~corti-nico/ubuntu/vivid/anarchism/fix1426015 : revision 5

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* What happened during the Russian Revolution?

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1 Can you give a short summary of what happened in 1917?

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2 How did the Bolsheviks gain mass support?

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3 Surely the Russian Revolution proves that vanguard

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parties work?

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4 Was Lenin's "State and Revolution" applied

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after October?

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5 Did the Bolsheviks really aim for Soviet power?

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6 What happened to the soviets after October?

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7 How did the factory committee movement develop?

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8 What was the Bolshevik position on "workers' control"

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in 1917?

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9 What happened to the factory committees after October?

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10 What were the Bolshevik economic policies in 1918?

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11 Did Bolshevik economic policies work?

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12 Was there an alternative to Lenin's "state capitalism"

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and "war communism"?

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13 Did the Bolsheviks allow independent trade unions?

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14 Was the Red Army really a revolutionary army?

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15 Was the Red Army "filled with socialist consciousness"?

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16 How did the civil war start and develop?

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17 Was the civil war between just Reds and Whites?

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18 How extensive was imperialist intervention?

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19 Did the end of the civil war change Bolshevik policies?

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20 Can the Red Terror and the Cheka be justified?

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21 Did Bolshevik peasant policies work?

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22 Was there an alternative to grain requisition?

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23 Was the repression of the socialist opposition justified?

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24 What did the anarchists do during the revolution?

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25 Did the Russian revolution refute anarchism?

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What happened during the Russian Revolution?

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This appendix of the FAQ is not a full history of the Russian

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Revolution. The scope of such a work would simply be too large.

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Instead, this section will concentrate on certain key issues

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which matter in evaluating whether the Bolshevik revolution

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and regime were genuinely socialist or not. This is not all.

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Some Leninists acknowledge that that Bolshevik policies had

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little to do with socialism as such were the best that were

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available at the time. As such, this section will look at

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possible alternatives to Bolshevik policies and see whether

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they were, in fact, inevitable.

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So for those seeking a comprehensive history of the revolution

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will have to look elsewhere. Here, we concentrate on those

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issues which matter when evaluating the socialist content of

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the revolution and of Bolshevism. In other words, the development

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of working class self-activity and self-organisation, workers'

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resistance to their bosses (whether capitalist or "red"), the

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activity of opposition groups and parties and the fate of

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working class organisations like trade unions, factory committees

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and soviets. Moreover, the role of the ruling party and its

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ideals also need to be indicated and evaluated somewhat (see

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section H.9 for a fuller discussion of the role of Bolshevik

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ideology in the defeat of the revolution).

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This means that this section is about two things, what Alexander

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Berkman termed "the Bolshevik Myth" and what Voline called "the

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Unknown Revolution" (these being the titles of their respective

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books on the revolution). After his experiences in Bolshevik

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Russia, Berkman came to the conclusion that it was "[h]igh

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time the truth about the Bolsheviki were told. The whited

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sepulchre must unmasked, the clay feet of the fetish beguiling

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the international proletariat to fatal will o' wisps exposed.

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The Bolshevik myth must be destroyed." By so doing, he aimed

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to help the global revolutionary movement learn from the

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experience of the Russian revolution. Given that "[t]o millions

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of the disinherited and enslaved it became a new religion, the

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beacon of social salvation" it was an "imperative to unmask the

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great delusion, which otherwise might lead the Western workers

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to the same abyss as their brothers in Russia." Bolshevism had

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"failed, utterly and absolutely" and so it was "incumbent upon

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those who have seen though the myth to expose its true nature

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. . . Bolshevism is of the past. The future belongs to man

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and his liberty." [_The Bolshevik Myth_, p. 318 and p. 342]

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Subsequent events proved Berkman correct. Socialism became

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linked to Soviet Russia and as it fell into Stalinism, the

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effect was to discredit socialism, even radical change as

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such, in the eyes of millions. And quite rightly too, given

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the horrors of Stalinism. If more radicals had had the

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foresight of Berkman and the other anarchists, this

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association of socialism and revolution with tyranny would

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have been combated and an alternative, libertarian, form

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of socialism would have risen to take the challenge of

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combating capitalism in the name of a *genuine* socialism,

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rooted in the ideals of liberty, equality and solidarity.

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However, in spite of the horrors of Stalinism many people

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seeking a radical change in society are drawn to Leninism.

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This is partly to do with the fact that in many countries

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Leninist parties have a organised presence and many

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radicalised people come across them first. It is also

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partly to do with the fact that many forms of Leninism

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denounce Stalinism for what it was and raise the possibility

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of the "genuine" Leninism of the Bolshevik party under

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Lenin and Trotsky. This current of Leninism is usually

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called "Trotskyism" and has many offshoots. For some of

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these parties, the differences between Trotskyism and

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Stalinism is pretty narrow. The closer to orthodox

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Trotskyism you get, the more Stalinist it appears. As

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Victor Serge noted of Trotsky's "Fourth International" in

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the 1930s, "in the hearts of the persecuted I encountered

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the same attitudes as in their persecutors [the Stalinists]

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. . . Trotskyism was displaying symptoms of an outlook

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in harmony with the very Stalinism against which it had

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taken its stand . . . any person in the circles of the

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'Fourth International' who went so far as to object to

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[Trotsky's] propositions was promptly expelled and

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denounced in the same language that the bureaucracy had]

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employed against us in the Soviet Union." [_Memoirs of

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a Revolutionary_, p. 349] As we discuss in section H.10.3,

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perhaps this is unsurprising given how much politically

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Trotsky's "Left Opposition" had shared with Stalinism.

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Other Trotskyist parties have avoided the worse excesses

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of orthodox Trotskyism. Parties associated with the

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_International Socialists_, for example portray

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themselves as defending what they like to term "socialism

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from below" and the democratic promise of Bolshevik as

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expressed during 1917 and in the early months of Bolshevik

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rule. While anarchists are somewhat sceptical that Leninism

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can be called "socialism from below" (see section H.3.3),

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we need to address the claim that the period between

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February 1917 to the start of the Russian civil war at the

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end of May 1918 shows the real nature of Bolshevism. In

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order to do that we need to discuss what the Russian

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anarchist Voline called "The Unknown Revolution."

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So what is the "Unknown Revolution"? Voline, an active

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participant in 1917 Russian Revolution, used that

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expression as the title of his classic account of the

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Russian revolution. He used it to refer to the rarely

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acknowledged independent, creative actions of the

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revolutionary people themselves. As Voline argued,

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"it is not known how to study a revolution" and most

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historians "mistrust and ignore those developments

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which occur silently in the depths of the revolution

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. . . at best, they accord them a few words in passing

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. . . [Yet] it is precisely these hidden facts which

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are important, and which throw a true light on the

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events under consideration and on the period." This

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section of the FAQ will try and present this "unknown

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revolution," those movements "which fought the

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Bolshevik power in the name of true liberty and of

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the principles of the Social Revolution which that

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power had scoffed at and trampled underfoot." [_The

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Unknown Revolution_, p. 19 and p. 437] Voline gives

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the Kronstadt rebellion (see section H.7) and the

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Makhnovist movement (see section H.11) pride of place

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in his account. Here we discuss other movements and

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the Bolshevik response to them.

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Leninist accounts of the Russian Revolution, to a

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surprising extent, fall into the official form of

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history -- a concern more with political leaders

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than with the actions of the masses. Indeed, the

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popular aspects of the revolution are often distorted

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to accord with a predetermined social framework of

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Leninism. Thus the role of the masses is stressed

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during the period before the Bolshevik seizure of

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power. Here the typical Leninist would agree, to

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a large extend, with summarised history of 1917

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we present in section 1. They would undoubtedly

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disagree with the downplaying of the role of the

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Bolshevik party (although as we discuss in section

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2, that party was far from the ideal model of

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the vanguard party of Leninist theory and modern

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Leninist practice). However, the role of the masses

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in the revolution would be praised, as would the

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Bolsheviks for supporting it.

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The real difference arises once the Bolsheviks seize

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power in November 1917 (October, according to the Old

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Style calendar then used). After that, the masses simply

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disappear and into the void steps the leadership of the

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Bolshevik party. For Leninism, the "unknown revolution"

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simply stops. The sad fact is that very little is known

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about the dynamics of the revolution at the grassroots,

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particularly after October. Incredible as it may sound,

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very few Leninists are that interested in the realities

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of "workers' power" under the Bolsheviks or the actual

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performance and fate of such working class institutions

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as soviets, factory committees and co-operatives. What

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is written is often little more than vague generalities

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that aim to justify authoritarian Bolshevik policies

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which either explicitly aimed to undermine such bodies

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or, at best, resulted in their marginalisation when

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implemented.

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This section of the FAQ aims to make known the "unknown

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revolution" that continued under the Bolsheviks and,

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equally important, the Bolshevik response to it. As

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part of this process we need to address some of the

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key events of that period, such as the role of foreign

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intervention and the impact of the civil war. However,

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we do not go into these issues in depth here and instead

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cover them in depth in section H.8. This is because most

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Leninists excuse Bolshevik authoritarianism on the impact

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of the civil war, regardless of the facts of the matter.

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As we discuss in section H.9, the ideology of Bolshevism

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played its role as well -- something that modern day

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Leninists strenuously deny (again, regardless of the

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obvious). As we indicate in this section, the idea that

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Bolshevism came into conflict with the "unknown revolution"

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is simply not viable. Bolshevik ideology and practice made

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it inevitable that this conflict erupted, as it did *before*

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the start of the civil war (also see section H.8.3).

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Ultimately, the reason why Leninist ideas still have

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influence on the socialist movement is due to the apparent

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success of the Russian Revolution. Many Leninist groups,

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mainly Trotskyists and derivatives of Trotskyism, point to

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"Red October" and the creation of the first ever workers

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state as concrete examples of the validity of their ideas.

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They point to Lenin's _State and Revolution_ as proving the

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"democratic" (even "libertarian") nature of Leninism while,

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at the same time, supporting the party dictatorship he

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created and, moreover, rationalising the utter lack of

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working class freedom and power under it. We will try to

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indicate the falseness of such claims. As will become clear

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from this section, the following summation of an anonymous

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revolutionary is totally correct:

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"Every notion about revolution inherited from Bolshevism

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is false."

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In this, they were simply repeating the conclusions of

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anarchists. As Kropotkin stressed in 1920:

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"It seems to me that this attempt to build a communist

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republic on the basis of a strongly centralised state,

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under the iron law of the dictatorship of one party, has

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ended in a terrible fiasco. Russia teaches us how not to

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impose communism." [Peter Kropotkin, quoted by Guerin,

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_Anarchism_, p. 106]

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Ultimately, the experience of Bolshevism was a disaster.

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And as the Makhnovists in the Ukraine proved, Bolshevik

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ideology and practice was *not* the only option available

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(see section H.11). There *were* alternatives, but

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Bolshevik ideology simply excluded using them (we will

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discuss some possibilities in this various sub-sections

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below). In other words, Bolshevik ideology is simply not

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suitable for a real revolutionary movement and the problems

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it will face. In fact, its ideology and practice ensures

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that any such problems will be magnified and made worse,

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as the Russian revolution proves.

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Sadly many socialists cannot bring themselves to acknowledge

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this. While recognising the evils of the Stalinist bureaucracy,

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these socialists deny that this degeneration of Bolshevism

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was inevitable and was caused by outside factors (namely

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the Russian Civil War or isolation). While not denying

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that these factors did have an effect in the outcome of

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the Russian Revolution, the seeds for bureaucracy existed

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from the first moment of the Bolshevik insurrection. These

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seeds where from three sources: Bolshevik politics, the

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nature of the state and the post-October economic

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arrangements favoured and implemented by the ruling party.

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As we will indicate, these three factors caused the new

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"workers' state" to degenerate long before the out break

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of the Civil war in May of 1918. This means that the

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revolution was *not* defeated primarily because of

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isolation or the effects of the civil war. The Bolsheviks

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had already seriously undermined it from within *long

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before* the effects of isolation or civil war had a chance

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to take hold. The civil war which started in the summer

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of 1918 did take its toll in what revolutionary gains

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survived, not least because it allowed the Bolsheviks

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to portray themselves and their policies as the lessor

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of two evils. However, Lenin's regime was already

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defending (state) capitalism against genuine socialist

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tendencies before the outbreak of civil war (see section

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H.9). The suppression of Kronstadt in March 1921 was simply

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the logical end result of a process that had started in

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the spring of 1918, at the latest. As such, isolation

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and civil war are hardly good excuses -- particularly as

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anarchists had predicted they would affect every revolution

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decades previously (see section H.8.1) and Leninists

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are meant to realise that civil war and revolution are

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inevitable (see section H.8.2). Also, it must be stressed

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that Bolshevik rule was opposed by the working class, who

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took collective action to resist it (see section H.8.5)

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and the Bolsheviks justified their policies in ideological

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terms and *not* in terms of measures required by difficult

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circumstances (see section H.8.6).

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One last thing. We are sure, in chronicling the "excesses"

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of the Bolshevik regime, that some Leninists will say "they

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sound exactly like the right-wing." Presumably, if we said

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that the sun rises in the East and sets in the West we would

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also "sound like the right-wing." That the right-wing also

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points to certain *facts* of the revolution does not in any

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way discredit these facts. How these facts are used is what

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counts. The right uses the facts to discredit socialism and

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the revolution. Anarchists use them to argue for libertarian

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socialism and support the revolution while opposing the

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Bolshevik ideology and practice which distorted it. Similarly,

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unlike the right we take into account the factors which

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Leninists urge us to use to excuse Bolshevik authoritarianism

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(such as civil war, economic collapse and so on). We are

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simply not convinced by Leninist arguments (see section H.8

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for further discussion).

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Needless to say, few Leninists apply their logic to

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Stalinism. To attack Stalinism by describing the

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facts of the regime would make one sound like the

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"right-wing." Does that mean socialists should

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defend one of the most horrific dictatorships that ever

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existed? If so, how does that sound to non-socialists?

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Surely they would conclude that socialism *is* about

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Stalinism, dictatorship, terror and so on? If not, why

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not? If "sounding like the right" makes criticism of

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Lenin's regime anti-revolutionary, then why does this not

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apply to Stalinism? Simply because Lenin and Trotsky were

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not at the head of the dictatorship as they were in the

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early 1920s? Does the individuals who are in charge

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override the social relations of a society? Does

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dictatorship and one-man management become less so

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when Lenin rules? The apologists for Lenin and Trotsky

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point to the necessity created by the civil war and

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isolation within international capitalism for their

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authoritarian policies (while ignoring the fact they

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started *before* the civil war, continued after it

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*and were justified at the time* in terms of Bolshevik

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ideology). Stalin could make the same claim.

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Other objections may be raised. It may be claimed that we

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quote "bourgeois" (or even worse, *Menshevik*) sources and

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so our account is flawed. In reply, we have to state that

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you cannot judge a regime based purely on what it says about

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itself. As such, critical accounts are required to paint a

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full picture of events. Moreover, it is a sad fact that few,

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if any, Leninist accounts of the Russian Revolution actually

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discuss the class and social dynamics (and struggles) of the

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period under Lenin and Trotsky. This means we have to utilise

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the sources which *do,* namely those historians who do not

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identify with the Bolshevik regime. And, of course, any

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analysis (or defence) of the Bolshevik regime will have to

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account for critical accounts, either by refuting them or

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by showing their limitations. As will become obvious in our

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discussion, the reason why latter day Bolsheviks talk about

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the class dynamics post-October in the most superficial way

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is that it would be hard, even impossible, to maintain that

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Lenin's regime was remotely socialist or based on working

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class power. Simply put, from early 1918 (at the latest)

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conflict between the Bolsheviks and the Russian working

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masses was a constant feature of the regime. It is only

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when that conflict reached massive proportions that

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Leninists do not (i.e. cannot) ignore it. In such cases,

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as the Kronstadt rebellion proves, history is distorted in

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order to defend the Bolshevik state (see section H.7 for

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details).

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The fact that Leninists try to discredit anarchists by

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saying that we sound like the right is sad. In effect,

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it *blocks* any real discussion of the Russian Revolution

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and Bolshevism (as intended, probably). This ensures that

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Leninism remains above critique and so no lessons can be

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learnt from the Russian experience. After all, if the

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Bolsheviks had no choice then what lessons *are* there to

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learn? None. And if we are to learn no lessons (bar,

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obviously, mimic the Bolsheviks) we are doomed to repeat

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the same mistakes -- mistakes that are partly explained

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by the objective circumstances at the time and partly by

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Bolshevik politics. But given that most of the circumstances

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the Bolsheviks faced, such as civil war and isolation, are

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likely to reappear in any future revolution, modern-day

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Leninists are simply ensuring that Karl Marx was right --

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history repeats itself, first time as tragedy, second time

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as farce.

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Such a position is, of course, wonderful for the

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pro-Leninist. It allows them to quote Lenin and

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Trotsky and use the Bolsheviks as the paradigm of

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revolution while washing their hands of the results

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of that revolution. By arguing that the Bolsheviks

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were "making a virtue of necessity," (to use the

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expression of Leninist Donny Gluckstein [_The Tragedy

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of Bukharin_, p. 41]), they are automatically absolved

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of proving their arguments about the "democratic"

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essence of Bolshevism in power. Which is useful as,

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logically, no such evidence could exist and, in fact,

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there is a whole host of evidence pointing the other

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way which can, by happy co-incidence, be ignored.

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Indeed, from this perspective there is no point even

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discussing the revolution at all, beyond praising the

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activities and ideology of the Bolsheviks while sadly

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noting that "fate" (to quote Leninist Tony Cliff)

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ensured that they could not fulfil their promises.

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Which, of course, almost Leninist accounts *do* boil

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down to. Thus, for the modern Leninist, the Bolsheviks

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cannot be judged on what they did nor what they said

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while doing it (or even after). They can only be praised

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for what they said and did *before* they seized power.

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However, anarchists have a problem with this position. It

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smacks more of religion than theory. Karl Marx was right to

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argue that you cannot judge people by what they say, only

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by what they do. It is in this revolutionary spirit that

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this section of the FAQ analyses the Russian revolution and

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the Bolshevik role within it. We need to analyse what they

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did when they held power as well as the election manifesto.

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As we will indicate in this section, neither was particularly

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appealing.

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Finally, we should note that Leninists today have various

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arguments to justify what the Bolsheviks did once in power.

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We discuss these in section H.8. We also discuss in section

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H.9 the ideological roots of the counter-revolutionary

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role of the Bolsheviks during the revolution. That the

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politics of the Bolsheviks played its role in the failure

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of the revolution can be seen from the example of the

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anarchist influenced Makhnovist movement which applied

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basic libertarian principles in the same difficult

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circumstances of the Russian Civil War (see section H.11

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on this important movement).

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3 Surely the Russian Revolution proves that vanguard

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parties work?

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No, far from it. Looking at the history of vanguardism we

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are struck by its failures, not its successes. Indeed, the

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proponents of "democratic centralism" can point to only one

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apparent success of their model, namely the Russian Revolution.

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However, we are warned by Leninists that failure to use the

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vanguard party will inevitably condemn future revolutions to

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failure:

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"The proletariat can take power only through its vanguard. . .

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Without the confidence of the class in the vanguard, without

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support of the vanguard by the class, there can be no talk

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of the conquest of power . . . The Soviets are the only

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organised form of the tie between the vanguard and the

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class. A revolutionary content can be given this form

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only by the party. This is proved by the positive

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experience of the October Revolution and by the negative

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experience of other countries (Germany, Austria, finally,

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Spain). No one has either shown in practice or tried to

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explain articulately on paper how the proletariat can

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seize power without the political leadership of a party

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that knows what it wants." [_Stalinism and Bolshevism_]

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To anarchist ears, such claims seem out of place. After all,

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did the Russian Revolution actually result in socialism or

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even a viable form of soviet democracy? Far from it. Unless

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you picture revolution as simply the changing of the party

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in power, you have to acknowledge that while the Bolshevik

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party *did* take power in Russian in November 1917, the net

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effect of this was *not* the stated goals that justified

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that action. Thus, if we take the term "effective" to mean

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"an efficient means to achieve the desired goals" then

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vanguardism has not been proven to be effective, quite

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the reverse (assuming that your desired goal is a socialist

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society, rather than party power). Needless to say, Trotsky

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blames the failure of the Russian Revolution on "objective"

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factors rather than Bolshevik policies and practice, an

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argument we address in detail in section H.8 and will not

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do so here.

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So while Leninists make great claims for the effectiveness of

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their chosen kind of party, the hard facts of history are

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against their positive evaluation of vanguard parties.

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Ironically, even the Russian Revolution disproves the claims

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of Leninists. The fact is that the Bolshevik party in 1917

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was very far from the "democratic centralist" organisation

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which supporters of "vanguardism" like to claim it is. As

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such, its success in 1917 lies more in its divergence from

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the principles of "democratic centralism" than in their

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application. The subsequent degeneration of the revolution

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and the party is marked by the increasing *application*

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of those principles in the life of the party.

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Thus, to refute the claims of the "effectiveness" and "efficiency"

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of vanguardism, we need to look at its one and only success, namely

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the Russian Revolution. As the Cohen-Bendit brothers argue, "far

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from leading the Russian Revolution forwards, the Bolsheviks were

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responsible for holding back the struggle of the masses between

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February and October 1917, and later for turning the revolution

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into a bureaucratic counter-revolution -- in both cases because

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of the party's very nature, structure and ideology." Indeed,

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"[f]rom April to October, Lenin had to fight a constant battle

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to keep the Party leadership in tune with the masses." [_Obsolete

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Communism_, p. 183 and p. 187] It was only by continually violating

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its own "nature, structure and ideology" that the Bolshevik party

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played an important role in the revolution. Whenever the principles

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of "democratic centralism" were applied, the Bolshevik party played

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the role the Cohen-Bendit brothers subscribed to it (and once in

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power, the party's negative features came to the fore).

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Even Leninists acknowledge that, to quote Tony Cliff, throughout

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the history of Bolshevism, "a certain conservatism arose." Indeed,

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"[a]t practically all sharp turning points, Lenin had to rely on

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the lower strata of the party machine against the higher, or on

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the rank and file against the machine as a whole." [_Lenin_,

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vol. 2, p. 135] This fact, incidentally, refutes the basic

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assumptions of Lenin's party schema, namely that the broad party

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membership, like the working class, was subject to bourgeois

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influences so necessitating central leadership and control from

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above.

505

506

Looking at both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, we are struck

507

by how often this "conservatism" arose and how often the higher

508

bodies were behind the spontaneous actions of the masses and

509

the party membership. Looking at the 1905 revolution, we discover

510

a classic example of the inefficiency of "democratic centralism."

511

Facing in 1905 the rise of the soviets, councils of workers'

512

delegates elected to co-ordinate strikes and other forms of

513

struggle, the Bolsheviks did not know what to do. "The

514

Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks," noted Trotsky, "was

515

frightened at first by such an innovation as a non-partisan

516

representation of the embattled masses, and could find nothing

517

better to do than to present the Soviet with an ultimatum:

518

immediately adopt a Social-Democratic program or disband. The

519

Petersburg Soviet as a whole, including the contingent of

520

Bolshevik workingmen as well ignored this ultimatum without

521

batting an eyelash." [_Stalin_, vol. 1, p. 106] More than

522

that, "[t]he party's Central Committee published the resolution

523

on October 27, thereby making it the binding directive for all

524

other Bolshevik organisations." [Oskar Anweiler, _The Soviets_,

525

p. 77] It was only the return of Lenin which stopped the

526

Bolshevik's open attacks against the Soviet (also see

527

section H.9.8).

528

529

The rationale for these attacks is significant. The St.

530

Petersburg Bolsheviks were convinced that "only a strong

531

party along class lines can guide the proletarian political

532

movement and preserve the integrity of its program, rather

533

than a political mixture of this kind, an indeterminate and

534

vacillating political organisation such as the workers council

535

represents and cannot help but represent." [quoted by Anweiler,

536

Op. Cit., p. 77] In other words, the soviets could not reflect

537

workers' interests because they were elected by the workers!

538

The implications of this perspective came clear in 1918, when

539

the Bolsheviks gerrymandered and disbanded soviets to remain

540

in power (see section 6). That the Bolshevik's position

541

flowed naturally from Lenin's arguments in _What is to be

542

Done?_ is clear. Thus the underlying logic of Lenin's

543

vanguardism ensured that the Bolsheviks played a negative

544

role with regards the soviets which, combined with "democratic

545

centralism" ensured that it was spread far and wide. Only by

546

ignoring their own party's principles and staying in the

547

Soviet did rank and file Bolsheviks play a positive role in

548

the revolution. This divergence of top and bottom would be

549

repeated in 1917.

550

551

Given this, perhaps it is unsurprising that Leninists started

552

to rewrite the history of the 1905 revolution. Victor Serge,

553

a "Left Oppositionist" and anti-Stalinist asserted in the

554

late 1920s that in 1905 the Petrograd Soviet was "led by

555

Trotsky and inspired by the Bolsheviks." [_Year One of the

556

Russian Revolution_, p. 36]. While the former claim is correct,

557

the latter is not. As noted, the Bolsheviks were initially

558

opposed the soviets and systematically worked to undermine

559

them. Unsurprisingly, Trotsky at that time was a Menshevik,

560

not a Bolshevik. After all, how could the most revolutionary

561

party that ever existed have messed up so badly? How could

562

democratic centralism faired so badly in practice? Best,

563

then, to suggest that it did not and give the Bolsheviks

564

a role better suited to the rhetoric of Bolshevism than

565

its reality.

566

567

Trotsky was no different. He, needless to say, denied

568

the obvious implications of these events in 1905. While

569

admitting that the Bolsheviks "adjusted themselves more

570

slowly to the sweep of the movement" and that the Mensheviks

571

"were preponderant in the Soviet," he tries to save vanguardism

572

by asserting that "the general direction of the Soviet's

573

policy proceeded in the main along Bolshevik lines." So, in

574

spite of the lack of Bolshevik influence, in spite of the

575

slowness in adjusting to the revolution, Bolshevism was, in

576

fact, the leading set of ideas in the revolution! Ironically,

577

a few pages later, he mocks the claims of Stalinists that Stalin

578

had "isolated the Mensheviks from the masses" by noting that

579

the "figures hardly bear [the claims] out." [Op. Cit., p. 112

580

and p. 117] Shame he did not apply this criteria to his own

581

claims.

582

583

Of course, every party makes mistakes. The question is,

584

how did the "most revolutionary party of all time" fare

585

in 1917. Surely that revolution proves the validity of

586

vanguardism and "democratic centralism"? After all, there

587

was a successful revolution, the Bolshevik party did seize

588

power. However, the apparent success of 1917 was not due

589

to the application of "democratic centralism," quite the

590

reverse. While the myth of 1917 is that a highly efficient,

591

democratic centralist vanguard party ensured the overthrow

592

of the Provisional Government in November 1917 in favour

593

of the Soviets (or so it seemed at the time) the facts are

594

somewhat different. Rather, the Bolshevik party throughout

595

1917 was a fairly loose collection of local organisations

596

(each more than willing to ignore central commands and

597

express their autonomy), with much internal dissent and

598

infighting and no discipline beyond what was created by

599

common loyalty. The "democratic centralist" party, as

600

desired by Lenin, was only created in the course of the

601

Civil War and the tightening of the party dictatorship.

602

In other words, the party became more like a "democratic

603

centralist" one as the revolution degenerated. As such,

604

the various followers of Lenin (Stalinists, Trotskyists

605

and their multitude of offshoots) subscribe to a myth,

606

which probably explains their lack of success in

607

reproducing a similar organisation since. So assuming

608

that the Bolsheviks did play an important role in the

609

Russian revolution, it was because it was *not* the

610

centralised, disciplined Bolshevik party of Leninist

611

myth. Indeed, when the party *did* operate in a vanguardist

612

manner, failure was soon to follow.

613

614

This claim can be proven by looking at the history of the

615

1917 revolution. The February revolution started with a

616

spontaneous protests and strikes. As Murray Bookchin

617

notes, "the Petrograd organisation of the Bolsheviks

618

opposed the calling of strikes precisely on the eve of

619

the revolution which was destined to overthrow the

620

Tsar. Fortunately, the workers ignored the Bolshevik

621

'directives' and went on strike anyway. In the events

622

which followed, no one was more surprised by the revolution

623

than the 'revolutionary' parties, including the Bolsheviks."

624

[_Post-Scarcity Anarchism_, p. 194] Trotsky quotes one

625

of the Bolshevik leaders at the time:

626

627

"Absolutely no guiding initiative from the party centres

628

was felt . . . the Petrograd Committee had been arrested

629

and the representative of the Central Committee . . . was

630

unable to give any directives for the coming day." [quoted

631

by Trotsky, _History of the Russian Revolution_, vol. 1,

632

p. 147]

633

634

Not the best of starts. Of course rank and file Bolsheviks

635

took part in the demonstrations, street fights and strikes

636

and so violated the principles their party was meant

637

to be based on. As the revolution progressed, so did the

638

dual nature of the Bolshevik party (i.e. its practical

639

divergence from "democratic centralism" in order to be

640

effective and attempts to force it back into that schema

641

which handicapped the revolution). However, during 1917,

642

"democratic centralism" was ignored in order to ensure the

643

the Bolsheviks played any role at all in the revolution.

644

As one historian of the party makes clear, in 1917 and

645

until the outbreak of the Civil War, the party operated

646

in ways that few modern "vanguard" parties would tolerate:

647

648

"The committees were a law unto themselves when it came to

649

accepting orders from above. Democratic centralism, as

650

vague a principle of internal administration as there ever

651

has been, was commonly held at least to enjoin lower

652

executive bodies that they should obey the behests of all

653

higher bodies in the organisational hierarchy. But town

654

committees in practice had the devil's own job in imposing

655

firm leadership . . . Insubordination was the rule of the

656

day whenever lower party bodies thought questions of

657

importance were at stake.

658

659

"Suburb committees too faced difficulties in imposing

660

discipline. Many a party cell saw fit to thumb its nose

661

at higher authority and to pursue policies which it

662

felt to be more suited to local circumstances or more

663

desirable in general. No great secret was made of this.

664

In fact, it was openly admitted that hardly a party

665

committee existed which did not encounter problems

666

in enforcing its will even upon individual activists."

667

[Robert Service, _The Bolshevik Party in Revolution

668

1917-1923_, pp. 51-2]

669

670

So while Lenin's ideal model of a disciplined, centralised

671

and top-down party had been expounded since 1902, the

672

operation of the party never matched his desire. As Service

673

notes, "a disciplined hierarchy of command stretching down

674

from the regional committees to party cells" had "never

675

existed in Bolshevik history." In the heady days of the

676

revolution, when the party was flooded by new members,

677

the party ignored what was meant to be its guiding principles.

678

As Service constantly stresses, Bolshevik party life in

679

1917 was the exact opposite of that usually considered

680

(by both opponents and supporters of Bolshevism) as it

681

normal mode of operation. "Anarchist attitudes to higher

682

authority," he argues, "were the rule of the day" and

683

"no Bolshevik leader in his right mind could have

684

contemplated a regular insistence upon rigid standards of

685

hierarchical control and discipline unless he had abandoned

686

all hope of establishing a mass socialist party." This

687

meant that "in the Russia of 1917 it was the easiest thing

688

in the world for lower party bodies to rebut the demands and

689

pleas by higher authority." He stresses that "[s]uburb and

690

town committees . . . often refused to go along with official

691

policies . . . they also . . . sometimes took it into their

692

heads to engage in active obstruction." [Op. Cit., p. 80,

693

p. 62 p. 56 and p. 60]

694

695

This worked both ways, of course. Town committees did "snub

696

their nose at lower-echelon viewpoints in the time before the

697

next election. Try as hard as they might, suburb committees

698

and ordinary cells could meanwhile do little to rectify

699

matters beyond telling their own representative on their

700

town committee to speak on their behalf. Or, if this too

701

failed, they could resort to disruptive tactics by

702

criticising it in public and refusing it all collaboration."

703

[Op. Cit., pp. 52-3] Even by early 1918, the Bolshevik

704

party bore little resemblance to the "democratic centralist"

705

model desired by Lenin:

706

707

"The image of a disciplined hierarchy of party committees was

708

therefore but a thin, artificial veneer which was used by

709

Bolshevik leaders to cover up the cracked surface of the

710

real picture underneath. Cells and suburb committees saw

711

no reason to kow-tow to town committees; nor did town

712

committees feel under compulsion to show any greater respect

713

to their provincial and regional committees then before."

714

[Op. Cit., p. 74]

715

716

It is this insubordination, this local autonomy and action

717

in spite of central orders which explains the success of

718

the Bolsheviks in 1917. Rather than a highly centralised

719

and disciplined body of "professional" revolutionaries,

720

the party in 1917 saw a "significant change . . . within

721

the membership of the party at local level . . . From the

722

time of the February revolution requirements for party

723

membership had been all but suspended, and now Bolshevik

724

ranks swelled with impetuous recruits who knew next to

725

nothing about Marxism and who were united by little more

726

than overwhelming impatience for revolutionary action."

727

[Alexander Rabinowitch, _Prelude to Revolution_, p. 41]

728

729

This mass of new members (many of whom were peasants who

730

had just recently joined the industrial workforce) had a

731

radicalising effect on the party's policies and structures.

732

As even Leninist commentators argue, it was this influx of

733

members who allowed Lenin to gain support for his radical

734

revision of party aims in April. However, in spite of this

735

radicalisation of the party base, the party machine still

736

was at odds with the desires of the party. As Trotsky

737

acknowledged, the situation "called for resolute

738

confrontation of the sluggish Party machine with

739

masses and ideas in motion." He stressed that "the

740

masses were incomparably more revolutionary than the

741

Party, which in turn was more revolutionary than its

742

committeemen." Ironically, given the role Trotsky usually

743

gave the party, he admits that "[w]ithout Lenin, no one

744

had known what to make of the unprecedented situation."

745

[_Stalin_, vol. 1, p. 301, p. 305 and p. 297]

746

747

Which is significant in itself. The Bolshevik party is

748

usually claimed as being the "most revolutionary" that

749

ever existed, yet here is Trotsky admitting that its

750

leading members did not have a clue what to do. He even

751

argued that "[e]very time the Bolshevik leaders had to

752

act without Lenin they fell into error, usually inclining

753

to the Right." [Op. Cit., p. 299] This negative opinion

754

of the Bolsheviks applied even to the "left Bolsheviks,

755

especially the workers" whom we are informed "tried with

756

all their force to break through this quarantine" created

757

by the Bolshevik leaders policy "of waiting, of accommodation,

758

and of actual retreat before the Compromisers" after the

759

February revolution and before the arrival of Lenin.

760

Trotsky argues that "they did not know how to refute the

761

premise about the bourgeois character of the revolution

762

and the danger of an isolation of the proletariat. They

763

submitted, gritting their teeth, to the directions of

764

their leaders." [_History of the Russian Revolution_,

765

vol. 1, p. 273] It seems strange, to say the least, that

766

without one person the whole of the party was reduced to

767

such a level given that the aim of the "revolutionary"

768

party was to develop the political awareness of its

769

members.

770

771

Lenin's arrival, according to Trotsky, allowed the influence

772

of the more radical rank and file to defeat the conservatism

773

of the party machine. By the end of April, Lenin had

774

managed to win over the majority of the party leadership

775

to his position. However, as Trotsky argues, this "April

776

conflict between Lenin and the general staff of the party

777

was not the only one of its kind. Throughout the whole

778

history of Bolshevism . . . all the leaders of the party

779

at all the most important moments stood to the *right* of

780

Lenin." [Op. Cit., p. 305] As such, if "democratic centralism"

781

had worked as intended, the whole party would have been

782

arguing for incorrect positions the bulk of its existence

783

(assuming, of course, that Lenin was correct most of the

784

time).

785

786

For Trotsky, "Lenin exerted influence not so much as an

787

individual but because he embodied the influence of the

788

class on the Party and of the Party on its machine."

789

[_Stalin_, vol. 1, p. 299] Yet, this was the machine

790

which Lenin had forged, which embodied his vision of how

791

a "revolutionary" party should operate and was headed by

792

him. In other words, to argue that the party machine was

793

behind the party membership and the membership behind the

794

class shows the bankruptcy of Lenin's organisational scheme.

795

This "backwardness," moreover, indicates an independence of

796

the party bureaucracy from the membership and the membership

797

from the masses. As Lenin's constantly repeated aim was for

798

the party to seize power (based on the dubious assumption

799

that class power would only be expressed, indeed was identical

800

to, party power) this independence held serious dangers,

801

dangers which became apparent once this goal was achieved.

802

803

Trotsky asks the question "by what miracle did Lenin manage

804

in a few short weeks to turn the Party's course into a new

805

channel?" Significantly, he answers as follows: "Lenin's

806

personal attributes and the objective situation." [Ibid.]

807

No mention is made of the democratic features of the party

808

organisation, which suggests that without Lenin the rank

809

and file party members would not have been able to shift

810

the weight of the party machine in their favour. Trotsky

811

seems close to admitting this:

812

813

"As often happens, a sharp cleavage developed between the

814

classes in motion and the interests of the party machines.

815

Even the Bolshevik Party cadres, who enjoyed the benefit

816

of exceptional revolutionary training, were definitely

817

inclined to disregard the masses and to identify their own

818

special interests and the interests of the machine on the

819

very day after the monarchy was overthrown." [_Stalin_,

820

vol. 1, p. 298]

821

822

Thus the party machine, which embodied the principles of

823

"democratic centralism" proved less than able to the task

824

assigned it in practice. Without Lenin, it is doubtful

825

that the party membership would have over come the

826

party machine:

827

828

"Lenin was strong not only because he understood the laws

829

of the class struggle but also because his ear was

830

faultlessly attuned to the stirrings of the masses in

831

motion. He represented not so much the Party machine as

832

the vanguard of the proletariat. He was definitely

833

convinced that thousands from among those workers who

834

had borne the brunt of supporting the underground Party

835

would now support him. The masses at the moment were

836

more revolutionary than the Party, and the Party more

837

revolutionary than its machine. As early as March the

838

actual attitude of the workers and soldiers had in many

839

cases become stormily apparent, and it was widely at

840

variance with the instructions issued by all the parties,

841

including the Bolsheviks." [Op. Cit., p. 299]

842

843

Little wonder the local party groupings ignored the

844

party machine, practising autonomy and initiative in

845

the face of a party machine inclined to conservatism,

846

inertia, bureaucracy and remoteness. This conflict

847

between the party machine and the principles it was

848

based on and the needs of the revolution and party

849

membership was expressed continually throughout 1917:

850

851

"In short, the success of the revolution called for action

852

against the 'highest circles of the party,' who, from

853

February to October, utterly failed to play the

854

revolutionary role they ought to have taken in theory.

855

The masses themselves made the revolution, with or even

856

against the party -- this much at least was clear to

857

Trotsky the historian. But far from drawing the correct

858

conclusion, Trotsky the theorist continued to argue

859

that the masses are incapable of making a revolution

860

without a leader." [Daniel & Gabriel Cohn-Bendit,

861

Op. Cit., p. 188]

862

863

Looking at the development of the revolution from April

864

onwards, we are struck by the sluggishness of the party

865

hierarchy. At every revolutionary upsurge, the party

866

simply was not to the task of responding to the needs of

867

masses and the local party groupings closest to them.

868

The can be seen in June, July and October itself. At

869

each turn, the rank and file groupings or Lenin had to

870

constantly violate the principles of their own party

871

in order to be effective. The remoteness and conservatism

872

of the party even under Lenin can be constantly seen.

873

874

For example, when discussing the cancellation by the central

875

committee of a demonstration planned for June 10th by

876

the Petrograd Bolsheviks, the unresponsiveness of the

877

party hierarchy can be seen. The "speeches by Lenin and

878

Zinoviev [justifying their actions] by no means satisfied

879

the Petersburg Committee. If anything, it appears that

880

their explanations served to strengthen the feeling that

881

at best the party leadership had acted irresponsibly and

882

incompetently and was seriously out of touch with reality."

883

Indeed, many "blamed the Central Committee for taking so

884

long to respond to Military Organisation appeals for a

885

demonstration." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 88 and p. 92]

886

887

During the discussions in late June, 1917, on whether to

888

take direct action against the Provisional Government there

889

was a "wide gulf" between lower organs evaluations of the

890

current situation and that of the Central Committee.

891

[Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 129] Indeed, among the delegates

892

from the Bolshevik military groups, only Lashevich (an

893

old Bolshevik) spoke in favour of the Central Committee

894

position and he noted that "[f]requently it is impossible

895

to make out where the Bolshevik ends and the Anarchist

896

begins." [quoted by Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 129]

897

898

In the July days, the breach between the local party groups

899

and the central committee increased. As we noted in the

900

section 1, this spontaneous uprising was opposed by

901

the Bolshevik leadership, in spite of the leading role

902

of their own militants (along with anarchists) in

903

fermenting it. While calling on their own militants to

904

restrain the masses, the party leadership was ignored by

905

the rank and file membership who played an active role in

906

the event. Sickened by being asked to play the role of

907

"fireman," the party militants rejected party discipline in

908

order to maintain their credibility with the working class.

909

Rank and file activists, pointing to the snowballing of

910

the movement, showed clear dissatisfaction with the Central

911

Committee. One argued that it "was not aware of the latest

912

developments when it made its decision to oppose the movement

913

into the streets." Ultimately, the Central Committee appeal

914

"for restraining the masses . . . was removed from . . .

915

*Pravda* . . . and so the party's indecision was reflected

916

by a large blank space on page one." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit.,

917

p. 150, p. 159 and P. 175] Ultimately, the indecisive nature

918

of the leadership can be explained by the fact it did not

919

think it could seize state power for itself. As Trotsky

920

noted, "the state of popular consciousness . . . made

921

impossible the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in July."

922

[_History of the Russian Revolution_, vol. 2, p. 81]

923

924

The indecision of the party hierarchy did have an effect,

925

of course. While the anarchists at Kronstadt looked at the

926

demonstration as the start of an uprising, the Bolsheviks

927

there were "wavering indecisively in the middle" between

928

them and the Left-Social Revolutionaries who saw it as a

929

means of applying pressure on the government. This was because

930

they were "hamstrung by the indecision of the party Central

931

Committee." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 187] Little wonder

932

so many Bolshevik party organisations developed and protected

933

their own autonomy and ability to act!

934

935

Significantly, one of the main Bolshevik groupings

936

which helped organise and support the July uprising,

937

the Military Organisation, started their own paper

938

after the Central Committee had decreed after the

939

failed revolt that neither it, nor the Petersburg

940

Committee, should be allowed to have one. It "angrily

941

insisted on what it considered its just prerogatives"

942

and in "no uncertain terms it affirmed its right to

943

publish an independent newspaper and formally protested

944

what is referred to as 'a system of persecution and repression

945

of an extremely peculiar character which had begun with

946

the election of the new Central Committee.'" [Rabinowitch,

947

Op. Cit., p. 227] The Central Committee backed down,

948

undoubtedly due to the fact it could not enforce its

949

decision.

950

951

As the Cohn-Bendit brothers argue, "five months after the

952

Revolution and three months before the October uprising, the

953

masses were still governing themselves, and the Bolshevik

954

vanguard simply had to toe the line." [Op. Cit., p. 186]

955

Within that vanguard, the central committee proved to be

956

out of touch with the rank and file, who ignored it rather

957

than break with their fellow workers.

958

959

Even by October, the party machine still lagged behind the

960

needs of the revolution. In fact, Lenin could only impose

961

his view by going over the head of the Central Committee.

962

According to Trotsky's account, "this time he [wa]s not

963

satisfied with furious criticism" of the "ruinous Fabianism

964

of the Petrograd leadership" and "by way of protest he

965

resign[ed] from the Central Committee." [_History of the

966

Russian Revolution_, vol. 3, p. 131] Trotsky quotes

967

Lenin as follows:

968

969

"I am compelled to request permission to withdraw from

970

the Central Committee, which I hereby do, and leave

971

myself freedom of agitation in the lower ranks of the

972

party and at the party congress." [quoted by Trotsky,

973

Op. Cit., p. 131]

974

975

Thus the October revolution was precipitated by a blatant

976

violation of the principles Lenin spent his life advocating.

977

Indeed, if someone else other than Lenin had done this we

978

are sure that Lenin, and his numerous followers, would have

979

dismissed it as the action of a "petty-bourgeois intellectual"

980

who cannot handle party "discipline." This is itself is

981

significant, as is the fact that he decided to appeal to

982

the "lower ranks" of the party. Simply put, rather than

983

being "democratic" the party machine effectively blocked

984

communication and control from the bottom-up. Looking at

985

the more radical party membership, he "could only impose

986

his view by going over the head of his Central Committee."

987

[Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Op. Cit., p. 187] He

988

made sure to send his letter of protest to "the Petrograd

989

and Moscow committees" and also made sure that "copies fell

990

into the hands of the more reliable party workers of the

991

district locals." By early October (and "over the heads of

992

the Central Committee") he wrote "directly to the Petrograd

993

and Moscow committees" calling for insurrection. He also

994

"appealed to a Petrograd party conference to speak a firm

995

word in favour of insurrection." [Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 131

996

and p. 132]

997

998

In October, Lenin had to fight what he called "a wavering"

999

in the "upper circles of the party" which lead to a "sort

1000

of dread of the struggle for power, an inclination to

1001

replace this struggle with resolutions protests, and

1002

conferences." [quoted by Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 132] For

1003

Trotsky, this represented "almost a direct pitting of the

1004

party against the Central Committee," required because

1005

"it was a question of the fate of the revolution" and

1006

so "all other considerations fell away." [Trotsky,

1007

Op. Cit., pp. 132-3] On October 8th, when Lenin addressed

1008

the Bolshevik delegates of the forthcoming Northern

1009

Congress of Soviets on this subject, he did so "personally"

1010

as there "was no party decision" and the "higher institutions

1011

of the party had not yet expressed themselves." [Trotsky,

1012

Op. Cit., p. 133] Ultimately, the Central Committee came

1013

round to Lenin's position but they did so under pressure

1014

of means at odds with the principles of the party.

1015

1016

This divergence between the imagine and reality of the

1017

Bolsheviks explains their success. If the party had

1018

applied or had remained true to the principles of

1019

"democratic centralism" it is doubtful that it would

1020

have played an important role in the movement. As

1021

Alexander Rabinowitch argues, Bolshevik organisational

1022

unity and discipline is "vastly exaggerated" and, in

1023

fact, Bolshevik success in 1917 was down to "the party's

1024

internally relatively democratic, tolerant, and

1025

decentralised structure and method of operation, as

1026

well as its essentially open and mass character --

1027

in striking contrast to the traditional Leninist model."

1028

In 1917, he goes on, "subordinate party bodies with the

1029

Petersburg Committee and the Military Organisation were

1030

permitted considerable independence and initiative . . .

1031

Most importantly, these lower bodies were able to tailor

1032

their tactics and appeals to suit their own particular

1033

constituencies amid rapidly changing conditions. Vast

1034

numbers of new members were recruited into the party . . .

1035

The newcomers included tens of thousands of workers and

1036

soldiers . . . who knew little, if anything, about Marxism

1037

and cared nothing about party discipline." For example,

1038

while the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" was "officially

1039

withdrawn by the Sixth [Party] Congress in late July, this

1040

change did not take hold at the local level." [_The Bolsheviks

1041

Come to Power_, p. 311, p. 312 and p. 313]

1042

1043

It is no exaggeration to argue that if any member of a current

1044

vanguard party acted as the Bolshevik rank and file did in 1917,

1045

they would quickly be expelled (this probably explains why no

1046

such party has been remotely successful since). However, this

1047

ferment from below was quickly undermined within the party

1048

with the start of the Civil War. It is from this period when

1049

"democratic centralism" was actually applied within the party

1050

and clarified as an organisational principle:

1051

1052

"It was quite a turnabout since the anarchic days before the

1053

Civil War. The Central Committee had always advocated the

1054

virtues of obedience and co-operation; but the rank-and-filers

1055

of 1917 had cared little about such entreaties as they did

1056

about appeals made by other higher authorities. The wartime

1057

emergency now supplied an opportunity to expatiate on this

1058

theme at will." [Service, Op. Cit., p. 91]

1059

1060

Service stresses that "it appears quite remarkable how

1061

quickly the Bolsheviks, who for years had talked idly

1062

about a strict hierarchy of command inside the party, at

1063

last began to put ideas into practice." [Op. Cit., p. 96]

1064

1065

In other words, the conversion of the Bolshevik party into

1066

a fully fledged "democratic centralist" party occurred

1067

during the degeneration of the Revolution. This was both

1068

a consequence of the rising authoritarianism within the

1069

party and society as well as one of its causes. As such,

1070

it is quite ironic that the model used by modern day

1071

followers of Lenin is that of the party during the decline

1072

of the revolution, not its peak. This is not surprising.

1073

Once in power, the Bolshevik party imposed an authoritarian

1074

state capitalist regime onto the Russian people. Can it be

1075

surprising that the party structure which it developed to

1076

aid this process was also based on bourgeois attitudes and

1077

organisation? Simply put, the party model advocated by

1078

Lenin may not have been very effective during a revolution

1079

but it was exceedingly effective at prompting hierarchy and

1080

authority in the post-revolutionary regime. It simply

1081

replaced the old ruling elite with another, made up of

1082

members of the radical intelligentsia and odd ex-worker

1083

or ex-peasant.

1084

1085

This was due to the hierarchical and top-down nature of

1086

the party Lenin had created. While the party base was

1087

largely working class, the leadership was not. Full-time

1088

revolutionaries, they were either middle-class intellectuals

1089

or (occasionally) ex-workers and (even rarer) ex-peasants

1090

who had left their class to become part of the party machine.

1091

Even the delegates at the party congresses did not truly

1092

reflect class basis of the party membership. For example,

1093

the number of delegates was still dominated by white-collar

1094

or others (59.1% to 40.9%) at the sixth party congress at

1095

the end of July 1917. [Cliff, _Lenin_, vol. 2, p. 160] So

1096

while the party gathered more working class members in

1097

1917, it cannot be said that this was reflected in the

1098

party leadership which remained dominated by non-working

1099

class elements. Rather than being a genuine working class

1100

organisation, the Bolshevik party was a hierarchical group

1101

headed by non-working class elements whose working class

1102

base could not effectively control them even during the

1103

revolution in 1917. It was only effective because these

1104

newly joined and radicalised working class members

1105

ignored their own party structure and its defining

1106

ideology.

1107

1108

After the revolution, the Bolsheviks saw their membership

1109

start to decrease. Significantly, "the decline in numbers

1110

which occurred from early 1918 onwards" started happening

1111

"contrary to what is usually assumed, some months before

1112

the Central Committee's decree in midsummer that the party

1113

should be purged of its 'undesirable' elements." These lost

1114

members reflected two things. Firstly, the general decline

1115

in the size of the industrial working class. This meant

1116

that the radicalised new elements from the countryside

1117

which had flocked to the Bolsheviks in 1917 returned home.

1118

Secondly, the lost of popular support the Bolsheviks were

1119

facing due to the realities of their regime. This can be

1120

seen from the fact that while the Bolsheviks were losing

1121

members, the Left SRS almost doubled in size to 100,000

1122

(the Mensheviks claimed to have a similar number). Rather

1123

than non-proletarians leaving, "[i]t is more probable by

1124

far that it was industrial workers who were leaving in

1125

droves. After all, it would have been strange if the

1126

growing unpopularity of Sovnarkom in factory milieu

1127

had been confined exclusively to non-Bolsheviks."

1128

Unsurprisingly, given its position in power, "[a]s the

1129

proportion of working-class members declined, so that

1130

of entrants from the middle-class rose; the steady drift

1131

towards a party in which industrial workers no longer

1132

numerically predominated was under way." By late 1918

1133

membership started to increase again but "[m]ost newcomers

1134

were not of working-class origin . . . the proportion of

1135

Bolsheviks of working-class origin fell from 57 per cent

1136

at the year's beginning to 48 per cent at the end." It

1137

should be noted that it was not specified how many were

1138

classed as having working-class origin were still employed

1139

in working-class jobs. [Robert Service, Op. Cit., p. 70,

1140

pp. 70-1 and p. 90] A new ruling elite was thus born,

1141

thanks to the way vanguard parties are structured and the

1142

application of vanguardist principles which had previously

1143

been ignored.

1144

1145

In summary, the experience of the Russian Revolution does

1146

not, in fact, show the validity of the "vanguard" model.

1147

The Bolshevik party in 1917 played a leading role in the

1148

revolution only insofar as its members violated its own

1149

organisational principles (Lenin included). Faced with a

1150

real revolution and an influx of more radical new members,

1151

the party had to practice anarchist ideas of autonomy,

1152

local initiative and the ignoring of central orders which

1153

had no bearing to reality on the ground. When the party

1154

did try to apply the top-down and hierarchical principles

1155

of "democratic centralism" it failed to adjust to the

1156

needs of the moment. Moreover, when these principles were

1157

finally applied they helped ensure the degeneration of

1158

the revolution. As we discussed in section H.5, this

1159

was to be expected.

1160

1161

4 Was Lenin's "State and Revolution" applied

1162

after October?

1163

1164

In a nutshell, no. In fact the opposite was the case.

1165

Post-October, the Bolsheviks not only failed to introduce

1166

the ideas of Lenin's _State and Revolution_, they in fact

1167

introduced the exact opposite. As one historian puts it:

1168

1169

"To consider 'State and Revolution' as the basic statement of

1170

Lenin's political philosophy -- which non-Communists as well

1171

as Communists usually do -- is a serious error. Its argument

1172

for a utopian anarchism never actually became official policy.

1173

The Leninism of 1917 . . . came to grief in a few short years;

1174

it was the revived Leninism of 1902 which prevailed as the

1175

basis for the political development of the USSR." [Robert V.

1176

Daniels, _The Conscience of the Revolution_, pp. 51-2]

1177

1178

Daniels is being far too lenient with the Bolsheviks. It

1179

was not, in fact, "a few short years" before the promises

1180

of 1917 were forgotten. In some cases, it was a few short

1181

hours. In others, a few short months. However, in a sense

1182

Daniels is right. It did take until 1921 before all hope

1183

for saving the Russian Revolution finally ended. With the

1184

crushing of the Kronstadt rebellion, the true nature of

1185

the regime became obvious to all with eyes to see. Moreover,

1186

the banning of factions within the party at the same time

1187

did mark a return to the pattern of "What is to be Done?"

1188

rather than the more fluid practice Bolshevism exhibited

1189

in, say, 1917 (see section 3). However, as we discuss

1190

in section H.10, the various Bolshevik oppositions were,

1191

in their own way, just as authoritarian as the mainstream

1192

of the party.

1193

1194

In order to show that this is the case, we need to summarise

1195

the main ideas contained in Lenin's work. Moreover, we need

1196

to indicate what the Bolsheviks did, in fact, do. Finally,

1197

we need to see if the various rationales justifying these

1198

actions hold water.

1199

1200

So what did Lenin argue for in _State and Revolution_?

1201

Writing in the mid-1930s, anarchist Camillo Berneri

1202

summarised the main ideas of that work as follows:

1203

1204

"The Leninist programme of 1917 included these points:

1205

the discontinuance of the police and standing army,

1206

abolition of the professional bureaucracy, elections

1207

for all public positions and offices, revocability of

1208

all officials, equality of bureaucratic wages with

1209

workers' wages, the maximum of democracy, peaceful

1210

competition among the parties within the soviets,

1211

abolition of the death penalty." ["The Abolition and

1212

Extinction of the State," _Cienfuegos Press Anarchist

1213

Review_, no. 4, p. 50]

1214

1215

As he noted, "[n]ot a single one of the points of this

1216

programme has been achieved." This was, of course,

1217

under Stalinism and most Leninists will concur with

1218

Berneri. However what Leninists tend not to mention is

1219

that in the 7 month period from November 1917 to May 1918

1220

none of these points was achieved. So, as an example

1221

of what Bolshevism "really" stands for it seems strange

1222

to harp on about a work which was never implemented when

1223

the its author was in a position to do so (i.e. before

1224

the onslaught of a civil war Lenin thought was inevitable

1225

anyway!).

1226

1227

To see that Berneri's summary is correct, we need to quote

1228

Lenin directly. Obviously the work is a wide ranging defence

1229

of Lenin's interpretation of Marxist theory on the state.

1230

As it is an attempt to overturn decades of Marxist orthodoxy,

1231

much of the work is quotes from Marx and Engels and Lenin's

1232

attempts to enlist them for his case (we discuss this issue

1233

in section H.3.10). Equally, we need to discount the numerous

1234

straw men arguments about anarchism Lenin inflicts on his

1235

reader (see sections H.1.3, H.1.4 and H.1.5 for the truth

1236

about his claims). Here we simply list the key points as

1237

regards Lenin's arguments about his "workers' state" and

1238

how the workers would maintain control of it:

1239

1240

1) Using the Paris Commune as a prototype, Lenin argued

1241

for the abolition of "parliamentarianism" by turning

1242

"representative institutions from mere 'talking shops'

1243

into working bodies." This would be done by removing

1244

"the division of labour between the legislative and the

1245

executive." [_Essential Works of Lenin_, p. 304 and p. 306]

1246

1247

2) "All officials, without exception, to be elected and

1248

subject to recall *at any time*" and so "directly

1249

responsible to their constituents." "Democracy means

1250

equality." [Op. Cit., p. 302, p. 306 and p. 346]

1251

1252

3) The "immediate introduction of control and

1253

superintendence by *all,* so that *all* shall become

1254

'bureaucrats' for a time and so that, therefore, *no one*

1255

can become a 'bureaucrat'." Proletarian democracy would

1256

"take immediate steps to cut bureaucracy down to the roots

1257

. . . to the complete abolition of bureaucracy" as the

1258

"*essence* of bureaucracy" is officials becoming transformed

1259

"into privileged persons divorced from the masses and

1260

*superior to* the masses." [Op. Cit., p. 355 and p. 360]

1261

1262

4) There should be no "special bodies of armed men" standing

1263

apart from the people "since the majority of the people

1264

itself suppresses its oppressors, a 'special force' is no

1265

longer necessary." Using the example of the Paris Commune,

1266

Lenin suggested this meant "abolition of the standing army."

1267

Instead there would be the "armed masses." [Op. Cit., p. 275,

1268

p. 301 and p. 339]

1269

1270

5) The new (workers) state would be "the organisation of

1271

violence for the suppression of . . . the exploiting class,

1272

i.e. the bourgeoisie. The toilers need a state only to

1273

overcome the resistance of the exploiters" who are "an

1274

insignificant minority," that is "the landlords and

1275

the capitalists." This would see "an immense expansion

1276

of democracy . . . for the poor, democracy for the people"

1277

while, simultaneously, imposing "a series of restrictions

1278

on the freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the

1279

capitalists. . . their resistance must be broken by force:

1280

it is clear that where is suppression there is also violence,

1281

there is no freedom, no democracy." [Op. Cit., p. 287 and

1282

pp. 337-8]

1283

1284

This would be implemented after the current, bourgeois, state had

1285

been smashed. This would be the "dictatorship of the proletariat"

1286

and be "the introduction of complete democracy for the people."

1287

[Op. Cit., p. 355] However, the key practical ideas on what the

1288

new "semi-state" would be are contained in these five points.

1289

He generalised these points, considering them valid not only

1290

for Russia in 1917 but in all countries. In this his followers

1291

agree. Lenin's work is considered valid for today, in advanced

1292

countries as it was in revolutionary Russia.

1293

1294

Three things strike anarchist readers of Lenin's work. Firstly,

1295

as we noted in section H.1.7, much of it is pure anarchism.

1296

Bakunin had raised the vision of a system of workers' councils

1297

as the framework of a free socialist society in the 1860s and

1298

1870s. Moreover, he had also argued for the election of mandated

1299

and recallable delegates as well as for using a popular militia

1300

to defend the revolution (see section H.2.1). What is not

1301

anarchist is the call for centralisation, equating the council

1302

system with a state and the toleration of a "new" officialdom.

1303

Secondly, the almost utter non-mention of the role of the party

1304

in the book is deeply significant. Given the emphasis that Lenin

1305

had always placed on the party, it's absence is worrying.

1306

Particularly (as we indicate in section 5) he had been

1307

calling for the party to seize power all through 1917. As

1308

we discuss in section H.9.2, when he does mention the party

1309

he does so in an ambiguous way which suggests that it, not

1310

the class, would be in power. As subsequent events show, this

1311

was indeed what happened in practice. And, finally, the

1312

anarchist reader is struck by the fact that every one of these

1313

key ideas were not implemented under Lenin. In fact, the

1314

opposite was done. This can be seen from looking at each point

1315

in turn.

1316

1317

The first point as the creation of "working bodies", the

1318

combining of legislative and executive bodies. The first

1319

body to be created by the Bolshevik revolution was the

1320

"Council of People's Commissars" (CPC) This was a government

1321

separate from and above the Central Executive Committee (CEC)

1322

of the soviets congress. It was an executive body elected

1323

by the soviet congress, but the soviets themselves were

1324

not turned into "working bodies." Thus the promises of

1325

Lenin's _State and Revolution_ did not last the night.

1326

1327

As indicated in section 5, the Bolsheviks clearly knew

1328

that the Soviets had alienated their power to this body.

1329

However, it could be argued that Lenin's promises were

1330

kept as this body simply gave itself legislative powers

1331

four days later. Sadly, this is not the case. In the

1332

Paris Commune the delegates of the people took executive

1333

power into their own hands. Lenin reversed this. His

1334

executive took legislative power from the hands of

1335

the people's delegates. In the former case, power was

1336

decentralised into the hands of the population. In the

1337

latter case, it was centralised into the hands of a few.

1338

This concentration of power into executive committees

1339

occurred at all levels of the soviet hierarchy (see

1340

section 6 for full details). Simply put, legislative

1341

and executive power was taken *from* the soviets assemblies

1342

and handed to Bolshevik dominated executive committees.

1343

1344

What of the next principle, namely the election and recall

1345

of all officials? This lasted slightly longer, namely

1346

around 5 months. By March of 1918, the Bolsheviks started

1347

a systematic campaign against the elective principle in

1348

the workplace, in the military and even in the soviets.

1349

In the workplace, Lenin was arguing for appointed

1350

one-man managers "vested with dictatorial powers" by

1351

April 1918 (see section 10). In the military, Trotsky

1352

simply decreed the end of elected officers in favour of

1353

appointed officers (see section 14). And as far as

1354

the soviets go, the Bolsheviks were refusing to hold

1355

elections because they "feared that the opposition parties

1356

would show gains." When elections were held, "Bolshevik

1357

armed force usually overthrew the results" in provincial

1358

towns. Moreover, the Bolsheviks "pack[ed] local soviets"

1359

with representatives of organisations they controlled

1360

"once they could not longer count on an electoral

1361

majority." [Samuel Farber, _Before Stalinism_, p. 22,

1362

p. 24 and p. 33] This gerrymandering was even practised

1363

at the all-Russian soviet congress (see section 6

1364

for full details of this Bolshevik onslaught against

1365

the soviets). So much for competition among the parties

1366

within the soviets! And as far as the right of recall

1367

went, the Bolsheviks only supported this when the

1368

workers were recalling the opponents of the Bolsheviks,

1369

not when the workers were recalling them.

1370

1371

In summary, in under six months the Bolsheviks had replaced

1372

election of "all officials" by appointment from above in many

1373

areas of life. Democracy had simply being substituted by

1374

appointed from above (see section H.9.4 for the deeply

1375

undemocratic reasoning used to justify this top-down and

1376

autocratic system of so-called democracy). The idea that

1377

different parties could compete for votes in the soviets

1378

(or elsewhere) was similarly curtailed and finally abolished.

1379

1380

Then there was the elimination of bureaucracy. As we show

1381

in section H.9.7, a new bureaucratic and centralised system

1382

quickly emerged. Rather than immediately cutting the size

1383

and power of the bureaucracy, it steadily grew. It soon

1384

became the real power in the state (and, ultimately, in

1385

the 1920s became the social base for the rise of Stalin).

1386

Moreover, with the concentration of power in the hands of

1387

the Bolshevik government, the "essence" of bureaucracy

1388

remained as the party leaders became "privileged persons

1389

divorced from the masses and *superior to* the masses."

1390

They were, for example, more than happy to justify their

1391

suppression of military democracy in terms of them knowing

1392

better than the general population what was best for them

1393

(see section H.9.4 for details).

1394

1395

Then there is the fourth point, namely the elimination of

1396

the standing army, the suppression of "special bodies of

1397

armed men" by the "armed masses." This promise did not

1398

last two months. On the 20th of December, 1917, the

1399

Council of People's Commissars decreed the formation

1400

of a political (secret) police force, the "Extraordinary

1401

Commission to Fight Counter-Revolution." This was more

1402

commonly known by the Russian initials of the first two

1403

terms of its official name: The Cheka. Significantly,

1404

its founding decree stated it was to "watch the press,

1405

saboteurs, strikers, and the Socialist-Revolutionaries

1406

of the Right." [contained in Robert V. Daniels, _A

1407

Documentary History of Communism_, vol. 1, p. 133]

1408

1409

While it was initially a small organisation, as 1918

1410

progressed it grew in size and activity. By April 1918,

1411

it was being used to break the anarchist movement across

1412

Russia (see section 23 for details). The Cheka soon

1413

became a key instrument of Bolshevik rule, with the full

1414

support of the likes of Lenin and Trotsky. The Cheka

1415

was most definitely a "special body of armed men" and

1416

not the same as the "armed workers." In other words,

1417

Lenin's claims in _State and Revolution_ did not last

1418

two months and in under six months the Bolshevik state

1419

had a mighty group of "armed men" to impose its will.

1420

1421

This is not all. The Bolsheviks also conducted a sweeping

1422

transformation of the military within the first six months

1423

of taking power. During 1917, the soldiers and sailors

1424

(encouraged by the Bolsheviks and other revolutionaries)

1425

had formed their own committees and elected officers. In

1426

March 1918, Trotsky simply abolished all this by decree

1427

and replaced it with appointed officers (usually ex-Tsarist

1428

ones). In this way, the Red Army was turned from a workers'

1429

militia (i.e. an armed people) into a "special body"

1430

separate from the general population (see section 15

1431

for further discussion on this subject).

1432

1433

So instead of eliminating a "special force" above the people,

1434

the Bolsheviks did the opposite by creating a political police

1435

force (the Cheka) and a standing army (in which elections were

1436

a set aside by decree). These were special, professional, armed

1437

forces standing apart from the people and unaccountable to

1438

them. Indeed, they were used to repress strikes and working

1439

class unrest, a topic we now turn to.

1440

1441

Then there is the idea of that Lenin's "workers' state"

1442

would simple be an instrument of violence directed at

1443

the exploiters. This was not how it turned out in practice.

1444

As the Bolsheviks lost popular support, they turned the

1445

violence of the "worker's state" against the workers (and,

1446

of course, the peasants). As noted above, when the Bolsheviks

1447

lost soviet elections they used force to disband them (see

1448

section 6 for further details). Faced with strikes and

1449

working class protest during this period, the Bolsheviks

1450

responded with state violence (see section H.8.5 for

1451

details). We will discuss the implications of this for

1452

Lenin's theory below. So, as regards the claim that the

1453

new ("workers") state would repress only the exploiters,

1454

the truth was that it was used to repress whoever opposed

1455

Bolshevik power, including workers and peasants.

1456

1457

As can be seen, after the first six months of Bolshevik

1458

rule not a single measure advocated by Lenin in _State

1459

and Revolution_ existed in "revolutionary" Russia. Some

1460

of the promises were broken in quiet quickly (overnight,

1461

in one case). Most took longer. For example, the

1462

democratisation of the armed forces had been decreed in

1463

late December 1917. However, this was simply acknowledging

1464

the existing revolutionary gains of the military personnel.

1465

Similarly, the Bolsheviks passed a decree on workers' control

1466

which, again, simply acknowledged the actual gains by the

1467

grassroots (and, in fact, limited them for further

1468

development -- see section 9). This cannot be taken

1469

as evidence of the democratic nature of Bolshevism as

1470

most governments faced with a revolutionary movement will

1471

acknowledge and "legalise" the facts on the ground (until

1472

such time as they can neutralise or destroy them). For

1473

example, the Provisional Government created after the

1474

February Revolution also legalised the revolutionary

1475

gains of the workers (for example, legalising the soviets,

1476

factory committees, unions, strikes and so forth). The

1477

real question is whether Bolshevism continued to encourage

1478

these revolutionary gains once it had consolidated its

1479

power. Which they did not. Indeed, it can be argued that

1480

the Bolsheviks simply managed to do what the Provisional

1481

Government it replaced had failed to do, namely destroy

1482

the various organs of popular self-management created

1483

by the revolutionary masses. So the significant fact is

1484

not that the Bolsheviks recognised the gains of the masses

1485

but that their toleration of the application of what their

1486

followers say were their real principles did not last long

1487

and was quickly ended. Moreover, when the leading Bolsheviks

1488

looked back at this abolition they did not consider it in

1489

any way in contradiction to the principles of "communism"

1490

(see section 14).

1491

1492

We have stressed this period for a reason. This was the

1493

period *before* the out-break of major Civil War and thus

1494

the policies applied show the actual nature of Bolshevism,

1495

it's essence if you like. This is a significant date

1496

as most Leninists blame the failure of Lenin to live

1497

up to his promises on this even. In reality, the civil

1498

war was *not* the reason for these betrayals -- simply

1499

because it had not started yet (see section 16

1500

on when the civil war started and its impact). Each of the

1501

promises were broken in turn months before the civil war

1502

happened. "All Power to the Soviets" became, very quickly, "All Power

1503

to the Bolsheviks." In the words of historian

1504

Marc Ferro:

1505

1506

"In a way, _The State and Revolution_ even laid the

1507

foundations and sketched out the essential features

1508

of an alternative to Bolshevik power, and only the

1509

pro-Leninist tradition has used it, almost to quieten

1510

its conscience, because Lenin, once in power, ignored

1511

its conclusions. The Bolsheviks, far from causing the

1512

state to wither away, found endless reasons for

1513

justifying its enforcement." [_October 1917_,

1514

pp. 213-4]

1515

1516

Where does that leave Lenin's _State and Revolution_? Well,

1517

modern-day Leninists still urge us to read it, considering

1518

it his greatest work and the best introduction to what

1519

Leninism really stands for. For example, we find Leninist

1520

Tony Cliff calling that book "Lenin's real testament" while,

1521

at the same time, acknowledging that its "message . . . which

1522

was the guide for the first victorious proletarian revolution,

1523

was violated again and again during the civil war." Not a

1524

very good "guide" or that convincing a "message" if it was

1525

not applicable in the very circumstances it was designed to

1526

be applied in (a bit like saying you have an excellent

1527

umbrella but it only works when it is not raining). Moreover,

1528

Cliff is factually incorrect. The Bolsheviks "violated" that

1529

"guide" before the civil war started (i.e. when "the

1530

victories of the Czechoslovak troops over the Red Army in

1531

June 1918, that threatened the greatest danger to the Soviet

1532

republic," to quote Cliff). Similarly, much of the economic

1533

policies implemented by the Bolsheviks had their roots in

1534

that book and the other writings by Lenin from 1917 (see

1535

section H.9.5). [_Lenin_, vol. 3, p. 161 and p. 18]

1536

1537

Given this, what use is Lenin's _State and Revolution_? If

1538

this really was the "guide" it is claimed to be, the fact

1539

that it proved totally impractical suggests it should simply

1540

be ignored. Simply put, if the side effects of a revolution

1541

(such as civil war) require it to be ripped up then modern

1542

Leninists should come clean and admit that revolution and

1543

workers' democracy simply do not go together. This was,

1544

after all, the conclusion of Lenin and Trotsky (see section

1545

H.3.8). As such, they should not recommend Lenin's work as

1546

an example of what Bolshevism aims for. If, however, the

1547

basic idea of workers' democracy and freedom are valid

1548

and considered the only way of achieving socialism then

1549

we need to wonder *why* the Bolsheviks did not apply them

1550

when they had the chance, particularly when the Makhnovists

1551

in the Ukraine did (see section H.11 on the Makhnovist

1552

movement). Such an investigation would only end up by

1553

concluding the validity of anarchism, *not* Leninism.

1554

1555

This can be seen from the trajectory of Bolshevik ideology

1556

post-October. Simply put, it was not bothered by the breaking

1557

of the promises of _State and Revolution_ and 1917 in general.

1558

As such, Cliff is just wrong to assert that while the message

1559

of _State and Revolution_ was "violated again and again" it

1560

"was also invoked again and again against bureaucratic

1561

degeneration." [Cliff, Op. Cit., p. 161] Far from it.

1562

1563

Lenin's _State and Revolution_ was rarely invoked against

1564

degeneration by the mainstream Bolshevik leadership. Indeed,

1565

they happily supported party dictatorship and one-man management.

1566

Ironically for Cliff, it *was* famously invoked against the

1567

state capitalist policies being implemented in early 1918.

1568

This was done by the "Left Communists" around Bukharin in

1569

their defence of workers' self-management against Lenin's

1570

policy! Lenin told them to reread it (along with his other

1571

1917 works) to see that "state capitalism" was his aim all

1572

along! Not only that, he quoted from _State and Revolution_.

1573

He argued that "accounting and control" was required "for

1574

the proper functioning of the first stage of communist

1575

society." "And this control," he continued, "must be

1576

established not only over 'the insignificant capitalist

1577

minority, over the gentry . . . ', but also over the

1578

workers who 'have been thoroughly corrupted by capitalism

1579

. . . '" He ended by saying it was "significant that

1580

Bukharin did *not* emphasise *this*." [_Collected Works_,

1581

vol. 27, pp. 353-4] Needless to say, the Leninists who

1582

urge us to read Lenin's work do not emphasis that either.

1583

1584

As the Bolsheviks lost more and more support, the number

1585

of workers "thoroughly corrupted by capitalism" increased.

1586

How to identify them was easy: they did not support the

1587

party. As historian Richard summarises, a "lack of

1588

identification with the Bolshevik party was treated

1589

as the absence of political consciousness altogether."

1590

[_Soviet Communists in Power_, p. 94] This is the

1591

logical conclusion of vanguardism, of course (see

1592

section H.5.3). However, to acknowledge that state

1593

violence was also required to "control" the working

1594

class totally undermines the argument of _State and

1595

Revolution_.

1596

1597

This is easy to see and to prove theoretically. For

1598

example, by 1920, Lenin was more than happy to admit

1599

that the "workers' state" used violence against the

1600

masses. At a conference of his political police, the

1601

Cheka, Lenin argued as follows:

1602

1603

"Without revolutionary coercion directed against the

1604

avowed enemies of the workers and peasants, it is

1605

impossible to break down the resistance of these

1606

exploiters. On the other hand, revolutionary coercion

1607

is bound to be employed towards the wavering and unstable

1608

elements among the masses themselves." [_Collected Works_,

1609

vol. 42, p. 170]

1610

1611

This was simply summarising Bolshevik practice from the

1612

start. However, in _State and Revolution_ Lenin had

1613

argued for imposing "a series of restrictions on the

1614

freedom of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists."

1615

In 1917 he was "clear that where is suppression there

1616

is also violence, there is no freedom, no democracy."

1617

[Op. Cit., pp. 337-8] So if violence is directed against

1618

the working class then, obviously, there can be "no freedom,

1619

no democracy" for that class. And who identifies who the

1620

"wavering and unstable" elements are? Only the party. Thus

1621

any expression of workers' democracy which conflicts with

1622

the party is a candidate for "revolutionary coercion."

1623

So it probably just as well that the Bolsheviks had

1624

eliminated military democracy in March, 1918.

1625

1626

Trotsky expands on the obvious autocratic implications of

1627

this in 1921 when he attacked the Workers' Opposition's

1628

ideas on economic democracy:

1629

1630

"The Party . . . is . . . duty bound to retain its

1631

dictatorship, regardless of the temporary vacillations

1632

of the amorphous masses, regardless of the temporary

1633

vacillations even of the working class. This awareness

1634

is essential for cohesion; without it the Party is in

1635

danger of perishing . . . At any given moment, the

1636

dictatorship does not rest on the formal principle of

1637

workers' democracy . . . if we look upon workers'

1638

democracy as something unconditional . . . then . . .

1639

every plant should elect its own administrative organs

1640

and so on . . . From a formal point of view this is

1641

the clearest link with workers' democracy. But we are

1642

against it. Why? . . . Because, in the first place,

1643

we want to retain the dictatorship of the Party, and,

1644

in the second place, because we think that the

1645

[democratic] way of managing important and essential

1646

plants is bound to be incompetent and prove a failure

1647

from an economic point of view . . ." [quoted by

1648

Jay B. Sorenson, _The Life and Death of Soviet Trade

1649

Unionism_, p. 165]

1650

1651

Thus the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik regime

1652

confirmed anarchist theory and predictions about state

1653

socialism. In the words of Luigi Fabbri:

1654

1655

"It is fairly certain that between the capitalist regime

1656

and the socialist there will be an intervening period of

1657

struggle, during which proletariat revolutionary workers

1658

will have to work to uproot the remnants of bourgeois

1659

society . . . But if the object of this struggle and this

1660

organisation is to free the proletariat from exploitation

1661

and state rule, then the role of guide, tutor or director

1662

cannot be entrusted to a new state, which would have an

1663

interest in pointing the revolution in a completely

1664

opposite direction. . .

1665

1666

"The outcome would be that a new government - battening on

1667

the revolution and acting throughout the more or less

1668

extended period of its 'provisional' powers - would lay down

1669

the bureaucratic, military and economic foundations of a new

1670

and lasting state organisation, around which a compact network

1671

of interests and privileges would, naturally, be woven. Thus

1672

in a short space of time what one would have would not be the

1673

state abolished, but a state stronger and more energetic than

1674

its predecessor and which would come to exercise those functions

1675

proper to it - the ones Marx recognised as being such -

1676

'keeping the great majority of producers under the yoke of

1677

a numerically small exploiting minority.'

1678

1679

"This is the lesson that the history of all revolutions teaches

1680

us, from the most ancient down to the most recent; and it is

1681

confirmed . . . by the day-to-day developments of the Russian

1682

revolution . . .

1683

1684

"Certainly, [state violence] starts out being used against the

1685

old power . . . But as the new power goes on consolidating its

1686

position . . . ever more frequently and ever more severely,

1687

the mailed fist of dictatorship is turned against the proletariat

1688

itself in whose name that dictatorship was set up and is

1689

operated! . . . the actions of the present Russian government

1690

[of Lenin and Trotsky] have shown that in real terms (and it

1691

could not be otherwise) the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'

1692

means police, military, political and economic dictatorship

1693

exercised over the broad mass of the proletariat in city and

1694

country by the few leaders of the political party.

1695

1696

"The violence of the state always ends up being used AGAINST

1697

ITS SUBJECTS, of whom the vast majority are always proletarians

1698

. . . The new government will be able to expropriate the old

1699

ruling class in whole or in part, but only so as to establish

1700

a new ruling class that will hold the greater part of the

1701

proletariat in subjection.

1702

1703

"That will come to pass if those who make up the government and

1704

the bureaucratic, military and police minority that upholds it

1705

end up becoming the real owners of wealth when the property of

1706

everyone is made over exclusively to the state. In the first

1707

place, the failure of the revolution will be self evident. In

1708

the second, in spite of the illusions that many people create,

1709

the conditions of the proletariat will always be those of a

1710

subject class." ["Anarchy and 'Scientific' Communism", in

1711

_The Poverty of Statism_, pp. 13-49, Albert Meltzer (ed.),

1712

pp. 26-31]

1713

1714

The standard response by most modern Leninists to arguments

1715

like this about Bolshevism is simply to downplay the

1716

authoritarianism of the Bolsheviks by stressing the

1717

effects of the civil war on shaping their ideology and

1718

actions. However, this fails to address the key issue

1719

of why the reality of Bolshevism (even before the civil

1720

war) was so different to the rhetoric. Anarchists, as we

1721

discuss in section H.9, can point to certain aspects of

1722

Bolshevik ideology and the social structures its favoured

1723

which can explain it. The problems facing the revolution

1724

simply brought to the fore the limitations and dangers

1725

inherent in Leninism and, moreover, shaping them in

1726

distinctive ways. We draw the conclusion that a future

1727

revolution, as it will face similar problems, would be

1728

wise to avoid applying Leninist ideology and the

1729

authoritarian practices it allows and, indeed, promotes

1730

by its support of centralisation, confusion of party power

1731

with class power, vanguardism and equation of state

1732

capitalism with socialism. Leninists, in contrast, can

1733

only stress the fact that the revolution was occurring

1734

in difficult circumstances and hope that "fate" is

1735

more kind to them next time -- as if a revolution, as

1736

Lenin himself noted in 1917, would not occur during

1737

nor create "difficult" circumstances! Equally, they

1738

can draw no lessons (bar repeat what the Bolsheviks

1739

did in 1917 and hope for better objective circumstances!)

1740

from the Russian experience simply because they are blind

1741

to the limitations of their politics. They are thus doomed

1742

to repeat history rather than make it.

1743

1744

So where does this analysis of Lenin's _State and

1745

Revolution_ and the realities of Bolshevik power

1746

get us? The conclusions of dissent Marxist Samuel

1747

Farber seem appropriate here. As he puts it, "the

1748

very fact that a Sovnarkom had been created as a

1749

separate body from the CEC [Central Executive

1750

Committee] of the soviets clearly indicates that,

1751

Lenin's _State and Revolution_ notwithstanding, the

1752

separation of at least the top bodies of the executive

1753

and the legislative wings of the government remained

1754

in effect in the new Soviet system." This suggests

1755

"that _State and Revolution_ did not play a decisive

1756

role as a source of policy guidelines for 'Leninism

1757

in power.'" After all, "immediately after the

1758

Revolution the Bolsheviks established an executive

1759

power . . . as a clearly separate body from the

1760

leading body of the legislature. . . Therefore, some

1761

sections of the contemporary Left appear to have

1762

greatly overestimated the importance that _State and

1763

Revolution_ had for Lenin's government. I would suggest

1764

that this document . . . can be better understood as a

1765

distant, although doubtless sincere [!], socio-political

1766

vision . . . as opposed to its having been a programmatic

1767

political statement, let alone a guide to action, for

1768

the period immediately after the successful seizure of

1769

power." [Farber, Op. Cit., pp. 20-1 and p. 38]

1770

1771

That is *one* way of looking at it. Another would be to draw

1772

the conclusion that a "distant . . . socio-political vision"

1773

drawn up to sound like a "guide to action" which was then

1774

immediately ignored is, at worse, little more than a deception,

1775

or, at best, a theoretical justification for seizing power

1776

in the face of orthodox Marxist dogma. Whatever the rationale

1777

for Lenin writing his book, one thing is true -- it was never

1778

implemented. Strange, then, that Leninists today urge use to

1779

read it to see what "Lenin really wanted." Particularly given

1780

that so few of its promises were actually implemented (those

1781

that were just recognised the facts on the ground) and *all*

1782

of were no longer applied in less than six months after the

1783

seize of power.

1784

1785

The best that can be said is that Lenin did want this vision

1786

to be applied but the realities of revolutionary Russia, the

1787

objective problems facing the revolution, made its application

1788

impossible. This is the standard Leninist account of the

1789

revolution. They seem unconcerned that they have just admitted

1790

that Lenin's ideas were utterly impractical for the real

1791

problems that any revolution is most likely to face. This

1792

was the conclusion Lenin himself drew, as did the rest of

1793

the Bolshevik leadership. This can be seen from the actual

1794

practice of "Leninism in power" and the arguments it used.

1795

And yet, for some reason, Lenin's book is still recommended

1796

by modern Leninists!

1797

1798

5 Did the Bolsheviks really aim for Soviet power?

1799

1800

It seems a truism for modern day Leninists that the

1801

Bolsheviks stood for "soviet power." For example, they

1802

like to note that the Bolsheviks used the slogan "All

1803

Power to the Soviets" in 1917 as evidence. However,

1804

for the Bolsheviks this slogan had a radically different

1805

meaning to what many people would consider it to mean.

1806

1807

As we discuss in section 25, it was the anarchists

1808

(and those close to them, like the SR-Maximalists) who

1809

first raised the idea of soviets as the means by which

1810

the masses could run society. This was during the 1905

1811

revolution. At that time, neither the Mensheviks nor

1812

the Bolsheviks viewed the soviets as the possible

1813

framework of a socialist society. This was still the

1814

case in 1917, until Lenin returned to Russia and

1815

convinced the Bolshevik Party that the time was right

1816

to raise the slogan "All Power to the Soviets."

1817

1818

However, as well as this, Lenin also advocated a somewhat

1819

different vision of what a Bolshevik revolution would

1820

result in. Thus we find Lenin in 1917 continually

1821

repeating the basic idea: "The Bolsheviks must assume

1822

power." The Bolsheviks "can and *must* take state power

1823

into their own hands." He raised the question of "will

1824

the Bolsheviks dare take over full state power alone?"

1825

and answered it: "I have already had occasion . . . to

1826

answer this question in the affirmative." Moreover, "a

1827

political party . . . would have no right to exist, would

1828

be unworthy of the name of party . . . if it refused to

1829

take power when opportunity offers." [_Selected Works_,

1830

vol. 2, p 328, p. 329 and p. 352]

1831

1832

He equated party power with popular power: "the power of

1833

the Bolsheviks -- that is, the power of the proletariat."

1834

Moreover, he argued that Russia "was ruled by 130,000

1835

landowners . . . and they tell us that Russia will not

1836

be able to be governed by the 240,000 members of the

1837

Bolshevik Party -- governing in the interest of the poor

1838

and against the rich." He stresses that the Bolsheviks

1839

"are not Utopians. We know that just any labourer or

1840

any cook would be incapable of taking over immediately

1841

the administration of the State." Therefore they

1842

"demand that the teaching should be conducted by the

1843

class-consciousness workers and soldiers, that this

1844

should be started immediately." Until then, the

1845

"conscious workers must be in control." [_Will the

1846

Bolsheviks Maintain Power?_ p. 102, pp. 61-62, p. 66

1847

and p. 68]

1848

1849

As such, given this clear and unambiguous position throughout

1850

1917 by Lenin, it seems incredulous, to say the least, for

1851

Leninist Tony Cliff to assert that "[t]o start with Lenin

1852

spoke of the *proletariat,* the *class* -- not the Bolshevik

1853

Party -- assuming state power." [_Lenin_, vol. 3, p. 161]

1854

Surely the title of one of Lenin's most famous pre-October

1855

essays, usually translated as "Can the Bolsheviks Retain

1856

State Power?", should have given the game away? As would,

1857

surely, quoting numerous calls by Lenin for the Bolsheviks

1858

to seize power? Apparently not.

1859

1860

This means, of course, Lenin is admitting that the working

1861

class in Russia would *not* have power under the Bolsheviks.

1862

Rather than "the poor" governing society directly, we would

1863

have *the Bolsheviks* governing in their interests. Thus,

1864

rather than soviet power as such, the Bolsheviks aimed for

1865

"party power through the soviets" -- a radically different

1866

position. And as we discuss in the next section, when soviet

1867

power clashed with party power the former was always

1868

sacrificed to ensure the latter. As we indicate in

1869

section H.1.2, this support for party power before the

1870

revolution was soon transformed into a defence for party

1871

dictatorship after the Bolsheviks had seized power. However,

1872

we should not forget, to quote one historian, that the

1873

Bolshevik leaders "anticipated a 'dictatorship of the

1874

proletariat,' and that concept was a good deal closer to

1875

a party dictatorship in Lenin's 1917 usage than revisionist

1876

scholars sometimes suggest." [Sheila Fitzpatrick, "The Legacy

1877

of the Civil War," pp. 385-398, _Party, State, and Society

1878

in the Russian Civil War_, Diane P. Koenker, William G.

1879

Rosenberg and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), p. 388]

1880

1881

While modern-day Leninists tend to stress the assumption of

1882

power by the soviets as the goal of the Bolshevik revolution,

1883

the Bolsheviks themselves were more honest about it. For

1884

example, Trotsky quotes Lenin at the first soviet congress

1885

stating that it was "not true to say that no party exists

1886

which is ready to assume power; such a party exists: this

1887

is our party." Moreover, "[o]ur party is ready to assume

1888

power." As the Second Congress approached, Lenin "rebuked

1889

those who connected the uprising with the Second Congress

1890

of the Soviets." He protested against Trotsky's argument

1891

that they needed a Bolshevik majority at the Second

1892

Congress, arguing (according to Trotsky) that "[w]e have

1893

to win power and not tie ourselves to the Congress. It

1894

was ridiculous and absurd to warn the enemy about the

1895

date of the rising . . . First the party must seize power,

1896

arms in hand, and then we could talk about the Congress."

1897

[_On Lenin_, p. 71, p. 85]

1898

1899

Trotsky argued that "the party could not seize power by

1900

itself, independently of the Soviets and behind its back.

1901

This would have been a mistake . . . [as the] soldiers

1902

knew their delegates in the Soviet; it was through the

1903

Soviet that they knew the party. If the uprising had

1904

taken place behind the back of the Soviet, independently

1905

of it, without its authority . . . there might have been

1906

a dangerous confusion among the troops." Significantly,

1907

Trotsky made no mention of the proletariat. Finally,

1908

Lenin came over to Trotsky's position, saying "Oh, all

1909

right, one can proceed in this fashion as well, provided

1910

we seize power." [Op. Cit., p. 86 and p. 89]

1911

1912

Trotsky made similar arguments in his _History of the

1913

Russian Revolution_ and his article _Lessons of October_.

1914

Discussing the July Days of 1917, for example, Trotsky

1915

discusses whether (to quote the title of the relevant

1916

chapter) "Could the Bolsheviks have seized the Power in

1917

July?" and noted, in passing, the army "was far from

1918

ready to raise an insurrection in order to give the

1919

power to the Bolshevik Party." As far as the workers

1920

were concerned, although "inclining toward the Bolsheviks

1921

in its overwhelming majority, had still not broken the

1922

umbilical cord attaching it to the Compromisers" and

1923

so the Bolsheviks could not have "seized the helm in

1924

July." He then lists other parts of the country where

1925

the soviets were ready to take power. He states that

1926

in "a majority of provinces and county seats, the

1927

situation was incomparably less favourable" simply

1928

because the Bolsheviks were not as well supported.

1929

Later he notes that "[m]any of the provincial soviets

1930

had already, before the July days, become organs of

1931

power." Thus Trotsky was only interested in whether

1932

the workers could have put the Bolsheviks in power or

1933

not rather than were the soviets able to take power

1934

themselves. Party power was the decisive criteria.

1935

[_History of the Russian Revolution_, vol. 2, p. 78,

1936

p. 77, p. 78, p. 81 and p. 281]

1937

1938

This can be seen from the October insurrection. Trotsky

1939

again admits that the "Bolsheviks could have seized power

1940

in Petrograd at the beginning of July" but "they could

1941

not have held it." However, by September the Bolsheviks

1942

had gained majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow soviets.

1943

The second Congress of Soviets was approaching. The time

1944

was considered appropriate to think of insurrection. By

1945

in whose name and for what end? Trotsky makes it clear.

1946

"A revolutionary party is interested in legal coverings,"

1947

he argued and so the party could use the defending the

1948

second Congress of Soviets as the means to justify its

1949

seizure of power. He raises the question: "Would it not

1950

have been simpler . . . to summon the insurrection directly

1951

in the name of the party?" and answers it in the negative.

1952

"It would be an obvious mistake," he argued, "to identify

1953

the strength of the Bolshevik party with the strength of

1954

the soviets led by it. The latter was much greater than

1955

the former. However, without the former it would have

1956

been mere impotence." He then quotes numerous Bolshevik

1957

delegates arguing that the masses would follow the soviet,

1958

not the party. Hence the importance of seizing power in

1959

the name of the soviets, regardless of the fact it was

1960

the Bolshevik party who would in practice hold "all power."

1961

Trotsky quotes Lenin are asking "Who is to seize power?"

1962

"That is now of no importance," argued Lenin. "Let the

1963

Military Revolutionary Committee take it, or 'some other

1964

institution,' which will declare that it will surrender

1965

the power only to the genuine representatives of the

1966

interests of the people." Trotsky notes that "some other

1967

institution" was a "conspirative designation for the Central

1968

Committee of the Bolsheviks." And who turned out to be

1969

the "genuine representatives of the interests of the people"?

1970

By amazing co-incidence the Bolsheviks, the members of

1971

whose Central Committee formed the first "soviet"

1972

government. [Op. Cit., vol. 3, p. 265, p. 259, p. 262,

1973

p. 263 and p. 267]

1974

1975

As we discuss in section H.3.11, Trotsky was simply

1976

repeating the same instrumentalist arguments he had

1977

made earlier. Clearly, the support for the soviets

1978

was purely instrumental, simply a means of securing

1979

party power. For Bolshevism, the party was the key

1980

institution of proletarian revolution:

1981

1982

"The party set the soviets in motion, the soviets set

1983

in motion the workers, soldiers, and to some extent

1984

the peasantry . . . If you represent this conducting

1985

apparatus as a system of cog-wheels -- a comparison

1986

which Lenin had recourse at another period on another

1987

theme -- you may say that the impatient attempt to

1988

connect the party wheel directly with the gigantic

1989

wheel of the masses -- omitting the medium-sized

1990

wheel of the soviets -- would have given rise to the

1991

danger of breaking the teeth of the party wheel."

1992

[Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 264]

1993

1994

Thus the soviets existed to allow the party to influence

1995

the workers. What of the workers running society directly?

1996

What if the workers reject the decisions of the party?

1997

After all, *before* the revolution Lenin "more than once

1998

repeated that the masses are far to the left of the party,

1999

just as the party is to the left of the Central Committee."

2000

[Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 258] What happens when the workers

2001

refuse to be set in motion by the party but instead set

2002

themselves in motion and reject the Bolsheviks? What then

2003

for the soviets? Looking at the logic of Trotsky's

2004

instrumentalist perspective, in such a case we would

2005

predict that the soviets would have to be tamed (by

2006

whatever means possible) in favour of party power (the

2007

real goal). And this is what did happen. The fate of the

2008

soviets after October prove that the Bolsheviks did not,

2009

in fact, seek soviet power without doubt (see next section).

2010

And as we discuss in section H.9.4, the peculiar Bolshevik

2011

definition of "soviet power" allowed them to justify the

2012

elimination of from the bottom-up grassroots democracy in

2013

the military and in the workplace with top-down appointments.

2014

2015

Thus we have a distinctly strange meaning by the expression

2016

"All Power to the Soviets." In practice, it meant that the

2017

soviets alienate its power to a Bolshevik government. This

2018

is what the Bolsheviks considered as "soviet power," namely

2019

party power, pure and simple. As the Central Committee argued

2020

in November 1917, "it is impossible to refuse a purely Bolshevik

2021

government without treason to the slogan of the power of the

2022

Soviets, since a majority at the Second All-Russian Congress

2023

of Soviets . . . handed power over to this government."

2024

[contained in Robert v. Daniels (ed.), _A Documentary

2025

History of Communism_, vol. 1, pp. 128-9] Lenin was clear,

2026

arguing mere days after the October Revolution that "our

2027

present slogan is: No Compromise, i.e. for a homogeneous

2028

Bolshevik government." [quoted by Daniels, _Conscience of

2029

the Revolution_, p. 65]

2030

2031

In other words, "soviet power" exists when the soviets hand

2032

power over the someone else (namely the Bolshevik leaders)!

2033

The difference is important, "for the Anarchists declared,

2034

if 'power' really should belong to the soviets, it could not

2035

belong to the Bolshevik party, and if it should belong to

2036

that Party, as the Bolsheviks envisaged, it could not belong

2037

to the soviets." [Voline, _The Unknown Revolution_, p. 213]

2038

2039

Which means that while anarchists and Leninists both use

2040

the expression "All Power to the Soviets" it does not mean

2041

they mean exactly the same thing by it. In practice the

2042

Bolshevik vision simply replaced the power of the soviets

2043

with a "soviet power" above them:

2044

2045

"The success of the Bolsheviks in the October Revolution

2046

in power and from there subordinated the whole Revolution

2047

to their Party is explained by their ability to substitute

2048

the idea of a Soviet power for the social revolution and

2049

the social emancipation of the masses. A priori, these

2050

two ideas appear as non-contradictory for it was possible

2051

to understand Soviet power as the power of the soviets,

2052

and this facilitated the substitution of the idea of

2053

Soviet power for that of the Revolution. Nevertheless,

2054

in their realisation and consequences these ideas were

2055

in violent contraction to each other. The conception of

2056

Soviet Power incarnated in the Bolshevik state, was

2057

transformed into an entirely traditional bourgeois power

2058

concentrated in a handful of individuals who subjected to

2059

their authority all that was fundamental and most powerful

2060

in the life of the people -- in this particular case, the

2061

social revolution. Therefore, with the help of the 'power

2062

of the soviets' -- in which the Bolsheviks monopolised

2063

most of the posts - they effectively attained a total

2064

power and could proclaim their dictatorship throughout

2065

the revolutionary territory . . . All was reduced to

2066

a single centre, from where all instructions emanated

2067

concerning the way of life, of thought, of action of

2068

the working masses." [Peter Arshinov, _The Two Octobers_]

2069

2070

Isolated from the masses, holding power on their behalf,

2071

the Bolshevik party could not help being influenced by

2072

the realities of their position in society and the social

2073

relationships produced by statist forms. Far from being

2074

the servants of the people, they become upon the seizing

2075

of power their masters. As we argue in section H.9.7,

2076

the experience of Bolshevism in power confirmed anarchist

2077

fears that the so-called "workers' state" would quickly

2078

become a danger to the revolution, corrupting those who

2079

held power and generating a bureaucracy around the new

2080

state bodies which came into conflict with both the ruling

2081

party and the masses. Placed above the people, isolated

2082

from them by centralisation of power, the Bolsheviks

2083

pre-revolutionary aim for party power unsurprising became

2084

in practice party dictatorship.

2085

2086

In less than a year, by July 1918, the soviet regime was

2087

a *de facto* party dictatorship. The theoretical revisions

2088

soon followed. Lenin, for example, was proclaiming in

2089

early December 1918 that while legalising the Mensheviks

2090

the Bolsheviks would "reserve state power for ourselves,

2091

*and for ourselves alone.*" [_Collected Works_, vol. 28,

2092

p. 213] Victor Serge records how when he arrived in Russia

2093

in the following month he discovered "a colourless article"

2094

signed by Zinoviev on "The Monopoly of Power" which said

2095

"Our Party rules alone . . . it will not allow anyone

2096

. . . The false democratic liberties demanded by the

2097

counter-revolution." [_Memoirs of a Revolutionary_,

2098

p. 69] Serge, like most Bolsheviks, embraced this

2099

perspective wholeheartedly. For example, when the

2100

Bolsheviks published Bakunin's "confession" to the

2101

Tsar in 1921 (in an attempt to discredit anarchism)

2102

"Serge seized on Bakunin's passage concerning the need

2103

for dictatorial rule in Russia, suggesting that

2104

'already in 1848 Bakunin had presaged Bolshevism.'"

2105

[Lawrence D. Orton, "introduction," _The Confession

2106

of Mikhail Bakunin_, p. 21] At the time Bakunin wrote

2107

his "confession" he was not an anarchist. At the time

2108

Serge wrote his comments, he was a leading Bolshevik

2109

and reflecting mainstream Bolshevik ideology.

2110

2111

Indeed, so important was it considered by them, the

2112

Bolsheviks revised their theory of the state to include

2113

this particular lesson of their revolution (see section

2114

H.3.8 for details). As noted in section H.1.2, all the

2115

leading Bolsheviks were talking about the "dictatorship

2116

of the party" and continued to do so until their deaths.

2117

Such a position, incidentally, is hard to square with

2118

support for soviet power in any meaningful term (although

2119

it is easy to square with an instrumentalist position

2120

on workers' councils as a means to party power). It was

2121

only in the mid-30s that Serge started to revise his

2122

position for this position (Trotsky still subscribed to

2123

it). By the early 1940s, he wrote that "[a]gainst the Party

2124

the anarchists were right when they inscribed on their

2125

black banners, 'There is no worse poison than power' --

2126

meaning absolute power. From now on the psychosis of

2127

power was to captive the great majority of the leadership,

2128

especially at the lower levels." [Serge, Op. Cit., p. 100]

2129

2130

Nor can the effects of the civil war explain this shift.

2131

As we discuss in the next section, the Bolshevik assault

2132

on the soviets and their power started in the spring of

2133

1918, months before the start of large scale civil war.

2134

And it should be stressed that the Bolsheviks were not

2135

at all bothered by the creation of party dictatorship

2136

over the soviets. Indeed, in spite of ruling over a one

2137

party state Lenin was arguing in November 1918 that

2138

"Soviet power is a million times more democratic than

2139

the most democratic bourgeois republic." How can that

2140

be when the workers do not run society nor have a say

2141

in who rules them? When Karl Kautsky raised this issue,

2142

Lenin replied by saying he "fails to see the *class*

2143

nature of the state apparatus, of the machinery of

2144

state . . . The Soviet government is the *first* in

2145

the world . . . to *enlist* the people, specifically

2146

the *exploited* people in the work of administration."

2147

[_Collected Works_, vol. 28, p. 247 and p. 248]

2148

2149

However, the key issue is not whether workers take part

2150

in the state machinery but whether they determine the

2151

policies that are being implemented, i.e. whether the

2152

masses are running their own lives. After all, as

2153

Ante Ciliga pointed out, the Stalinist GPU (secret

2154

police) "liked to boast of the working class origin of

2155

its henchmen." One of his fellow prisoners retorted to

2156

such claims by pointing out they were "wrong to believe

2157

that in the days the Tsar the gaolers were recruited

2158

from among the dukes and the executioners from among

2159

the princes!" [_The Russian Engima_, pp. 255-6] Simply

2160

put, just because the state administration is made

2161

up of bureaucrats who were originally working class

2162

does not mean that the working class, as a class,

2163

manages society.

2164

2165

In December of that year Lenin went one further and

2166

noted that at the Sixth Soviet Congress "the Bolsheviks

2167

had 97 per cent" of delegates, i.e. "practically all

2168

representatives of the workers and peasants of the

2169

whole of Russia." This was proof of "how stupid and

2170

ridiculous is the bourgeois fairy-tale about the

2171

Bolsheviks only having minority support." [Op. Cit.,

2172

pp. 355-6] Given that the workers and peasants had no

2173

real choice in who to vote for, can this result be

2174

surprising? Of course not. While the Bolsheviks *had*

2175

mass support a year previously, pointing to election

2176

results under a dictatorship where all other parties

2177

and groups are subject to state repression is hardly

2178

convincing evidence for current support. Needless

2179

to say, Stalin (like a host of other dictators)

2180

made similar claims on similarly dubious election

2181

results. If the Bolsheviks were sincere in their

2182

support for soviet power then they would have

2183

tried to organise genuine soviet elections. This

2184

was possible even during the civil war as the

2185

example of the Makhnovists showed (see section

2186

H.11.7 for details).

2187

2188

So, in a nutshell, the Bolsheviks did not fundamentally

2189

support the goal of soviet power. Rather, they aimed to

2190

create a "soviet power," a Bolshevik power above the

2191

soviets which derived its legitimacy from them. However,

2192

if the soviets conflicted with that power, it were the

2193

soviets which were repudiated *not* party power. Thus the

2194

result of Bolshevik ideology was the marginalisation of

2195

the soviets and their replacement by Bolshevik dictatorship.

2196

This process started before the civil war and can be traced

2197

to the nature of the state as well as the underlying

2198

assumptions of Bolshevik ideology (see section H.9).

2199

2200

6 What happened to the soviets after October?

2201

2202

As indicated in the last question, the last thing which

2203

the Bolsheviks wanted was "all power to the soviets."

2204

Rather they wanted the soviets to hand over that power

2205

to a Bolshevik government. As the people in liberal

2206

capitalist politics, the soviets were "sovereign" in

2207

name only. They were expected to delegate power to a

2208

government. Like the "sovereign people" of bourgeois

2209

republics, the soviets were much praised but in practice

2210

ignored by those with real power.

2211

2212

In such a situation, we would expect the soviets to

2213

play no meaningful role in the new "workers' state."

2214

Under such a centralised system, we would expect the

2215

soviets to become little more than a fig-leaf for party

2216

power. Unsurprisingly, this is *exactly* what they did

2217

become. As we discuss in section H.9.7, anarchists are

2218

not surprised by this as the centralisation so beloved

2219

by Marxists is designed to empower the few at the centre

2220

and marginalise the many at the circumference.

2221

2222

The very first act of the Bolshevik revolution was for

2223

the Second Congress of Soviets to alienate its power and

2224

hand it over to the "Council of People's Commissars." This

2225

was the new government and was totally Bolshevik in make-up

2226

(the Left SRs later joined it, although the Bolsheviks

2227

always maintained control). Thus the first act of the

2228

revolution was the creation of a power *above* the soviets.

2229

Although derived from the soviet congress, it was not

2230

identical to it. Thus the Bolshevik "workers' state" or

2231

"semi-state" started to have the same characteristics as

2232

the normal state (see sections H.3.7 for a discussion of

2233

what marks a state).

2234

2235

The subsequent marginalisation of the soviets in the "soviet"

2236

state occurred from top to bottom should not, therefore be

2237

considered an accident or a surprise. The Bolshevik desire

2238

for party power within a highly centralised state could have

2239

no other effect. At the top, the Central Executive Committee

2240

(CEC or VTsIK) was quickly marginalised from power. This

2241

body was meant to be the highest organ of soviet power but,

2242

in practice, it was sidelined by the Bolshevik government.

2243

This can be seen when, just four days after seizing power,

2244

the Bolshevik Council of People's Commissars (CPC or Sovnarkom)

2245

"unilaterally arrogated to itself legislative power simply by

2246

promulgating a decree to this effect. This was, effectively,

2247

a Bolshevik *coup d'etat* that made clear the government's

2248

(and party's) pre-eminence over the soviets and their

2249

executive organ. Increasingly, the Bolsheviks relied upon

2250

the appointment from above of commissars with plenipotentiary

2251

powers, and they split up and reconstituted fractious Soviets

2252

and intimidated political opponents." [Neil Harding, _Leninism_,

2253

p. 253] Strange actions for a party proclaiming it was acting

2254

to ensure "All power to the soviets" (as we discussed in the

2255

last section, this was always considered by Lenin as little

2256

more than a slogan to hide the fact that the party would be

2257

in power).

2258

2259

It is doubtful that when readers of Lenin's _State and

2260

Revolution_ read his argument for combining legislative

2261

and executive powers into one body, they had this in mind!

2262

But then, as we discussed in section 4, that work was

2263

never applied in practice so we should not be too surprised

2264

by this turn of events. One thing is sure, four days after

2265

the "soviet" revolution the soviets had been replaced as

2266

the effective power in society by a handful of Bolshevik

2267

leaders. So the Bolsheviks immediately created a power

2268

*above* the soviets in the form of the CPC. Lenin's argument

2269

in _The State and Revolution_ that, like the Paris Commune,

2270

the workers' state would be based on a fusion of executive

2271

and administrative functions in the hands of the workers'

2272

delegates did not last one night. In reality, the Bolshevik

2273

party was the *real* power in "soviet" Russia.

2274

2275

Given that the All-Russian central Executive Committee

2276

of Soviets (VTsIK) was dominated by Bolsheviks, it comes

2277

as no surprise to discover it was used to augment this

2278

centralisation of power into the hands of the party.

2279

The VTsIK ("charged by the October revolution with

2280

controlling the government," the Sovnarkom) was "used

2281

not to control but rather extend the authority and

2282

centralising fiat of the government. That was the work

2283

of Iakov Sverdlov, the VTsIK chairman, who -- in close

2284

collaboration with Lenin as chairman of the Sovnarkom

2285

were by the VTsIK and that they were thus endowed with

2286

Soviet legitimacy when they were sent to provincial

2287

soviet executive committees for transmission to all

2288

local soviets . . . To achieve that, Sverdlov had to

2289

reduce the 'Soviet Parliament' to nothing more than

2290

an 'administrative branch' (as Sukhanov put it) of the

2291

Sovnarkom. Using his position as the VTsIK chairman and

2292

his tight control over its praesidium and the large,

2293

disciplined and compliant Bolshevik majority in the

2294

plenary assembly, Sverdlov isolated the opposition and

2295

rendered it impotent. So successful was he that, by

2296

early December 1917, Sukhanov had already written off

2297

the VTsIK as 'a sorry parody of a revolutionary

2298

parliament,' while for the Bolshevik, Martin

2299

Latsis-Zurabs, the VTsIL was not even a good

2300

rubberstamp. Latsis campaigned vigorously in March

2301

and April 1918 for the VTsIK's abolition: with its

2302

'idle, long-winded talk and its incapacity for

2303

productive work' the VTsIK merely held up the work

2304

of government, he claimed. And he may have had a

2305

point: during the period of 1917 to 1918, the

2306

Sovnarkom issued 474 decrees, the VTsIK a mere

2307

62." [Israel Getzler, _Soviets as Agents of

2308

Democratisation_, p. 27]

2309

2310

This process was not an accident. Far from it. In

2311

fact, the Bolshevik chairman Sverdlov knew exactly

2312

what he was doing. This included modifying the way

2313

the CEC worked:

2314

2315

"The structure of VTsIK itself began to change under

2316

Sverdlov. He began to use the presidium to circumvent

2317

the general meeting, which contained eloquent minority

2318

spokesmen . . . Sverdlov's used of the presidium marked

2319

a decisive change in the status of that body within the

2320

soviet hierarchy. In mid-1917 . . . [the] plenum had

2321

directed all activities and ratified bureau decisions

2322

which had a 'particularly important social-political

2323

character.' The bureau . . . served as the executive

2324

organ of the VTsIK plenum . . . Only in extraordinary

2325

cases when the bureau could no be convened for technical

2326

reason could the presidium make decisions. Even then

2327

such actions remained subject to review by the plenum."

2328

[Charles Duval, "Yakov M. Sverdlov and the All-Russian

2329

Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK)", pp. 3-22,

2330

_Soviet Studies_, vol. XXXI, no. 1, January 1979, pp. 6-7]

2331

2332

Under the Bolsheviks, the presidium was converted "into

2333

the *de facto* centre of power within VTsIK." It "began

2334

to award representations to groups and factions which

2335

supported the government. With the VTsIK becoming ever

2336

more unwieldy in size by the day, the presidium began

2337

to expand its activities." The presidium was used "to

2338

circumvent general meetings." Thus the Bolsheviks were

2339

able "to increase the power of the presidium, postpone

2340

regular sessions, and present VTsIK with policies which

2341

had already been implemented by the Sovnarkon. Even

2342

in the presidium itself very few people determined

2343

policy." [Charles Duval, Op. Cit., p.7, p. 8 and p. 18]

2344

2345

So, from the very outset, the VTsIK was overshadowed by

2346

the "Council of People's Commissars" (CPC). In the first

2347

year, only 68 of 480 decrees issued by the CPC were

2348

actually submitted to the Soviet Central Executive Committee,

2349

and even fewer were actually drafted by it. The VTsIK functions

2350

"were never clearly delineated, even in the constitution,

2351

despite vigorous attempts by the Left SRs . . . that Lenin

2352

never saw this highest soviet organ as the genuine equal

2353

of his cabin and that the Bolsheviks deliberated obstructed

2354

efforts at clarification is [a] convincing" conclusion to

2355

draw. It should be stressed that this process started before

2356

the outbreak of civil war in late May, 1918. After that

2357

the All-Russian Congress of soviets, which convened every

2358

three months or so during the first year of the revolution,

2359

met annually thereafter. Its elected VTsIK "also began to

2360

meet less frequently, and at the height of the civil war

2361

in late 1918 and throughout 1919, it never once met in full

2362

session. [Carmen Sirianni, _Workers' Control and Socialist

2363

Democracy_, pp. 203-4]

2364

2365

The marginalisation of the soviets can be seen from the

2366

decision on whether to continue the war against Germany.

2367

As Cornelius Castoriadis notes, under Lenin "[c]ollectively,

2368

the only real instance of power is the Party, and very soon,

2369

only the summits of the Party. Immediately after the seizure

2370

of power the soviets as institutions are reduced to the status

2371

of pure window-dressing (we need only look at the fact that,

2372

already at the beginning of 1918 in the discussions leading

2373

up to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, their role was absolutely

2374

nil)." [_The role of Bolshevik Ideology in the birth of the

2375

Bureaucracy_, p. 97] In fact, on the 26th of February, 1918,

2376

the Soviet Executive "began a survey of 200 local soviets;

2377

by 10 March 1918 a majority (105-95) had come out in favour

2378

of a revolutionary war, although the soviets in the two

2379

capitals voted . . . to accept a separate peace." [Geoffrey

2380

Swain, _The Origins of the Russian Civil War_, p. 128] This

2381

survey was ignored by the Bolshevik Central Committee which

2382

voted 4 against, 4 abstain and 5 for it. This took Russia

2383

out of the Great War but handed over massive areas to

2384

imperialist Germany. The controversial treaty was ratified

2385

at the Fourth Soviet Congress, unsurprisingly as the Bolshevik

2386

majority simply followed the orders of their Central Committee.

2387

It would be pointless to go over the arguments of the rights

2388

and wrongs of the decision here, the point is that the 13

2389

members of the Bolshevik Central Committee decided the

2390

future faith of Russia in this vote. The soviets were simply

2391

ignored in spite of the fact it was possible to consult them

2392

fully. Clearly, "soviet power" meant little more than

2393

window-dressing for Bolshevik power.

2394

2395

Thus, at the top summits of the state, the soviets had

2396

been marginalised by the Bolsheviks from day one. Far from having "all

2397

power" their CEC had given that to a

2398

Bolshevik government. Rather than exercise real power,

2399

it's basic aim was to control those who did exercise it.

2400

And the Bolsheviks successfully acted to undermine even

2401

this function.

2402

2403

If this was happening at the top, what was the situation

2404

at the grassroots? Here, too, oligarchic tendencies in the

2405

soviets increased post-October, with "[e]ffective power

2406

in the local soviets relentlessly gravitated to the executive

2407

committees, and especially their presidia. Plenary sessions

2408

became increasingly symbolic and ineffectual." The party was

2409

"successful in gaining control of soviet executives in the

2410

cities and at *uezd* and *guberniya* levels. These executive

2411

bodies were usually able to control soviet congresses, though

2412

the party often disbanded congresses that opposed major

2413

aspects of current policies." Local soviets "had little input

2414

into the formation of national policy" and "[e]ven at higher

2415

levels, institutional power shifted away from the soviets."

2416

[C. Sirianni, Op. Cit., p. 204 and p. 203] The soviets quickly

2417

had become rubber-stamps for the Communist government, with

2418

the Soviet Constitution of 1918 codifying the centralisation

2419

of power and top-down decision making. Local soviets were

2420

expected to "carry out all orders of the respective higher

2421

organs of the soviet power" (i.e. to carry out the commands

2422

of the central government).

2423

2424

This was not all. While having popular support in October

2425

1917, the realities of "Leninism in power" soon saw a

2426

backlash develop. The Bolsheviks started to loose popular

2427

support to opposition groups like the Mensheviks and SRs

2428

(left and right). This growing opposition was reflected in

2429

two ways. Firstly, a rise in working class protests in the

2430

form of strikes and independent organisations (see section

2431

H.8.5, for example). Secondly, there was a rise in votes for

2432

the opposition parties in soviet elections. Faced with this,

2433

the Bolsheviks responded in three ways, delaying elections.

2434

gerrymandering or force. We will discuss each in turn.

2435

2436

Lenin argued in mid-April 1918 that the "socialist character

2437

of Soviet, i.e. *proletarian*, democracy" lies, in part, in

2438

because "the people themselves determine the order and time

2439

of elections." [_The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government_,

2440

pp. 36-7] However, the reality in the grassroots was somewhat

2441

different. There "the government [was] continually postponed

2442

the new general elections to the Petrograd Soviet, the term of

2443

which had ended in March 1918" because it "feared that the

2444

opposition parties would show gains. This fear was well

2445

founded since in the period immediately preceding 25 January,

2446

in those Petrograd factories where the workers had decided

2447

to hold new elections, the Mensheviks, SRs, and non-affiliated

2448

candidates had won about half the seats." [Samuel Farber,

2449

_Before Stalinism_, p. 22] In Yaroslavl, the "more the

2450

Bolsheviks tried to postpone the elections, the more the

2451

idea of holding new elections became an issue itself." When

2452

the Bolsheviks gave in and held elections in early April,

2453

the Mensheviks won 47 of the 98 seats, the Bolsheviks 38

2454

and the SRs 13. ["The Mensheviks' Political Comeback:

2455

The Elections to the Provincial City Soviets in Spring

2456

1918", _The Russian Review_, vol. 42, pp. 1-50, p. 18]

2457

The fate of the Yaroslavl soviet will be discussed shorted.

2458

As Geoffrey Swain summaries, Menshevik and SR "successes

2459

in recalling Bolshevik delegates from the soviets had

2460

forced the Bolsheviks increasingly to delay by-elections."

2461

[_The Origins of the Russian Civil War_, p. 91]

2462

2463

As well as postponing elections and recall, the Bolsheviks

2464

also quickly turned to gerrymandering the soviets to ensure

2465

the stability of their majority in the soviets. In this

2466

they made use of certain institutional problems the

2467

soviets had had from the start. On the day which the

2468

Petrograd soviet was formed in 1917, the Bolshevik

2469

Shlyapnikov "proposed that each socialist party should

2470

have the right to two seats in the provisional executive

2471

committee of the soviet." This was "designed, initially,

2472

to give the Bolsheviks a decent showing, for they were

2473

only a small minority of the initiating group." It was

2474

agreed. However, the "result was that members of a dozen

2475

different parties and organisations (trades unions,

2476

co-operative movements, etc.) entered the executive

2477

committee. They called themselves 'representatives'

2478

(of their organisations) and, by virtue of this, they

2479

speedily eliminated from their discussions the committee

2480

members chosen by the general assembly although they were

2481

the true founders of the Soviet." This meant, for example,

2482

Bolshevik co-founders of the soviet made way for such

2483

people as Kamenev and Stalin. Thus the make-up of the

2484

soviet executive committee was decided upon by "the

2485

leadership of each organisation, its executive officers,

2486

and not with the [soviet] assembly. The assembly had lost

2487

its right to control." Thus, for example, the Bolshevik

2488

central committee member Yoffe became the presidium of

2489

the soviet of district committees without being elected

2490

by anyone represented at those soviets. "After October,

2491

the Bolsheviks were more systematic in their use of these

2492

methods, but there was a difference: there were now no

2493

truly free elections that might have put a brake to a

2494

procedure that could only benefit the Bolshevik party."

2495

[Marc Ferro, _October 1917_, p. 191 and p. 195]

2496

2497

The effects of this can be seen in Petrograd soviet

2498

elections of June 1918. In these the Bolsheviks "lost

2499

the absolute majority in the soviet they had previously

2500

enjoyed" but remained its largest party. However, the

2501

results of these elections were irrelevant. This was

2502

because "under regulations prepared by the Bolsheviks

2503

and adopted by the 'old' Petrograd soviet, more than

2504

half of the projected 700-plus deputies in the 'new'

2505

soviet were to be elected by the Bolshevik-dominated

2506

district soviets, trade unions, factory committees,

2507

Red Army and naval units, and district worker

2508

conferences: thus, the Bolsheviks were assured of

2509

a solid majority even before factory voting began."

2510

[Alexander Rabinowitch, _Early Disenchantment with

2511

Bolshevik Rule_, p. 45] To be specific, the number

2512

of delegates elected directly from the workplace made

2513

up a mere third of the new soviet (i.e. only 260 of the

2514

700 plus deputies in the new soviet were elected directly

2515

from the factories): "It was this arbitrary 'stacking' of

2516

the new soviet, much more than election of 'dead souls'

2517

from shut-down factories, unfair campaign practices,

2518

falsification of the vote, or direct repression, that

2519

gave the Bolsheviks an unfair advantage in the contest."

2520

[Alexander Rabinowitch, _The Petrograd First City

2521

District Soviet during the Civil War_, p. 140]

2522

2523

In other words, the Bolsheviks gerrymandered and packed

2524

the soviet to remain in power, so distorting the soviet

2525

structure to ensure Bolshevik dominance. This practice

2526

seems to have been commonplace. In Saratov, as in Petrograd,

2527

"the Bolsheviks, fearing that they would lose elections,

2528

changed the electoral rules . . . in addition to the

2529

delegates elected directly at the factories, the trade

2530

unions -- but only those in favour of soviet power, in

2531

other words supporters of the Bolsheviks and Left SRs --

2532

were given representation. Similarly, the political

2533

parties supporting Soviet power automatically received

2534

twenty-five seats in the soviets. Needless to say, these

2535

rules heavily favoured the ruling parties" as the

2536

Mensheviks and SRs "were regarded by the Bolsheviks as

2537

being against Soviet power." [Brovkin, Op. Cit., p. 30]

2538

2539

A similar situation existed in Moscow. For example, the

2540

largest single union in the soviet in 1920 was that of

2541

soviet employees with 140 deputies (9% of the total),

2542

followed by the metal workers with 121 (8%). In total,

2543

the bureaucracies of the four biggest trade unions had

2544

29.5% of delegates in the Moscow soviet. This packing

2545

of the soviet by the trade union bureaucracy existed

2546

in 1918 as well, ensuring the Bolsheviks were

2547

insulated from popular opposition and the recall of

2548

workplace delegates by their electors. Another form of

2549

gerrymandering was uniting areas of Bolshevik strength

2550

"for electoral purposes with places where they were weak,

2551

such as the creation of a single constituency out of the

2552

Moscow food administration (MPO) and the Cheka in February

2553

1920." [Richard Sakwa, _Soviet Communists in Power_,

2554

p. 179 and p. 178]

2555

2556

However, this activity was mild compared to the Bolshevik

2557

response to soviet elections which did not go their way.

2558

According to one historian, by the spring of 1918 "Menshevik

2559

newspapers and activists in the trade unions, the Soviets,

2560

and the factories had made a considerable impact on a working

2561

class which was becoming increasingly disillusioned with the

2562

Bolshevik regime, so much so that in many places the Bolsheviks

2563

felt constrained to dissolve Soviets or prevent re-elections

2564

where Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries had gained

2565

majorities." [Israel Getzler, _Martov_, p. 179] This is

2566

confirmed by other sources. "By the middle of 1918," notes

2567

Leonard Schapiro, "the Mensheviks could claim with some

2568

justification that large numbers of the industrial working

2569

class were now behind them, and that for the systematic

2570

dispersal and packing of the soviets, and the mass arrests

2571

at workers' meetings and congresses, their party could

2572

eventually have won power by its policy of constitutional

2573

opposition. In the elections to the soviets which were

2574

taking place in the spring of 1918 throughout Russia,

2575

arrests, military dispersal, even shootings followed

2576

whenever Mensheviks succeeded in winning majorities or

2577

a substantial representation." [_The Origin of the

2578

Communist Autocracy_, p. 191]

2579

2580

For example, the Mensheviks "made something of a comeback

2581

about Saratov workers in the spring of 1918, for which the

2582

Bolsheviks expelled them from the soviet." [Donald J.

2583

Raleigh, _Experiencing Russia's Civil War_, p. 187] Izhevsk,

2584

a town of 100,000 with an armaments industry which was

2585

the main suppliers of rifles to the Tzar's Army, experienced

2586

a swing to the left by the time of the October revolution.

2587

The Bolsheviks and SR-Maximalists became the majority and

2588

with a vote 92 to 58 for the soviet to assume power. After

2589

a revolt by SR-Maximalist Red Guards against the Bolshevik

2590

plans for a centralised Red Army in April, 1918, the

2591

Bolsheviks became the sole power. However, in the May

2592

elections the Mensheviks and [right] SRs "experienced a

2593

dramatic revival" and for "the first time since September

2594

1917, these two parties constituted a majority in the

2595

Soviet by winning seventy of 135 seats." The Bolsheviks

2596

"simply refused to acquiesce to the popular mandate of

2597

the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries." In June,

2598

the Bolshevik leadership "appealed to the Karzan' Soviet

2599

. . . for assistance." The troops sent along with the

2600

Bolshevik dominated Red Guards "abrogated the results

2601

of the May and June elections" and imprisoned the SR

2602

and Menshevik soviet delegates. The summer of 1918 also

2603

saw victories for the SRs and Mensheviks in the soviet

2604

elections in Votkinsk, a steel town near Izhevsk. "As

2605

in Izhevsk the Bolsheviks voided the elections." [Stephan

2606

M. Merk, "The 'Class-Tragedy' of Izhevsk: Working Class

2607

Opposition to Bolshevism in 1918", pp. 176-90, _Russian

2608

History_, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 181 and p. 186]

2609

2610

However, the most in depth account of this destruction

2611

of soviet is found in the research of Vladimir Brovkin.

2612

According to him, there "are three factors" which emerge

2613

from the soviet election results in the spring of 1918.

2614

These are, firstly, "the impressive success of the

2615

Menshevik-SR opposition" in those elections in all

2616

regions in European Russia. The second "is the

2617

Bolshevik practice of outright disbandment of the

2618

Menshevik-SR-controlled soviets. The third is the

2619

subsequent wave of anti-Bolshevik uprisings." In

2620

fact, "in all provincial capitals of European Russia

2621

where elections were held on which there are data, the

2622

Mensheviks and the SRs won majorities on the city

2623

soviets in the spring of 1918." Brovkin stresses that

2624

the "process of the Menshevik-SR electoral victories

2625

threatened Bolshevik power. That is why in the course

2626

of the spring and summer of 1918, the soviet assemblies

2627

were disbanded in most cities and villages. To stay in

2628

power, the Bolsheviks had to destroy the soviets. . .

2629

These steps generated a far-reaching transformation in

2630

the soviet system, which remained 'soviet' in name

2631

only." Brovkin presents accounts from numerous towns

2632

and cities. As an example, he discusses Tver' where

2633

the "escalation of political tensions followed the

2634

already familiar pattern" as the "victory of the

2635

opposition at the polls" in April 1918 "brought about

2636

an intensification of the Bolshevik repression. Strikes,

2637

protests, and marches in Tver' lead to the imposition

2638

of martial law." [Brovkin, Op. Cit., p. 46, p. 47, p. 48

2639

and p. 11] Thus Bolshevik armed force not only overthrew

2640

the election results, it also suppressed working class

2641

protest against such actions. (Brovkin's book _The

2642

Mensheviks after October_ contains the same information

2643

as his article).

2644

2645

This Bolshevik attack on the soviets usually started with

2646

attempts to stop new elections. For example, after a

2647

demonstration in Petrograd in favour of the Constituent

2648

Assembly was repressed by the Bolsheviks in mid-January

2649

1918, calls for new elections to the soviet occurred in

2650

many factories. "Despite the efforts of the Bolsheviks

2651

and the Factory Committees they controlled, the movement

2652

for new elections to the soviet spread to more than twenty

2653

factories by early February and resulted in the election

2654

of fifty delegates: thirty-six SRs, seven Mensheviks and

2655

seven non-party." However, the Bolsheviks "unwillingness

2656

to recognise the elections and to seat new delegates

2657

pushed a group of Socialists to . . . lay plans for an

2658

alternative workers' forum . . . what was later to become

2659

the Assembly of Workers' Plenipotentiaries." [Scott Smith,

2660

"The Social-Revolutionaries and the Dilemma of Civil War",

2661

_The Bolsheviks in Russian Society_, pp. 83-104, Vladimir

2662

N. Brovkin (Ed.), pp. 85-86] As we discuss in section H.8.5

2663

this forum, like all forms of working class protest, was

2664

crushed by the Bolshevik state. By the time the elections

2665

were held, in June 1918, the civil war had started

2666

(undoubtedly favouring the Bolsheviks) and the Bolsheviks

2667

had secured their majority by packing the soviet with

2668

non-workplace "representatives."

2669

2670

In Tula, again in the spring of 1918, local Bolsheviks

2671

reported to the Bolshevik Central Committee that the

2672

"Bolshevik deputies began to be recalled one after

2673

another . . . our situation became shakier with passing

2674

day. We were forced to block new elections to the soviet

2675

and even not to recognise them where they had taken place

2676

not in our favour." In the end, the local party leader

2677

was forced to abolish the city soviet and to vest power

2678

in the Provincial Executive Committee. This refused to

2679

convene a plenum of the city soviet for more than two

2680

months, knowing that newly elected delegates were

2681

non-Bolshevik. [Smith, Op. Cit., p. 87]

2682

2683

In Yaroslavl', the newly elected soviet convened on April

2684

9th, 1918, and when it elected a Menshevik chairman, "the

2685

Bolshevik delegation walked out and declared the soviet

2686

dissolved. In response, workers in the city went out on

2687

strike, which the Bolsheviks answered by arresting the

2688

strike committee and threatening to dismiss the strikers

2689

and replace them with unemployed workers." This failed and

2690

the Bolsheviks were forced to hold new elections, which

2691

they lost. Then "the Bolsheviks dissolved this soviet as

2692

well and places the city under martial law." A similar

2693

event occurred in Riazan' (again in April) and, again,

2694

the Bolsheviks "promptly dissolved the soviet and declared

2695

a dictatorship under a Military-Revolutionary Committee."

2696

[Op. Cit., pp. 88-9]

2697

2698

The opposition parties raised such issues at the All-Russian

2699

Central Executive Committee of Soviets (VTsIK), to little avail.

2700

On the 11th of April, one "protested that non-Bolshevik controlled

2701

soviets were being dispersed by armed force, and wanted to

2702

discuss the issue." The chairman "refus[ed] to include it in

2703

the agenda because of lack of supporting material" and such

2704

information be submitted to the presidium of the soviet. The

2705

majority (i.e. the Bolsheviks) "supported their chairman"

2706

and the facts were "submitted . . . to the presidium, where

2707

they apparently remained." It should be noted that the "same

2708

fate befell attempts to challenge the arrests of Moscow

2709

anarchists by the government on 12 April." The chairman's

2710

"handling of the anarchist matter ended its serious discussion

2711

in the VTsIK." [Charles Duval, Op. Cit., pp. 13-14] Given that

2712

the VTsIK was *meant* to be the highest soviet body between

2713

congresses, the lack of concern for Bolshevik repression

2714

against soviets and opposition groups clearly shows the

2715

Bolshevik contempt for soviet democracy.

2716

2717

Needless to say, this destruction of soviet democracy

2718

continued during the civil war. For example, the

2719

Bolsheviks simply rejected the voice of people and

2720

would refuse to accept an election result. Emma

2721

Goldman attended an election meeting of bakers in Moscow

2722

in March, 1920. "It was," she said, "the most exciting

2723

gathering I had witnessed in Russia." However the "chosen

2724

representative, an Anarchist, had been refused his mandate

2725

by the Soviet authorities. It was the third time the

2726

workers gathered to re-elect their delegate . . . and

2727

every time they elected the same man. The Communist

2728

candidate opposing him was Semashko, the Commissar of

2729

the Department of Health . . . [who] raved against the

2730

workers for choosing a non-Communist, called anathema

2731

upon their heads, and threatened them with the Tcheka

2732

and the curtailment of their rations. But he had no

2733

effect on the audience except to emphasise their

2734

opposition to him, and to arouse antagonism against the

2735

party he represented. The workers' choice was repudiated

2736

by the authorities by the authorities and later even

2737

arrested and imprisoned." After a hunger strike, they

2738

were released. In spite of chekists with loaded guns

2739

attending union meetings, the bakers "would not be

2740

intimidated" and threatened a strike "unless they

2741

were permitted to elect their own candidate. This ensured

2742

the bakers' demands were met. [_My Disillusionment in

2743

Russia_, pp. 88-9]

2744

2745

Unsurprisingly, "there is a mass of evidence to support

2746

the Menshevik accusations of electoral malpractice" during

2747

elections in May 1920. And in spite of Menshevik "declaration

2748

of support for the Soviet regime against the Poles" the

2749

party was "still subject to harassment." [Skawa, Op. Cit.,

2750

p. 178]

2751

2752

This gerrymandering was not limited to just local soviets.

2753

The Bolsheviks used it at the fifth soviet congress as well.

2754

2755

First, it should be noted that in the run up to the congress,

2756

"on 14 June 1918, they expelled Martov and his five Mensheviks together

2757

with the Socialist Revolutionaries from the Central

2758

Executive Committee, closed down their newspapers . . and

2759

drove them underground, just on the eve of the elections to

2760

the Fifth Congress of Soviets in which the Mensheviks were

2761

expected to make significant gains." [Israel Getzler,

2762

_Martov_, p. 181] The rationale for this action was the

2763

claim that the Mensheviks had taken part in anti-soviet

2764

rebellions (as we discuss in section 23, this was not

2765

true). The action was opposed by the Left SRs, who correctly

2766

questioned the legality of the Bolshevik expulsion of

2767

opposition groupings. They "branded the proposed expulsion

2768

bill illegal, since the Mensheviks and SRs had been sent

2769

to the CEC by the Congress of Soviets, and only the next

2770

congress had the right to withdraw their representation.

2771

Furthermore, the Bolsheviks had no right to pose as

2772

defenders of the soviets against the alleged SR

2773

counter-revolution when they themselves has been disbanding

2774

the peasants' soviets and creating the committees of the

2775

poor to replace them." [Brovkin, _The Mensheviks After

2776

October_, p. 231] When the vote was taken, only the

2777

Bolsheviks supported it. Their votes were sufficient

2778

to pass it.

2779

2780

Given that the Mensheviks had been winning soviet elections

2781

across Russia, it is clear that this action was driven far

2782

more by political needs than the truth. This resulted in

2783

the Left Social Revolutionaries (LSRs) as the only

2784

significant party left in the run up to the fifth Congress.

2785

The LSR author (and ex-commissar for justice in the only

2786

coalition soviet government) of the only biography of LSR

2787

leader (and long standing revolutionary who suffered

2788

torture and imprisonment in her fight against Tsarism)

2789

Maria Spiridonova states that "[b]etween 900 and 100

2790

delegates were present. Officially the LSR numbered 40

2791

percent of the delegates. They own opinion was that

2792

their number were even higher. The Bolsheviks strove to

2793

keep their majority by all the means in their power." He

2794

quotes Spiridonova's address to the Congress: "You may

2795

have a majority in this congress, but you do have not

2796

a majority in the country." [I. Steinberg, _Spiridonova_,

2797

p. 209]

2798

2799

Historian Geoffrey Swain indicates that the LSRs had a

2800

point:

2801

2802

"Up to the very last minute the Left SRs had been

2803

confident that, as the voice of Russia's peasant masses,

2804

they would receive a majority when the Fifth Congress of

2805

Soviets assembled . . . which would enable them to deprive

2806

Lenin of power and launch a revolutionary war against Germany.

2807

Between April and the end of June 1918 membership of their

2808

party had almost doubled, from 60,000 to 100,000, and to

2809

prevent them securing a majority at the congress Lenin was

2810

forced to rely on dubious procedures: he allowed so-called

2811

committees of poor peasants to be represented at the congress.

2812

Thus as late as 3 July 1918 returns suggested a majority

2813

for the Left SRs, but a Congress of Committees of Poor

2814

Peasants held in Petrograd the same day 'redressed the

2815

balance in favour of the Bolsheviks,' to quote the

2816

_Guardian_'s Philips-Price, by deciding it had the right

2817

to represent the all those districts where local soviets

2818

had not been 'cleansed of kulak elements and had not

2819

delivered the amount of food laid down in the requisitioning

2820

lists of the Committees of Poor Peasants.' This blatant

2821

gerrymandering ensured a Bolshevik majority at the

2822

Fifth Congress of Soviets." [_The Origins of the Russian

2823

Civil War_, p. 176]

2824

2825

Historian Alexander Rabinowitch confirms this gerrymandering.

2826

As he put it, by the summer of 1918 "popular disenchantment

2827

with Bolshevik rule was already well advanced, not only in

2828

rural but also in urban Russia" and the "primary beneficiaries

2829

of this nationwide grass-roots shift in public opinion

2830

were the Left SRs. During the second half of June 1918,

2831

it was an open question which of the two parties would

2832

have a majority at the Fifth All-Russian Congress of

2833

Soviets . . . On the evening of 4 July, virtually from

2834

the moment the Fifth Congress of Soviets opened in Moscow's

2835

Bolshoi Theatre, it was clear to the Left SRs that the

2836

Bolsheviks had effectively 'fabricated' a sizeable majority

2837

in the congress and consequently, that there was no hope

2838

whatever of utilising it to force a fundamental change in

2839

the government's pro-German, anti-peasant policies." While

2840

he acknowledges that an "exact breakdown of properly

2841

elected delegates may be impossible to ascertain" it

2842

was possible ("based on substantial but incomplete archival

2843

evidence") to conclude that "it is quite clear that the

2844

Bolshevik majority was artificially inflated and highly

2845

suspect." He quotes the report of one leading LSR, based on

2846

data from LSR members of the congress's Credentials Committee,

2847

saying that the Bolsheviks "conjured up" 299 voting delegates.

2848

"The Bible tells us," noted the report's author, "that God

2849

created the heavens and the earth from nothing . . . In the

2850

twentieth century the Bolsheviks are capable of no lesser

2851

miracles: out of nothing, they create legitimate credentials."

2852

["Maria Spiridonova's 'Last Testament'", _The Russian Review_,

2853

pp. 424-46, vol. 54, July 1995, p. 426]

2854

2855

This gerrymandering played a key role in the subsequent

2856

events. "Deprived of their democratic majority," Swain

2857

notes, "the Left SRs resorted to terror and assassinated

2858

the German ambassador Mirbach." [Swain, Op. Cit., p. 176]

2859

The LSR assassination of Mirbach and the events which

2860

followed were soon labelled by the Bolsheviks an "uprising"

2861

against "soviet power" (see section 23 for more details).

2862

Lenin "decided that the killing of Mirbach provided

2863

a fortuitous opportunity to put an end to the growing

2864

Left SR threat." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 427] After

2865

this, the LSRs followed the Mensheviks and Right SRs and

2866

were expelled from the soviets. This in spite of the

2867

fact that the rank and file knew nothing of the plans of

2868

the central committees and that their soviet delegates

2869

had been elected by the masses. The Bolsheviks had finally

2870

eliminated the last of their more left-wing opponents

2871

(the anarchists had been dealt with the in April, see

2872

section 24 for details).

2873

2874

As discussed in section 21, the Committees of

2875

Poor Peasants were only supported by the Bolsheviks.

2876

Indeed, the Left SRs opposed then as being utterly

2877

counter-productive and an example of Bolshevik ignorance

2878

of village life. Consequently, we can say that the

2879

"delegates" from the committees were Bolsheviks or

2880

at least Bolshevik supporters. Significantly, by

2881

early 1919 Lenin admitted the Committees were failures

2882

and ordered them disbanded. The new policy reflected

2883

Left SR arguments against the Committees. It is hard

2884

not to concur with Vladimir Brovkin that by

2885

"establishing the committees of the poor to replace

2886

the [rural] soviets . . . the Bolsheviks were trying to

2887

create some institutional leverage of their own in

2888

the countryside for use against the SRs. In this light,

2889

the Bolshevik measures against the Menshevik-led city

2890

soviets . . . and against SR-led village soviets may

2891

be seen as a two-pronged attempt to stem the tide

2892

that threatened to leave them in the minority at the

2893

Fifth Congress of Soviets." [_The Mensheviks after

2894

October_, p. 226]

2895

2896

Thus, by July 1918, the Bolsheviks had effectively

2897

secured a monopoly of political power in Russia. When

2898

the Bolsheviks (rightly, if hypocritically) disbanded

2899

the Constituent Assembly in January 1918, they had

2900

claimed that the soviets (rightly) represented a

2901

superior form of democracy. Once they started losing

2902

soviet elections, they could find no better way to

2903

"secure" workers' democracy than to destroy it by

2904

gerrymandering soviets, disbanding them and expelling

2905

opposition parties from them. All peaceful attempts

2906

to replace them had been destroyed. The soviet CEC

2907

was marginalised and without any real power.

2908

Opposition parties had been repressed, usually on

2909

little or no evidence. The power of the soviets

2910

had been replaced by a soviet power in less than

2911

a year. However, this was simply the culmination

2912

of a process which had started when the Bolsheviks

2913

seized power in November 1917. Simply put, the Bolsheviks

2914

had always aimed for "all power to the party via the

2915

soviets" and once this had been achieved, the soviets

2916

could be dispensed with. Maurice Brinton simply stated

2917

the obvious when he wrote that "when institutions such

2918

as the soviets could no longer be influenced by

2919

ordinary workers, the regime could no longer be

2920

called a soviet regime." [_The Bolsheviks and Workers'

2921

Control_, p. xiii] By this obvious criteria, the

2922

Bolshevik regime was no longer soviet by the spring

2923

of 1918, i.e. before the outbreak of civil war. While

2924

opposition groups were not finally driven out of the

2925

soviets until 1923 (i.e. three years *after* the end

2926

of the civil war) their presence "does not indicate

2927

the existence of a multi-party system since they in

2928

no way threatened the dominating role of the Bolsheviks,

2929

and they had not done so from mid-1918." [Richard

2930

Sakwa, Op. Cit., p. 168]

2931

2932

Tony Cliff, leader of the British Leninist party the SWP,

2933

justified the repression of the Mensheviks and SRs on the

2934

grounds that they were not prepared to accept the Soviet

2935

system and rejected the role of "constitutional opposition."

2936

He tries to move forward the repression until after the

2937

outbreak of full civil war by stating that "[d]espite their

2938

strong opposition to the government, for some time, i.e.

2939

until after the armed uprising of the Czechoslovakian Legion

2940

[in late May, 1918] -- the Mensheviks were not much hampered

2941

in their propaganda work." If having papers banned every

2942

now and then, members arrested and soviets being disbanded

2943

as soon as they get a Menshevik majority is "not much

2944

hampered" then Cliff does seem to be giving that phrase

2945

a new meaning. Similarly, Cliff's claim that the "civil

2946

war undermined the operation of the local soviets" also

2947

seems lacking based on this new research. [_Lenin:

2948

Revolution Besieged_, vol. 3, p. 163, p. 167 and p. 150]

2949

2950

However, the Bolshevik assault on the soviets started

2951

during the spring of 1918 (i.e. in March, April and May).

2952

That is *before* the Czech rising and the onset of full

2953

scale civil war which occurred in late May (see section

2954

H.8.3 on Bolshevik repression before the Czech revolt).

2955

Nor is it true that the Mensheviks rejected constitutional

2956

methods. Though they wished to see a re-convocation of the

2957

Constituent Assembly they believed that the only way to

2958

do this was by winning a majority of the soviets (see

2959

section 23). Clearly, attempts to blame the Civil

2960

War for the elimination of soviet power and democracy

2961

seems woefully weak given the actions of the Bolsheviks

2962

in the spring of 1918. And, equally clearly, the

2963

reduction of local soviet influence cannot be fully

2964

understood without factoring in the Bolshevik prejudice

2965

in favour of centralisation (as codified in the Soviet

2966

Constitution of 1918) along with this direct repression

2967

(see section H.9.7 for further discussion).

2968

2969

The simple fact is that the soviets were marginalised

2970

and undermined after the October Revolution simply

2971

because they *did* reflect the wishes of the working

2972

class, in spite of their defects (defects the Bolsheviks

2973

exploited to consolidate their power). The problem was

2974

that the workers no longer supported Lenin. Few Leninists

2975

would support such an obvious conclusion. For example,

2976

John Rees states that "[i]n the cities the Reds enjoyed

2977

the fierce

2978

and virtually undivided loyalty of the masses

2979

throughout the civil war period." ["In Defence of October",

2980

pp. 3-82, _International Socialism_, no. 52, p. 47] Which,

2981

of course, explains the vast number of strikes and protests

2982

directed against the Bolshevik regime and the workers'

2983

resolutions calling its end! It also explains why the

2984

Bolsheviks, in the face of such "undivided loyalty",

2985

had to suppress opposition parties and impose a party

2986

dictatorship!

2987

2988

Simply put, *if* the Bolsheviks did have the support

2989

Rees states they did then they had no need to repress

2990

soviet democracy and opposition parties. Such "fierce"

2991

loyalty would not have been amenable to opposition

2992

arguments. Strange, then, that the Bolsheviks continually

2993

explained working class unrest in terms of the influence

2994

of Mensheviks, Left SRs and so on during the civil war.

2995

Moreover, Rees contradicts himself by arguing that if

2996

the Kronstadt revolt had succeeded, then it would have

2997

resulted in "the fall of the Bolsheviks." [Op. Cit.,

2998

p. 63] Now, given that the Kronstadt revolt called for

2999

free soviet elections (and *not* "soviets without parties"

3000

as Rees asserts), why did the Bolsheviks not agree to them

3001

(at least in the cities)? If, as Rees argues, the Reds had

3002

the fierce loyalty of the city workers, then why did the

3003

Bolsheviks not introduce soviet democracy in the cities

3004

after the end of the Civil War? Simply because they knew

3005

that such "loyalty" did not, in fact, exist. Zinoviev,

3006

for example, declared that the Bolsheviks' support had

3007

been reduced to 1 per cent in early 1920. [Farber,

3008

_Before Stalinism_, p. 188]

3009

3010

So much for working class "loyalty" to the Bolsheviks.

3011

And, needless to say, Rees' comments totally ignore

3012

the election results *before* the start of the civil war

3013

which prompted the Bolsheviks to pack or disband soviets.

3014

As Bertrand Russell summarised from his experiences in

3015

Lenin's Russia during the civil war (in 1920): "No

3016

conceivable system of free elections would give majorities

3017

to the Communists, either in the town or country." [_The

3018

Practice and Theory of Bolshevism_, pp. 40-1] Thus we

3019

have a major contradiction in the pro-Leninist argument.

3020

On the one hand, they stress that the workers supported the

3021

Bolsheviks wholeheartedly during the civil war. On the other,

3022

they argue that party dictatorship had to be imposed. If

3023

the Bolsheviks had the support they claimed they had, then

3024

they would have won soviet elections easily. They did not

3025

and so free soviet elections were not held.

3026

3027

This fact also explains the fate of the so-called "non

3028

party" conferences favoured by the Bolsheviks in late

3029

1920. In spite of praising the soviets as "more democratic"

3030

than anything in the "best democratic republics of the

3031

bourgeois world," Lenin also argued that non-Party

3032

conferences were also required "to be able to watch the

3033

mood of the masses, to come closer to them, to respond

3034

to their demands." [_Left-Wing Communism_, p. 33 and p. 32]

3035

If the soviets were as democratic as Lenin claimed, then

3036

the Bolsheviks would have no need of "non-party" conferences.

3037

Significantly, the Bolsheviks "responded" to these conferences

3038

and "their demands" by disbanding them. This was because

3039

"[d]uring the disturbances" of late 1920, "they provided an

3040

effective platform for criticism of Bolshevik policies."

3041

Their frequency was decreased and they "were discontinued

3042

soon afterward." [Richard Sakwa, _Soviet Communists in Power_,

3043

p. 203] In other words, they meet the same fate as the

3044

soviets in the spring and summer of 1918.

3045

3046

Perhaps we should not be too surprised by these developments.

3047

After all, as we discuss in section H.9.8, the Bolsheviks had

3048

long had a distinctly undemocratic political ideology. Their

3049

support for democratic norms were less than consistent. The

3050

one thing they *were* consistent was their hypocrisy. Thus

3051

democratic decisions were to be binding on their opponents

3052

(even if that majority had to be manipulated into being) but

3053

not upon them. Before the revolution Lenin had openly espoused

3054

a double standard of discipline. "We will not permit," he

3055

argued, "the idea of unity to tie a noose around our necks,

3056

and we shall under no circumstances permit the Mensheviks to

3057

lead us by the rope." [quoted by Robert V. Daniels, _The

3058

Conscience of the Revolution_, p. 17] Once in power, their

3059

political perspectives had little trouble ignoring the will

3060

of the working class when it classed with what they, as that

3061

class's self-proclaimed vanguard, had decided what was in

3062

its best interests. As we discussed in section H.5, such a

3063

autocratic perspective is at the heart of vanguardism. If

3064

you aim for party power, it comes as no surprise that the

3065

organs used to achieve it will wither under it. Just as

3066

muscles only remain strong if you use them, so soviets

3067

can only work if it is used to run society, not nominate

3068

the handful of party leaders who do. As Kropotkin argued

3069

in 1920:

3070

3071

"The idea of soviets . . . of councils of workers and peasants

3072

. . . controlling the economic and political life of the country

3073

is a great idea. All the more so, since it necessarily follows

3074

that these councils should be composed of all who take part in

3075

the production of natural wealth by their own efforts.

3076

3077

"But as long as the country is governed by a party dictatorship,

3078

the workers' and peasants' councils evidently lose their

3079

entire significance. They are reduced to . . . [a] passive

3080

role . . . A council of workers ceases to be free and of any

3081

use when liberty of the press no longer exists . . . [and

3082

they] lose their significance when the elections are not

3083

preceded by a free electoral campaign, and when the elections

3084

are conducted under pressure of a party dictatorship . . . It

3085

means the death-knell of the new system." [_Kropotkin's

3086

Revolutionary Pamphlets_, pp. 254-5]

3087

3088

Clearly, the fate of the soviets after October shows the

3089

dangers of Bolshevism to popular self-management and

3090

autonomy. We should be try and learn the lessons from the

3091

experience rather than, as pro-Bolsheviks do, rationalise

3092

and justify the usurpation of power by the party. The most

3093

obvious lesson to learn is to oppose the creation of any

3094

power *above* the soviets. This was not lost on Russian

3095

anarchists active in the revolution. For this reason,

3096

anarcho-syndicalists resolved, in August 1918, that they

3097

"were for the soviets but categorically against the Soviet

3098

of People's Commissars as an organ which does not stem

3099

from the soviet structure but only interferes with its

3100

work." Thus they were "for the establishment of *free

3101

soviets* of workers' and peasants' representatives, and

3102

the abolition of the Soviet of People's Commissars as an

3103

organisation inimical to the interests of the working

3104

class." [contained in Paul Avrich, _The Anarchists in

3105

the Russian Revolution_, p. 118 and p. 117] This resolution

3106

was driven by the experience of the Bolshevik dominated

3107

"soviet" regime.

3108

3109

It is also worth quoting Rudolf Rocker at length on this

3110

issue:

3111

3112

"Let no one object that the 'dictatorship of the proletariat'

3113

cannot be compared to run of the mill dictatorship because

3114

it is the dictatorship of a class. Dictatorship of a class

3115

cannot exist as such, for it ends up, in the last analysis,

3116

as being the dictatorship of a given party which arrogates

3117

to itself the right to speak for that class. Thus, the liberal

3118

bourgeoisie, in their fight against despotism, used to speak

3119

in the name of the 'people'. . .

3120

3121

"We already know that a revolution cannot be made with rosewater.

3122

And we know, too, that the owning classes will never yield up

3123

their privileges spontaneously. On the day of victorious

3124

revolution the workers will have to impose their will on the

3125

present owners of the soil, of the subsoil and of the means

3126

of production, which cannot be done -- let us be clear on

3127

this -- without the workers taking the capital of society

3128

into their own hands, and, above all, without their having

3129

demolished the authoritarian structure which is, and will

3130

continue to be, the fortress keeping the masses of the people

3131

under dominion. Such an action is, without doubt, an act of

3132

liberation; a proclamation of social justice; the very essence

3133

of social revolution, which has nothing in common with the

3134

utterly bourgeois principle of dictatorship.

3135

3136

"The fact that a large number of socialist parties have

3137

rallied to the idea of councils, which is the proper mark

3138

of libertarian socialist and revolutionary syndicalists,

3139

is a confession, recognition that the tack they have taken

3140

up until now has been the product of a falsification, a

3141

distortion, and that with the councils the labour movement

3142

must create for itself a single organ capable of carrying

3143

into effect the unmitigated socialism that the conscious

3144

proletariat longs for. On the other hand, it ought not to

3145

be forgotten that this abrupt conversion runs the risk of

3146

introducing many alien features into the councils concept,

3147

features, that is, with no relation to the original tasks

3148

of socialism, and which have to be eliminated because they

3149

pose a threat to the further development of the councils.

3150

These alien elements are able only to conceive things from

3151

the dictatorial viewpoint. It must be our task to face up

3152

to this risk and warn our class comrades against experiments

3153

which cannot bring the dawn of social emancipation any

3154

nearer -- which indeed, to the contrary, positively postpone

3155

it.

3156

3157

"Consequently, our advice is as follows: Everything for the

3158

councils or soviets! No power above them! A slogan which at

3159

the same time will be that of the social revolutionary."

3160

[_Anarchism and Sovietism_]

3161

3162

The validity of this argument can be seen, for example, from

3163

the expulsion of opposition parties from the soviets in June

3164

and July 1918. This act exposes the hollowness of Bolshevik

3165

claims of their soviet system presented a form of "higher"

3166

democracy. If the Bolshevik soviet system was, as they

3167

claimed, based on instant recall then why did they, for

3168

example, have to expel the Mensheviks and Right SRs from

3169

the soviet CEC in the first place? Why did the electors not

3170

simply recall them? It was two weeks after the Czech revolt

3171

before the Bolsheviks acted, surely enough time for voters

3172

to act? Perhaps this did not happen because the CEC was not,

3173

in fact, subject to instant recall at all? Being nominated

3174

at the quarterly soviet congress, they were effectively

3175

isolated from popular control. It also means that the

3176

Bolshevik government was even more insulated from popular

3177

control and accountability. To "recall" it, electors would

3178

have to either wait for the next national soviet congress

3179

or somehow convince the CEC to call an emergency one. As

3180

an example of workers' running society, the Bolshevik

3181

system leaves much to be desired.

3182

3183

Another obvious lesson to learn was the use of appointments

3184

to the soviets and their executives from other organisations.

3185

As seen above, the Bolsheviks used the "representation" of

3186

other bodies they control (such as trade unions) to pack

3187

soviet assemblies in their favour. Similarly, allowing

3188

political parties to nominate representatives in soviet

3189

executives also marginalised the soviet assemblies and those

3190

delegates actually elected in the workplaces.

3191

3192

This was obvious to the Russian anarchists, who argued "for

3193

effective soviets organised on collective lines with the

3194

direct delegation of workers and peasants from every factory,

3195

workshop, village, etc., and not political chatterboxes

3196

gaining entry through party lists and turning the soviets

3197

into talking shops." [contained in Paul Avrich, _The

3198

Anarchists in the Russian Revolution_, p. 118] The

3199

Makhnovists, likewise, argued that "[o]nly labourers who

3200

are contributing work necessary to the social economy should

3201

participate in the soviets. Representatives of political

3202

organisations have no place in worker-peasant soviets,

3203

since their participation in a workers' soviet will

3204

transform the latter into deputies of the party and

3205

can lead to the downfall of the soviet system."

3206

[contained in Peter Arshinov's _History of the Makhnovist

3207

Movement_, p. 266] As we discuss in H.11.15, Leninists

3208

sometimes distort this into a claim that the Makhnovists

3209

opposed members of political standing for election.

3210

3211

This use of party lists meant that soviet delegates could

3212

be anyone. For example, the leading left-wing Menshevik

3213

Martov recounts that in early 1920 Bolsheviks in a chemical

3214

factory "put up Lenin against me as a candidate [to the

3215

Moscow soviet]. I received seventy-six votes he-eight (in

3216

an open vote)." [quoted by Israel Getzler, _Martov_, p. 202]

3217

How would either of these two intellectuals actually know

3218

and reflect the concerns and interests of the workers they

3219

would be "delegates" of? If the soviets were meant to be

3220

the delegates of working people, then why should non-working

3221

class members of political parties be elected to a soviet?

3222

3223

However, in spite of these problems, the Russian soviets

3224

were a key means of ensuring working class participation

3225

in the revolution. As recognised by all the socialist

3226

oppositions to the Bolsheviks, from the anarchists to the

3227

Mensheviks. As one historian put it:

3228

3229

"Small wonder that the principal political demand of

3230

Mensheviks, Left SRs, SR Maximalists, Kronstadt sailors

3231

and of many oppositionists . . . has been for freely

3232

elected soviets which would this be restored to their

3233

original role as agents of democratisation." [Israel

3234

Getzler, _Soviets as Agents of Democratisation_, p. 30]

3235

3236

The sad fate of the soviets after the Bolshevik seizure

3237

of power simply confirms the opinion of the left

3238

Menshevik Martov who had "rubbed it in to the Bolsheviks . . .

3239

at the first All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions [in January

3240

1918], that they who were now extolling the Soviets as the

3241

'highest forms of the socialist development of the proletariat,'

3242

had shown little love of them in 1905 or in 1917 after the

3243

July days; they loved Soviets only when they were 'in the

3244

hands of the Bolshevik party.'" [Getlzer, _Martov_, p. 174]

3245

As the next few months showed, once the soviets left those

3246

hands, then the soviets themselves were destroyed. The civil

3247

war did not start this process, it just gave the latter-day

3248

supporters of Bolshevism something to use to justify these

3249

actions.

3250