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:mod:`rexec` --- Restricted execution framework
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===============================================
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:synopsis: Basic restricted execution framework.
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The :mod:`rexec` module has been removed in Python 3.0.
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.. versionchanged:: 2.3
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The documentation has been left in place to help in reading old code that uses
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This module contains the :class:`RExec` class, which supports :meth:`r_eval`,
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:meth:`r_execfile`, :meth:`r_exec`, and :meth:`r_import` methods, which are
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restricted versions of the standard Python functions :meth:`eval`,
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:meth:`execfile` and the :keyword:`exec` and :keyword:`import` statements. Code
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executed in this restricted environment will only have access to modules and
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functions that are deemed safe; you can subclass :class:`RExec` to add or remove
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capabilities as desired.
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While the :mod:`rexec` module is designed to perform as described below, it does
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have a few known vulnerabilities which could be exploited by carefully written
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code. Thus it should not be relied upon in situations requiring "production
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ready" security. In such situations, execution via sub-processes or very
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careful "cleansing" of both code and data to be processed may be necessary.
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Alternatively, help in patching known :mod:`rexec` vulnerabilities would be
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The :class:`RExec` class can prevent code from performing unsafe operations like
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reading or writing disk files, or using TCP/IP sockets. However, it does not
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protect against code using extremely large amounts of memory or processor time.
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.. class:: RExec([hooks[, verbose]])
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Returns an instance of the :class:`RExec` class.
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*hooks* is an instance of the :class:`RHooks` class or a subclass of it. If it
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is omitted or ``None``, the default :class:`RHooks` class is instantiated.
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Whenever the :mod:`rexec` module searches for a module (even a built-in one) or
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reads a module's code, it doesn't actually go out to the file system itself.
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Rather, it calls methods of an :class:`RHooks` instance that was passed to or
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created by its constructor. (Actually, the :class:`RExec` object doesn't make
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these calls --- they are made by a module loader object that's part of the
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:class:`RExec` object. This allows another level of flexibility, which can be
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useful when changing the mechanics of :keyword:`import` within the restricted
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By providing an alternate :class:`RHooks` object, we can control the file system
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accesses made to import a module, without changing the actual algorithm that
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controls the order in which those accesses are made. For instance, we could
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substitute an :class:`RHooks` object that passes all filesystem requests to a
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file server elsewhere, via some RPC mechanism such as ILU. Grail's applet
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loader uses this to support importing applets from a URL for a directory.
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If *verbose* is true, additional debugging output may be sent to standard
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It is important to be aware that code running in a restricted environment can
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still call the :func:`sys.exit` function. To disallow restricted code from
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exiting the interpreter, always protect calls that cause restricted code to run
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with a :keyword:`try`/:keyword:`except` statement that catches the
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:exc:`SystemExit` exception. Removing the :func:`sys.exit` function from the
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restricted environment is not sufficient --- the restricted code could still use
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``raise SystemExit``. Removing :exc:`SystemExit` is not a reasonable option;
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some library code makes use of this and would break were it not available.
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`Grail Home Page <http://grail.sourceforge.net/>`_
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Grail is a Web browser written entirely in Python. It uses the :mod:`rexec`
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module as a foundation for supporting Python applets, and can be used as an
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example usage of this module.
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:class:`RExec` instances support the following methods:
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.. method:: RExec.r_eval(code)
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*code* must either be a string containing a Python expression, or a compiled
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code object, which will be evaluated in the restricted environment's
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:mod:`__main__` module. The value of the expression or code object will be
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.. method:: RExec.r_exec(code)
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*code* must either be a string containing one or more lines of Python code, or a
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compiled code object, which will be executed in the restricted environment's
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:mod:`__main__` module.
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.. method:: RExec.r_execfile(filename)
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Execute the Python code contained in the file *filename* in the restricted
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environment's :mod:`__main__` module.
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Methods whose names begin with ``s_`` are similar to the functions beginning
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with ``r_``, but the code will be granted access to restricted versions of the
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standard I/O streams ``sys.stdin``, ``sys.stderr``, and ``sys.stdout``.
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.. method:: RExec.s_eval(code)
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*code* must be a string containing a Python expression, which will be evaluated
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in the restricted environment.
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.. method:: RExec.s_exec(code)
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*code* must be a string containing one or more lines of Python code, which will
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be executed in the restricted environment.
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.. method:: RExec.s_execfile(code)
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Execute the Python code contained in the file *filename* in the restricted
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:class:`RExec` objects must also support various methods which will be
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implicitly called by code executing in the restricted environment. Overriding
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these methods in a subclass is used to change the policies enforced by a
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restricted environment.
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.. method:: RExec.r_import(modulename[, globals[, locals[, fromlist]]])
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Import the module *modulename*, raising an :exc:`ImportError` exception if the
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module is considered unsafe.
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.. method:: RExec.r_open(filename[, mode[, bufsize]])
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Method called when :func:`open` is called in the restricted environment. The
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arguments are identical to those of :func:`open`, and a file object (or a class
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instance compatible with file objects) should be returned. :class:`RExec`'s
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default behaviour is allow opening any file for reading, but forbidding any
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attempt to write a file. See the example below for an implementation of a less
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restrictive :meth:`r_open`.
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.. method:: RExec.r_reload(module)
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Reload the module object *module*, re-parsing and re-initializing it.
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.. method:: RExec.r_unload(module)
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Unload the module object *module* (remove it from the restricted environment's
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``sys.modules`` dictionary).
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And their equivalents with access to restricted standard I/O streams:
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.. method:: RExec.s_import(modulename[, globals[, locals[, fromlist]]])
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Import the module *modulename*, raising an :exc:`ImportError` exception if the
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module is considered unsafe.
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.. method:: RExec.s_reload(module)
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Reload the module object *module*, re-parsing and re-initializing it.
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.. method:: RExec.s_unload(module)
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Unload the module object *module*.
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.. XXX what are the semantics of this?
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Defining restricted environments
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--------------------------------
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The :class:`RExec` class has the following class attributes, which are used by
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the :meth:`__init__` method. Changing them on an existing instance won't have
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any effect; instead, create a subclass of :class:`RExec` and assign them new
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values in the class definition. Instances of the new class will then use those
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new values. All these attributes are tuples of strings.
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.. attribute:: RExec.nok_builtin_names
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Contains the names of built-in functions which will *not* be available to
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programs running in the restricted environment. The value for :class:`RExec` is
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``('open', 'reload', '__import__')``. (This gives the exceptions, because by far
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the majority of built-in functions are harmless. A subclass that wants to
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override this variable should probably start with the value from the base class
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and concatenate additional forbidden functions --- when new dangerous built-in
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functions are added to Python, they will also be added to this module.)
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.. attribute:: RExec.ok_builtin_modules
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Contains the names of built-in modules which can be safely imported. The value
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for :class:`RExec` is ``('audioop', 'array', 'binascii', 'cmath', 'errno',
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'imageop', 'marshal', 'math', 'md5', 'operator', 'parser', 'regex', 'select',
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'sha', '_sre', 'strop', 'struct', 'time')``. A similar remark about overriding
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this variable applies --- use the value from the base class as a starting point.
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.. attribute:: RExec.ok_path
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Contains the directories which will be searched when an :keyword:`import` is
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performed in the restricted environment. The value for :class:`RExec` is the
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same as ``sys.path`` (at the time the module is loaded) for unrestricted code.
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.. attribute:: RExec.ok_posix_names
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Contains the names of the functions in the :mod:`os` module which will be
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available to programs running in the restricted environment. The value for
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:class:`RExec` is ``('error', 'fstat', 'listdir', 'lstat', 'readlink', 'stat',
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'times', 'uname', 'getpid', 'getppid', 'getcwd', 'getuid', 'getgid', 'geteuid',
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.. Should this be called ok_os_names?
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.. attribute:: RExec.ok_sys_names
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Contains the names of the functions and variables in the :mod:`sys` module which
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will be available to programs running in the restricted environment. The value
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for :class:`RExec` is ``('ps1', 'ps2', 'copyright', 'version', 'platform',
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.. attribute:: RExec.ok_file_types
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Contains the file types from which modules are allowed to be loaded. Each file
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type is an integer constant defined in the :mod:`imp` module. The meaningful
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values are :const:`PY_SOURCE`, :const:`PY_COMPILED`, and :const:`C_EXTENSION`.
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The value for :class:`RExec` is ``(C_EXTENSION, PY_SOURCE)``. Adding
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:const:`PY_COMPILED` in subclasses is not recommended; an attacker could exit
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the restricted execution mode by putting a forged byte-compiled file
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(:file:`.pyc`) anywhere in your file system, for example by writing it to
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:file:`/tmp` or uploading it to the :file:`/incoming` directory of your public
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Let us say that we want a slightly more relaxed policy than the standard
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:class:`RExec` class. For example, if we're willing to allow files in
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:file:`/tmp` to be written, we can subclass the :class:`RExec` class::
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class TmpWriterRExec(rexec.RExec):
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def r_open(self, file, mode='r', buf=-1):
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if mode in ('r', 'rb'):
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elif mode in ('w', 'wb', 'a', 'ab'):
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# check filename : must begin with /tmp/
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if file[:5]!='/tmp/':
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raise IOError, "can't write outside /tmp"
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elif (string.find(file, '/../') >= 0 or
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file[:3] == '../' or file[-3:] == '/..'):
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raise IOError, "'..' in filename forbidden"
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else: raise IOError, "Illegal open() mode"
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return open(file, mode, buf)
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Notice that the above code will occasionally forbid a perfectly valid filename;
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for example, code in the restricted environment won't be able to open a file
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called :file:`/tmp/foo/../bar`. To fix this, the :meth:`r_open` method would
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have to simplify the filename to :file:`/tmp/bar`, which would require splitting
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apart the filename and performing various operations on it. In cases where
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security is at stake, it may be preferable to write simple code which is
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sometimes overly restrictive, instead of more general code that is also more
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complex and may harbor a subtle security hole.
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Doc/library/rexec.rst
