2
* Copyright (c) 1997-2007 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
3
* (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
6
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
7
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
10
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
11
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
13
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
14
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
15
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
17
* 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
18
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
19
* without specific prior written permission.
21
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
22
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
23
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
24
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
25
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
26
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
27
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
28
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
29
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
30
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
36
#define MAX_TIME ((time_t)((1U << 31) - 1))
39
_kdc_fix_time(time_t **t)
45
if(**t == 0) **t = MAX_TIME; /* fix for old clients */
49
realloc_method_data(METHOD_DATA *md)
52
pa = realloc(md->val, (md->len + 1) * sizeof(*md->val));
61
set_salt_padata(METHOD_DATA *md, Salt *salt)
64
realloc_method_data(md);
65
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = salt->type;
66
der_copy_octet_string(&salt->salt,
67
&md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value);
72
_kdc_find_padata(const KDC_REQ *req, int *start, int type)
74
if (req->padata == NULL)
77
while((size_t)*start < req->padata->len){
79
if(req->padata->val[*start - 1].padata_type == (unsigned)type)
80
return &req->padata->val[*start - 1];
86
* This is a hack to allow predefined weak services, like afs to
87
* still use weak types
91
_kdc_is_weak_exception(krb5_principal principal, krb5_enctype etype)
93
if (principal->name.name_string.len > 0 &&
94
strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], "afs") == 0 &&
95
(etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC
96
|| etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4
97
|| etype == ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5))
104
* Detect if `key' is the using the the precomputed `default_salt'.
108
is_default_salt_p(const krb5_salt *default_salt, const Key *key)
110
if (key->salt == NULL)
112
if (default_salt->salttype != key->salt->type)
114
if (krb5_data_cmp(&default_salt->saltvalue, &key->salt->salt))
120
* return the first appropriate key of `princ' in `ret_key'. Look for
121
* all the etypes in (`etypes', `len'), stopping as soon as we find
122
* one, but preferring one that has default salt
126
_kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
127
krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
128
krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
129
krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key)
133
krb5_enctype enctype = ETYPE_NULL;
137
/* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
138
ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
142
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
144
if (use_strongest_session_key) {
145
const krb5_enctype *p;
146
krb5_enctype clientbest = ETYPE_NULL;
150
* Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
151
* client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
152
* list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
154
* This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
155
* adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
156
* clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
157
* available with different supported enctype lists.
160
/* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
161
p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
162
for (i = 0; p[i] != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; i++) {
163
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0)
166
/* check that the client supports it too */
167
for (j = 0; j < len && enctype == ETYPE_NULL; j++) {
168
if (p[i] != etypes[j])
170
/* save best of union of { client, crypto system } */
171
if (clientbest == ETYPE_NULL)
173
/* check target princ support */
174
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, p[i], &key);
177
if (is_preauth && !is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
182
if (clientbest != ETYPE_NULL && enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
183
enctype = clientbest;
184
else if (enctype == ETYPE_NULL)
185
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
186
if (ret == 0 && ret_enctype != NULL)
187
*ret_enctype = enctype;
188
if (ret == 0 && ret_key != NULL)
192
* Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
193
* supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
195
* RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
196
* client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
197
* weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
198
* algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
200
for(key = NULL, i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++, key = NULL) {
202
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
203
!_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
206
while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
207
if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
208
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
213
if (ret_enctype != NULL)
214
*ret_enctype = etypes[i];
216
if (is_preauth && is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
223
krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
228
_kdc_make_anonymous_principalname (PrincipalName *pn)
230
pn->name_type = KRB5_NT_PRINCIPAL;
231
pn->name_string.len = 1;
232
pn->name_string.val = malloc(sizeof(*pn->name_string.val));
233
if (pn->name_string.val == NULL)
235
pn->name_string.val[0] = strdup("anonymous");
236
if (pn->name_string.val[0] == NULL) {
237
free(pn->name_string.val);
238
pn->name_string.val = NULL;
245
_kdc_log_timestamp(krb5_context context,
246
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
248
KerberosTime authtime, KerberosTime *starttime,
249
KerberosTime endtime, KerberosTime *renew_till)
251
char authtime_str[100], starttime_str[100],
252
endtime_str[100], renewtime_str[100];
254
krb5_format_time(context, authtime,
255
authtime_str, sizeof(authtime_str), TRUE);
257
krb5_format_time(context, *starttime,
258
starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
260
strlcpy(starttime_str, "unset", sizeof(starttime_str));
261
krb5_format_time(context, endtime,
262
endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
264
krb5_format_time(context, *renew_till,
265
renewtime_str, sizeof(renewtime_str), TRUE);
267
strlcpy(renewtime_str, "unset", sizeof(renewtime_str));
269
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
270
"%s authtime: %s starttime: %s endtime: %s renew till: %s",
271
type, authtime_str, starttime_str, endtime_str, renewtime_str);
275
log_patypes(krb5_context context,
276
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
279
struct rk_strpool *p = NULL;
283
for (i = 0; i < padata->len; i++) {
284
switch(padata->val[i].padata_type) {
285
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
286
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "PK-INIT(ietf)");
288
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN:
289
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "PK-INIT(win2k)");
291
case KRB5_PADATA_PA_PK_OCSP_RESPONSE:
292
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "OCSP");
294
case KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP:
295
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "encrypted-timestamp");
298
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", padata->val[i].padata_type);
301
if (p && i + 1 < padata->len)
302
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
304
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
309
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "none");
311
str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
312
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Client sent patypes: %s", str);
322
_kdc_encode_reply(krb5_context context,
323
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
324
KDC_REP *rep, const EncTicketPart *et, EncKDCRepPart *ek,
326
int skvno, const EncryptionKey *skey,
327
int ckvno, const EncryptionKey *reply_key,
338
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTicketPart, buf, buf_size, et, &len, ret);
340
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
341
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode ticket: %s", msg);
342
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
345
if(buf_size != len) {
347
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
348
*e_text = "KDC internal error";
349
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
352
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, skey, etype, &crypto);
356
msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
357
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
358
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
362
ret = krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
368
&rep->ticket.enc_part);
370
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
372
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
373
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encrypt data: %s", msg);
374
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
378
if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep && !config->encode_as_rep_as_tgs_rep)
379
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncASRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
381
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(EncTGSRepPart, buf, buf_size, ek, &len, ret);
383
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
384
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
385
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
388
if(buf_size != len) {
390
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
391
*e_text = "KDC internal error";
392
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
394
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, reply_key, 0, &crypto);
396
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
398
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
399
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
402
if(rep->msg_type == krb_as_rep) {
403
krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
405
KRB5_KU_AS_REP_ENC_PART,
411
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
413
krb5_encrypt_EncryptedData(context,
415
rk_is_subkey ? KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SUB_KEY : KRB5_KU_TGS_REP_ENC_PART_SESSION,
421
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(TGS_REP, buf, buf_size, rep, &len, ret);
423
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
425
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
426
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Failed to encode KDC-REP: %s", msg);
427
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
430
if(buf_size != len) {
432
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Internal error in ASN.1 encoder");
433
*e_text = "KDC internal error";
434
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
437
reply->length = buf_size;
442
* Return 1 if the client have only older enctypes, this is for
443
* determining if the server should send ETYPE_INFO2 or not.
447
older_enctype(krb5_enctype enctype)
450
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
451
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
452
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
453
case ETYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
454
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5:
455
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_MD5_56:
457
* The following three is "old" windows enctypes and is needed for
458
* windows 2000 hosts.
460
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_MD4:
461
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD:
462
case ETYPE_ARCFOUR_HMAC_OLD_EXP:
473
static krb5_error_code
474
make_etype_info_entry(krb5_context context, ETYPE_INFO_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
476
ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
479
ALLOC(ent->salttype);
481
if(key->salt->type == hdb_pw_salt)
482
*ent->salttype = 0; /* or 1? or NULL? */
483
else if(key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt)
486
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "unknown salt-type: %d",
488
return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
490
/* according to `the specs', we can't send a salt if
491
we have AFS3 salted key, but that requires that you
492
*know* what cell you are using (e.g by assuming
493
that the cell is the same as the realm in lower
496
ALLOC(ent->salttype);
497
*ent->salttype = key->salt->type;
500
* We shouldn't sent salttype since it is incompatible with the
501
* specification and it breaks windows clients. The afs
502
* salting problem is solved by using KRB5-PADATA-AFS3-SALT
503
* implemented in Heimdal 0.7 and later.
505
ent->salttype = NULL;
507
krb5_copy_data(context, &key->salt->salt,
510
/* we return no salt type at all, as that should indicate
511
* the default salt type and make everybody happy. some
512
* systems (like w2k) dislike being told the salt type
515
ent->salttype = NULL;
521
static krb5_error_code
522
get_pa_etype_info(krb5_context context,
523
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
524
METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
526
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
533
pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
537
ret = make_etype_info_entry(context, &pa.val[0], ckey);
539
free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
543
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
544
free_ETYPE_INFO(&pa);
547
ret = realloc_method_data(md);
552
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO;
553
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
554
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
562
extern int _krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator;
564
static krb5_error_code
565
make_etype_info2_entry(ETYPE_INFO2_ENTRY *ent, Key *key)
567
ent->etype = key->key.keytype;
570
if (ent->salt == NULL)
572
*ent->salt = malloc(key->salt->salt.length + 1);
573
if (*ent->salt == NULL) {
578
memcpy(*ent->salt, key->salt->salt.data, key->salt->salt.length);
579
(*ent->salt)[key->salt->salt.length] = '\0';
583
ent->s2kparams = NULL;
585
switch (key->key.keytype) {
586
case ETYPE_AES128_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
587
case ETYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA1_96:
588
ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
589
if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
591
ent->s2kparams->length = 4;
592
ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
593
if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
594
free(ent->s2kparams);
595
ent->s2kparams = NULL;
598
_krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
599
_krb5_AES_string_to_default_iterator,
600
ent->s2kparams->length);
602
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
603
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
604
case ETYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
605
/* Check if this was a AFS3 salted key */
606
if(key->salt && key->salt->type == hdb_afs3_salt){
607
ALLOC(ent->s2kparams);
608
if (ent->s2kparams == NULL)
610
ent->s2kparams->length = 1;
611
ent->s2kparams->data = malloc(ent->s2kparams->length);
612
if (ent->s2kparams->data == NULL) {
613
free(ent->s2kparams);
614
ent->s2kparams = NULL;
617
_krb5_put_int(ent->s2kparams->data,
619
ent->s2kparams->length);
629
* Return an ETYPE-INFO2. Enctypes are storted the same way as in the
630
* database (client supported enctypes first, then the unsupported
634
static krb5_error_code
635
get_pa_etype_info2(krb5_context context,
636
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
637
METHOD_DATA *md, Key *ckey)
639
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
645
pa.val = calloc(1, sizeof(pa.val[0]));
649
ret = make_etype_info2_entry(&pa.val[0], ckey);
651
free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
655
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(ETYPE_INFO2, buf, len, &pa, &len, ret);
656
free_ETYPE_INFO2(&pa);
659
ret = realloc_method_data(md);
664
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ETYPE_INFO2;
665
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.length = len;
666
md->val[md->len - 1].padata_value.data = buf;
675
log_as_req(krb5_context context,
676
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
679
const KDC_REQ_BODY *b)
682
struct rk_strpool *p;
686
p = rk_strpoolprintf(NULL, "%s", "Client supported enctypes: ");
688
for (i = 0; i < b->etype.len; i++) {
689
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, b->etype.val[i], &str);
691
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%s", str);
694
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "%d", b->etype.val[i]);
695
if (p && i + 1 < b->etype.len)
696
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", ");
698
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "out of memory");
703
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, "no encryption types");
709
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, cetype, &cet);
711
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, setype, &set);
713
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using %s/%s", cet, set);
719
p = rk_strpoolprintf(p, ", using enctypes %d/%d",
723
str = rk_strpoolcollect(p);
724
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", str);
729
unparse_flags(KDCOptions2int(b->kdc_options), asn1_KDCOptions_units(),
730
fixedstr, sizeof(fixedstr));
732
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Requested flags: %s", fixedstr);
737
* verify the flags on `client' and `server', returning 0
738
* if they are OK and generating an error messages and returning
739
* and error code otherwise.
743
kdc_check_flags(krb5_context context,
744
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
745
hdb_entry_ex *client_ex, const char *client_name,
746
hdb_entry_ex *server_ex, const char *server_name,
747
krb5_boolean is_as_req)
749
if(client_ex != NULL) {
750
hdb_entry *client = &client_ex->entry;
753
if (client->flags.locked_out) {
754
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
755
"Client (%s) is locked out", client_name);
756
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
759
if (client->flags.invalid) {
760
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
761
"Client (%s) has invalid bit set", client_name);
762
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
765
if(!client->flags.client){
766
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
767
"Principal may not act as client -- %s", client_name);
768
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
771
if (client->valid_start && *client->valid_start > kdc_time) {
772
char starttime_str[100];
773
krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_start,
774
starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
775
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
776
"Client not yet valid until %s -- %s",
777
starttime_str, client_name);
778
return KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
781
if (client->valid_end && *client->valid_end < kdc_time) {
782
char endtime_str[100];
783
krb5_format_time(context, *client->valid_end,
784
endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
785
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
786
"Client expired at %s -- %s",
787
endtime_str, client_name);
788
return KRB5KDC_ERR_NAME_EXP;
791
if (client->pw_end && *client->pw_end < kdc_time
792
&& (server_ex == NULL || !server_ex->entry.flags.change_pw)) {
794
krb5_format_time(context, *client->pw_end,
795
pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
796
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
797
"Client's key has expired at %s -- %s",
798
pwend_str, client_name);
799
return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
805
if (server_ex != NULL) {
806
hdb_entry *server = &server_ex->entry;
808
if (server->flags.locked_out) {
809
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
810
"Client server locked out -- %s", server_name);
811
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
813
if (server->flags.invalid) {
814
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
815
"Server has invalid flag set -- %s", server_name);
816
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
819
if(!server->flags.server){
820
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
821
"Principal may not act as server -- %s", server_name);
822
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
825
if(!is_as_req && server->flags.initial) {
826
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
827
"AS-REQ is required for server -- %s", server_name);
828
return KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
831
if (server->valid_start && *server->valid_start > kdc_time) {
832
char starttime_str[100];
833
krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_start,
834
starttime_str, sizeof(starttime_str), TRUE);
835
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
836
"Server not yet valid until %s -- %s",
837
starttime_str, server_name);
838
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_NOTYET;
841
if (server->valid_end && *server->valid_end < kdc_time) {
842
char endtime_str[100];
843
krb5_format_time(context, *server->valid_end,
844
endtime_str, sizeof(endtime_str), TRUE);
845
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
846
"Server expired at %s -- %s",
847
endtime_str, server_name);
848
return KRB5KDC_ERR_SERVICE_EXP;
851
if (server->pw_end && *server->pw_end < kdc_time) {
853
krb5_format_time(context, *server->pw_end,
854
pwend_str, sizeof(pwend_str), TRUE);
855
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
856
"Server's key has expired at -- %s",
857
pwend_str, server_name);
858
return KRB5KDC_ERR_KEY_EXPIRED;
865
* Return TRUE if `from' is part of `addresses' taking into consideration
866
* the configuration variables that tells us how strict we should be about
871
_kdc_check_addresses(krb5_context context,
872
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
873
HostAddresses *addresses, const struct sockaddr *from)
878
krb5_boolean only_netbios = TRUE;
881
if(config->check_ticket_addresses == 0)
884
if(addresses == NULL)
885
return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
887
for (i = 0; i < addresses->len; ++i) {
888
if (addresses->val[i].addr_type != KRB5_ADDRESS_NETBIOS) {
889
only_netbios = FALSE;
893
/* Windows sends it's netbios name, which I can only assume is
894
* used for the 'allowed workstations' check. This is painful,
895
* but we still want to check IP addresses if they happen to be
900
return config->allow_null_ticket_addresses;
902
ret = krb5_sockaddr2address (context, from, &addr);
906
result = krb5_address_search(context, &addr, addresses);
907
krb5_free_address (context, &addr);
916
send_pac_p(krb5_context context, KDC_REQ *req)
919
PA_PAC_REQUEST pacreq;
923
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PA_PAC_REQUEST);
927
ret = decode_PA_PAC_REQUEST(pa->padata_value.data,
928
pa->padata_value.length,
933
i = pacreq.include_pac;
934
free_PA_PAC_REQUEST(&pacreq);
941
_kdc_is_anonymous(krb5_context context, krb5_principal principal)
943
if (principal->name.name_type != KRB5_NT_WELLKNOWN ||
944
principal->name.name_string.len != 2 ||
945
strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[0], KRB5_WELLKNOWN_NAME) != 0 ||
946
strcmp(principal->name.name_string.val[1], KRB5_ANON_NAME) != 0)
956
_kdc_as_rep(krb5_context context,
957
krb5_kdc_configuration *config,
959
const krb5_data *req_buffer,
962
struct sockaddr *from_addr,
965
KDC_REQ_BODY *b = &req->req_body;
967
KDCOptions f = b->kdc_options;
968
hdb_entry_ex *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
970
krb5_enctype setype, sessionetype;
974
krb5_principal client_princ = NULL, server_princ = NULL;
975
char *client_name = NULL, *server_name = NULL;
976
krb5_error_code ret = 0;
977
const char *e_text = NULL;
980
EncryptionKey *reply_key = NULL, session_key;
981
int flags = HDB_F_FOR_AS_REQ;
983
pk_client_params *pkp = NULL;
986
memset(&rep, 0, sizeof(rep));
987
memset(&session_key, 0, sizeof(session_key));
988
krb5_data_zero(&e_data);
992
rep.padata->val = NULL;
995
flags |= HDB_F_CANON;
997
if(b->sname == NULL){
998
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
999
e_text = "No server in request";
1001
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1006
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, server_princ, &server_name);
1009
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1010
"AS-REQ malformed server name from %s", from);
1013
if(b->cname == NULL){
1014
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
1015
e_text = "No client in request";
1017
ret = _krb5_principalname2krb5_principal (context,
1024
ret = krb5_unparse_name(context, client_princ, &client_name);
1027
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1028
"AS-REQ malformed client name from %s", from);
1032
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "AS-REQ %s from %s for %s",
1033
client_name, from, server_name);
1039
if (_kdc_is_anonymous(context, client_princ)) {
1040
if (!b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1041
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Anonymous ticket w/o anonymous flag");
1042
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1045
} else if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1046
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1047
"Request for a anonymous ticket with non "
1048
"anonymous client name: %s", client_name);
1049
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1057
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, client_princ,
1058
HDB_F_GET_CLIENT | flags, NULL,
1059
&clientdb, &client);
1060
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1061
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "client %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", client_name);
1064
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1065
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", client_name, msg);
1066
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1067
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1070
ret = _kdc_db_fetch(context, config, server_princ,
1071
HDB_F_GET_SERVER|HDB_F_GET_KRBTGT | flags,
1072
NULL, NULL, &server);
1073
if(ret == HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE) {
1074
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "target %s does not have secrets at this KDC, need to proxy", server_name);
1077
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1078
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "UNKNOWN -- %s: %s", server_name, msg);
1079
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1080
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
1084
memset(&et, 0, sizeof(et));
1085
memset(&ek, 0, sizeof(ek));
1088
* Select a session enctype from the list of the crypto system
1089
* supported enctypes that is supported by the client and is one of
1090
* the enctype of the enctype of the service (likely krbtgt).
1092
* The latter is used as a hint of what enctypes all KDC support,
1093
* to make sure a newer version of KDC won't generate a session
1094
* enctype that an older version of a KDC in the same realm can't
1097
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context, config->as_use_strongest_session_key, FALSE,
1098
client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, &sessionetype,
1101
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1102
"Client (%s) from %s has no common enctypes with KDC "
1103
"to use for the session key",
1108
* But if the KDC admin is paranoid and doesn't want to have "not
1109
* the best" enctypes on the krbtgt, lets save the best pick from
1110
* the client list and hope that that will work for any other
1115
* Pre-auth processing
1123
log_patypes(context, config, req->padata);
1126
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1127
"Looking for PKINIT pa-data -- %s", client_name);
1129
e_text = "No PKINIT PA found";
1132
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ);
1135
pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN);
1138
char *client_cert = NULL;
1140
ret = _kdc_pk_rd_padata(context, config, req, pa, client, &pkp);
1142
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1143
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1144
"Failed to decode PKINIT PA-DATA -- %s",
1148
if (ret == 0 && pkp == NULL)
1151
ret = _kdc_pk_check_client(context,
1158
e_text = "PKINIT certificate not allowed to "
1159
"impersonate principal";
1160
_kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
1162
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s", e_text);
1168
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1169
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1170
"PKINIT pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
1171
client_name, client_cert);
1178
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Looking for ENC-TS pa-data -- %s",
1182
e_text = "No ENC-TS found";
1183
while((pa = _kdc_find_padata(req, &i, KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP))){
1187
EncryptedData enc_data;
1193
if (b->kdc_options.request_anonymous) {
1194
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1195
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "ENC-TS doesn't support anon");
1199
ret = decode_EncryptedData(pa->padata_value.data,
1200
pa->padata_value.length,
1204
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
1205
kdc_log(context, config, 5, "Failed to decode PA-DATA -- %s",
1210
ret = hdb_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1211
enc_data.etype, &pa_key);
1214
e_text = "No key matches pa-data";
1215
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
1216
if(krb5_enctype_to_string(context, enc_data.etype, &estr))
1219
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1220
"No client key matching pa-data (%d) -- %s",
1221
enc_data.etype, client_name);
1223
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1224
"No client key matching pa-data (%s) -- %s",
1227
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1233
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &pa_key->key, 0, &crypto);
1235
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1236
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "krb5_crypto_init failed: %s", msg);
1237
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1238
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1242
ret = krb5_decrypt_EncryptedData (context,
1244
KRB5_KU_PA_ENC_TIMESTAMP,
1247
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, crypto);
1249
* Since the user might have several keys with the same
1250
* enctype but with diffrent salting, we need to try all
1251
* the keys with the same enctype.
1254
krb5_error_code ret2;
1255
const char *msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, ret);
1257
ret2 = krb5_enctype_to_string(context,
1258
pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
1261
kdc_log(context, config, 5,
1262
"Failed to decrypt PA-DATA -- %s "
1263
"(enctype %s) error %s",
1264
client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype", msg);
1265
krb5_free_error_message(context, msg);
1268
if(hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &client->entry,
1269
enc_data.etype, &pa_key) == 0)
1271
e_text = "Failed to decrypt PA-DATA";
1273
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1275
if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1276
(clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client, HDB_AUTH_WRONG_PASSWORD);
1278
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
1281
free_EncryptedData(&enc_data);
1282
ret = decode_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(ts_data.data,
1286
krb5_data_free(&ts_data);
1288
e_text = "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS-ENC";
1289
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
1290
kdc_log(context, config,
1291
5, "Failed to decode PA-ENC-TS_ENC -- %s",
1295
free_PA_ENC_TS_ENC(&p);
1296
if (abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp) > context->max_skew) {
1297
char client_time[100];
1299
krb5_format_time(context, p.patimestamp,
1300
client_time, sizeof(client_time), TRUE);
1302
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW;
1303
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1304
"Too large time skew, "
1305
"client time %s is out by %u > %u seconds -- %s",
1307
(unsigned)abs(kdc_time - p.patimestamp),
1312
* The following is needed to make windows clients to
1313
* retry using the timestamp in the error message, if
1314
* there is a e_text, they become unhappy.
1319
et.flags.pre_authent = 1;
1321
set_salt_padata(rep.padata, pa_key->salt);
1323
reply_key = &pa_key->key;
1325
ret = krb5_enctype_to_string(context, pa_key->key.keytype, &str);
1329
kdc_log(context, config, 2,
1330
"ENC-TS Pre-authentication succeeded -- %s using %s",
1331
client_name, str ? str : "unknown enctype");
1338
if(found_pa == 0 && config->require_preauth)
1340
/* We come here if we found a pa-enc-timestamp, but if there
1341
was some problem with it, other than too large skew */
1342
if(found_pa && et.flags.pre_authent == 0){
1343
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "%s -- %s", e_text, client_name);
1347
}else if (config->require_preauth
1348
|| b->kdc_options.request_anonymous /* hack to force anon */
1349
|| client->entry.flags.require_preauth
1350
|| server->entry.flags.require_preauth) {
1351
METHOD_DATA method_data;
1357
method_data.len = 0;
1358
method_data.val = NULL;
1360
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1362
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1365
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1366
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_ENC_TIMESTAMP;
1367
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1368
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1371
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1373
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1376
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1377
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ;
1378
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1379
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1381
ret = realloc_method_data(&method_data);
1383
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1386
pa = &method_data.val[method_data.len-1];
1387
pa->padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_WIN;
1388
pa->padata_value.length = 0;
1389
pa->padata_value.data = NULL;
1393
* If there is a client key, send ETYPE_INFO{,2}
1395
ret = _kdc_find_etype(context,
1396
config->preauth_use_strongest_session_key, TRUE,
1397
client, b->etype.val, b->etype.len, NULL, &ckey);
1402
* - If the client only knows about old enctypes, then send
1403
* both info replies (we send 'info' first in the list).
1404
* - If the client is 'modern', because it knows about 'new'
1405
* enctype types, then only send the 'info2' reply.
1407
* Before we send the full list of etype-info data, we pick
1408
* the client key we would have used anyway below, just pick
1412
if (older_enctype(ckey->key.keytype)) {
1413
ret = get_pa_etype_info(context, config,
1414
&method_data, ckey);
1416
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1420
ret = get_pa_etype_info2(context, config,
1421
&method_data, ckey);
1423
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1428
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(METHOD_DATA, buf, len, &method_data, &len, ret);
1429
free_METHOD_DATA(&method_data);
1432
e_data.length = len;
1433
e_text ="Need to use PA-ENC-TIMESTAMP/PA-PK-AS-REQ",
1435
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED;
1437
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1438
"No preauth found, returning PREAUTH-REQUIRED -- %s",
1443
if (clientdb->hdb_auth_status)
1444
(clientdb->hdb_auth_status)(context, clientdb, client,
1448
* Verify flags after the user been required to prove its identity
1449
* with in a preauth mech.
1452
ret = _kdc_check_access(context, config, client, client_name,
1453
server, server_name,
1459
* Selelct the best encryption type for the KDC with out regard to
1460
* the client since the client never needs to read that data.
1463
ret = _kdc_get_preferred_key(context, config,
1464
server, server_name,
1469
if(f.renew || f.validate || f.proxy || f.forwarded || f.enc_tkt_in_skey
1470
|| (f.request_anonymous && !config->allow_anonymous)) {
1471
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_BADOPTION;
1472
e_text = "Bad KDC options";
1473
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "Bad KDC options -- %s", client_name);
1478
rep.msg_type = krb_as_rep;
1480
ret = copy_Realm(&client->entry.principal->realm, &rep.crealm);
1483
ret = _krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.cname, client->entry.principal);
1487
rep.ticket.tkt_vno = 5;
1488
copy_Realm(&server->entry.principal->realm, &rep.ticket.realm);
1489
_krb5_principal2principalname(&rep.ticket.sname,
1490
server->entry.principal);
1491
/* java 1.6 expects the name to be the same type, lets allow that
1492
* uncomplicated name-types. */
1493
#define CNT(sp,t) (((sp)->sname->name_type) == KRB5_NT_##t)
1494
if (CNT(b, UNKNOWN) || CNT(b, PRINCIPAL) || CNT(b, SRV_INST) || CNT(b, SRV_HST) || CNT(b, SRV_XHST))
1495
rep.ticket.sname.name_type = b->sname->name_type;
1498
et.flags.initial = 1;
1499
if(client->entry.flags.forwardable && server->entry.flags.forwardable)
1500
et.flags.forwardable = f.forwardable;
1501
else if (f.forwardable) {
1502
e_text = "Ticket may not be forwardable";
1503
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1504
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1505
"Ticket may not be forwardable -- %s", client_name);
1508
if(client->entry.flags.proxiable && server->entry.flags.proxiable)
1509
et.flags.proxiable = f.proxiable;
1510
else if (f.proxiable) {
1511
e_text = "Ticket may not be proxiable";
1512
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1513
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1514
"Ticket may not be proxiable -- %s", client_name);
1517
if(client->entry.flags.postdate && server->entry.flags.postdate)
1518
et.flags.may_postdate = f.allow_postdate;
1519
else if (f.allow_postdate){
1520
e_text = "Ticket may not be postdate";
1521
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_POLICY;
1522
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1523
"Ticket may not be postdatable -- %s", client_name);
1527
/* check for valid set of addresses */
1528
if(!_kdc_check_addresses(context, config, b->addresses, from_addr)) {
1529
e_text = "Bad address list in requested";
1530
ret = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BADADDR;
1531
kdc_log(context, config, 0,
1532
"Bad address list requested -- %s", client_name);
1536
ret = copy_PrincipalName(&rep.cname, &et.cname);
1539
ret = copy_Realm(&rep.crealm, &et.crealm);
1547
start = et.authtime = kdc_time;
1549
if(f.postdated && req->req_body.from){
1550
ALLOC(et.starttime);
1551
start = *et.starttime = *req->req_body.from;
1552
et.flags.invalid = 1;
1553
et.flags.postdated = 1; /* XXX ??? */
1555
_kdc_fix_time(&b->till);
1558
/* be careful not overflowing */
1560
if(client->entry.max_life)
1561
t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_life);
1562
if(server->entry.max_life)
1563
t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_life);
1565
t = min(t, start + realm->max_life);
1568
if(f.renewable_ok && et.endtime < *b->till){
1570
if(b->rtime == NULL){
1574
if(*b->rtime < *b->till)
1575
*b->rtime = *b->till;
1577
if(f.renewable && b->rtime){
1581
if(client->entry.max_renew)
1582
t = start + min(t - start, *client->entry.max_renew);
1583
if(server->entry.max_renew)
1584
t = start + min(t - start, *server->entry.max_renew);
1586
t = min(t, start + realm->max_renew);
1588
ALLOC(et.renew_till);
1590
et.flags.renewable = 1;
1594
if (f.request_anonymous)
1595
et.flags.anonymous = 1;
1599
copy_HostAddresses(b->addresses, et.caddr);
1602
et.transited.tr_type = DOMAIN_X500_COMPRESS;
1603
krb5_data_zero(&et.transited.contents);
1605
/* The MIT ASN.1 library (obviously) doesn't tell lengths encoded
1606
* as 0 and as 0x80 (meaning indefinite length) apart, and is thus
1607
* incapable of correctly decoding SEQUENCE OF's of zero length.
1609
* To fix this, always send at least one no-op last_req
1611
* If there's a pw_end or valid_end we will use that,
1612
* otherwise just a dummy lr.
1614
ek.last_req.val = malloc(2 * sizeof(*ek.last_req.val));
1615
if (ek.last_req.val == NULL) {
1619
ek.last_req.len = 0;
1620
if (client->entry.pw_end
1621
&& (config->kdc_warn_pwexpire == 0
1622
|| kdc_time + config->kdc_warn_pwexpire >= *client->entry.pw_end)) {
1623
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_PW_EXPTIME;
1624
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.pw_end;
1627
if (client->entry.valid_end) {
1628
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_ACCT_EXPTIME;
1629
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = *client->entry.valid_end;
1632
if (ek.last_req.len == 0) {
1633
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_type = LR_NONE;
1634
ek.last_req.val[ek.last_req.len].lr_value = 0;
1637
ek.nonce = b->nonce;
1638
if (client->entry.valid_end || client->entry.pw_end) {
1639
ALLOC(ek.key_expiration);
1640
if (client->entry.valid_end) {
1641
if (client->entry.pw_end)
1642
*ek.key_expiration = min(*client->entry.valid_end,
1643
*client->entry.pw_end);
1645
*ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.valid_end;
1647
*ek.key_expiration = *client->entry.pw_end;
1649
ek.key_expiration = NULL;
1650
ek.flags = et.flags;
1651
ek.authtime = et.authtime;
1653
ALLOC(ek.starttime);
1654
*ek.starttime = *et.starttime;
1656
ek.endtime = et.endtime;
1657
if (et.renew_till) {
1658
ALLOC(ek.renew_till);
1659
*ek.renew_till = *et.renew_till;
1661
copy_Realm(&rep.ticket.realm, &ek.srealm);
1662
copy_PrincipalName(&rep.ticket.sname, &ek.sname);
1665
copy_HostAddresses(et.caddr, ek.caddr);
1670
e_text = "Failed to build PK-INIT reply";
1671
ret = _kdc_pk_mk_pa_reply(context, config, pkp, client,
1672
sessionetype, req, req_buffer,
1673
&reply_key, &et.key, rep.padata);
1676
ret = _kdc_add_inital_verified_cas(context,
1686
ret = krb5_generate_random_keyblock(context, sessionetype, &et.key);
1691
if (reply_key == NULL) {
1692
e_text = "Client have no reply key";
1693
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NOTYET;
1697
ret = copy_EncryptionKey(&et.key, &ek.key);
1701
/* Add signing of alias referral */
1702
if (f.canonicalize) {
1703
PA_ClientCanonicalized canon;
1706
krb5_crypto cryptox;
1709
memset(&canon, 0, sizeof(canon));
1711
canon.names.requested_name = *b->cname;
1712
canon.names.mapped_name = client->entry.principal->name;
1714
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalizedNames, data.data, data.length,
1715
&canon.names, &len, ret);
1718
if (data.length != len)
1719
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
1721
/* sign using "returned session key" */
1722
ret = krb5_crypto_init(context, &et.key, 0, &cryptox);
1728
ret = krb5_create_checksum(context, cryptox,
1729
KRB5_KU_CANONICALIZED_NAMES, 0,
1730
data.data, data.length,
1731
&canon.canon_checksum);
1733
krb5_crypto_destroy(context, cryptox);
1737
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(PA_ClientCanonicalized, data.data, data.length,
1739
free_Checksum(&canon.canon_checksum);
1742
if (data.length != len)
1743
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 error");
1745
pa.padata_type = KRB5_PADATA_CLIENT_CANONICALIZED;
1746
pa.padata_value = data;
1747
ret = add_METHOD_DATA(rep.padata, &pa);
1753
if (rep.padata->len == 0) {
1759
if (send_pac_p(context, req)) {
1763
ret = _kdc_pac_generate(context, client, &p);
1765
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC generation failed for -- %s",
1770
ret = _krb5_pac_sign(context, p, et.authtime,
1771
client->entry.principal,
1772
&skey->key, /* Server key */
1773
&skey->key, /* FIXME: should be krbtgt key */
1775
krb5_pac_free(context, p);
1777
kdc_log(context, config, 0, "PAC signing failed for -- %s",
1782
ret = _kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(context, &et,
1783
KRB5_AUTHDATA_WIN2K_PAC,
1785
krb5_data_free(&data);
1791
_kdc_log_timestamp(context, config, "AS-REQ", et.authtime, et.starttime,
1792
et.endtime, et.renew_till);
1794
/* do this as the last thing since this signs the EncTicketPart */
1795
ret = _kdc_add_KRB5SignedPath(context,
1799
client->entry.principal,
1806
log_as_req(context, config, reply_key->keytype, setype, b);
1808
ret = _kdc_encode_reply(context, config,
1809
&rep, &et, &ek, setype, server->entry.kvno,
1810
&skey->key, client->entry.kvno,
1811
reply_key, 0, &e_text, reply);
1812
free_EncTicketPart(&et);
1813
free_EncKDCRepPart(&ek);
1818
if (datagram_reply && reply->length > config->max_datagram_reply_length) {
1819
krb5_data_free(reply);
1820
ret = KRB5KRB_ERR_RESPONSE_TOO_BIG;
1821
e_text = "Reply packet too large";
1826
if(ret != 0 && ret != HDB_ERR_NOT_FOUND_HERE){
1827
krb5_mk_error(context,
1830
(e_data.data ? &e_data : NULL),
1840
_kdc_pk_free_client_param(context, pkp);
1845
krb5_free_principal(context, client_princ);
1848
krb5_free_principal(context, server_princ);
1851
_kdc_free_ent(context, client);
1853
_kdc_free_ent(context, server);
1858
* Add the AuthorizationData `data´ of `type´ to the last element in
1859
* the sequence of authorization_data in `tkt´ wrapped in an IF_RELEVANT
1863
_kdc_tkt_add_if_relevant_ad(krb5_context context,
1866
const krb5_data *data)
1868
krb5_error_code ret;
1871
if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
1872
tkt->authorization_data = calloc(1, sizeof(*tkt->authorization_data));
1873
if (tkt->authorization_data == NULL) {
1874
krb5_set_error_message(context, ENOMEM, "out of memory");
1879
/* add the entry to the last element */
1881
AuthorizationData ad = { 0, NULL };
1882
AuthorizationDataElement ade;
1885
ade.ad_data = *data;
1887
ret = add_AuthorizationData(&ad, &ade);
1889
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");
1893
ade.ad_type = KRB5_AUTHDATA_IF_RELEVANT;
1895
ASN1_MALLOC_ENCODE(AuthorizationData,
1896
ade.ad_data.data, ade.ad_data.length,
1898
free_AuthorizationData(&ad);
1900
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "ASN.1 encode of "
1901
"AuthorizationData failed");
1904
if (ade.ad_data.length != size)
1905
krb5_abortx(context, "internal asn.1 encoder error");
1907
ret = add_AuthorizationData(tkt->authorization_data, &ade);
1908
der_free_octet_string(&ade.ad_data);
1910
krb5_set_error_message(context, ret, "add AuthorizationData failed");