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#include <fsu_mount.h>
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#define lstat(a, b) ukfs_lstat(ukfs, a, b)
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#define rmdir(a) ukfs_rmdir(ukfs, a)
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#define unlink(a) ukfs_remove(ukfs, a)
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#define undelete(a) (0) /* not supported */
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#define access(a, b) (0) /* we always have access */
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int dflag, eval, fflag, iflag, Pflag, stdin_ok, vflag, Wflag;
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int check(char *, char *, struct stat *);
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void checkdot(char **);
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void rm_file(char **);
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int rm_overwrite(char *, struct stat *);
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void rm_tree(char **);
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int main(int, char *[]);
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* For the sake of the `-f' flag, check whether an error number indicates the
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* failure of an operation due to an non-existent file, either per se (ENOENT)
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* or because its filename argument was illegal (ENAMETOOLONG, ENOTDIR).
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#define NONEXISTENT(x) \
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((x) == ENOENT || (x) == ENAMETOOLONG || (x) == ENOTDIR)
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* This rm is different from historic rm's, but is expected to match
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* POSIX 1003.2 behavior. The most visible difference is that -f
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* has two specific effects now, ignore non-existent files and force
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main(int argc, char *argv[])
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setprogname(argv[0]);
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(void)setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
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FSU_MOUNT(argc, argv, ukfs);
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while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfiPRrvW")) != -1)
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case 'r': /* Compatibility. */
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stdin_ok = isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
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int flags, needstat, rval;
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* Remove a file hierarchy. If forcing removal (-f), or interactive
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* (-i) or can't ask anyway (stdin_ok), don't stat the file.
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needstat = !fflag && !iflag && stdin_ok;
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* If the -i option is specified, the user can skip on the pre-order
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* visit. The fts_number field flags skipped directories.
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flags = FTS_PHYSICAL;
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flags |= FTS_WHITEOUT;
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if ((fts = fts_open(argv, flags, NULL)) == NULL)
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err(1, "fts_open failed");
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while ((p = fts_read(fts)) != NULL) {
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switch (p->fts_info) {
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if (!fflag || p->fts_errno != ENOENT) {
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warnx("%s: %s", p->fts_path,
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strerror(p->fts_errno));
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errx(EXIT_FAILURE, "%s: %s", p->fts_path,
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strerror(p->fts_errno));
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* FTS_NS: assume that if can't stat the file, it
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if (fflag && NONEXISTENT(p->fts_errno))
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warnx("%s: %s", p->fts_path,
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strerror(p->fts_errno));
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/* Pre-order: give user chance to skip. */
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if (!fflag && !check(p->fts_path, p->fts_accpath,
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(void)fts_set(fts, p, FTS_SKIP);
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p->fts_number = SKIPPED;
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/* Post-order: see if user skipped. */
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if (p->fts_number == SKIPPED)
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!check(p->fts_path, p->fts_accpath, p->fts_statp))
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* If we can't read or search the directory, may still be
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* able to remove it. Don't print out the un{read,search}able
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* message unless the remove fails.
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switch (p->fts_info) {
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rval = rmdir(p->fts_accpath);
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if (rval != 0 && fflag && errno == ENOENT)
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rval = undelete(p->fts_accpath);
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if (rval != 0 && fflag && errno == ENOENT)
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if (rm_overwrite(p->fts_accpath, NULL))
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rval = unlink(p->fts_accpath);
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if (rval != 0 && fflag && NONEXISTENT(errno))
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warn("%s", p->fts_path);
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(void)printf("%s\n", p->fts_path);
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* Remove a file. POSIX 1003.2 states that, by default, attempting
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* to remove a directory is an error, so must always stat the file.
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while ((f = *argv++) != NULL) {
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/* Assume if can't stat the file, can't unlink it. */
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sb.st_mode = S_IFWHT|S_IWUSR|S_IRUSR;
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if (!fflag || !NONEXISTENT(errno)) {
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warnx("%s: %s", f, strerror(EEXIST));
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if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) && !dflag) {
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warnx("%s: is a directory", f);
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if (!fflag && !S_ISWHT(sb.st_mode) && !check(f, f, &sb))
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if (S_ISWHT(sb.st_mode))
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else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode))
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if (rm_overwrite(f, &sb))
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if (rval && (!fflag || !NONEXISTENT(errno))) {
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if (vflag && rval == 0)
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(void)printf("%s\n", f);
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* Overwrite the file 3 times with varying bit patterns.
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* This is an expensive way to keep people from recovering files from your
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* non-snapshotted FFS filesystems using fsdb(8). Really. No more. Only
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* regular files are deleted, directories (and therefore names) will remain.
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* Also, this assumes a fixed-block file system (like FFS, or a V7 or a
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* System V file system). In a logging file system, you'll have to have
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* A note on standards: U.S. DoD 5220.22-M "National Industrial Security
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* Program Operating Manual" ("NISPOM") is often cited as a reference
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* for clearing and sanitizing magnetic media. In fact, a matrix of
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* "clearing" and "sanitization" methods for various media was given in
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* Chapter 8 of the original 1995 version of NISPOM. However, that
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* matrix was *removed from the document* when Chapter 8 was rewritten
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* in Change 2 to the document in 2001. Recently, the Defense Security
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* Service has made a revised clearing and sanitization matrix available
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* in Microsoft Word format on the DSS web site. The standardization
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* status of this matrix is unclear. Furthermore, one must be very
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* careful when referring to this matrix: it is intended for the "clearing"
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* prior to reuse or "sanitization" prior to disposal of *entire media*,
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* not individual files and the only non-physically-destructive method of
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* "sanitization" that is permitted for magnetic disks of any kind is
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* specifically noted to be prohibited for media that have contained
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* It is impossible to actually conform to the exact procedure given in
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* the matrix if one is overwriting a file, not an entire disk, because
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* the procedure requires examination and comparison of the disk's defect
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* lists. Any program that claims to securely erase *files* while
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* conforming to the standard, then, is not correct. We do as much of
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* what the standard requires as can actually be done when erasing a
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* file, rather than an entire disk; but that does not make us conformant.
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* Furthermore, the presence of track caches, disk and controller write
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* caches, and so forth make it extremely difficult to ensure that data
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* have actually been written to the disk, particularly when one tries
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* to repeatedly overwrite the same sectors in quick succession. We call
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* fsync(), but controllers with nonvolatile cache, as well as IDE disks
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* that just plain lie about the stable storage of data, will defeat this.
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* Finally, widely respected research suggests that the given procedure
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* is nowhere near sufficient to prevent the recovery of data using special
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* forensic equipment and techniques that are well-known. This is
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* presumably one reason that the matrix requires physical media destruction,
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* rather than any technique of the sort attempted here, for secret data.
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* rm_overwrite will return 0 on success.
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rm_overwrite(char *file, struct stat *sbp)
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if (lstat(file, &sb))
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if (!S_ISREG(sbp->st_mode))
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/* flags to try to defeat hidden caching by forcing seeks */
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if ((fd = open(file, O_RDWR|O_SYNC|O_RSYNC, 0)) == -1)
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#define WRITE_PASS(mode, byte) do { \
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char buf[8 * 1024]; \
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if (fsync(fd) || lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET)) \
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if (mode == THIS_BYTE) \
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memset(buf, byte, sizeof(buf)); \
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for (len = sbp->st_size; len > 0; len -= wlen) { \
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if (mode == RAND_BYTES) { \
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for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); \
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i+= sizeof(u_int32_t)) \
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*(int *)(buf + i) = arc4random(); \
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wlen = len < (off_t)sizeof(buf) ? (size_t)len : sizeof(buf); \
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if ((size_t)write(fd, buf, wlen) != wlen) \
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sync(); /* another poke at hidden caches */ \
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} while (/* CONSTCOND */ 0)
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#define READ_PASS(byte) do { \
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char pattern[8 * 1024]; \
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char buf[8 * 1024]; \
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if (fsync(fd) || lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET)) \
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memset(pattern, byte, sizeof(pattern)); \
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for(len = sbp->st_size; len > 0; len -= rlen) { \
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rlen = len < (off_t)sizeof(buf) ? (size_t)len : sizeof(buf); \
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if((size_t)read(fd, buf, rlen) != rlen) \
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if(memcmp(buf, pattern, rlen)) \
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sync(); /* another poke at hidden caches */ \
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} while (/* CONSTCOND */ 0)
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* DSS sanitization matrix "clear" for magnetic disks:
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* option 'c' "Overwrite all addressable locations with a single
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randint = arc4random();
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randchar = *(char *)&randint;
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WRITE_PASS(THIS_BYTE, randchar);
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* DSS sanitization matrix "sanitize" for magnetic disks:
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* option 'd', sub 2 "Overwrite all addressable locations with a
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* character, then its complement. Verify "complement" character
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* was written successfully to all addressable locations, then
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* overwrite all addressable locations with random characters; or
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* verify third overwrite of random characters." The rest of the
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* text in d-sub-2 specifies requirements for overwriting spared
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* sectors; we cannot conform to it when erasing only a file, thus
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* we do not conform to the standard.
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/* 1. "a character" */
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WRITE_PASS(THIS_BYTE, 0xff);
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/* 2. "its complement" */
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WRITE_PASS(THIS_BYTE, 0x00);
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/* 3. "Verify 'complement' character" */
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/* 4. "overwrite all addressable locations with random characters" */
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WRITE_PASS(RAND_BYTES, 0x00);
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* As the file might be huge, and we note that this revision of
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* the matrix says "random characters", not "a random character"
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* as the original did, we do not verify the random-character
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* write; the "or" in the standard allows this.
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if (close(fd) == -1) {
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check(char *path, char *name, struct stat *sp)
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/* Check -i first. */
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(void)fprintf(stderr, "remove '%s'? ", path);
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* If it's not a symbolic link and it's unwritable and we're
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* talking to a terminal, ask. Symbolic links are excluded
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* because their permissions are meaningless. Check stdin_ok
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* first because we may not have stat'ed the file.
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if (!stdin_ok || S_ISLNK(sp->st_mode) ||
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!(access(name, W_OK) && (errno != ETXTBSY)))
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strmode(sp->st_mode, modep);
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"%s: -P was specified but file could not"
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" be overwritten", path);
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(void)fprintf(stderr, "override %s%s%s:%s for '%s'? ",
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modep + 1, modep[9] == ' ' ? "" : " ",
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user_from_uid(sp->st_uid, 0),
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group_from_gid(sp->st_gid, 0), path);
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(void)fflush(stderr);
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first = ch = getchar();
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while (ch != '\n' && ch != EOF)
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return (first == 'y' || first == 'Y');
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* POSIX.2 requires that if "." or ".." are specified as the basename
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* portion of an operand, a diagnostic message be written to standard
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* error and nothing more be done with such operands.
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* Since POSIX.2 defines basename as the final portion of a path after
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* trailing slashes have been removed, we'll remove them here.
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#define ISDOT(a) ((a)[0] == '.' && (!(a)[1] || ((a)[1] == '.' && !(a)[2])))
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checkdot(char **argv)
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char *p, **save, **t;
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for (t = argv; *t;) {
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/* strip trailing slashes */
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p = strrchr(*t, '\0');
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while (--p > *t && *p == '/')
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/* extract basename */
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if ((p = strrchr(*t, '/')) != NULL)
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warnx("\".\" and \"..\" may not be removed");
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for (save = t; (t[0] = t[1]) != NULL; ++t)
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(void)fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s %s [-f|-i] [-dPRrvW] file ...\n",
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getprogname(), fsu_mount_usage());
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(void)fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-f|-i] [-dPRrvW] file ...\n",