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<title>D.5 What causes imperialism?</title>
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<body>
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<h1>D.5 What causes imperialism?</h1>
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<p>
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In a word: power. Imperialism is the process by which one country dominates
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another directly, by political means, or indirectly, by economic means, in
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order to steal its wealth (either natural or produced). This, by necessity,
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means the exploitation of working people in the dominated nation. Moreover,
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it can also aid the exploitation of working people in the imperialist nation
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itself. As such, imperialism cannot be considered in isolation from the
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dominant economic and social system. Fundamentally the cause is the same
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inequality of power, which is used in the service of exploitation.
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</p><p>
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While the rhetoric used for imperial adventures may be about
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self-defence, defending/exporting "democracy" and/or "humanitarian"
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interests, the reality is much more basic and grim. As Chomsky
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stresses, <i>"deeds consistently accord with interests, and conflict
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with words -- discoveries that must not, however, weaken our faith
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in the sincerity of the declarations of our leaders."</i> This is
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unsurprising as states are always <i>"pursuing the strategic and
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economic interests of dominant sectors to the accompaniment of
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rhetorical flourishes about its exceptional dedication to the
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highest values"</i> and so <i>"the evidence for . . . the proclaimed
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messianic missions reduces to routine pronouncements"</i> (faithfully
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repeated by the media) while <i>"counter-evidence is mountainous."</i>
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[<b>Failed States</b>, p. 171 and pp. 203-4]
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</p><p>
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We must stress that we are concentrating on the roots of imperialism here.
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We do not, and cannot, provide a detailed history of the horrors associated
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with it. For US imperialism, the works of Noam Chomsky are recommended. His
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books <b>Turning the Tide</b> and <b>The Culture of Terrorism</b> expose the evils of
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US intervention in Central America, for example, while <b>Deterring Democracy</b>,
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<b>Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs</b> and <b>Failed States: The
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Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy</b> present a wider perspective.
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<b>Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II</b> and
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<b>Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower</b> by William Blum are
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also worth reading. For post-1945 British imperialism, Mark Curtis's <b>Web
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of Deceit: Britain's Real Role in the World</b> and <b>Unpeople: Britain's
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Secret Human Rights Abuses</b> are recommended.
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</p><p>
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As we will discuss in the following sections, imperialism has changed over
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time, particularly during the last two hundred years (where its forms and
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methods have evolved with the changing needs of capitalism). But even in
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the pre-capitalist days of empire building, imperialism was driven by
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economic forces and needs. In order to make one's state secure, in order to
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increase the wealth available to the state, its ruling bureaucracy and its
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associated ruling class, it had to be based on a strong economy and have a
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sufficient resource base for the state and ruling elite to exploit (both
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in terms of human and natural resources). By increasing the area controlled
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by the state, one increased the wealth available.
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</p><p>
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States by their nature, like capital, are expansionist bodies, with those
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who run them always wanting to increase the range of their power and influence
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(this can be seen from the massive number of wars that have occurred in
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Europe over the last 500 years). This process was began as nation-states
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were created by Kings declaring lands to be their private property, regardless
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of the wishes of those who actually lived there. Moreover, this conflict did
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not end when monarchies were replaced by more democratic forms of government.
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As Bakunin argued:
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</p><p><blockquote>
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<i>"we find wars of extermination, wars among races and nations; wars of
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conquest, wars to maintain equilibrium, political and religious wars,
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wars waged in the name of 'great ideas' . . . , patriotic wars for
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greater national unity . . . And what do we find beneath all that,
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beneath all the hypocritical phrases used in order to give these
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wars the appearance of humanity and right? Always the same economic
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phenomenon: <b>the tendency on the part of some to live and prosper at
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the expense of others.</b> All the rest is mere humbug. The ignorant and
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naive, and the fools are entrapped by it, but the strong men who direct
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the destinies of the State know only too well that underlying all those
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wars there is only one motive: pillage, the seizing of someone else's
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wealth and the enslavement of someone else's labour."</i> [<b>The Political
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Philosophy of Bakunin</b>, p. 170]
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</blockquote></p><p>
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However, while the economic motive for expansion is generally the same,
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the economic system which a nation is based on has a definite impact on
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what drives that motive as well as the specific nature of that imperialism.
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Thus the empire building of ancient Rome or Feudal England has a different
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economic base (and so driving need) than, say, the imperialism of nineteenth
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century Germany and Britain or twentieth and twenty-first century United
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States. Here we will focus mainly on modern capitalist imperialism as it is
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the most relevant one in the modern world.
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</p><p>
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Capitalism, by its very nature, is growth-based and so is characterised
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by the accumulation and concentration of capital. Companies <b>must</b> expand
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in order to survive competition in the marketplace. This, inevitably,
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sees a rise in international activity and organisation as a result of
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competition over markets and resources within a given country. By
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expanding into new markets in new countries, a company can gain an
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advantage over its competitors as well as overcome limited markets
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and resources in the home nation. In Bakunin's words:
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</p><p><blockquote>
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<i>"just as capitalist production and banking speculation, which in the long
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run swallows up that production, must, under the threat of bankruptcy,
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ceaselessly expand at the expense of the small financial and productive
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enterprises which they absorb, must become universal, monopolistic
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enterprises extending all over the world -- so this modern and necessarily
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military State is driven on by an irrepressible urge to become a universal
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State. . . . Hegemony is only a modest manifestation possible under the
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circumstances, of this unrealisable urge inherent in every State. And
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the first condition of this hegemony is the relative impotence and
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subjection of all the neighbouring States."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 210]
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</blockquote></p><p>
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Therefore, economically and politically, the imperialistic activities of
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<b>both</b> capitalist and state-capitalist (i.e. the Soviet Union and other
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"socialist" nations) comes as no surprise. Capitalism is inevitably
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imperialistic and so <i>"[w]ar, capitalism and imperialism form a veritable
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trinity,"</i> to quote Dutch pacifist-syndicalist Bart de Ligt [<b>The Conquest
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of Violence</b>, p. 64] The growth of big business is such that it can no
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longer function purely within the national market and so they have to
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expand internationally to gain advantage in and survive. This, in turn,
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requires the home state of the corporations also to have global reach
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in order to defend them and to promote their interests. Hence the
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economic basis for modern imperialism, with <i>"the capitalistic
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interests of the various countries fight[ing] for the foreign markets
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and compete with each other there"</i> and when they <i>"get into trouble
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about concessions and sources of profit,"</i> they <i>"call upon their
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respective governments to defend their interests . . . to protect
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the privileges and dividends of some . . . capitalist in a foreign
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country."</i> [Alexander Berkman, <b>What is Anarchism?</b>, p. 31] Thus a
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capitalist class needs the power of nation states not only to create
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internal markets and infrastructure but also to secure and protect
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international markets and opportunities in a world of rivals and
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<b>their</b> states.
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</p><p>
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As power depends on profits within capitalism, this means that modern
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imperialism is caused more by economic factors than purely political
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considerations (although, obviously, this factor does play a role).
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Imperialism serves capital by increasing the pool of profits available
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for the imperialistic country in the world market as well as reducing
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the number of potential competitors. As Kropotkin stressed, <i>"capital
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knows no fatherland; and if high profits can be derived from the work
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of Indian coolies whose wages are only one-half of those of English
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workmen [or women], or even less, capital will migrate to India, as
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it has gone to Russian, although its migration may mean starvation
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for Lancashire."</i> [<b>Fields, Factories and Workshops</b>, p. 57]
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</p><p>
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Therefore, capital will travel to where it can maximise its profits --
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regardless of the human or environmental costs at home or abroad. This
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is the economic base for modern imperialism, to ensure that any trade
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conducted benefits the stronger party more than the weaker one. Whether
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this trade is between nations or between classes is irrelevant, the aim
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of imperialism is to give business an advantage on the market. By
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travelling to where labour is cheap and the labour movement weak
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(usually thanks to dictatorial regimes), environmental laws few or
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non-existent, and little stands in the way of corporate power, capital
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can maximise its profits. Moreover, the export of capital allows a
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reduction in the competitive pressures faced by companies in the home
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markets (at least for short periods).
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</p><p>
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This has two effects. Firstly, the industrially developed nation (or,
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more correctly corporation based in that nation) can exploit less
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developed nations. In this way, the dominant power can maximise for
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itself the benefits created by international trade. If, as some claim,
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trade always benefits each party, then imperialism allows the benefits
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of international trade to accrue more to one side than the other.
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Secondly, it gives big business more weapons to use to weaken the
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position of labour in the imperialist nation. This, again, allows the
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benefits of trade (this time the trade of workers liberty for wages)
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to accrue to more to business rather than to labour.
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</p><p>
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How this is done and in what manner varies and changes, but the aim is
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always the same -- exploitation.
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</p><p>
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This can be achieved in many ways. For example, allowing the import of
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cheaper raw materials and goods; the export of goods to markets sheltered
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from foreign competitors; the export of capital from capital-rich areas
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to capital-poor areas as the investing of capital in less industrially
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developed countries allows the capitalists in question to benefit from
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lower wages; relocating factories to countries with fewer (or no)
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social and environmental laws, controls or regulations. All these
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allow profits to be gathered at the expense of the working people of
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the oppressed nation (the rulers of these nations generally do well out
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of imperialism, as would be expected). The initial source of exported
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capital is, of course, the exploitation of labour at home but it is
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exported to less developed countries where capital is scarcer and the
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price of land, labour and raw materials cheaper. These factors all
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contribute to enlarging profit margins:
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</p><p><blockquote>
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<i>"The relationship of these global corporations with the poorer countries
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had long been an exploiting one . . . Whereas U.S. corporations in Europe
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between 1950 and 1965 invested $8.1 billion and made $5.5 billion in
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profits, in Latin America they invested $3.8 billion and made $11.2
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billion in profits, and in Africa they invested $5.2 billion and made
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$14.3 bullion in profits."</i> [Howard Zinn, <b>A People's History of the
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United States</b>, p. 556]
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</blockquote></p><p>
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Betsy Hartman, looking at the 1980s, concurs. <i>"Despite the popular Western
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image of the Third World as a bottomless begging bowl,"</i> she observes, <i>"it
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today gives more to the industrialised world than it takes. Inflows of
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official 'aid' and private loans and investments are exceeded by outflows
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in the form of repatriated profits, interest payments, and private capital
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sent abroad by Third World Elites."</i> [quoted by George Bradford, <b>Woman's
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Freedom: Key to the Population Question</b>, p. 77]
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</p><p>
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In addition, imperialism allows big business to increase its strength
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with respect to its workforce in the imperialist nation by the threat of
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switching production to other countries or by using foreign investments
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to ride out strikes. This is required because, while the "home" working
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class are still exploited and oppressed, their continual attempts at
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organising and resisting their exploiters proved more and more successful.
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As such, <i>"the opposition of the white working classes to the . . .
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capitalist class continually gain[ed] strength, and the workers . . .
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[won] increased wages, shorter hours, insurances, pensions, etc.,
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the white exploiters found it profitable to obtain their labour from
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men [,women and children] of so-called inferior race . . . Capitalists
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can therefore make infinitely more out there than at home."</i> [Bart de
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Ligt, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 49]
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</p><p>
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As such, imperialism (like capitalism) is not only driven by the need to
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increase profits (important as this is, of course), it is also driven by
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the class struggle -- the need for capital to escape from the strength of
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the working class in a particular country. From this perspective,
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the export of capital can be seen in two ways. Firstly, as a means of
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disciplining rebellious workers at home by an "investment strike"
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(capital, in effect, runs away, so causing unemployment which disciplines
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the rebels). Secondly, as a way to increase the 'reserve army' of the
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unemployed facing working people in the imperialist nations by creating
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new competitors for their jobs (i.e. dividing, and so ruling, workers by
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playing one set of workers against another). Both are related, of course,
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and both seek to weaken working class power by the fear of unemployment.
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This process played a key role in the rise of globalisation -- see
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<a href="secD5.html#secd53">section D.5.3</a> for details.
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</p><p>
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Thus imperialism, which is rooted in the search from surplus profits for
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big business, is also a response to working class power at home. The
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export of capital is done by emerging and established transnational
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companies to overcome a militant and class consciousness working class
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which is often too advanced for heavy exploitation, and finance
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capital can make easier and bigger profits by investing productive
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capital elsewhere. It aids the bargaining position of business by pitting
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the workers in one country against another, so while they are being
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exploited by the same set of bosses, those bosses can use this fictional
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"competition" of foreign workers to squeeze concessions from workers at
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home.
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</p><p>
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Imperialism has another function, namely to hinder or control the
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industrialisation of other countries. Such industrialisation will,
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of course, mean the emergence of new capitalists, who will compete
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with the existing ones both in the "less developed" countries and in
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the world market as a whole. Imperialism, therefore, attempts to reduce
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competition on the world market. As we discuss in the
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<a href="secD5.html#secd51">next section</a>, the
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nineteenth century saw the industrialisation of many European nations as
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well as America, Japan and Russia by means of state intervention. However,
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this state-led industrialisation had a drawback, namely that it created
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more and more competitors on the world market. Moreover, as Kropotkin
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noted, they has the advantage that the <i>"new manufacturers . . . begin
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where"</i> the old have <i>"arrived after a century of experiments and
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groupings"</i> and so they <i>"are built according to the newest and best
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models which have been worked out elsewhere."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 32 and
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p. 49] Hence the need to stop new competitors and secure raw materials
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and markets, which was achieved by colonialism:
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</p><p><blockquote>
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<i>"Industries of all kinds decentralise and are scattered all over the
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globe; and everywhere a variety, an integrated variety, of trades grows,
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instead of specialisation . . . each nation becomes in its turn a
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manufacturing nation . . . For each new-comer the first steps only are
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difficult . . . The fact is so well felt, if not understood, that
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the race for colonies has become the distinctive feature of the last
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twenty years [Kropotkin is writing in 1912]. Each nation will have her
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own colonies. But colonies will not help."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 75]
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</blockquote></p><p>
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Imperialism hinders industrialisation in two ways. The first way was
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direct colonisation, a system which has effectively ended. The second
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is by indirect means -- namely the extraction of profits by international
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big business. A directly dominated country can be stopped from developing
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industry and be forced to specialise as a provider of raw materials. This
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was the aim of "classic" imperialism, with its empires and colonial wars.
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By means of colonisation, the imperialist powers ensure that the
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less-developed nation stays that way -- so ensuring one less competitor
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as well as favourable access to raw materials and cheap labour. French
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anarchist Elisee Reclus rightly called this a process of creating
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<i>"colonies of exploitation."</i> [quoted by John P Clark and Camille Martin
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(eds.), <b>Anarchy, Geography, Modernity</b>, p. 92]
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</p><p>
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This approach has been superseded by indirect means (see
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<a href="secD5.html#secd51">next section</a>).
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Globalisation can be seen as an intensification of this process. By
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codifying into international agreements the ability of corporations to
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sue nation states for violating "free trade," the possibility of new
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competitor nations developing is weakened. Industrialisation will be
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dependent on transnational corporations and so development will be
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hindered and directed to ensure corporate profits and power. Unsurprisingly,
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those nations which <b>have</b> industrialised over the last few decades (such
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as the East Asian Tiger economies) have done so by using the state to
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protect industry and control international finance.
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</p><p>
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The new attack of the capitalist class ("globalisation") is a means of
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plundering local capitalists and diminish their power and area of control.
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The steady weakening and ultimate collapse of the Eastern Block (in terms
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of economic/political performance and ideological appeal) also played a
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role in this process. The end of the Cold War meant a reduction in the
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space available for local elites to manoeuvre. Before this local ruling
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classes could, if they were lucky, use the struggle between US and USSR
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imperialism to give them a breathing space in which they could exploit to
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pursue their own agenda (within limits, of course, and with the blessing
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of the imperialist power in whose orbit they were in). The Eastern Tiger
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economies were an example of this process at work. The West could use
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them to provide cheap imports for the home market as well as in the
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ideological conflict of the Cold War as an example of the benefits of
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the "free market" (not that they were) and the ruling elites, while
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maintaining a pro-west and pro-business environment (by force directed
311
against their own populations, of course), could pursue their own economic
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strategies. With the end of the Cold War, this factor is no longer in
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play and the newly industrialised nations are now an obvious economic
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competitor. The local elites are now "encouraged" (by economic blackmail
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via the World Bank and the IMF) to embrace US economic ideology. Just as
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neo-liberalism attacks the welfare state in the Imperialist nations, so
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it results in a lower tolerance of local capital in "less developed"
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nations.
319
</p><p>
320
However, while imperialism is driven by the needs of capitalism it cannot
321
end the contradictions inherent in that system. As Reclus put it in the
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late nineteenth century, <i>"the theatre expands, since it now embraces the
323
whole of the land and seas. But the forces that struggled against one
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another in each particularly state are precisely those that fight across
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the earth. In each country, capital seeks to subdue the workers. Similarly,
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on the level of the broadest world market, capital, which had grown
327
enormously, disregards all the old borders and seeks to put the entire
328
mass of producers to work on behalf of its profits, and to secure all the
329
consumers in the world."</i> [Reclus, quoted by Clark and Martin (eds.),
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<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 97]
331
</p><p>
332
This struggle for markets and resources does, by necessity, lead
333
to conflict. This may be the wars of conquest required to initially
334
dominate an economically "backward" nation (such as the US invasion of
335
the Philippines, the conquest of Africa by West European states, and so
336
on) or maintain that dominance once it has been achieved (such as the
337
Vietnam War, the Algerian War, the Gulf War and so on). Or it may be
338
the wars between major imperialist powers once the competition for
339
markets and colonies reaches a point when they cannot be settled
340
peacefully (as in the First and Second World Wars). As Kropotkin
341
argued:
342
</p><p><blockquote>
343
<i>"men no longer fight for the pleasure of kings, they fight for the
344
integrity of revenues and for the growing wealth . . . [for the]
345
benefit of the barons of high finance and industry . . . [P]olitical
346
preponderance . . . is quite simply a matter of economic preponderance
347
in international markets. What Germany, France, Russia, England, and
348
Austria are all trying to win . . . is not military preponderance:
349
it is economic domination. It is the right to impose their goods
350
and their customs tariffs on their neighbours; the right to exploit
351
industrially backward peoples; the privilege of building railroads
352
. . . to appropriate from a neighbour either a port which will
353
activate commerce, or a province where surplus merchandise can
354
be unloaded . . . When we fight today, it is to guarantee our great
355
industrialists a profit of 30%, to assure the financial barons their
356
domination at the Bourse [stock-exchange], and to provide the
357
shareholders of mines and railways with their incomes."</i> [<b>Words of
358
a Rebel</b>, pp. 65-6]
359
</blockquote></p><p>
360
In summary, current imperialism is caused by, and always serves, the
361
needs and interests of Capital. If it did not, if imperialism were
362
bad for business, the business class would oppose it. This partly
363
explains why the colonialism of the 19th century is no more (the
364
other reasons being social resistance to foreign domination, which
365
obviously helped to make imperialism bad for business as well, and
366
the need for US imperialism to gain access to these markets after
367
the second world war). There are now more cost-effective means
368
than direct colonialism to ensure that "underdeveloped" countries
369
remain open to exploitation by foreign capital. Once the costs
370
exceeded the benefits, colonialist imperialism changed into the
371
neo-colonialism of multinationals, political influence, and the
372
threat of force. Moreover, we must not forget that any change in
373
imperialism relates to changes in the underlying
374
economic system and so the changing nature of modern imperialism can
375
be roughly linked to developments within the capitalist economy.
376
</p><p>
377
Imperialism, then, is basically the ability of countries to globally and
378
locally dictate trade relations and investments with other countries in
379
such a way as to gain an advantage over the other countries. When capital
380
is invested in foreign nations, the surplus value extracted from the workers
381
in those nations are not re-invested in those nations. Rather a sizeable
382
part of it returns to the base nation of the corporation (in the form of
383
profits for that company). Indeed, that is to be expected as the whole
384
reason for the investment of capital in the first place was to get more
385
out of the country than the corporation put into it. Instead of this
386
surplus value being re-invested into industry in the less-developed nation
387
(as would be the case with home-grown exploiters, who are dependent on
388
local markets and labour) it ends up in the hands of foreign exploiters
389
who take them out of the dominated country. This means that industrial
390
development as less resources to draw on, making the local ruling class
391
dependent on foreign capital and its whims.
392
</p><p>
393
This can be done directly (by means of invasion and colonies) or indirectly
394
(by means of economic and political power). Which method is used depends
395
on the specific circumstances facing the countries in question. Moreover,
396
it depends on the balance of class forces within each country as well (for
397
example, a nation with a militant working class would be less likely to
398
pursue a war policy due to the social costs involved). However, the
399
aim of imperialism is always to enrich and empower the capitalist and
400
bureaucratic classes.
401
</p>
402
403
<h2><a name="secd51">D.5.1 How has imperialism changed over time?</a></h2>
404
405
<p>
406
The development of Imperialism cannot be isolated from the general
407
dynamics and tendencies of the capitalist economy. Imperialist
408
capitalism, therefore, is not identical to pre-capitalist forms
409
of imperialism, although there can, of course, be similarities.
410
As such, it must be viewed as an advanced stage of capitalism and
411
not as some kind of deviation of it. This kind of imperialism was
412
attained by some nations, mostly Western European, in the late
413
19th and early 20th-century. Since then it has changed and
414
developed as economic and political developments occurred, but
415
it is based on the same basic principles. As such, it is useful
416
to describe the history of capitalism in order to fully understand
417
the place imperialism holds within it, how it has changed, what
418
functions it provides and, consequently, how it may change in the
419
future.
420
</p><p>
421
Imperialism has important economic advantages for those who run
422
the economy. As the needs of the business class change, the forms
423
taken by imperialism also change. We can identify three main
424
phases: classic imperialism (i.e. conquest), indirect (economic)
425
imperialism, and globalisation. We will consider the first two
426
in this section and globalisation in
427
<a href="secD5.html#secd53">section D.5.3</a>. However, for
428
all the talk of globalisation in recent years, it is important to
429
remember that capitalism has always been an international system,
430
that the changing forms of imperialism reflect this international
431
nature and that the changes within imperialism are in response to
432
developments within capitalism itself.
433
</p><p>
434
Capitalism has always been expansive. Under mercantilism, for
435
example, the "free" market was nationalised <b>within</b> the
436
nation state while state aid was used to skew international
437
trade on behalf of the home elite and favour the development
438
of capitalist industry. This meant using the centralised state
439
(and its armed might) to break down "internal" barriers and
440
customs which hindered the free flow of goods, capital and,
441
ultimately, labour. We should stress this as the state has
442
always played a key role in the development and protection
443
of capitalism. The use of the state to, firstly, protect
444
infant capitalist manufacturing and, secondly, to create
445
a "free" market (i.e. free from the customs and interference
446
of society) should not be forgotten, particularly as this
447
second ("internal") role is repeated "externally" through
448
imperialism. Needless to say, this process of "internal"
449
imperialism within the country by the ruling class by
450
means of the state was accompanied by extensive violence
451
against the working class (also see
452
<a href="secF8.html">section F.8</a>).
453
</p><p>
454
So, state intervention was used to create and ensure capital's
455
dominant position at home by protecting it against foreign
456
competition and the recently dispossessed working class. This
457
transition from feudal to capitalist economy enjoyed the
458
active promotion of the state authorities, whose increasing
459
centralisation ran parallel with the growing strength and size
460
of merchant capital. It also needed a powerful state to protect
461
its international trade, to conquer colonies and to fight for
462
control over the world market. The absolutist state was used to
463
actively implant, help and develop capitalist trade and industry.
464
</p><p>
465
The first industrial nation was Britain. After building up its
466
industrial base under mercantilism and crushing its rivals in
467
various wars, it was in an ideal position to dominate the
468
international market. It embraced free trade as its unique place
469
as the only capitalist/industrialised nation in the world market
470
meant that it did not have to worry about competition from other
471
nations. Any free exchange between unequal traders will benefit
472
the stronger party. Thus Britain, could achieve domination in
473
the world market by means of free trade. This meant that goods
474
were exported rather than capital.
475
</p><p>
476
Faced with the influx of cheap, mass produced goods, existing
477
industry in Europe and the Americas faced ruin. As economist
478
Nicholas Kaldor notes, <i>"the arrival of cheap factory-made
479
English goods <b>did</b> cause a loss of employment and output of
480
small-scale industry (the artisanate) both in European countries
481
(where it was later offset by large-scale industrialisation brought
482
about by protection) and even more in India and China, where it
483
was no so offset."</i> [<b>Further Essays on Applied Economics</b>, p. 238]
484
The existing industrial base was crushed, industrialisation was
485
aborted and unemployment rose. These countries faced two
486
possibilities: turn themselves into providers of raw materials
487
for Britain or violate the principles of the market and
488
industrialise by protectionism.
489
</p><p>
490
In many nations of Western Europe (soon to be followed by the USA
491
and Japan), the decision was simple. Faced with this competition,
492
these countries utilised the means by which Britain had
493
industrialised -- state protection. Tariff barriers were raised,
494
state aid was provided and industry revived sufficiently to turn
495
these nations into successful competitors of Britain. This process
496
was termed by Kropotkin as <i>"the consecutive development of nations"</i>
497
(although he underestimated the importance of state aid in this
498
process). No nation, he argued, would let itself become specialised
499
as the provider of raw materials or the manufacturer of a few
500
commodities but would diversify into many different lines of
501
production. Obviously no national ruling class would want to see
502
itself be dependent on another and so industrial development
503
was essential (regardless of the wishes of the general population).
504
Thus a nation in such a situation <i>"tries to emancipate herself from
505
her dependency . . . and rapidly begins to manufacture all those goods
506
she used to import."</i> [<b>Fields, Factories and Workshops</b>, p. 49 and
507
p. 32]
508
</p><p>
509
Protectionism may have violated the laws of neo-classical economics,
510
but it proved essential for industrialisation. While, as Kropotkin
511
argued, protectionism ensured <i>"the high profits of those manufacturers
512
who do not improve their factories and chiefly rely upon cheap labour
513
and long hours,"</i> it also meant that these profits would be used to
514
finance industry and develop an industrial base. [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 41]
515
Without this state aid, it is doubtful that these countries would
516
have industrialised (as Kaldor notes, <i>"all the present 'developed'
517
or 'industrialised' countries established their industries through
518
'import substitution' by means of protective tariffs and/or
519
differential subsidies."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 127]).
520
</p><p>
521
Within the industrialising country, the usual process of competition
522
driving out competitors continued. More and more markets became
523
dominated by big business (although, as Kropotkin stressed, without
524
totally eliminating smaller workshops within an industry and even
525
creating more around them). Indeed, as Russian anarchist G. P.
526
Maximoff stressed, the <i>"specific character of Imperialism is . . .
527
the concentration and centralisation of capital in syndicates, trusts
528
and cartels, which . . . have a decisive voice, not only in the
529
economic and political life of their countries, but also in the
530
life of the nations of the worlds a whole."</i> [<b>Program of
531
Anarcho-Syndicalism</b>, p. 10] The modern multi-national and
532
transnational corporations are the latest expression of this
533
process.
534
</p><p>
535
Simply put, the size of big business was such that it had to expand
536
internationally as their original national markets were not sufficient
537
and to gain further advantages over their competitors. Faced with
538
high tariff barriers and rising international competition, industry
539
responded by exporting capital as well as finished goods. This
540
export of capital was an essential way of beating protectionism
541
(and even reap benefits from it) and gain a foothold in foreign
542
markets (<i>"protective duties have no doubt contributed . . . towards
543
attracting German and English manufacturers to Poland and Russia"</i>
544
[Kropotkin, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 41]). In addition, it allowed access to
545
cheap labour and raw materials by placing capital in foreign lands
546
As part of this process colonies were seized to increase the
547
size of "friendly" markets and, of course, allow the easy export
548
of capital into areas with cheap labour and raw materials. The
549
increased concentration of capital this implies was essential to
550
gain an advantage against foreign competitors and dominate the
551
international market as well as the national one.
552
</p><p>
553
This form of imperialism, which arose in the late nineteenth
554
century, was based on the creation of larger and larger
555
businesses and the creation of colonies across the globe by
556
the industrialised nations. Direct conquest had the advantage
557
of opening up more of the planet for the capitalist market,
558
thus leading to more trade and exploitation of raw materials
559
and labour. This gave a massive boost to both the state and
560
the industries of the invading country in terms of new profits,
561
so allowing an increase in the number of capitalists and other
562
social parasites that could exist in the developed nation. As
563
Kropotkin noted at the time, <i>"British, French, Belgian and other
564
capitalists, by means of the ease with which they exploit
565
countries which themselves have no developed industry, today
566
control the labour of hundreds of millions of those people in
567
Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. The result is that the number
568
of those people in the leading industrialised countries of
569
Europe who live off the work of others doesn't gradually
570
decrease at all. Far from it."</i> [<i>"Anarchism and Syndicalism"</i>,
571
<b>Black Flag</b>, no. 210, p. 26]
572
</p><p>
573
As well as gaining access to raw materials, imperialism
574
allows the dominating nation to gain access to markets
575
for its goods. By having an empire, products produced
576
at home can be easily dumped into foreign markets with
577
less developed industry, undercutting locally produced
578
goods and consequently destroying the local economy
579
(and so potential competitors) along with the society
580
and culture based on it. Empire building is a good way
581
of creating privileged markets for one's goods. By
582
eliminating foreign competition, the imperialist nation's
583
capitalists can charge monopoly prices in the dominated
584
country, so ensuring high profit margins for capitalist
585
business. This adds with the problems associated with the
586
over-production of goods:
587
</p><p><blockquote>
588
<i>"The workman being unable to purchase with their wages the
589
riches they are producing, industry must search for new
590
markets elsewhere, amidst the middle classes of other
591
nations. It must find markets, in the East, in Africa,
592
anywhere; it must increase, by trade, the number of its
593
serfs in Egypt, in India, on the Congo. But everywhere it
594
finds competitors in other nations which rapidly enter
595
into the same line of industrial development. And wars,
596
continuous wars, must be fought for the supremacy in the
597
world-market -- wars for the possession of the East, wars
598
for getting possession of the seas, wars for the right of
599
imposing heavy duties on foreign merchandise."</i> [Kropotkin,
600
<b>Anarchism</b>, pp. 55-6]
601
</blockquote></p><p>
602
This process of expansion into non-capitalist areas also helps
603
Capital to weather both the subjective and objective economic
604
pressures upon it which cause the business cycle (see
605
<a href="secC7.html">section C.7</a> for more details). As wealth looted from less industrially
606
developed countries is exported back to the home country, profit
607
levels can be protected both from working-class demands and from
608
any relative decline in surplus-value production caused by
609
increased capital investment (see <a href="secC2.html">section C.2</a> for more on surplus
610
value). In fact, the working class of the imperialist country
611
could receive improved wages and living conditions as the looted
612
wealth was imported into the country and that meant that the
613
workers could fight for, and win, improvements that otherwise
614
would have provoked intense class conflict. And as the sons
615
and daughters of the poor emigrated to the colonies to make a
616
living for themselves on stolen land, the wealth extracted
617
from those colonies helped to overcome the reduction in the
618
supply of labour at home which would increase its market price.
619
This loot also helps reduce competitive pressures on the nation's
620
economy. Of course, these advantages of conquest cannot totally
621
<b>stop</b> the business cycle nor eliminate competition, as the
622
imperialistic nations soon discovered.
623
</p><p>
624
Therefore, the "classic" form of imperialism based on direct
625
conquest and the creation of colonies had numerous advantages
626
for the imperialist nations and the big business which their
627
states represented.
628
</p><p>
629
These dominated nations were, in the main, pre-capitalist
630
societies. The domination of imperialist powers meant the
631
importation of capitalist social relationships and institutions
632
into them, so provoking extensive cultural and physical
633
resistance to these attempts of foreign capitalists to
634
promote the growth of the free market. However, peasants',
635
artisans' and tribal people's desires to be "left alone"
636
was never respected, and "civilisation" was forced upon
637
them "for their own good." As Kropotkin realised, <i>"force
638
is necessary to continually bring new 'uncivilised nations'
639
under the same conditions [of wage labour]."</i> [<b>Anarchism
640
and Anarchist Communism</b>, p. 53] Anarchist George Bradford
641
also stresses this, arguing that we <i>"should remember that,
642
historically, colonialism, bringing with it an emerging
643
capitalist economy and wage system, destroyed the
644
tradition economies in most countries. By substituting
645
cash crops and monoculture for forms of sustainable
646
agriculture, it destroyed the basic land skills of the
647
people whom it reduced to plantation workers."</i> [<b>How
648
Deep is Deep Ecology</b>, p. 40] Indeed, this process
649
was in many ways similar to the development of capitalism
650
in the "developed" nations, with the creation of a class
651
of landless workers who forms the nucleus of the first
652
generation of people given up to the mercy of the
653
manufacturers.
654
</p><p>
655
However, this process had objective limitations. Firstly,
656
the expansion of empires had the limitation that there were
657
only so many potential colonies out there. This meant that
658
conflicts over markets and colonies was inevitable (as the
659
states involved knew, and so they embarked on a policy of
660
building larger and larger armed forces). As Kropotkin
661
argued before the First World War, the real cause of war
662
at the time was <i>"the competition for markets and the right
663
to exploit nations backward in industry."</i> [quoted by Martin
664
Miller, <b>Kropotkin</b>, p. 225] Secondly, the creation of
665
trusts, the export of goods and the import of cheap raw
666
materials cannot stop the business cycle nor "buy-off" the
667
working class indefinitely (i.e. the excess profits of
668
imperialism will never be enough to grant more and more
669
reforms and improvements to the working class in the
670
industrialised world). Thus the need to overcome economic
671
slumps propelled business to find new ways of dominating
672
the market, up to and including the use of war to grab new
673
markets and destroy rivals. Moreover, war was a good way of
674
side tracking class conflict at home -- which, let us not
675
forget, had been reaching increasingly larger, more militant
676
and more radical levels in all the imperialist nations (see
677
John Zerzan's <i>"Origins and Meaning of WWI"</i> in his <b>Elements
678
of Refusal</b>).
679
</p><p>
680
Thus this first phase of imperialism began as the growing
681
capitalist economy started to reach the boundaries of the
682
nationalised market created by the state within its own
683
borders. Imperialism was then used to expand the area that
684
could be colonised by the capital associated with a given
685
nation-state. This stage ended, however, once the dominant
686
powers had carved up the planet into different spheres of
687
influence and there was nowhere left to expand into. In the
688
competition for access to cheap raw materials and foreign
689
markets, nation-states came into conflict with each other.
690
As it was obvious that a conflict was brewing, the major
691
European countries tried to organise a "balance of power."
692
This meant that armies were built and navies created to
693
frighten other countries and so deter war. Unfortunately,
694
these measures were not enough to countermand the economic
695
and power processes at play (<i>"Armies equipped to the teeth
696
with weapons, with highly developed instruments of murder
697
and backed by military interests, have their own dynamic
698
interests,"</i> as Goldman put it [<b>Red Emma Speaks</b>, p. 353]).
699
War did break out, a war over empires and influence, a war,
700
it was claimed, that would end all wars. As we now know, of
701
course, it did not because it did not fight the root cause
702
of modern wars, capitalism.
703
</p><p>
704
After the First World War, the identification of nation-state
705
with national capital became even more obvious, and can be
706
seen in the rise of extensive state intervention to keep
707
capitalism going -- for example, the rise of Fascism in Italy
708
and Germany and the efforts of "national" governments in Britain
709
and the USA to "solve" the economic crisis of the Great Depression.
710
However, these attempts to solve the problems of capital did not
711
work. The economic imperatives at work before the first world war
712
had not gone away. Big business still needed markets and raw
713
materials and the statification of industry under fascism only
714
aided to the problems associated with imperialism. Another war
715
was only a matter of time and when it came most anarchists, as
716
they had during the first world war, opposed both sides and
717
called for revolution:
718
</p><p><blockquote>
719
<i>"the present struggle is one between rival Imperialisms and for
720
the protection of vested interests. The workers in every country,
721
belonging to the oppressed class, have nothing in common with
722
these interests and the political aspirations of the ruling class.
723
Their immediate struggle is their <b>emancipation.</b> <b>Their</b> front
724
line is the workshop and factory, not the Maginot Line where
725
they will just rot and die, whilst their masters at home pile
726
up their ill-gotten gains."</i> [<i>"War Commentary"</i>, quoted Mark
727
Shipway, <b>Anti-Parliamentary Communism</b>, p. 170]
728
</blockquote></p><p>
729
After the Second World War, the European countries yielded to
730
pressure from the USA and national liberation movements and
731
grated many former countries "independence" (often after
732
intense conflict). As Kropotkin predicted, such social
733
movements were to be expected for with the growth of
734
capitalism <i>"the number of people with an interest in the
735
capitulation of the capitalist state system also increases."</i>
736
[<i>"Anarchism and Syndicalism"</i>, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 26] Unfortunately
737
these "liberation" movements transformed mass struggle from
738
a potential struggle against capitalism into movements aiming
739
for independent capitalist nation states (see <a href="secD7.html">section D.7</a>).
740
Not, we must stress, that the USA was being altruistic in
741
its actions, independence for colonies weakened its rivals as
742
well as allowing US capital access to those markets.
743
</p><p>
744
This process reflected capital expanding even more <b>beyond</b> the
745
nation-state into multinational corporations. The nature of
746
imperialism and imperialistic wars changed accordingly. In
747
addition, the various successful struggles for National
748
Liberation ensured that imperialism had to change itself in
749
face of popular resistance. These two factors ensured that
750
the old form of imperialism was replaced by a new system of
751
"neo-colonialism" in which newly "independent" colonies are
752
forced, via political and economic pressure, to open their
753
borders to foreign capital. If a state takes up a position
754
which the imperial powers consider "bad for business," action
755
will be taken, from sanctions to outright invasion. Keeping
756
the world open and "free" for capitalist exploitation has been
757
America's general policy since 1945. It springs directly from
758
the expansion requirements of private capital and so cannot be
759
fundamentally changed. However, it was also influenced by the
760
shifting needs resulting from the new political and economic
761
order and the rivalries existing between imperialist nations
762
(particularly those of the Cold War). As such, which method
763
of intervention and the shift from direct colonialism to
764
neo-colonialism (and any "anomalies") can be explained by
765
these conflicts.
766
</p><p>
767
Within this basic framework of indirect imperialism, many
768
"developing" nations did manage to start the process of
769
industrialising. Partly in response to the Great Depression,
770
some former colonies started to apply the policies used so
771
successfully by imperialist nations like Germany and America
772
in the previous century. They followed a policy of "import
773
substitution" which meant that they tried to manufacture
774
goods like, for instance, cars that they had previously
775
imported. Without suggesting this sort of policy offered a
776
positive alternative (it was, after all, just local capitalism)
777
it did have one big disadvantage for the imperialist powers: it
778
tended to deny them both markets and cheap raw materials (the
779
current turn towards globalisation was used to break these
780
policies). As such, whether a nation pursued such policies
781
was dependent on the costs involved to the imperialist power
782
involved.
783
</p><p>
784
So instead of direct rule over less developed nations (which
785
generally proved to be too costly, both economically and
786
politically), indirect forms of domination were now preferred.
787
These are rooted in economic and political pressure rather
788
than the automatic use of violence, although force is always
789
an option and is resorted to if "business interests" are
790
threatened. This is the reality of the expression "the
791
international community" -- it is code for imperialist aims
792
for Western governments, particularly the U.S. and its junior
793
partner, the U.K. As discussed in
794
<a href="secD2.html#secd21">section D.2.1</a>, economic
795
power can be quite effective in pressuring governments to
796
do what the capitalist class desire even in advanced industrial
797
countries. This applies even more so to so-called developing
798
nations.
799
</p><p>
800
In addition to the stick of economic and political pressure, the
801
imperialist countries also use the carrot of foreign aid and
802
investment to ensure their aims. This can best be seen when
803
Western governments provide lavish funds to "developing" states,
804
particularly petty right-wing despots, under the pseudonym
805
"foreign aid." Hence the all to common sight of US Presidents
806
supporting authoritarian (indeed, dictatorial) regimes while at
807
the same time mouthing nice platitudes about "liberty" and
808
"progress." The purpose of this foreign aid, noble-sounding
809
rhetoric about freedom and democracy aside, is to ensure that
810
the existing world order remains intact and that US corporations
811
have access to the raw materials and markets they need. Stability
812
has become the watchword of modern imperialists, who see <b>any</b>
813
indigenous popular movements as a threat to the existing world
814
order. The U.S. and other Western powers provide much-needed
815
war material and training for the military of these governments,
816
so that they may continue to keep the business climate friendly to
817
foreign investors (that means tacitly and overtly supporting fascism
818
around the globe).
819
</p><p>
820
Foreign aid also channels public funds to home based transnational
821
companies via the ruling classes in Third World countries. It is,
822
in other words, is a process where the poor people of rich countries
823
give their money to the rich people of poor countries to ensure that
824
the investments of the rich people of rich countries is safe from
825
the poor people of poor countries! Needless to say, the owners of
826
the companies providing this "aid" also do very well out of it.
827
This has the advantage of securing markets as other countries are
828
"encouraged" to buy imperialist countries' goods (often in exchange
829
for "aid", typically military "aid") and open their markets to the
830
dominant power's companies and their products.
831
</p><p>
832
Thus, the Third World sags beneath the weight of well-funded
833
oppression, while its countries are sucked dry of their native
834
wealth, in the name of "development" and in the spirit of
835
"democracy" and "freedom". The United States leads the West in
836
its global responsibility (another favourite buzzword) to ensure
837
that this peculiar kind of "freedom" remains unchallenged by any
838
indigenous movements. The actual form of the regime supported is
839
irrelevant, although fascist states are often favoured due to
840
their stability (i.e. lack of popular opposition movements). As
841
long as the fascist regimes remain compliant and obedient to the
842
West and capitalism thrives unchallenged then they can commit any
843
crime against their own people while being praised for making
844
progress towards "democracy." However, the moment they step out
845
of line and act in ways which clash with the interests of the
846
imperialist powers then their short-comings will used to justify
847
intervention (the example of Saddam Hussein is the most obvious
848
one to raise here). As for "democracy,"</i> this can be tolerated by
849
imperialism as long as its in <i>"the traditional sense of 'top-down'
850
rule by elites linked to US power, with democratic forms of little
851
substance -- unless they are compelled to do so, by their own
852
populations in particular."</i> This applies <i>"internally"</i> as well as
853
abroad, for <i>"democracy is fine as long as it . . . does not risk
854
popular interference with primary interests of power and wealth."</i>
855
Thus the aim is to ensure <i>"an obedient client state is firmly in
856
place, the general perferene of conquerors, leaving just military
857
bases for future contingencies."</i> [<b>Failed States</b>, p. 171, p. 204
858
and p. 148]
859
</p><p>
860
In these ways, markets are kept open for corporations based in
861
the advanced nations all without the apparent use of force or
862
the need for colonies. However, this does not mean that war is
863
not an option and, unsurprisingly, the post-1945 period has
864
been marked by imperialist conflict. These include old-fashioned
865
direct war by the imperialist nation (such as the Vietnam and
866
Iraq wars) as well as new-style imperialistic wars by proxy
867
(such as US support for the Contras in Nicaragua or support
868
for military coups against reformist or nationalist governments).
869
As such, if a regime becomes too independent, military force
870
always remains an option. This can be seen from the 1990 Gulf
871
War, when Saddam invaded Kuwait (and all his past crimes,
872
conducted with the support of the West, were dragged from
873
the Memory Hole to justify war).
874
</p><p>
875
Least it be considered that we are being excessive in our
876
analysis, let us not forget that the US <i>"has intervened
877
well over a hundred times in the internal affairs of other
878
nations since 1945. The rhetoric has been that we have
879
done so largely to preserve or restore freedom and
880
democracy, or on behalf of human rights. The reality has
881
been that [they] . . . have been consistently designed
882
and implemented to further the interests of US (now
883
largely transnational) corporations, and the elites both
884
at home and abroad who profit from their depredations."</i>
885
[Henry Rosemont, Jr., <i>"U.S. Foreign Policy: the Execution
886
of Human Rights"</i>, pp. 13-25, <b>Social Anarchism</b>, no. 29
887
p. 13] This has involved the overthrow of democratically
888
elected governments (such as in Iran, 1953; Guatemala,
889
1954; Chile, 1973) and their replacement by reactionary
890
right-wing dictatorships (usually involving the military).
891
As George Bradford argues, <i>"[i]n light of [the economic]
892
looting [by corporations under imperialism], it should
893
become clearer . . . why nationalist regimes that cease
894
to serve as simple conduits for massive U.S. corporate
895
exploitation come under such powerful attack -- Guatemala
896
in 1954, Chile in 1973 . . . Nicaragua [in the 1980s] . . .
897
[U.S.] State Department philosophy since the 1950s has been
898
to rely on various police states and to hold back
899
'nationalistic regimes' that might be more responsive to
900
'increasing popular demand for immediate improvements in
901
the low living standards of the masses,' in order to
902
'protect our resources' -- in their countries!"</i> [<b>How
903
Deep is Deep Ecology?</b>, p. 62]
904
</p><p>
905
This is to be expected, as imperialism is the only means of
906
defending the foreign investments of a nation's capitalist class,
907
and by allowing the extraction of profits and the creation of
908
markets, it also safeguards the future of private capital.
909
</p><p>
910
This process has not come to an end and imperialism is continuing
911
to evolve based on changing political and economic developments.
912
The most obvious political change is the end of the USSR. During
913
the cold war, the competition between the USA and the USSR had
914
an obvious impact on how imperialism worked. On the one hand,
915
acts of imperial power could be justified in fighting "Communism"
916
(for the USA) or "US imperialism" (for the USSR). On the other,
917
fear of provoking a nuclear war or driving developing nations
918
into the hands of the other side allowed more leeway for developing
919
nations to pursue policies like import substitution. With the end
920
of the cold-war, these options have decreased considerably for
921
developing nations as US imperialism how has, effectively, no
922
constraints beyond international public opinion and pressure from
923
below. As the invasion of Iraq in 2003 shows, this power is still
924
weak but sufficient to limit some of the excesses of imperial
925
power (for example, the US could not carpet bomb Iraq as it had
926
Vietnam).
927
</p><p>
928
The most obvious economic change is the increased global nature of
929
capitalism. Capital investments in developing nations have increased
930
steadily over the years, with profits from the exploitation of cheap
931
labour flowing back into the pockets of the corporate elite in the
932
imperialist nation, not to its citizens as a whole (though there are
933
sometimes temporary benefits to other classes, as discussed in
934
<a href="secD5.html#secd54">section D.5.4</a>).
935
With the increasing globalisation of big business and markets,
936
capitalism (and so imperialism) is on the threshold of a new
937
transformation. Just as direct imperialism transformed into in-direct
938
imperialism, so in-direct imperialism is transforming into a global
939
system of government which aims to codify the domination of corporations
940
over governments. This process is often called "globalisation" and we
941
discuss it in <a href="secD5.html#secd53">section D.5.3</a>. First, however, we need to discuss
942
non-private capitalist forms of imperialism associated with the
943
Stalinist regimes and we do that in the <a href="secD5.html#secd52">next section</a>.
944
</p>
945
946
<h2><a name="secd52">D.5.2 Is imperialism just a product of private capitalism?</a></h2>
947
948
<p>
949
While we are predominantly interested in <b>capitalist</b> imperialism,
950
we cannot avoid discussing the activities of the so-called
951
"socialist" nations (such as the Soviet Union, China, etc.). Given
952
that modern imperialism has an economic base caused in developed
953
capitalism by, in part, the rise of big business organised on a
954
wider and wider scale, we should not be surprised that the state
955
capitalist ("socialist") nations are/were also imperialistic. As
956
the state-capitalist system expresses the logical end point of
957
capital concentration (the one big firm) the same imperialistic
958
pressures that apply to big business and its state will also apply
959
to the state capitalist nation.
960
</p><p>
961
In the words of libertarian socialist Cornelius Castoriadis:
962
</p><p><blockquote>
963
<i>"But if imperialist expansion is the necessary expression of
964
an economy in which the process of capital concentration has
965
arrived at the stage of monopoly domination, this is true a
966
fortiori for an economy in which this process of concentration
967
has arrived at its natural limit . . . In other words, imperialist
968
expansion is even more necessary for a totally concentrated
969
economy . . . That they are realised through different modes (for
970
example, capital exportation play a much more restricted role and
971
acts in a different way than is the case with monopoly domination)
972
is the result of the differences separating bureaucratic capitalism
973
from monopoly capitalism, but at bottom this changes nothing.
974
</p><p>
975
"We must strongly emphasise that the imperialistic features of
976
capital are not tied to 'private' or 'State' ownership of the
977
means of production . . . the same process takes place if,
978
instead of monopolies, there is an exploiting bureaucracy; in
979
other words, this bureaucracy also can <b>exploit</b>, but only on
980
the condition that it <b>dominates.</b>"</i> [<b>Political and Social
981
Writings</b>, vol. 1, p. 159]
982
</blockquote></p><p>
983
Given this, it comes as no surprise that the state-capitalist
984
countries also participated in imperialist activities, adventures
985
and wars, although on a lesser scale and for slightly different
986
reasons than those associated with private capitalism. However,
987
regardless of the exact cause the USSR <i>"has always pursued an
988
imperialist foreign policy, that it is the state and not the
989
workers which owns and controls the whole life of the country."</i>
990
Given this, it is unsurprising that <i>"world revolution was abandoned
991
in favour of alliances with capitalist countries. Like the bourgeois
992
states the USSR took part in the manoeuvrings to establish a
993
balance of power in Europe."</i> This has its roots in its internal
994
class structure, as <i>"it is obvious that a state which pursues
995
an imperialist foreign policy cannot itself by revolutionary"</i>
996
and this is shown in <i>"the internal life of the USSR"</i> where <i>"the
997
means of wealth production"</i> are <i>"owned by the state which
998
represents, as always, a privileged class -- the bureaucracy."</i>
999
[<i>"USSR -- Anarchist Position,"</i> pp. 21-24, Vernon Richards (ed.),
1000
<b>The Left and World War II</b>, p. 22 and p. 23]
1001
</p><p>
1002
This process became obvious after the defeat of Nazi Germany and
1003
the creation of Stalinist states in Eastern Europe. As anarchists
1004
at the time noted, this was <i>"the consolidation of Russian
1005
imperialist power"</i> and their <i>"incorporation . . . within the
1006
structure of the Soviet Union."</i> As such, <i>"all these countries
1007
behind the Iron Curtain are better regarded as what they really
1008
[were] -- satellite states of Russia."</i> [<i>"Russia's Grip Tightens"</i>,
1009
pp. 283-5, Vernon Richards (ed.), <b>World War - Cold War</b>, p. 285
1010
and p. 284] Of course, the creation of these satellite states
1011
was based on the inter-imperialist agreements reached at the
1012
Yalta conference of February 1945.
1013
</p><p>
1014
As can be seen by Russia's ruthless policy towards her satellite
1015
regimes, Soviet imperialism was more inclined to the defence
1016
of what she already had and the creation of a buffer zone between
1017
herself and the West. This is not to deny that the ruling elite of
1018
the Soviet Union did not try to exploit the countries under its
1019
influence. For example, in the years after the end of the Second
1020
World War, the Eastern Block countries paid the USSR millions
1021
of dollars in reparations. As in private capitalism, the <i>"satellite
1022
states were regarded as a source of raw materials and of cheap
1023
manufactured goods. Russia secured the satellites exports at
1024
below world prices. And it exported to them at above world
1025
prices."</i> Thus trade <i>"was based on the old imperialist principle
1026
of buying cheap and selling dear -- very, very dear!"</i> [Andy
1027
Anderson, <b>Hungary '56</b>, pp. 25-6 and p. 25] However, the
1028
nature of the imperialist regime was such that it discouraged
1029
too much expansionism as <i>"Russian imperialism [had] to rely on
1030
armies of occupation, utterly subservient quisling governments,
1031
or a highly organised and loyal political police (or all three).
1032
In such circumstances considerable dilution of Russian power
1033
occur[red] with each acquisition of territory."</i> [<i>"Russian
1034
Imperialism"</i>, pp. 270-1, Vernon Richards (ed.), <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 270]
1035
</p><p>
1036
Needless to say, the form and content of the state capitalist
1037
domination of its satellite countries was dependent on its
1038
own economic and political structure and needs, just as
1039
traditional capitalist imperialism reflected its needs and
1040
structures. While direct exploitation declined over time, the
1041
satellite states were still expected to develop their economies
1042
in accordance with the needs of the Soviet Bloc as a whole
1043
(i.e., in the interests of the Russian elite). This meant the
1044
forcing down of living standards to accelerate industrialisation
1045
in conformity with the requirements of the Russian ruling class.
1046
This was because these regimes served not as outlets for excess
1047
Soviet products but rather as a means of <i>"plugging holes in the
1048
Russian economy, which [was] in a chronic state of underproduction
1049
in comparison to its needs."</i> As such, the <i>"form and content"</i> of
1050
this regimes' <i>"domination over its satellite countries are determined
1051
fundamentally by its own economic structure"</i> and so it would be
1052
<i>"completely incorrect to consider these relations identical to
1053
the relations of classical colonialism."</i> [Castoriadis, <b>Op. Cit.</b>,
1054
p. 187] So part of the difference between private and state
1055
capitalist was drive by the need to plunder these countries of
1056
commodities to make up for shortages caused by central planning
1057
(in contrast, capitalist imperialism tended to export goods). As
1058
would be expected, within this overall imperialist agenda the
1059
local bureaucrats and elites feathered their own nests, as with
1060
any form of imperialism.
1061
</p><p>
1062
As well as physical expansionism, the state-capitalist elites also
1063
aided "anti-imperialist" movements when it served their interests.
1064
The aim of this was to placed such movements and any regimes they
1065
created within the Soviet or Chinese sphere of influence. Ironically,
1066
this process was aided by imperialist rivalries with US imperialism as
1067
American pressure often closed off other options in an attempt to
1068
demonise such movements and states as "communist" in order to justify
1069
supporting their repression or for intervening itself. This is <b>not</b>
1070
to suggest that Soviet regime was encouraging "world revolution" by
1071
this support. Far from it, given the Stalinist betrayals and attacks
1072
on genuine revolutionary movements and struggles (the example of the
1073
Spanish Revolution is the obvious one to mention here). Soviet aid was
1074
limited to those parties which were willing to subjugate themselves
1075
and any popular movements they influenced to the needs of the Russian
1076
ruling class. Once the Stalinist parties had replaced the local
1077
ruling class, trade relations were formalised between the so-called
1078
"socialist" nations for the benefit of both the local and Russian
1079
rulers. In a similar way, and for identical needs, the Western
1080
Imperialist powers supported murderous local capitalist and feudal
1081
elites in their struggle against their own working classes, arguing
1082
that it was supporting "freedom" and "democracy" against Soviet
1083
aggression.
1084
</p><p>
1085
The turning of Communist Parties into conduits of Soviet elite interests
1086
became obvious under Stalin, when the twists and turns of the party line
1087
were staggering. However, it actually started under Lenin and Trotsky
1088
and <i>"almost from the beginning"</i> the Communist International (Comintern)
1089
<i>"served primarily not as an instrument for World Revolution, but as
1090
an instrument of Russian Foreign Policy."</i> This explains <i>"the most
1091
bewildering changes of policy and political somersaults"</i> it imposed on
1092
its member parties. Ultimately, <i>"the allegedly revolutionary aims of
1093
the Comintern stood in contrast to the diplomatic relations of the
1094
Soviet Union with other countries."</i> [Marie-Louise Berneri, <b>Neither
1095
East Nor West</b>, p. 64 and p. 63] As early as 1920, the Dutch Council
1096
Communist Anton Pannekoek was arguing that the Comintern opposition to
1097
anti-parliamentarianism was rooted <i>"in the needs of the Soviet Republic"</i>
1098
for <i>"peaceful trade with the rest of the world."</i> This meant that the
1099
Comintern's policies were driven <i>"by the political needs of Soviet
1100
Russia."</i> [<i>"Afterword to World Revolution and Communist Tactics,"</i>
1101
D.A. Smart (ed.), <b>Pannekoek and Gorter's Marxism</b>, p. 143 and p. 144]
1102
This is to be expected, as the regime had always been state capitalist
1103
and so the policies of the Comintern were based on the interests of a
1104
(state) capitalist regime.
1105
</p><p>
1106
Therefore, imperialism is not limited to states based on private
1107
capitalism -- the state capitalist regimes have also been guilty
1108
of it. This is to be expected, as both are based on minority rule,
1109
the exploitation and oppression of labour and the need to expand
1110
the resources available to it. This means that anarchists oppose
1111
all forms of capitalist imperialism and raise the slogan <i>"Neither
1112
East nor West."</i> We <i>"cannot alter our views about Russia [or any
1113
other state capitalist regime] simply because, for imperialist
1114
reasons, American and British spokesmen now denounce Russia
1115
totalitarianism. We know that their indignation is hypocritical
1116
and that they may become friendly to Russia again if it suits
1117
their interests."</i> [Marie-Louise Berneri, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 187] In the
1118
clash of imperialism, anarchists support neither side as both are
1119
rooted in the exploitation and oppression of the working class.
1120
</p><p>
1121
Finally, it is worthwhile to refute two common myths about state
1122
capitalist imperialism. The first myth is that state-capitalist
1123
imperialism results in a non-capitalist regimes and that is why
1124
it is so opposed to by Western interests. From this position,
1125
held by many Trotskyists, it is argued that we should support
1126
such regimes against the West (for example, that socialists
1127
should have supported the Russian invasion of Afghanistan). This
1128
position is based on a fallacy rooted in the false Trotskyist
1129
notion that state ownership of the means of production is
1130
inherently socialist.
1131
</p><p>
1132
Just as capitalist domination saw the transformation of the
1133
satellite's countries social relations from pre-capitalist forms
1134
in favour of capitalist ones, the domination of "socialist" nations
1135
meant the elimination of traditional bourgeois social relations in
1136
favour of state capitalist ones. As such, the nature and form of
1137
imperialism was fundamentally identical and served the interests
1138
of the appropriate ruling class in each case. This transformation
1139
of one kind of class system into another explains the root of the
1140
West's very public attacks on Soviet imperialism. It had nothing
1141
to do with the USSR being considered a "workers' state" as Trotsky,
1142
for example, argued. <i>"Expropriation of the capitalist class,"</i> argued
1143
one anarchist in 1940, <i>"is naturally terrifying"</i> to the capitalist
1144
class <i>"but that does not prove anything about a workers' state . . .
1145
In Stalinist Russia expropriation is carried out . . . by, and
1146
ultimately for the benefit of, the bureaucracy, not by the workers
1147
at all. The bourgeoisie are afraid of expropriation, of power passing
1148
out of their hands, whoever seizes it from them. They will defend
1149
their property against any class or clique. The fact that they are
1150
indignant [about Soviet imperialism] proves their fear -- it tells
1151
us nothing at all about the agents inspiring that fear."</i> [J.H.,
1152
<i>"The Fourth International"</i>, pp. 37-43, Vernon Richards (ed.),
1153
<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 41-2] This elimination of tradition forms of class
1154
rule and their replacement with new forms is required as these are
1155
the only economic forms compatible with the needs of the state
1156
capitalist regimes to exploit these countries on a regular basis.
1157
</p><p>
1158
The second myth is the notion that opposition to state-capitalist
1159
imperialism by its subject peoples meant support for Western
1160
capitalism. In fact, the revolts and revolutions which repeatedly
1161
flared up under Stalinism almost always raised genuine socialist
1162
demands. For example, the 1956 Hungarian revolution <i>"was a social
1163
revolution in the fullest sense of the term. Its object was a
1164
fundamental change in the relations of production, and in the
1165
relations between ruler and ruled in factories, pits and on the
1166
land."</i> Given this, unsurprisingly Western political commentary
1167
<i>"was centred upon the nationalistic aspects of the Revolution, no
1168
matter how trivial."</i> This was unsurprising, as the West was <i>"opposed
1169
both to its methods and to its aims . . . What capitalist government
1170
could genuinely support a people demanding 'workers' management of
1171
industry' and already beginning to implement this on an increasing
1172
scale?"</i> The revolution <i>"showed every sign of making both them and
1173
their bureaucratic counterparts in the East redundant."</i> The revolt
1174
itself was rooted <i>"[n]ew organs of struggle,"</i> workers' councils
1175
<i>"which embodied, in embryo, the new society they were seeking to
1176
achieve."</i> [Anderson, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p.6, p. 106 and p. 107]
1177
</p><p>
1178
The ending of state capitalism in Eastern Europe in 1989 has ended
1179
its imperialist domination of those countries. However, it has simply
1180
opened the door for private-capitalist imperialism as the revolts
1181
themselves remained fundamentally at the political level. The ruling
1182
bureaucracy was faced with both popular pressure from the streets
1183
and economic stagnation flowing from its state-run capitalism. Being
1184
unable to continue as before and unwilling, for obvious reasons, to
1185
encourage economic and political participation, it opted for the
1186
top-down transformation of state to private capitalism. Representative
1187
democracy was implemented and state assets were privatised into the
1188
hands of a new class of capitalists (often made up of the old
1189
bureaucrats) rather than the workers themselves. In other words, the
1190
post-Stalinist regimes are still class systems and now subject to a
1191
different form of imperialism -- namely, globalisation.
1192
</p>
1193
1194
<h2><a name="secd53">D.5.3 Does globalisation mean the end of imperialism?</a></h2>
1195
1196
<p>
1197
No. While it is true that the size of multinational companies
1198
has increased along with the mobility of capital, the need for
1199
nation-states to serve corporate interests still exists. With
1200
the increased mobility of capital, i.e. its ability to move
1201
from one country and invest in another easily, and with the
1202
growth in international money markets, we have seen what can
1203
be called a "free market" in states developing. Corporations
1204
can ensure that governments do as they are told simply by
1205
threatening to move elsewhere (which they will do anyway,
1206
if it results in more profits).
1207
</p><p>
1208
Therefore, as Howard Zinn stresses, <i>"it's very important to point
1209
out that globalisation is in fact imperialism and that there is a
1210
disadvantage to simply using the term 'globalisation' in a way
1211
that plays into the thinking of people at the World Bank and
1212
journalists . . . who are agog at globalisation. They just can't
1213
contain their joy at the spread of American economic and corporate
1214
power all over the world. . . it would be very good to puncture
1215
that balloon and say 'This is imperialism.'"</i> [<b>Bush Drives us
1216
into Bakunin's Arms</b>] Globalisation is, like the forms of
1217
imperialism that preceded it, a response to both objective
1218
economic forces and the class struggle. Moreover, like the
1219
forms that came before, it is rooted in the economic power of
1220
corporations based in a few developed nations and political
1221
power of the states that are the home base of these corporations.
1222
These powers influence international institutions and individual
1223
countries to pursue neo-liberal policies, the so-called
1224
"Washington Consensus" of free market reforms, associated with
1225
globalisation.
1226
</p><p>
1227
Globalisation cannot be understood unless its history is known.
1228
The current process of increasing international trade, investment
1229
and finance markets started in the late 60s and early 1970s.
1230
Increased competition from a re-built Europe and Japan challenged
1231
US domination combined with working class struggle across the
1232
globe to leave the capitalist world feeling the strain.
1233
Dissatisfaction with factory and office life combined
1234
with other social movements (such as the women's movement,
1235
anti-racist struggles, anti-war movements and so on) which
1236
demanded more than capitalism could provide. The near
1237
revolution in France, 1968, is the most famous of these
1238
struggles but it occurred all across the globe.
1239
</p><p>
1240
For the ruling class, the squeeze on profits and authority
1241
from ever-increasing wage demands, strikes, stoppages, boycotts,
1242
squatting, protests and other struggles meant that a solution
1243
had to be found and the working class disciplined (and profits
1244
regained). One part of the solution was to "run away" and so
1245
capital flooded into certain areas of the "developing" world.
1246
This increased the trends towards globalisation. Another
1247
solution was the embrace of Monetarism and tight money
1248
(i.e. credit) policies. It is a moot point whether those
1249
who applied Monetarism actually knew it was nonsense and,
1250
consequently, sought an economic crisis or whether they were
1251
simply incompetent ideologues who knew little about economics
1252
and mismanaged the economy by imposing its recommendations,
1253
the outcome was the same. It resulted in increases in the
1254
interest rate, which helped deepen the recessions of the
1255
early 1980s which broke the back of working class resistance
1256
in the U.K. and U.S.A. High unemployment helped to discipline
1257
a rebellious working class and the new mobility of capital
1258
meant a virtual "investment strike" against nations which
1259
had a "poor industrial record" (i.e. workers who were not
1260
obedient wage slaves). Moreover, as in any economic crisis,
1261
the "degree of monopoly" (i.e. the dominance of large firms)
1262
in the market increased as weaker firms went under and others
1263
merged to survive. This enhancing the tendencies toward
1264
concentration and centralisation which always exist in
1265
capitalism, so ensuring an extra thrust towards global
1266
operations as the size and position of the surviving firms
1267
required wider and larger markets to operate in.
1268
</p><p>
1269
Internationally, another crisis played its role in promoting
1270
globalisation. This was the Debit Crisis of the late 1970s and
1271
early 1980s. Debt plays a central role for the western powers
1272
in dictating how their economies should be organised. The debt
1273
crisis proved an ideal leverage for the western powers to force
1274
"free trade" on the "third world." This occurred when third
1275
world countries faced with falling incomes and rising interest
1276
rates defaulted on their loans (loans that were mainly given
1277
as a bribe to the ruling elites of those countries and used
1278
as a means to suppress the working people of those countries
1279
-- who now, sickenly, are expected to repay them!).
1280
</p><p>
1281
Before this, as noted in <a href="secD5.html#secd51">section D.5.1</a>,
1282
many countries had followed a policy of "import substitution." This tended to
1283
create new competitors who could deny transnational
1284
corporations both markets and cheap raw materials. With the
1285
debt crisis, the imperialist powers could end this policy
1286
but instead of military force, the governments of the west
1287
sent in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank
1288
(WB). The loans required by "developing" nations in the face
1289
of recession and rising debt repayments meant that they had little
1290
choice but to agree to an IMF-designed economic reform programme.
1291
If they refused, not only were they denied IMF funds, but also
1292
WB loans. Private banks and lending agencies would also pull
1293
out, as they lent under the cover of the IMF -- the only body
1294
with the power to both underpin loans and squeeze repayment
1295
from debtors. These policies meant introducing austerity
1296
programmes which, in turn, meant cutting public spending,
1297
freezing wages, restricting credit, allowing foreign multinational
1298
companies to cherry pick assets at bargain prices, and passing
1299
laws to liberalise the flow of capital into and out of the
1300
country. Not surprisingly, the result was disastrous for the
1301
working population, but the debts were repaid and both local
1302
and international elites did very well out of it. So while
1303
workers in the West suffered repression and hardship, the
1304
fate of the working class in the "developing" world was
1305
considerably worse.
1306
</p><p>
1307
Leading economist Joseph Stiglitz worked in the World Bank and
1308
described some of dire consequences of these policies. He notes
1309
how the neo-liberalism the IMF and WB imposed has, <i>"too often,
1310
not been followed by the promised growth, but by increased misery"</i>
1311
and workers <i>"lost their jobs [being] forced into poverty"</i> or
1312
<i>"been hit by a heightened sense of insecurity"</i> if they remained
1313
in work. For many <i>"it seems closer to an unmitigated disaster."</i>
1314
He argues that part of the problem is that the IMF and WB have
1315
been taken over by true believers in capitalism and apply
1316
market fundamentalism in all cases. Thus, they <i>"became the new
1317
missionary institutions"</i> of <i>"free market ideology"</i> through
1318
which <i>"these ideas were pushed on reluctant poor countries."</i>
1319
Their policies were <i>"based on an ideology -- market fundamentalism
1320
-- that required little, if any, consideration of a country's
1321
particular circumstances and immediate problems. IMF economists
1322
could ignore the short-term effects their policies might have
1323
on [a] country, content in the belief <b>in the long run</b> the
1324
country would be better off"</i> -- a position which many working
1325
class people there rejected by rioting and protest. In summary,
1326
globalisation <i>"as it has been practised has not lived up to what
1327
its advocates promised it would accomplish . . . In some cases
1328
it has not even resulted in growth, but when it has, it has not
1329
brought benefits to all; the net effect of the policies set by
1330
the Washington Consensus had all too often been to benefit the
1331
few at the expense of the many, the well-off at the expense of
1332
the poor."</i> [<b>Globalisation and Its Discontents</b>, p. 17, p. 20,
1333
p. 13, p. 36 and p. 20]
1334
</p><p>
1335
While transnational companies are, perhaps, the most well-known
1336
representatives of this process of globalisation, the power and
1337
mobility of modern capitalism can be seen from the following
1338
figures. From 1986 to 1990, foreign exchange transactions rose
1339
from under $300 billion to $700 billion daily and were expected
1340
to exceed $1.3 trillion in 1994. The World Bank estimates that
1341
the total resources of international financial institutions
1342
at about $14 trillion. To put some kind of perspective on
1343
these figures, the Balse-based Bank for International Settlement
1344
estimated that the aggregate daily turnover in the foreign
1345
exchange markets at nearly $900 billion in April 1992, equal
1346
to 13 times the Gross Domestic Product of the OECD group of
1347
countries on an annualised basis [<b>Financial Times</b>, 23/9/93].
1348
In Britain, some $200-300 billion a day flows through
1349
London's foreign exchange markets. This is the equivalent
1350
of the UK's annual Gross National Product in two or three days.
1351
Needless to say, since the early 1990s, these amounts have
1352
grown to even higher levels (daily currency transactions
1353
have risen from a mere $80 billion in 1980 to $1.26 billion
1354
in 1995. In proportion to world trade, this trading in foreign
1355
exchange rose from a ration of 10:1 to nearly 70:1 [Mark
1356
Weisbrot, <b>Globalisation for Whom?</b>]).
1357
</p><p>
1358
Little wonder that a <b>Financial Times</b> special supplement on
1359
the IMF stated that <i>"Wise governments realise that the only
1360
intelligent response to the challenge of globalisation is to
1361
make their economies more acceptable."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>] More acceptable
1362
to business, that is, not their populations. As Chomsky put it,
1363
<i>"free capital flow creates what's sometimes called a 'virtual
1364
parliament' of global capital, which can exercise veto power
1365
over government policies that it considers irrational. That
1366
means things like labour rights, or educational programmes, or
1367
health, or efforts to stimulate the economy, or, in fact,
1368
anything that might help people and not profits (and therefore
1369
irrational in the technical sense)."</i> [<b>Rogue States</b>, pp. 212-3]
1370
</p><p>
1371
This means that under globalisation, states will compete with
1372
each other to offer the best deals to investors and transnational
1373
companies -- such as tax breaks, union busting, no pollution
1374
controls, and so forth. The effects on the countries' ordinary
1375
people will be ignored in the name of future benefits (not so
1376
much pie in the sky when you die, more like pie in the future,
1377
maybe, if you are nice and do what you are told). For example,
1378
such an "acceptable" business climate was created in Britain,
1379
where <i>"market forces have deprived workers of rights in the name
1380
of competition."</i> [<b>Scotland on Sunday</b>, 9/1/95] Unsurprisingly.
1381
number of people with less than half the average income rose
1382
from 9% of the population in 1979 to 25% in 1993. The share of
1383
national wealth held by the poorer half of the population has
1384
fallen from one third to one quarter. However, as would be
1385
expected, the number of millionaires has increased, as has
1386
the welfare state for the rich, with the public's tax money
1387
being used to enrich the few via military Keynesianism,
1388
privatisation and funding for Research and Development. Like
1389
any religion, the free-market ideology is marked by the
1390
hypocrisy of those at the top and the sacrifices required
1391
from the majority at the bottom.
1392
</p><p>
1393
In addition, the globalisation of capital allows it to
1394
play one work force against another. For example, General
1395
Motors plans to close two dozen plants in the United States
1396
and Canada, but it has become the largest employer in Mexico.
1397
Why? Because an <i>"economic miracle"</i> has driven wages down.
1398
Labour's share of personal income in Mexico has <i>"declined
1399
from 36 percent in the mid-1970's to 23 percent by 1992."</i>
1400
Elsewhere, General Motors opened a $690 million assembly
1401
plant in the former East Germany. Why? Because there workers
1402
are willing to <i>"work longer hours than their pampered
1403
colleagues in western Germany"</i> (as the <b>Financial Times</b>
1404
put it) at 40% of the wage and with few benefits.
1405
[Noam Chomsky, <b>World Orders, Old and New</b>, p. 160]
1406
</p><p>
1407
This mobility is a useful tool in the class war. There
1408
has been <i>"a significant impact of NAFTA on strikebreaking.
1409
About half of union organising efforts are disrupted by
1410
employer threats to transfer production abroad, for example
1411
. . . The threats are not idle. When such organising drives
1412
succeed, employers close the plant in whole or in part at
1413
triple the pre-NAFTA rate (about 15 percent of the time).
1414
Plant-closing threats are almost twice as high in more
1415
mobile industries (e.g. manufacturing vs. construction)."</i>
1416
[<b>Rogue States</b>, pp. 139-40] This process is hardly unique
1417
to America, and takes place all across the world (including
1418
in the "developing" world itself). This process has increased
1419
the bargaining power of employers and has helped to hold wages
1420
down (while productivity has increased). In the US, the share
1421
of national income going to corporate profits increased by
1422
3.2 percentage points between 1989 and 1998. This represents a
1423
significant redistribution of the economic pie. [Mark Weisbrot,
1424
<b>Op. Cit.</b>] Hence the need for <b>international</b> workers'
1425
organisation and solidarity (as anarchists have been arguing
1426
since Bakunin [<b>The Political Philosophy of Bakunin</b>, pp.
1427
305-8]).
1428
</p><p>
1429
This means that such agreements such as NAFTA and the Multilateral
1430
Agreement on Investment (shelved due to popular protest and outrage
1431
but definitely not forgotten) considerably weaken the governments
1432
of nation-states -- but only in one area, the regulation of
1433
business. Such agreements restrict the ability of governments to
1434
check capital flight, restrict currency trading, eliminate
1435
environment and labour protection laws, ease the repatriation of
1436
profits and anything else that might impede the flow of profits or
1437
reduce business power. Indeed, under NAFTA, corporations can sue
1438
governments if they think the government is hindering its freedom
1439
on the market. Disagreements are settled by unelected panels
1440
outside the control of democratic governments. Such agreements
1441
represent an increase in corporate power and ensure that states
1442
can only intervene when it suits corporations, not the general
1443
public.
1444
</p><p>
1445
The ability of corporations to sue governments was enshrined in
1446
chapter 11 of NAFTA. In a small town in the Mexican state of San
1447
Luis Potosi, a California firm -- Metalclad -- a commercial
1448
purveyor of hazardous wastes, bought an abandoned dump site
1449
nearby. It proposed to expand on the dumpsite and use it to
1450
dump toxic waste material. The people in the neighbourhood of
1451
the dump site protested. The municipality, using powers
1452
delegated to it by the state, rezoned the site and forbid
1453
Metalclad to extend its land holdings. Metalclad, under
1454
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, then sued the Mexican government for
1455
damage to its profit margins and balance sheet as a result of
1456
being treated unequally by the people of San Luis Potosi. A
1457
trade panel, convened in Washington, agreed with the company.
1458
[Naomi Klein, <b>Fences and Windows</b>, pp. 56-59] In Canada, the
1459
Ethyl corporation sued when the government banned its gasoline
1460
additive as a health hazard. The government settled "out of
1461
court" to prevent a public spectacle of a corporation
1462
overruling the nation's Parliament.
1463
</p><p>
1464
NAFTA and other Free Trade agreements are designed for
1465
corporations and corporate rule. Chapter 11 was not
1466
enshrined in the NAFTA in order to make a better world
1467
for the people of Canada, any more than for the people
1468
of San Luis Potosi but, instead, for the capitalist elite.
1469
This is an inherently imperialist situation, which will
1470
"justify" further intervention in the "developing" nations
1471
by the US and other imperialist nations, either through indirect
1472
military aid to client regimes or through outright invasion,
1473
depending on the nature of the <i>"crisis of democracy"</i> (a term
1474
used by the Trilateral Commission to characterise popular
1475
uprisings and a politicising of the general public).
1476
</p><p>
1477
However, force is always required to protect private capital.
1478
Even a globalised capitalist company still requires a defender.
1479
After all, <i>"[a]t the international level, U.S. corporations
1480
need the government to insure that target countries are
1481
'safe for investment' (no movements for freedom and democracy),
1482
that loans will be repaid, contracts kept, and international
1483
law respected (but only when it is useful to do so)."</i> [Henry
1484
Rosemont, Jr., <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 18] For the foreseeable future,
1485
America seems to be the global rent-a-cop of choice --
1486
particularly as many of the largest corporations are based
1487
there.
1488
</p><p>
1489
It makes sense for corporations to pick and choose between
1490
states for the best protection, blackmailing their citizens
1491
to pay for the armed forces via taxes. It is, in other words,
1492
similar to the process at work within the US when companies
1493
moved to states which promised the most favourable laws. For
1494
example, New Jersey repealed its anti-trust law in 1891-2
1495
and amended its corporation law in 1896 to allow companies
1496
to be as large as they liked, to operate anywhere and to
1497
own other corporations. This drew corporations to it until
1498
Delaware offered even more freedoms to corporate power until
1499
other states offered similar laws. In other words, competed
1500
for revenue by writing laws to sell to corporations and
1501
the mobility of corporations meant that they bargained from
1502
a superior position. Globalisation is simply this process on
1503
a larger scale, as capital will move to countries whose
1504
governments supply what it demands (and punish those which
1505
do not). Therefore, far from ending imperialism, globalisation
1506
will see it continue, but with one major difference: the
1507
citizens in the imperialist countries will see even fewer
1508
benefits from imperialism than before, while, as ever, still
1509
having to carry the costs.
1510
</p><p>
1511
So, in spite of claims that governments are powerless in the
1512
face of global capital, we should never forget that state power
1513
has increased drastically in one area -- in state repression
1514
against its own citizens. No matter how mobile capital is, it
1515
still needs to take concrete form to generate surplus value.
1516
Without wage salves, capital would not survive. As such, it
1517
can never permanently escape from its own contradictions --
1518
wherever it goes, it has to create workers who have a tendency
1519
to disobey and do problematic things like demand higher wages,
1520
better working conditions, go on strike and so on (indeed, this
1521
fact has seen companies based in "developing" nations move to
1522
less "developed" to find more compliant labour).
1523
</p><p>
1524
This, of course, necessitates a strengthening of the state
1525
in its role as protector of property and as a defence against
1526
any unrest provoked by the inequalities, impoverishment and
1527
despair caused by globalisation (and, of course, the hope,
1528
solidarity and direct action generated by that unrest within
1529
the working class). Hence the rise of the neo-liberal
1530
consensus in both Britain and the USA saw an increase in
1531
state centralisation as well as the number of police, police
1532
powers and in laws directed against the labour and radical
1533
movements.
1534
</p><p>
1535
As such, it would be a mistake (as many in the
1536
anti-globalisation movement do) to contrast the market to
1537
the state. State and capital are not opposed to each other
1538
-- in fact, the opposite is the case. The modern state
1539
exists to protect capitalist rule, just as every state
1540
exists to defend minority rule, and it is essential for
1541
nation states to attract and retain capital within their
1542
borders to ensure their revenue by having a suitably strong
1543
economy to tax. Globalisation is a state-led initiative
1544
whose primary aim is to keep the economically dominant happy.
1545
The states which are being "undermined" by globalisation are
1546
not horrified by this process as certain protestors are, which
1547
should give pause for thought. States are complicit in the
1548
process of globalisation -- unsurprisingly, as they represent
1549
the ruling elites who favour and benefit from globalisation.
1550
Moreover, with the advent of a "global market" under GATT,
1551
corporations still need politicians to act for them in
1552
creating a "free" market which best suits their interests.
1553
Therefore, by backing powerful states, corporate elites
1554
can increase their bargaining powers and help shape the
1555
"New World Order" in their own image.
1556
</p><p>
1557
Governments may be, as Malatesta put it, the property owners
1558
<b>gendarme</b>, but they can be influenced by their subjects, unlike
1559
multinationals. NAFTA was designed to reduce this influence even
1560
more. Changes in government policy reflect the changing needs of
1561
business, modified, of course, by fear of the working population
1562
and its strength. Which explains globalisation -- the need for
1563
capital to strengthen its position vis-�-vis labour by pitting
1564
one labour force against -- and our next step, namely to
1565
strengthen and globalise working class resistance. Only when it
1566
is clear that the costs of globalisation -- in terms of strikes,
1567
protests, boycotts, occupations, economic instability and so on --
1568
is higher than potential profits will business turn away from it.
1569
Only international working class direct action and solidarity
1570
will get results. Until that happens, we will see governments
1571
co-operating in the process of globalisation.
1572
</p><p>
1573
So, for better or for worse, globalisation has become the latest
1574
buzz word to describe the current stage of capitalism and so
1575
we shall use it here. It use does have two positive side effects
1576
though. Firstly, it draws attention to the increased size and
1577
power of transnational corporations and their impact on global
1578
structures of governance <b>and</b> the nation state. Secondly, it
1579
allows anarchists and other protesters to raise the issue of
1580
international solidarity and a globalisation from below which
1581
respects diversity and is based on people's needs, not profit.
1582
</p><p>
1583
After all, as Rebecca DeWitt stresses, anarchism and the WTO
1584
<i>"are well suited opponents and anarchism is benefiting from
1585
this fight. The WTO is practically the epitome of an
1586
authoritarian structure of power to be fought against.
1587
People came to Seattle because they knew that it was wrong
1588
to let a secret body of officials make policies unaccountable
1589
to anyone except themselves. A non-elected body, the WTO
1590
is attempting to become more powerful than any national
1591
government . . . For anarchism, the focus of global capitalism
1592
couldn't be more ideal."</i> [<i>"An Anarchist Response to Seattle,"</i>
1593
pp. 5-12, <b>Social Anarchism</b>, no. 29, p. 6]
1594
</p><p>
1595
To sum up, globalisation will see imperialism change as
1596
capitalism itself changes. The need for imperialism remains,
1597
as the interests of private capital still need to be defended
1598
against the dispossessed. All that changes is that the
1599
governments of the imperialistic nations become even
1600
more accountable to capital and even less to their
1601
populations.
1602
</p>
1603
1604
<h2><a name="secd54">D.5.4 What is the relationship between imperialism and the social classes within capitalism?</a></h2>
1605
1606
<p>
1607
The two main classes within capitalist society are, as we indicated
1608
in <a href="secB7.html">section B.7</a>, the ruling class and the working class. The grey
1609
area between these two classes is sometimes called the middle
1610
class. As would be expected, different classes have different
1611
positions in society and, therefore, different relationships
1612
with imperialism. Moreover, we have to also take into account
1613
the differences resulting from the relative positions of the
1614
nations in question in the world economic and political systems.
1615
The ruling class in imperialist nations will not have identical
1616
interests as those in the dominated ones, for example. As such,
1617
our discussion will have indicate these differences as well.
1618
</p><p>
1619
The relationship between the ruling class and imperialism is
1620
quite simple: It is in favour of it when it supports its
1621
interests and when the benefits outweigh the costs. Therefore,
1622
for imperialist countries, the ruling class will always be
1623
in favour of expanding their influence and power as long as
1624
it pays. If the costs outweigh the benefits, of course,
1625
sections of the ruling class will argue against imperialist
1626
adventures and wars (as, for example, elements of the US
1627
elite did when it was clear that they would lose both the
1628
Vietnam war and, perhaps, the class war at home by continuing
1629
it).
1630
</p><p>
1631
There are strong economic forces at work as well. Due to capital's
1632
need to grow in order to survive and compete on the market, find
1633
new markets and raw materials, it needs to expand (as we discussed
1634
in <a href="secD5.html">section D.5</a>). Consequently, it needs to conquer foreign markets
1635
and gain access to cheap raw materials and labour. As such, a nation
1636
with a powerful capitalist economy will need an aggressive and
1637
expansionist foreign policy, which it achieves by buying politicians,
1638
initiating media propaganda campaigns, funding right-wing think
1639
tanks, and so on, as previously described.
1640
</p><p>
1641
Thus the ruling class benefits from, and so usually supports,
1642
imperialism -- only, we stress, when the costs out-weight the
1643
benefits will we see members of the elite oppose it. Which,
1644
of course, explains the elites support for what is termed
1645
"globalisation." Needless to say, the ruling class has done
1646
<b>very</b> well over the last few decades. For example, in the US,
1647
the gaps between rich and poor <b>and</b> between the rich and
1648
middle income reaching their widest point on record in 1997
1649
(from the <b>Congressional Budget Office</b> study on Historic
1650
Effective Tax Rates 1979-1997). The top 1% saw their after-tax
1651
incomes rise by $414,200 between 1979-97, the middle fifth by
1652
$3,400 and the bottom fifth fell by -$100. The benefits of
1653
globalisation are concentrated at the top, as is to be
1654
expected (indeed, almost all of the income gains from
1655
economic growth between 1989 and 1998 accrued to the top
1656
5% of American families).
1657
</p><p>
1658
Needless to say, the local ruling classes of the dominated
1659
nations may not see it that way. While, of course, local
1660
ruling classes do extremely well from imperialism, they
1661
need not <b>like</b> the position of dependence and subordination
1662
they are placed in. Moreover, the steady stream of profits
1663
leaving the country for foreign corporations cannot be used
1664
to enrich local elites even more. Just as the capitalist
1665
dislikes the state or a union limiting their power or
1666
taxing/reducing their profits, so the dominated nation's
1667
ruling class dislikes imperialist domination and will
1668
seek to ignore or escape it whenever possible. This is
1669
because <i>"every State, in so far as it wants to live not
1670
only on paper and not merely by sufferance of its neighbours,
1671
but to enjoy real independence -- inevitably must become a
1672
conquering State."</i> [Bakunin, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 211] So the local
1673
ruling class, while benefiting from imperialism, may dislike
1674
its dependent position and, if it feels strong enough, may
1675
contest their position and gain more independence for
1676
themselves.
1677
</p><p>
1678
Many of the post-war imperialist conflicts were of this nature,
1679
with local elites trying to disentangle themselves from an
1680
imperialist power. Similarly, many conflicts (either fought
1681
directly by imperialist powers or funded indirectly by them)
1682
were the direct result of ensuring that a nation trying to
1683
free itself from imperialist domination did not serve as
1684
a positive example for other satellite nations. Which means
1685
that local ruling classes can come into conflict with
1686
imperialist ones. These can express themselves as wars of
1687
national liberation, for example, or just as normal conflicts
1688
(such as the first Gulf War). As competition is at the heart
1689
of capitalism, we should not be surprised that sections of
1690
the international ruling class disagree and fight each
1691
other.
1692
</p><p>
1693
The relationship between the working class and imperialism is
1694
more complex. In traditional imperialism, foreign trade and the
1695
export of capital often make it possible to import cheap goods
1696
from abroad and increase profits for the capitalist class, and
1697
in this sense, workers can gain because they can improve their
1698
standard of living without necessarily coming into system
1699
threatening conflict with their employers (i.e. struggle can
1700
win reforms which otherwise would be strongly resisted by the
1701
capitalist class). Thus living standard may be improved by low
1702
wage imports while rising profits may mean rising wages for some
1703
key workers (CEOs giving themselves higher wages because they
1704
control their own pay rises does not, of course, count!).
1705
Therefore, in imperialistic nations during economic boom times,
1706
one finds a tendency among the working class (particularly the
1707
unorganised sector) to support foreign military adventurism and
1708
an aggressive foreign policy. This is part of what is often
1709
called the "embourgeoisement" of the proletariat, or the
1710
co-optation of labour by capitalist ideology and "patriotic"
1711
propaganda. Needless to say, those workers made redundant by
1712
these cheap imports may not consider this as a benefit and, by
1713
increasing the pool of unemployment and the threat of companies
1714
outsourcing work and moving plants to other countries, help hold
1715
or drive down wages for most of the working population (as has
1716
happened in various degrees in Western countries since the 1970s).
1717
</p><p>
1718
However, as soon as international rivalry between imperialist
1719
powers becomes too intense, capitalists will attempt to maintain
1720
their profit rates by depressing wages and laying people off in
1721
their own country. Workers' real wages will also suffer if
1722
military spending goes beyond a certain point. Moreover, if
1723
militarism leads to actual war, the working class has much more
1724
to lose than to gain as they will be fighting it and making the
1725
necessary sacrifices on the "home front" in order to win it. In
1726
addition, while imperialism can improve living conditions (for
1727
a time), it cannot remove the hierarchical nature of capitalism
1728
and therefore cannot stop the class struggle, the spirit of revolt
1729
and the instinct for freedom. So, while workers in the developed
1730
nations may sometimes benefit from imperialism, such periods
1731
cannot last long and cannot end the class struggle.
1732
</p><p>
1733
Rudolf Rocker was correct to stress the contradictory (and
1734
self-defeating) nature of working class support for imperialism:
1735
</p><p><blockquote>
1736
<i>"No doubt some small comforts may sometimes fall to the
1737
share of the workers when the bourgeoisie of their country
1738
attain some advantage over that of another country; but
1739
this always happens at the cost of their own freedom and
1740
the economic oppression of other peoples. The worker . . .
1741
participates to some extent in the profits which, without
1742
effort on their part, fall into the laps of the bourgeoisie
1743
of his country from the unrestrained exploitation of colonial
1744
peoples; but sooner or later there comes the time when these
1745
people too, wake up, and he has to pay all the more dearly
1746
for the small advantages he has enjoyed. . . . Small gains
1747
arising from increased opportunity of employment and
1748
higher wages may accrue to the workers in a successful
1749
state from the carving out of new markets at the cost of
1750
others; but at the same time their brothers on the other
1751
side of the border have to pay for them by unemployment
1752
and the lowering of the standards of labour. The result
1753
is an ever widening rift in the international labour
1754
movement . . . By this rift the liberation of the workers
1755
from the yoke of wage-slavery is pushed further and further
1756
into the distance. As long as the worker ties up his
1757
interests with those of the bourgeoisie of his country
1758
instead of with his class, he must logically also take
1759
in his stride all the results of that relationship.
1760
He must stand ready to fight the wars of the possessing
1761
classes for the retention and extension of their markets,
1762
and to defend any injustice they may perpetrate on other
1763
people . . . Only when the workers in every country shall
1764
come to understand clearly that their interests are
1765
everywhere the same, and out of this understanding learn
1766
to act together, will the effective basis be laid for
1767
the international liberation of the working class."</i>
1768
[<b>Anarcho-Syndicalism</b>, p. 71]
1769
</blockquote></p><p>
1770
Ultimately, any <i>"collaboration of workers and employers . . .
1771
can only result in the workers being condemned to . . . eat
1772
the crumbs that fall from the rich man's table."</i> [Rocker,
1773
<b>Op. Cit.</b>, pp. 70-1] This applies to both the imperialist and
1774
the satellite state, of course. Moreover, as imperialism needs
1775
to have a strong military force available for it and as a
1776
consequence it required militarism at home. This has an impact
1777
at home in that resources which could be used to improve the
1778
quality of life for all are funnelled towards producing weapons
1779
(and profits for corporations). Moreover, militarism is directed
1780
not only at external enemies, but also against those who threaten
1781
elite role at home. We discuss militarism in more detail in
1782
<a href="secD8.html">section D.8</a>.
1783
</p><p>
1784
However, under globalisation things are somewhat different. With
1785
the increase in world trade and the signing of "free trade"
1786
agreements like NAFTA, the position of workers in the imperialist
1787
nations need not improve. For example, since the 1970s, the wages
1788
-- adjusted for inflation -- of the typical American employee have
1789
actually fallen, even as the economy has grown. In other words,
1790
the majority of Americans are no longer sharing in the gains from
1791
economic growth. This is very different from the previous era, for
1792
example 1946-73, when the real wages of the typical worker rose by
1793
about 80 percent. Not that this globalisation has aided the working
1794
class in the "developing" nations. In Latin America, for example, GDP
1795
per capita grew by 75 percent from 1960-1980, whereas between 1981
1796
and 1998 it has only risen 6 percent. [Mark Weisbrot, Dean Baker,
1797
Robert Naiman, and Gila Neta, <b>Growth May Be Good for the Poor--
1798
But are IMF and World Bank Policies Good for Growth?</b>]
1799
</p><p>
1800
As Chomsky noted, <i>"[t]o the credit of the <b>Wall Street Journal</b>, it
1801
points out that there's a 'but.' Mexico has 'a stellar reputation,'
1802
and it's an economic miracle, but the population is being devastated.
1803
There's been a 40 percent drop in purchasing power since 1994. The
1804
poverty rate is going up and is in fact rising fast. The economic
1805
miracle wiped out, they say, a generation of progress; most Mexicans
1806
are poorer than their parents. Other sources reveal that agriculture
1807
is being wiped out by US-subsidised agricultural imports,
1808
manufacturing wages have declines about 20 percent, general wages
1809
even more. In fact, NAFTA is a remarkable success: it's the first
1810
trade agreement in history that's succeeded in harming the
1811
populations of all three countries involved. That's quite an
1812
achievement."</i> In the U.S., <i>"the medium income (half above, half
1813
below) for families has gotten back now to what it was in 1989,
1814
which is below what it was in the 1970s."</i> [<b>Rogue States</b>, pp. 98-9
1815
and p. 213]
1816
</p><p>
1817
An achievement which was predicted. But, of course, while occasionally
1818
admitting that globalisation may harm the wages of workers in developed
1819
countries, it is argued that it will benefit those in the "developing"
1820
world. It is amazing how open to socialist arguments capitalists and
1821
their supporters are, as long as its not their income being redistributed!
1822
As can be seen from NAFTA, this did not happen. Faced with cheap imports,
1823
agriculture and local industry would be undermined, increasing the number
1824
of workers seeking work, so forcing down wages as the bargaining power of
1825
labour is decreased. Combine this with governments which act in the
1826
interests of capital (as always) and force the poor to accept the costs
1827
of economic austerity and back business attempts to break unions and
1828
workers resistance then we have a situation where productivity can
1829
increase dramatically while wages fall behind (either relatively
1830
or absolutely). As has been the case in both the USA and Mexico,
1831
for example.
1832
</p><p>
1833
This reversal has had much to do with changes in the global "rules of
1834
the game," which have greatly favoured corporations and weakened labour.
1835
Unsurprisingly, the North American union movement has opposed NAFTA and
1836
other treaties which empower business over labour. Therefore, the position
1837
of labour within both imperialist and dominated nations can be harmed under
1838
globalisation, so ensuring international solidarity and organisation have
1839
a stronger reason to be embraced by both sides. This should not come as
1840
a surprise, however, as the process towards globalisation was accelerated
1841
by intensive class struggle across the world and was used as a tool against
1842
the working class (see <a href="secD5.html#secd53">last section</a>).
1843
</p><p>
1844
It is difficult to generalise about the effects of imperialism on the
1845
"middle class" (i.e. professionals, self-employed, small business people,
1846
peasants and so on -- <b>not</b> middle income groups, who are usually working
1847
class). Some groups within this strata stand to gain, others to lose (in
1848
particular, peasants who are impoverished by cheap imports of food). This
1849
lack of common interests and a common organisational base makes the middle
1850
class unstable and susceptible to patriotic sloganeering, vague theories
1851
of national or racial superiority, or fascist scapegoating of minorities
1852
for society's problems. For this reason, the ruling class finds it
1853
relatively easy to recruit large sectors of the middle class to an
1854
aggressive and expansionist foreign policy, through media propaganda
1855
campaigns. Since many in organised labour tends to perceive imperialism
1856
as being against its overall best interests, and thus usually opposes
1857
it, the ruling class is able to intensify the hostility of the middle
1858
class to the organised working class by portraying the latter as
1859
"unpatriotic" and "unwilling to sacrifice" for the "national interest."
1860
Sadly, the trade union bureaucracy usually accepts the "patriotic"
1861
message, particularly at times of war, and often collaborates with the
1862
state to further imperialistic interests. This eventually brings them
1863
into conflict with the rank-and-file, whose interests are ignored even
1864
more than usual when this occurs.
1865
</p><p>
1866
To summarise, the ruling class is usually pro-imperialism -- as long as
1867
it is in their interests (i.e. the benefits outweigh the costs). The
1868
working class, regardless of any short term benefit its members may
1869
gain, end up paying the costs of imperialism by having to fight its
1870
wars and pay for the militarism it produces. So, under imperialism,
1871
like any form of capitalism, the working class will pay the bill
1872
required to maintain it. This means that we have a real interest in
1873
ending it -- particularly as under globalisation the few benefits
1874
that used to accrue to us are much less.
1875
</p>
1876
1877
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1878
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