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* Version: $Id: eap_tls.c,v 1.22.2.1 2004/09/01 19:30:48 aland Exp $
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
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* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
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* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
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* GNU General Public License for more details.
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* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
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* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
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* Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
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* Copyright 2001 hereUare Communications, Inc. <raghud@hereuare.com>
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* Copyright 2003 Alan DeKok <aland@freeradius.org>
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* TLS Packet Format in EAP
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* --- ------ ------ -- ---
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* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* | Code | Identifier | Length |
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* Allocate a new TLS_PACKET
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EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_alloc(void)
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if ((rp = malloc(sizeof(EAPTLS_PACKET))) == NULL) {
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radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
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memset(rp, 0, sizeof(EAPTLS_PACKET));
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void eaptls_free(EAPTLS_PACKET **eaptls_packet_ptr)
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EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_packet;
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if (!eaptls_packet_ptr) return;
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eaptls_packet = *eaptls_packet_ptr;
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if (eaptls_packet == NULL) return;
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if (eaptls_packet->data) {
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free(eaptls_packet->data);
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eaptls_packet->data = NULL;
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*eaptls_packet_ptr = NULL;
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The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message
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sent from the EAP server to the peer.
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int eaptls_start(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
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reply.code = EAPTLS_START;
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reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
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reply.flags = peap_flag;
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reply.flags = SET_START(reply.flags);
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eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
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int eaptls_success(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
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reply.code = EAPTLS_SUCCESS;
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reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
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reply.flags = peap_flag;
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eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
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int eaptls_fail(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
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reply.code = EAPTLS_FAIL;
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reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN;
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reply.flags = peap_flag;
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eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
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A single TLS record may be up to 16384 octets in length, but a TLS
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message may span multiple TLS records, and a TLS certificate message
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may in principle be as long as 16MB.
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* Frame the Dirty data that needs to be send to the client in an
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* EAP-Request. We always embed the TLS-length in all EAP-TLS
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* packets that we send, for easy reference purpose. Handle
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* fragmentation and sending the next fragment etc.
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int eaptls_request(EAP_DS *eap_ds, tls_session_t *ssn)
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unsigned int lbit = 0;
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/* This value determines whether we set (L)ength flag for
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EVERY packet we send and add corresponding
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"TLS Message Length" field.
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This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" in EVERY
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This means we include L flag and "TLS Msg Len" **ONLY**
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in First packet of a fragment series. We do not use
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Having L flag in every packet is prefered.
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if (ssn->length_flag) {
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if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
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ssn->tls_msg_len = ssn->dirty_out.used;
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reply.code = EAPTLS_REQUEST;
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reply.flags = ssn->peap_flag;
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/* Send data, NOT more than the FRAGMENT size */
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if (ssn->dirty_out.used > ssn->offset) {
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reply.flags = SET_MORE_FRAGMENTS(reply.flags);
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/* Length MUST be included if it is the First Fragment */
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if (ssn->fragment == 0) {
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size = ssn->dirty_out.used;
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reply.dlen = lbit + size;
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reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/ + reply.dlen;
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reply.data = malloc(reply.dlen);
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nlen = htonl(ssn->tls_msg_len);
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memcpy(reply.data, &nlen, lbit);
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reply.flags = SET_LENGTH_INCLUDED(reply.flags);
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record_minus(&ssn->dirty_out, reply.data + lbit, size);
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eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
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* Acknowledge received is for one of the following messages sent earlier
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* 1. Handshake completed Message, so now send, EAP-Success
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* 2. Alert Message, now send, EAP-Failure
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* 3. Fragment Message, now send, next Fragment
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static eaptls_status_t eaptls_ack_handler(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
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tls_session_t *tls_session;
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tls_session = (tls_session_t *)handler->opaque;
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if (tls_session == NULL){
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radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unexpected ACK received");
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if (tls_session->info.initialized == 0) {
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DEBUG(" rlm_eap_tls: No SSL info available. Waiting for more SSL data.");
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return EAPTLS_REQUEST;
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if (tls_session->info.origin == 0) {
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radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Unexpected ACK received");
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switch (tls_session->info.content_type) {
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DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack alert");
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eaptls_fail(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
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if (tls_session->info.handshake_type == finished) {
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DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack handshake is finished");
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return EAPTLS_SUCCESS;
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DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack handshake fragment handler");
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/* Fragmentation handler, send next fragment */
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return EAPTLS_REQUEST;
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* For the rest of the conditions, switch over
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* to the default section below.
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DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: ack default");
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radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid ACK received: %d",
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tls_session->info.content_type);
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* Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
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* the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
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* EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment ACK.
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* In order to prevent errors in the processing of fragments, the
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* EAP server MUST use increment the Identifier value for each
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* fragment ACK contained within an EAP-Request, and the peer
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* MUST include this Identifier value in the subsequent fragment
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* contained within an EAP- Reponse.
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* EAP server sends an ACK when it determines there are More
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* fragments to receive to make the complete
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* TLS-record/TLS-Message
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static int eaptls_send_ack(EAP_DS *eap_ds, int peap_flag)
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reply.code = EAPTLS_ACK;
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reply.length = TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1/*flags*/;
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reply.flags = peap_flag;
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eaptls_compose(eap_ds, &reply);
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* The S flag is set only within the EAP-TLS start message sent
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* from the EAP server to the peer.
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* Similarly, when the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with
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* the M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
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* EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a fragment
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* ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait.
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static eaptls_status_t eaptls_verify(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
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EAP_DS *eap_ds = handler->eap_ds;
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EAP_DS *prev_eap_ds = handler->prev_eapds;
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eaptls_packet_t *eaptls_packet, *eaptls_prev = NULL;
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* We don't check ANY of the input parameters. It's all
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* code which works together, so if something is wrong,
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* we SHOULD core dump.
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* e.g. if eap_ds is NULL, of if eap_ds->response is
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* NULL, of if it's NOT an EAP-Response, or if the packet
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* is too short. See eap_validation()., in ../../eap.c
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* Also, eaptype_select() takes care of selecting the
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* appropriate type, so we don't need to check
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* eap_ds->response->type.type == PW_EAP_TLS, or anything
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eaptls_packet = (eaptls_packet_t *)eap_ds->response->type.data;
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if (prev_eap_ds && prev_eap_ds->response)
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eaptls_prev = (eaptls_packet_t *)prev_eap_ds->response->type.data;
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* If there's no TLS data, or there's 1 byte of TLS data,
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* with the flags set to zero, then it's an ACK.
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* Find if this is a reply to the previous request sent
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if ((eaptls_packet == NULL) ||
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((eap_ds->response->length == EAP_HEADER_LEN + 2) &&
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((eaptls_packet->flags & 0xc0) == 0x00))) {
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if (prev_eap_ds->request->id == eap_ds->response->id) {
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* Run the ACK handler directly from here.
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radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: Received EAP-TLS ACK message");
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return eaptls_ack_handler(handler);
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radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Received Invalid EAP-TLS ACK message");
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return EAPTLS_INVALID;
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* We send TLS_START, but do not receive it.
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if (TLS_START(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
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radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Received unexpected EAP-TLS Start message");
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return EAPTLS_INVALID;
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* The L bit (length included) is set to indicate the
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* presence of the four octet TLS Message Length field,
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* and MUST be set for the first fragment of a fragmented
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* TLS message or set of messages.
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* The M bit (more fragments) is set on all but the last
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* The S bit (EAP-TLS start) is set in an EAP-TLS Start
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* message. This differentiates the EAP-TLS Start message
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* from a fragment acknowledgement.
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if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
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if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
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* FIRST_FRAGMENT is identified
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* 1. If there is no previous EAP-response received.
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* 2. If EAP-response received, then its M bit not set.
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* (It is because Last fragment will not have M bit set)
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if ((prev_eap_ds->response == NULL) ||
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(eaptls_prev == NULL) ||
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!TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_prev->flags)) {
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radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: Received EAP-TLS First Fragment of the message");
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return EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT;
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radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: More Fragments with length included");
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return EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH;
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radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: Length Included");
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return EAPTLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED;
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if (TLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS(eaptls_packet->flags)) {
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radlog(L_INFO, "rlm_eap_tls: More fragments to follow");
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return EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS;
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* None of the flags are set, but it's still a valid
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* length = code + id + length + flags + tlsdata
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* = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
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* length = EAP-length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
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* flags = EAP-typedata[0] (1 octet)
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* dlen = EAP-typedata[1-4] (4 octets), if L flag set
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* = length - 5(code+id+length+flags), otherwise
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* data = EAP-typedata[5-n], if L flag set
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* = EAP-typedata[1-n], otherwise
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* packet = EAP-typedata (complete typedata)
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* Points to consider during EAP-TLS data extraction
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* 1. In the received packet, No data will be present incase of ACK-NAK
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* 2. Incase if more fragments need to be received then ACK after retreiving this fragment.
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* RFC 2716 Section 4.2. PPP EAP TLS Request Packet
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* 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* | Code | Identifier | Length |
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* | Type | Flags | TLS Message Length
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* | TLS Message Length | TLS Data...
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* +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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* The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP
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* packet including the Code, Identifir, Length, Type, and TLS data
438
static EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_extract(EAP_DS *eap_ds, eaptls_status_t status)
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EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
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uint32_t data_len = 0;
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uint8_t *data = NULL;
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if (status == EAPTLS_INVALID)
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* The main EAP code & eaptls_verify() take care of
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* ensuring that the packet is OK, and that we can
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* extract the various fields we want.
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* e.g. a TLS packet with zero data is allowed as an ACK,
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* but we will never see it here, as we will simply
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* send another fragment, instead of trying to extract
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* MUST have TLS type octet, followed by flags, followed
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rad_assert(eap_ds->response->length > 2);
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tlspacket = eaptls_alloc();
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if (tlspacket == NULL) return NULL;
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* Code & id for EAPTLS & EAP are same
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* but eaptls_length = eap_length - 1(EAP-Type = 1 octet)
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* length = code + id + length + type + tlsdata
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* = 1 + 1 + 2 + 1 + X
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tlspacket->code = eap_ds->response->code;
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tlspacket->id = eap_ds->response->id;
475
tlspacket->length = eap_ds->response->length - 1; /* EAP type */
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tlspacket->flags = eap_ds->response->type.data[0];
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* A quick sanity check of the flags. If we've been told
480
* that there's a length, and there isn't one, then stop.
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if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags) &&
483
(tlspacket->length < 5)) { /* flags + TLS message length */
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radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid EAP-TLS packet received. (Length bit is set, but no length was found.)");
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eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
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* If the final TLS packet is larger than we can handle, die
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* Likewise, if the EAP packet says N bytes, and the TLS
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* packet says there's fewer bytes, it's a problem.
496
* FIXME: Try to ensure that the claimed length is
497
* consistent across multiple TLS fragments.
499
if (TLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED(tlspacket->flags)) {
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memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], 4);
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data_len = ntohl(data_len);
502
if (data_len > MAX_RECORD_SIZE) {
503
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: The EAP-TLS packet will contain more data than we can process.");
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eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
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DEBUG2(" TLS: %d %d\n", data_len, tlspacket->length);
511
if (data_len < tlspacket->length) {
512
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: EAP-TLS packet claims to be smaller than the encapsulating EAP packet.");
513
eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
521
* The TLS Message Length field is four octets, and
522
* provides the total length of the TLS message or set of
523
* messages that is being fragmented; this simplifies
526
* Dynamic allocation of buffers as & when we know the
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* length should solve the problem.
529
case EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
530
case EAPTLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
531
case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
532
if (tlspacket->length < 5) { /* flags + TLS message length */
533
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid EAP-TLS packet received. (Expected length, got none.)");
534
eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
539
* Extract all the TLS fragments from the
540
* previous eap_ds Start appending this
541
* fragment to the above ds
543
memcpy(&data_len, &eap_ds->response->type.data[1], sizeof(uint32_t));
544
data_len = ntohl(data_len);
545
data = (eap_ds->response->type.data + 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/);
546
len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 5/*flags+TLS-Length*/;
549
* Hmm... this should be an error, too.
551
if (data_len > len) {
557
* Data length is implicit, from the EAP header.
559
case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
561
data_len = eap_ds->response->type.length - 1/*flags*/;
562
data = eap_ds->response->type.data + 1/*flags*/;
566
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Invalid EAP-TLS packet received");
567
eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
571
tlspacket->dlen = data_len;
573
tlspacket->data = (unsigned char *)malloc(data_len);
574
if (tlspacket->data == NULL) {
575
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
576
eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
579
memcpy(tlspacket->data, data, data_len);
588
* To process the TLS,
590
* 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
591
* 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
592
* 3. Handle that data structure to the TLS module.
593
* 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and
594
* handle back to EAP-TLS
597
* 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the
600
* During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
601
* initialized and stored. For every new authentication
602
* requests, TLS will open a new session object and that session
603
* object should be maintained even after the session is
604
* completed for session resumption. (Probably later as a feature
605
* as we donot know who maintains these session objects ie,
606
* SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module(explicitly). If TLS module,
607
* then how to let SSL API know about these sessions.)
609
static void eaptls_operation(EAPTLS_PACKET *eaptls_packet UNUSED,
610
eaptls_status_t status, EAP_HANDLER *handler)
612
tls_session_t *tls_session;
614
tls_session = (tls_session_t *)handler->opaque;
616
if ((status == EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS) ||
617
(status == EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH) ||
618
(status == EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT)) {
622
eaptls_send_ack(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
625
* We have the complete TLS-data or TLS-message.
627
* Clean the dirty message.
629
* Authenticate the user and send
633
* is required then send another request. */
634
if (tls_handshake_recv(tls_session)) {
636
* FIXME: return success/fail.
638
* TLS proper can decide what to do, then.
640
eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
642
eaptls_fail(handler->eap_ds, tls_session->peap_flag);
650
* In the actual authentication first verify the packet and then create the data structure
653
* To process the TLS,
655
* 1. EAP-TLS should get the compelete TLS data from the peer.
656
* 2. Store that data in a data structure with any other required info
657
* 3. Hand this data structure to the TLS module.
658
* 4. TLS module will perform its operations on the data and hands back to EAP-TLS
660
* 1. EAP-TLS if necessary will fragment it and send it to the destination.
662
* During EAP-TLS initialization, TLS Context object will be
663
* initialized and stored. For every new authentication
664
* requests, TLS will open a new session object and that
665
* session object SHOULD be maintained even after the session
666
* is completed, for session resumption. (Probably later as a
667
* feature, as we do not know who maintains these session
668
* objects ie, SSL_CTX (internally) or TLS module (explicitly). If
669
* TLS module, then how to let SSL API know about these
674
* Process an EAP request
676
eaptls_status_t eaptls_process(EAP_HANDLER *handler)
678
tls_session_t *tls_session = (tls_session_t *) handler->opaque;
679
EAPTLS_PACKET *tlspacket;
680
eaptls_status_t status;
682
DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: processing TLS");
684
/* This case is when SSL generates Alert then we
685
* send that alert to the client and then send the EAP-Failure
687
status = eaptls_verify(handler);
688
DEBUG2(" eaptls_verify returned %d\n", status);
696
* Success means that we're done the initial
697
* handshake. For TTLS, this means send stuff
698
* back to the client, and the client sends us
699
* more tunneled data.
706
* Normal TLS request, continue with the "get rest
707
* of fragments" phase.
710
eaptls_request(handler->eap_ds, tls_session);
711
return EAPTLS_HANDLED;
715
* The handshake is done, and we're in the "tunnel
719
DEBUG2(" rlm_eap_tls: Done initial handshake");
722
* Get the rest of the fragments.
724
case EAPTLS_FIRST_FRAGMENT:
725
case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS:
726
case EAPTLS_LENGTH_INCLUDED:
727
case EAPTLS_MORE_FRAGMENTS_WITH_LENGTH:
732
* Extract the TLS packet from the buffer.
734
if ((tlspacket = eaptls_extract(handler->eap_ds, status)) == NULL)
738
* Get the session struct from the handler
740
* update the dirty_in buffer
742
* NOTE: This buffer will contain partial data when M bit is set.
744
* CAUTION while reinitializing this buffer, it should be
745
* reinitialized only when this M bit is NOT set.
747
if (tlspacket->dlen !=
748
record_plus(&tls_session->dirty_in, tlspacket->data, tlspacket->dlen)) {
749
eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
750
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: Exceeded maximum record size");
755
* SSL initalization is done. Return.
757
* The TLS data will be in the tls_session structure.
759
if (SSL_is_init_finished(tls_session->ssl)) {
760
eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
765
* Continue the handshake.
767
eaptls_operation(tlspacket, status, handler);
769
eaptls_free(&tlspacket);
770
return EAPTLS_HANDLED;
775
* compose the TLS reply packet in the EAP reply typedata
777
int eaptls_compose(EAP_DS *eap_ds, EAPTLS_PACKET *reply)
782
* Don't set eap_ds->request->type.type, as the main EAP
783
* handler will do that for us. This allows the TLS
784
* module to be called from TTLS & PEAP.
788
* When the EAP server receives an EAP-Response with the
789
* M bit set, it MUST respond with an EAP-Request with
790
* EAP-Type=EAP-TLS and no data. This serves as a
791
* fragment ACK. The EAP peer MUST wait until it receives
792
* the EAP-Request before sending another fragment.
794
* In order to prevent errors in the processing of
795
* fragments, the EAP server MUST use increment the
796
* Identifier value for each fragment ACK contained
797
* within an EAP-Request, and the peer MUST include this
798
* Identifier value in the subsequent fragment contained
799
* within an EAP- Reponse.
801
eap_ds->request->type.data = malloc(reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN + 1);
802
if (eap_ds->request->type.data == NULL) {
803
radlog(L_ERR, "rlm_eap_tls: out of memory");
807
/* EAPTLS Header length is excluded while computing EAP typelen */
808
eap_ds->request->type.length = reply->length - TLS_HEADER_LEN;
810
ptr = eap_ds->request->type.data;
811
*ptr++ = (uint8_t)(reply->flags & 0xFF);
813
if (reply->dlen) memcpy(ptr, reply->data, reply->dlen);
815
switch (reply->code) {
819
eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_REQUEST;
822
eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_SUCCESS;
825
eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;
828
/* Should never enter here */
829
eap_ds->request->code = PW_EAP_FAILURE;
added
removed
src/modules/rlm_eap/types/rlm_eap_tls/eap_tls.c
