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<title>H.5 What is vanguardism and why do anarchists reject it?

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<h1>H.5 What is vanguardism and why do anarchists reject it?</h1>

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Many socialists follow the ideas of Lenin and, in particular,

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his ideas on vanguard parties. These ideas were expounded by

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Lenin in his (in)famous work What is to be Done? which

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is considered as one of the important books in the development

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of Bolshevism.

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The core of these ideas is the concept of "vanguardism," or

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the "vanguard party." According to this perspective, socialists

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need to organise together in a party, based on the principles

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of "democratic centralism," which aims to gain a decisive

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influence in the class struggle. The ultimate aim of such a

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party is revolution and its seizure of power. Its short term

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aim is to gather into it all "class conscious" workers into

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a "efficient" and "effective" party, alongside members of

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other classes who consider themselves as revolutionary Marxists.

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The party would be strictly centralised, with all members

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expected to submit to party decisions, speak in one voice and

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act in one way. Without this "vanguard," injecting its politics

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into the working class (who, it is asserted, can only reach

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trade union consciousness by its own efforts), a revolution

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is impossible.

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Lenin laid the foundation of this kind of party in his book

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What is to be Done? and the vision of the "vanguard" party

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was explicitly formalised in the Communist International. As

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Lenin put it, "Bolshevism has created the ideological and

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tactical foundations of a Third International . . . Bolshevism

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can serve as a model of tactics for all." [Collected Works,

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vol. 28, pp. 292-3] Using the Russian Communist Party as its

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model, Bolshevik ideas on party organisation were raised as

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a model for revolutionaries across the world. Since then, the

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various followers of Leninism and its offshoots like Trotskyism

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have organised themselves in this manner (with varying success).

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The wisdom of applying an organisational model that had been

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developed in the semi-feudal conditions of Tsarist Russia to

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every country, regardless of its level of development, has

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been questioned by anarchists from the start. After all, could

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it not be wiser to build upon the revolutionary tendencies

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which had developed in specific countries rather than import

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a new model which had been created for, and shaped by, radically

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different social, political and economic conditions? The

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wisdom of applying the vanguard model is not questioned

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on these (essentially materialist) points by those who

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subscribe to it. While revolutionary workers in the advanced

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capitalist nations subscribed to anarchist and syndicalist ideas,

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this tradition is rejected in favour of one developed by, in

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the main, bourgeois intellectuals in a nation which was still

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primarily feudal and absolutist. The lessons learned from years

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of struggle in actual capitalist societies were simply rejected

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in favour of those from a party operating under Tsarism. While

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most supporters of vanguardism will admit that conditions

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now are different than in Tsarist Russia, they still subscribe

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to organisational method developed in that context and justify

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it, ironically enough, because of its "success" in the totally

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different conditions that prevailed in Russia in the early

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20th Century! And Leninists claim to be materialists!

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Perhaps the reason why Bolshevism rejected the materialist approach

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was because most of the revolutionary movements in advanced

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capitalist countries were explicitly anti-parliamentarian, direct

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actionist, decentralist, federalist and influenced by libertarian

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ideas? This materialist analysis was a key aspect of the council

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communist critique of Lenin's Left-Wing Communism, for

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example (see Herman Gorter's Open Letter to Comrade Lenin

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for one excellent reply to Bolshevik arguments, tactics and

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assumptions). This attempt to squeeze every working class movement

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into one "officially approved" model dates back to Marx and

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Engels. Faced with any working class movement which did not

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subscribe to their vision of what they should be doing (namely

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organising in political parties to take part in "political action,"

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i.e. standing in bourgeois elections) they simply labelled it as

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the product of non-proletarian "sects." They went so far as

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to gerrymander the 1872 conference of the First International

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to make acceptance of "political action" mandatory on all

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sections in an attempt to destroy anarchist influence in it.

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So this section of our FAQ will explain why anarchists reject

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this model. In our view, the whole concept of a "vanguard

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party" is fundamentally anti-socialist. Rather than present an

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effective and efficient means of achieving revolution, the

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Leninist model is elitist, hierarchical and highly inefficient

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in achieving a socialist society. At best, these parties play

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a harmful role in the class struggle by alienating activists

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and militants with their organisational principles and manipulative

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tactics within popular structures and groups. At worse, these

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parties can seize power and create a new form of class society

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(a state capitalist one) in which the working class is oppressed

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by new bosses (namely, the party hierarchy and its appointees).

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However, before discussing why anarchists reject "vanguardism"

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we need to stress a few points. Firstly, anarchists recognise

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the obvious fact that the working class is divided in terms

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of political consciousness. Secondly, from this fact most

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anarchists recognise the need to organise together to

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spread our ideas as well as taking part in, influencing

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and learning from the class struggle. As such, anarchists

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have long been aware of the need for revolutionaries

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to organise as revolutionaries. Thirdly, anarchists are

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well aware of the importance of revolutionary minorities

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playing an inspiring and "leading" role in the class struggle.

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We do not reject the need for revolutionaries to "give a

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lead" in struggles, we reject the idea of institutionalised

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leadership and the creation of a leader/led hierarchy

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implicit (and sometimes no so implicit) in vanguardism.

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As such, we do not oppose "vanguardism" for these reasons.

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So when Leninists like Tony Cliff argue that it is

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"unevenness in the class [which] makes the party necessary,"

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anarchists reply that "unevenness in the class" makes it

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essential that revolutionaries organise together to influence

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the class but that organisation does not and need not take

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the form of a vanguard party. [Tony Cliff, Lenin, vol. 2,

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p. 149] This is because we reject the concept and practice

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for three reasons.

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Firstly, and most importantly, anarchists reject the underlying

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assumption of vanguardism. It is based on the argument that

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"socialist consciousness" has to be introduced into the

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working class from outside. We argue that not only is this position

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empirically false, it is fundamentally anti-socialist in nature.

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This is because it logically denies that the emancipation of the

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working class is the task of the working class itself. Moreover,

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it serves to justify elite rule. Some Leninists, embarrassed by

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the obvious anti-socialist nature of this concept, try and argue

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that Lenin (and so Leninism) does not hold this position. We show

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that such claims are false.

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Secondly, there is the question of organisational structure. Vanguard

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parties are based on the principle of "democratic centralism".

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Anarchists argue that such parties, while centralised, are not, in fact,

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democratic nor can they be. As such, the "revolutionary" or

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"socialist" party is no such thing as it reflects the structure

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of the capitalist system it claims to oppose.

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Lastly, anarchists argue that such parties are, despite the

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claims of their supporters, not actually very efficient or

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effective in the revolutionary sense of the word. At best,

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they hinder the class struggle by being slow to respond to

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rapidly changing situations. At worse, they are "efficient" in

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shaping both the revolution and the post-revolutionary society

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in a hierarchical fashion, so re-creating class rule.

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So these are key aspects of the anarchist critique of vanguardism,

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which we discuss in more depth in the following sections. It is a

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bit artificial to divide these issues into different sections

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because they are all related. The role of the party implies a

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specific form of organisation (as Lenin himself stressed), the

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form of the party influences its effectiveness. It is for ease of

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presentation we divide up our discussion so.

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<a name="sech51"><h2>H.5.1 Why are vanguard parties anti-socialist?</h2></a>

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The reason why vanguard parties are anti-socialist is simply

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because of the role assigned to them by Lenin, which he thought

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was vital. Simply put, without the party, no revolution would

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be possible. As Lenin put it in 1900, "[i]solated from

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Social-Democracy, the working class movement becomes petty

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and inevitably becomes bourgeois." [Collected Works, vol.

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4, p. 368] In What is to be Done?, he expands on this position:

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"Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers

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only from without, that is, only outside of the economic

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struggle, outside the sphere of relations between workers and

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employers. The sphere from which alone it is possible to obtain

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this knowledge is the sphere of relationships between all the

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various classes and strata and the state and the government -

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the sphere of the interrelations between all the various

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classes." [Essential Works of Lenin, p. 112]

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</blockquote>

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Thus the role of the party is to inject socialist politics into

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a class incapable of developing them itself.

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Lenin is at pains to stress the Marxist orthodoxy of his claims

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and quotes the "profoundly true and important" comments of Karl

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Kautsky on the subject. [Op. Cit., p. 81] Kautsky, considered

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the "pope" of Social-Democracy, stated that it was "absolutely

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untrue" that "socialist consciousness" was a "necessary and

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direct result of the proletarian class struggle." Rather,

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"socialism and the class struggle arise side by side and not

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one out of the other . . . Modern socialist consciousness can

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arise only on the basis of profound scientific knowledge . . .

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The vehicles of science are not the proletariat, but the

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bourgeois intelligentsia: it was in the minds of some members

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of this stratum that modern socialism originated, and it was

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they who communicated it to the more intellectually developed

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proletarians who, in their turn, introduced it into the

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proletarian class struggle." Kautsky stressed that "socialist

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consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian

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class struggle from without." [quoted by Lenin, Op. Cit.,

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pp. 81-2]

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So Lenin, it must be stressed, was not inventing anything new here. He

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was simply repeating the orthodox Marxist position and, as is obvious,

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wholeheartedly agreed with Kautsky's pronouncements (any attempt to

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claim that he did not or later rejected it is nonsense, as we prove

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in <a href="secH5.html#sech54">section H.5.4</a>). Lenin, with his

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usual modesty, claimed to speak on behalf of the workers when

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he wrote that "intellectuals must talk to us, and tell us more

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about what we do not know and what we can never learn from our

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factory and 'economic' experience, that is, you must give us

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political knowledge." [Op. Cit., p. 108] Thus we have Lenin

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painting a picture of a working class incapable of developing

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"political knowledge" or "socialist consciousness" by its

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own efforts and so is reliant on members of the party,

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themselves either radical elements of the bourgeoisie and

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petty-bourgeoisie or educated by them, to provide it with such

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knowledge.

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The obvious implication of this argument is that the working class

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cannot liberate itself by its own efforts. Without the radical

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bourgeois to provide the working class with "socialist" ideas, a

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socialist movement, let alone society, is impossible. If the working

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class cannot develop its own political theory by its own efforts

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then it cannot conceive of transforming society and, at best, can

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see only the need to work within capitalism for reforms to improve

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its position in society. A class whose members cannot develop

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political knowledge by its own actions cannot emancipate itself.

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It is, by necessity, dependent on others to shape and form its

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movements. To quote Trotsky's telling analogy on the respective

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roles of party and class, leaders and led:

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"Without a guiding organisation, the energy of the masses

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would dissipate like steam not enclosed in a piston. But

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nevertheless, what moves things is not the piston or the

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box, but the steam." [History of the Russian Revolution,

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vol. 1, p. 17]

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</blockquote>

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While Trotsky's mechanistic analogy may be considered as

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somewhat crude, it does expose the underlying assumptions

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of Bolshevism. After all, did not Lenin argue that the

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working class could not develop "socialist consciousness"

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by themselves and that it had to be introduced from without?

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How can you expect steam to create a piston? You cannot.

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Thus we have a blind, elemental force incapable of conscious

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thought being guided by a creation of science, the piston

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(which, of course, is a product of the work of the "vehicles

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of science," namely the bourgeois intelligentsia). In the

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Leninist perspective, if revolutions are the locomotives

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of history (to use Marx's words) then the masses are the

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steam, the party the locomotive and the leaders the train

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driver. The idea of a future society being constructed

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democratically from below by the workers themselves rather

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than through periodically elected leaders seems to have

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passed Bolshevism past. This is unsurprising, given that

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the Bolsheviks saw the workers in terms of blindly moving

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steam in a box, something incapable of being creative unless

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an outside force gave them direction (instructions).

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Libertarian socialist Cornelius Castoriadis provides a good

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critique of the implications of the Leninist position:

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"No positive content, nothing new capable of providing

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the foundation for the reconstruction of society could

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arise out of a mere awareness of poverty. From the

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experience of life under capitalism the proletariat

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could derive no new principles either for organising

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this new society or for orientating it in another

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direction. Under such conditions, the proletarian

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revolution becomes . . . a simple reflex revolt against

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hunger. It is impossible to see how socialist society

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could ever be the result of such a reflex . . . Their

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situation forces them to suffer the consequences of

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capitalism's contradictions, but in no way does it

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lead them to discover its causes. An acquaintance with

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these causes comes not from experiencing the production

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process but from theoretical knowledge . . . This

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knowledge may be accessible to individual workers, but

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not to the proletariat qua proletariat. Driven by

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its revolt against poverty, but incapable of self-direction

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since its experiences does not give it a privileged

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viewpoint on reality, the proletariat according to this

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outlook, can only be an infantry in the service of a

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general staff of specialists. These specialists know

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(from considerations that the proletariat as such does

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not have access to) what is going wrong with present-day

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society and how it must be modified. The traditional view

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of the economy and its revolutionary perspective can only

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found, and actually throughout history has only founded,

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a bureaucratic politics . . . [W]hat we have outlined

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are the consequences that follow objectively from this

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theory. And they have been affirmed in an ever clearer

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fashion within the actual historical movement of Marxism,

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culminating in Stalinism." [Social and Political Writings,

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vol. 2, pp. 257-8]

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</blockquote>

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Thus we have a privileged position for the party and a

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perspective which can (and did) justify party dictatorship

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over the proletariat. Given the perspective that the

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working class cannot formulate its own "ideology" by its

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own efforts, of its incapacity to move beyond "trade union

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consciousness" independently of the party, the clear

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implication is that the party could in no way be bound

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by the predominant views of the working class. As the

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party embodies "socialist consciousness" (and this arises

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outside the working class and its struggles) then

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opposition of the working class to the party signifies

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a failure of the class to resist alien influences. As

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Lenin put it:

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"Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology being

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developed by the masses of the workers in the process of

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their movement, the only choice is: either bourgeois or

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socialist ideology. There is no middle course . . . Hence,

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to belittle socialist ideology in any way, to deviate

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from it in the slightest degree means strengthening

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bourgeois ideology. There is a lot of talk about spontaneity,

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but the spontaneous development of the labour movement

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leads to its becoming subordinated to bourgeois ideology

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. . . Hence our task, the task of Social-Democracy, is to

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combat spontaneity, to divert the labour movement from

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its spontaneous, trade unionist striving to go under the

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wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of

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revolutionary Social-Democracy." [Op. Cit., pp. 82-3]

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</blockquote>

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The implications of this argument became clear once the

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Bolsheviks seized power. As a justification for party

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dictatorship, you would be hard pressed to find any

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better. If the working class revolts against the

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ruling party, then we have a "spontaneous" development

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which, inevitably, is an expression of bourgeois ideology.

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As the party represents socialist consciousness, any

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deviation in working class support for it simply meant

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that the working class was being "subordinated" to the

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bourgeoisie. This meant, obviously, that to "belittle"

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the "role" of the party by questioning its rule meant

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to "strengthen bourgeois ideology" and when workers

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spontaneously went on strike or protested against the

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party's rule, the party had to "combat" these strivings

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in order to maintain working class rule! As the "masses

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of the workers" cannot develop an "independent ideology,"

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the workers are rejecting socialist ideology in favour of

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bourgeois ideology. The party, in order to defend the

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"the revolution" (even the "rule of the workers"!) has

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to impose its will onto the class, to "combat spontaneity."

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As we saw in

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<a href="secH1.html#sech12">section H.1.2</a>, none of the leading Bolsheviks

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were shy about drawing these conclusions once in power and

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faced with working class revolt against their rule. Indeed,

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they raised the idea that the "dictatorship of the

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proletariat" was also, in fact, the "dictatorship of

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the party" and, as we discussed in

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<a href="secH3.html#sech38">section H.3.8</a> integrated

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this into their theory of the state. Thus, Leninist ideology

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implies that "workers' power" exists independently of the

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workers. This means that the sight of the "dictatorship of

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the proletariat" (i.e. the Bolshevik government) repressing

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the proletariat is to be expected.

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This elitist perspective of the party, the idea that it and it

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alone possesses knowledge can be seen from the resolution of the

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Communist International on the role of the party. It stated that

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"the working class without an independent political party is

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a body without a head." [Proceedings and Documents of the

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Second Congress 1920, vol. 1, p. 194] This use of biological

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analogies says more about Bolshevism that its authors intended.

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After all, it suggests a division of labour which is unchangeable.

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Can the hands evolve to do their own thinking? Of course not. Yet

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again, we have an image of the class as unthinking brute force.

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As the Cohen-Bendit brothers argued, the "Leninist belief that

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the workers cannot spontaneously go beyond the level of trade union

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consciousness is tantamount to beheading the proletariat, and then

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insinuating the Party as the head . . . Lenin was wrong, and in

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fact, in Russia the Party was forced to decapitate the workers'

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movement with the help of the political police and the Red Army

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under the brilliant leadership of Trotsky and Lenin."

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[Obsolute Communism, pp. 194-5]

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As well as explaining the subsequent embrace of party

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dictatorship over the working class, vanguardism also

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explains the notorious inefficiency of Leninist parties

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faced with revolutionary situations we discuss in

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<a href="secH5.html#sech58">section H.5.8</a>. Basing themselves

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on the perspective that all spontaneous movements are inherently

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bourgeois they could not help but be opposed to autonomous

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class struggle and the organisations and tactics it

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generates. James C. Scott, in his excellent discussion

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of the roots and flaws in Lenin's ideas on the party,

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makes the obvious point that since, for Lenin, "authentic,

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revolutionary class consciousness could never develop

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autonomously within the working class, it followed that

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that the actual political outlook of workers was always

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a threat to the vanguard party." [Seeing like a State,

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p. 155] As Maurice Brinton argued, the "Bolshevik cadres saw

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their role as the leadership of the revolution. Any movement not

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initiated by them or independent of their control could only

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evoke their suspicion." These developments, of course, did

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not occur by chance or accidentally for "a given ideological

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premise (the preordained hegemony of the Party) led necessarily

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to certain conclusions in practice." [The Bolsheviks and

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Workers' Control, p. xi and p. xii]

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Bakunin expressed the implications of the vanguardist

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perspective extremely well. It is worthwhile quoting

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him at length:

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"Idealists of all sorts, metaphysicians, positivists,

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those who uphold the priority of science over life, the

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doctrinaire revolutionists - all of them champion with

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equal zeal although differing in their argumentation,

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the idea of the State and State power, seeing in them,

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quite logically from their point of view, the only

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salvation of society. Quite logically, I say, having

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taken as their basis the tenet - a fallacious tenet in

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our opinion - that thought is prior to life, and

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abstract theory is prior to social practice, and that

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therefore sociological science must become the starting

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point for social upheavals and social reconstruction -

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they necessarily arrived at the conclusion that since

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thought, theory, and science are, for the present at

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least, the property of only a very few people, those

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few should direct social life; and that on the morrow

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of the Revolution the new social organisation should

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be set up not by the free integration of workers'

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associations, villages, communes, and regions from

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below upward, conforming to the needs and instincts

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of the people, but solely by the dictatorial power of

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this learned minority, allegedly expressing the general

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will of the people." [The Political Philosophy of

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Bakunin, pp. 283-4]

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</blockquote>

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The idea that "socialist consciousness" can exist independently

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of the working class and its struggle suggests exactly the

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perspective Bakunin was critiquing. For vanguardism, the abstract

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theory of socialism exists prior to the class struggle and

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exists waiting to be brought to the masses by the educated few.

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The net effect is, as we have argued, to lay the ground for party

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dictatorship. The concept is fundamentally anti-socialist,

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a justification for elite rule and the continuation of class

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society in new, party approved, ways.

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<a name="sech52"><h2>H.5.2 Have vanguardist assumptions been validated?</h2></a>

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Lenin claimed that workers can only reach a "trade union consciousness"

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by their own efforts. Anarchists argue that such an assertion is empirically

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false. The history of the labour movement is marked by revolts and struggles

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which went far further than just seeking reforms as well as revolutionary

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theories derived from such experiences.

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The category of "economic struggle" corresponds to no known social

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reality. Every "economic" struggle is "political" in some

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sense and those involved can, and do, learn political lessons from them.

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As Kropotkin noted in the 1880s, there "is almost no serious strike

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which occurs together with the appearance of troops, the exchange of

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blows and some acts of revolt. Here they fight with the troops; there

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they march on the factories . . . Thanks to government intervention the

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rebel against the factory becomes the rebel against the State."

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[quoted by Caroline Cahm, Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary

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Anarchism, p. 256] If history shows anything, it shows that workers

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are more than capable of going beyond "trade union consciousness."

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The Paris Commune, the 1848 revolts and, ironically enough, the 1905 and

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1917 Russian Revolutions show that the masses are capable of revolutionary

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struggles in which the self-proclaimed "vanguard" of socialists

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spend most of their time trying to catch up with them!

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The history of Bolshevism also helps discredit Lenin's argument that

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the workers cannot develop socialist consciousness alone due to the

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power of bourgeois ideology. Simply put, if the working class is

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subjected to bourgeois influences, then so are the "professional"

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revolutionaries within the party. Indeed, the strength of such

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influences on the "professionals" of revolution must be higher

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as they are not part of proletarian life. If social being influences

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consciousness then if a revolutionary is no longer part of the working

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class then they no longer are rooted in the social conditions which

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generate socialist theory and action. No longer connected with

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collective labour and working class life, the "professional"

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revolutionary is more likely to be influenced by the social milieu he

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or she now is part of (i.e. a bourgeois, or at best petit-bourgeois,

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environment).

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This tendency for the "professional" revolutionary to be subject

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to bourgeois influences can continually be seen from the history of the

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Bolshevik party. As Trotsky himself noted:

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"It should not be forgotten that the political machine of

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the Bolshevik Party was predominantly made up of the

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intelligentsia, which was petty bourgeois in its origin

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and conditions of life and Marxist in its ideas and in

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its relations with the proletariat. Workers who turned

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professional revolutionists joined this set with great

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eagerness and lost their identity in it. The peculiar

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social structure of the Party machine and its authority

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over the proletariat (neither of which is accidental

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but dictated by strict historical necessity) were more

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than once the cause of the Party's vacillation and

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finally became the source of its degeneration . . . In

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most cases they lacked independent daily contact with

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the labouring masses as well as a comprehensive

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understanding of the historical process. They thus left

505

themselves exposed to the influence of alien classes."

506

[Stalin, vol. 1, pp. 297-8]

507

</blockquote>

508

He pointed to the example of the First World War, when,

509

"even the Bolshevik party did not at once find its way

510

in the labyrinth of war. As a general rule, the confusion

511

was most pervasive and lasted longest amongst the Party's

512

higher-ups, who came in direct contact with bourgeois

513

public opinion." Thus the professional revolutionaries

514

"were largely affected by compromisist tendencies, which

515

emanated from bourgeois circles, while the rank and file

516

Bolshevik workingmen displayed far greater stability resisting

517

the patriotic hysteria that had swept the country."

518

[Op. Cit., p. 248 and p. 298] It should be noted that

519

he was repeating earlier comments on the "immense

520

intellectual backsliding of the upper stratum of the

521

Bolsheviks during the war" was caused by "isolation

522

from the masses and isolation from those abroad - that is

523

primarily from Lenin." [History of the Russian

524

Revolution, vol. 3, p. 134] As we discuss in

525

<a href="secH5.html#sech512">section H.5.12</a>, even Trotsky

526

had to admit that during 1917 the working class was far more

527

revolutionary than the party and the party more revolutionary

528

than the "party machine" of "professional revolutionaries."

529

530

Ironically enough, Lenin himself recognised this aspect of

531

intellectuals after he had praised their role in bringing

532

"revolutionary" consciousness to the working class. In his

533

1904 work One Step Forward, Two Steps Back, he argued

534

that it was now the presence of "large numbers of radical

535

intellectuals in the ranks" which has ensured that "the

536

opportunism which their mentality produces had been, and is, bound

537

to exist." [Collected Works, vol. 7, pp. 403-4] According

538

to Lenin's new philosophy, the working class simply needs to have been

539

through the "schooling of the factory" in order to give the

540

intelligentsia lessons in political discipline, the very

541

same intelligentsia which up until then had played the leading

542

role in the Party and had given political consciousness to

543

the working class. In his words:

544

545

"For the factory, which seems only a bogey to some, represents

546

that highest form of capitalist co-operation which has united

547

and disciplined the proletariat, taught it to organise . . .

548

And it is Marxism, the ideology of the proletariat trained by

549

capitalism, has been and is teaching . . . unstable intellectuals

550

to distinguish between the factory as a means of exploitation

551

(discipline based on fear of starvation) and the factory as a

552

means of organisation (discipline based on collective work . . .).

553

The discipline and organisation which come so hard to the bourgeois

554

intellectual are very easily acquired by the proletariat just because

555

of this factory 'schooling.'" [Op. Cit., pp. 392-3]

556

</blockquote>

557

Lenin's analogy is, of course, flawed. The factory is a "means

558

of exploitation" because its "means of organisation" is top-down

559

and hierarchical. The "collective work" which the workers are

560

subjected to is organised by the boss and the "discipline" is

561

that of the barracks, not that of free individuals. In fact,

562

the "schooling" for revolutionaries is not the factory,

563

but the class struggle - healthy and positive self-discipline

564

is generated by the struggle against the way the workplace is

565

organised under capitalism. Factory discipline, in other words,

566

is completely different from the discipline required for social

567

struggle or revolution. Workers become revolutionary in so far as

568

they reject the hierarchical discipline of the workplace and develop

569

the self-discipline required to fight it.

570

571

A key task of anarchism is to encourage working class revolt

572

against this type of discipline, particularly in the

573

capitalist workplace. The "discipline" Lenin praises

574

simply replaces human thought and association with the

575

following of orders and hierarchy. Thus anarchism aims to

576

undermine capitalist (imposed and brutalising) discipline

577

in favour of solidarity, the "discipline" of free association

578

and agreement based on the community of struggle and the

579

political consciousness and revolutionary enthusiasm that

580

struggle creates. Thus, for anarchists, the model of the

581

factory can never be the model for a revolutionary organisation

582

any more than Lenin's vision of society as "one big workplace"

583

could be our vision of socialism (see

584

<a href="secH3.html#sech31">section H.3.1</a>). Ultimately, the

585

factory exists to reproduce hierarchical social relationships

586

and class society just as much as it exists to produce goods.

587

588

It should be noted that Lenin's argument does not contradict

589

his earlier ones. The proletarian and intellectual have

590

complementary jobs in the party. The proletariat is to give

591

lessons in political discipline to the intellectuals as they

592

have been through the process of factory (i.e. hierarchical)

593

discipline. The role of the intellectuals as providers of

594

"political consciousness" is the same and so they give

595

political lessons to the workers. Moreover, his vision of

596

the vanguard party is basically the same as in What is

597

to Be Done?. This can be seen from his comments that

598

the leading Menshevik Martov "lumps together in

599

the party organised and unorganised elements, those who lend

600

themselves to direction and those who do not, the advanced and

601

the incorrigibly backward." He stressed that the "division

602

of labour under the direction of a centre evokes from him [the

603

intellectual] a tragicomical outcry against transforming people

604

into 'cogs and wheels.'" [Op. Cit., p. 258 and p. 392]

605

Thus there is the same division of labour as in the capitalist

606

factory, with the boss (the "centre") having the power

607

to direct the workers (who submit to "direction"). Thus

608

we have a "revolutionary" party organised in a capitalist

609

manner, with the same "division of labour" between order

610

givers and order takers.

611

612

<a name="sech53"><h2>H.5.3 Why does vanguardism imply party power?</h2></a>

613

614

615

As we discussed in

616

<a href="secH5.html#sech51">section H.5.1</a>, anarchists argue

617

that the assumptions of vanguardism lead to party rule over the

618

working class. Needless to say, followers of Lenin disagree.

619

For example, Chris Harman of the British Socialist Workers

620

Party argues the opposite case in his essay "Party and Class."

621

However, his own argument suggests the elitist conclusions

622

libertarians have draw from Lenin's.

623

624

Harman argues that there are two ways to look at the

625

revolutionary party, the Leninist way and the traditional

626

social-democratic way (as represented by the likes of

627

Trotsky and Rosa Luxemburg in 1903-5). "The latter,"

628

he argues, "was thought of as a party of the whole [working]

629

class . . . All the tendencies within the class had to be

630

represented within it. Any split within it was to be

631

conceived of as a split within the class. Centralisation,

632

although recognised as necessary, was feared as a centralisation

633

over and against the spontaneous activity of the class. Yet

634

it was precisely in this kind of party that the 'autocratic'

635

tendencies warned against by Luxemburg were to develop most.

636

For within it the confusion of member and sympathiser, the

637

massive apparatus needed to hold together a mass of only

638

half-politicised members in a series of social activities,

639

led to a toning down of political debate, a lack of political

640

seriousness, which in turn reduced the ability of the members

641

to make independent political evaluations and increased the

642

need for apparatus-induced involvement." [Party and Class,

643

p. 32]

644

645

Thus, the lumping together into one organisation all those

646

who consider themselves as "socialist" and agree with the

647

party's aims creates in a mass which results in "autocratic"

648

tendencies within the party organisation. As such, it is

649

important to remember that "the Party, as the vanguard

650

of the working class, must not be confused with the entire

651

class." [Op. Cit., p. 22] For this reason, the

652

party must be organised in a specific manner which reflect

653

his Leninist assumptions:

654

655

"The alternative [to the vanguard party] is the 'marsh' -

656

where elements motivated by scientific precision are so mixed

657

up with those who are irremediably confused as to prevent any

658

decisive action, effectively allowing the most backward to

659

lead." [Op. Cit., p. 30]

660

</blockquote>

661

The problem for Harman is to explain how the proletariat

662

can become the ruling class if this were true. He argues that

663

"the party is not the embryo of the workers' state - the

664

workers' council is. The working class as a whole will be

665

involved in the organisations that constitute the state,

666

the most backward as well as the most progressive elements."

667

The "function of the party is not to be the state."

668

[Op. Cit., p. 33] The implication is that the working

669

class will take an active part in the decision making process

670

during the revolution (although the level of this "involvement"

671

is unspecified, probably for good reasons as we explain).

672

If this is the case, then the problem of the mass party

673

reappears, but in a new form (we must also note that this

674

problem must have also appearing in 1917, when the Bolshevik

675

party opened its doors to become a mass party).

676

677

As the "organisations that constitute the state" are made

678

up of the working class "as a whole," then, obviously,

679

they cannot be expected to wield power (i.e. directly

680

manage the revolution from below). If they did, then the

681

party would be "mixed up" with the "irremediably confused"

682

and so could not lead (as we discuss in

683

<a href="secH5.html#sech55">section H.5.5</a>,

684

Lenin linked "opportunism" to "primitive" democracy, i.e.

685

self-management, within the party). Hence the need for

686

party power. Which, of course, explains Lenin's 1920

687

comments that an organisation embracing the whole working

688

class cannot exercise the "dictatorship of the proletariat"

689

and that a "vanguard" is required to do so (see

690

<a href="secH1.html#sech12">section

691

H.1.2</a> for details). Of course, Harman does not explain how

692

the "irremediably confused" are able to judge that the party

693

is the best representative of its interests. Surely if

694

someone is competent enough to pick their ruler, they must

695

also be competent enough to manage their own affairs

696

directly? Equally, if the "irremediably confused" vote

697

against the party once it is in power, what happens? Will

698

the party submit to the "leadership" of what it considers

699

"the most backward"? If the Bolsheviks are anything to go

700

by, the answer has to be no.

701

702

Ironically, Harman argues that it "is worth noting that in Russia

703

a real victory of the apparatus over the party required precisely the

704

bringing into the party hundreds of thousands of 'sympathisers,' a

705

dilution of the 'party' by the 'class.' . . . The Leninist party does

706

not suffer from this tendency to bureaucratic control precisely because

707

it restricts its membership to those willing to be serious and disciplined

708

enough to take political and theoretical issues as their

709

starting point, and to subordinate all their activities to those."

710

[Op. Cit., p. 33] It would be churlish to note that, firstly, the

711

party had already imposed its dictatorship on the working class by that

712

time and, secondly, his own party is regularly attacked by its own dissidents

713

for being bureaucratic (see <a href="secH5.html#sech511">section H.5.11</a>).

714

715

Significantly, this substitution of the rule of the party for working

716

class self-government and the party apparatus for the party membership

717

does not happen by accident. In order to have a socialist revolution, the

718

working class as a whole must participate in the process so the decision

719

making organisations will be based on the party being "mixed up"

720

with the "irremediably confused" as if they were part of a

721

non-Leninist party. So from Harman's own assumptions, this by necessity

722

results in an "autocratic" regime within the new "workers' state."

723

724

This was implicitly recognised by the Bolsheviks when they stressed that

725

the function of the party was to become the government, the head

726

of the state, to "assume power", (see

727

<a href="secH3.html#sech33">section H.3.3</a>). Thus, while

728

the working class "as a whole" will be "involved in the

729

organisations that constitute the state," the party (in practice,

730

its leadership) will hold power. And for Trotsky, this substitution

731

of the party for the class was inevitable:

732

733

"We have more than once been accused of having substituted for

734

the dictatorship of the Soviets the dictatorship of our party.

735

Yet it can be said with complete justice that the dictatorship

736

of the Soviets became possible only by means of the dictatorship

737

of the party. It is thanks to the clarity of its theoretical

738

vision and its strong revolutionary organisation that the party

739

has afforded to the Soviets the possibility of becoming transformed

740

from shapeless parliaments of labour into the apparatus of the

741

supremacy of labour. In this 'substitution' of the power of the

742

party for the power of the working class there is nothing

743

accidental, and in reality there is no substitution at all.

744

The Communists express the fundamental interests of the working

745

class. It is quite natural that, in the period in which history

746

brings up those interests . . . the Communists have become the

747

recognised representatives of the working class as a whole."

748

[Terrorism and Communism, p. 109]

749

</blockquote>

750

He noted that within the state, "the last word belongs to the

751

Central Committee of the party." [Op. Cit., p. 107] As

752

we discuss in <a href="secH3.html#sech38">section H.3.8</a>, he

753

held this position into the 1930s.

754

755

This means that given Harman's own assumptions, autocratic rule

756

by the party is inevitable. Ironically, he argues that "to be a

757

'vanguard' is not the same as to substitute one's own desires,

758

or policies or interests, for those of the class." He stresses

759

that an "organisation that is concerned with participating in

760

the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism by the working class

761

cannot conceive of substituting itself for the organs of the

762

direct rule of that class." [Op. Cit., p. 33 and p. 34] However,

763

the logic of his argument suggests otherwise. Simply put, his

764

arguments against a broad party organisation are also applicable

765

to self-management during the class struggle and revolution.

766

The rank and file party members are "mixed up" in the class.

767

This leads to party members becoming subject to bourgeois

768

influences. This necessitates the power of the higher bodies

769

over the lower (see

770

<a href="secH5.html#sech55">section H.5.5</a>). The highest party organ,

771

the central committee, must rule over the party machine, which

772

in turn rules over the party members, who, in turn, rule over

773

the workers. This logical chain was, ironically enough,

774

recognised by Trotsky in 1904 in his polemic against Lenin:

775

776

"The organisation of the party substitutes itself for the

777

party as a whole; then the central committee substitutes

778

itself for the organisation; and finally the 'dictator'

779

substitutes himself for the central committee." [quoted

780

by Harman, Op. Cit., p. 22]

781

</blockquote>

782

Obviously once in power this substitution was less of a concern

783

for him! Which, however, does not deny the insight Trotsky had

784

previously showed about the dangers inherent in the Bolshevik

785

assumptions on working class spontaneity and how revolutionary

786

ideas develop. Dangers which he, ironically, helped provide

787

empirical evidence for.

788

789

This false picture of the party (and its role) explains the

790

progression of the Bolshevik party after 1917. As the soviets

791

organised all workers, we have the problem that the party

792

(with its "scientific" knowledge) is swamped by the class.

793

The task of the party is to "persuade, not coerce these

794

[workers] into accepting its lead" and, as Lenin made clear,

795

for it to take political power. [Harman, Op. Cit., p. 34]

796

Once in power, the decisions of the party are in constant

797

danger of being overthrown by the working class, which

798

necessitates a state run with "iron discipline" (and the

799

necessary means of coercion) by the party. With the

800

disempowering of the mass organisations by the party,

801

the party itself becomes a substitute for popular

802

democracy as being a party member is the only way to

803

influence policy. As the party grows, the influx of new

804

members "dilutes" the organisation, necessitating a similar

805

growth of centralised power at the top of the organisation.

806

This eliminated the substitute for proletarian democracy

807

which had developed within the party (which explains the

808

banning of factions within the Bolshevik party in 1921).

809

Slowly but surely, power concentrates into fewer and fewer

810

hands, which, ironically enough, necessitates a bureaucracy

811

to feed the party leaders information and execute its will.

812

Isolated from all, the party inevitably degenerates and

813

Stalinism results.

814

815

We are sure that many Trotskyists will object to our

816

analysis, arguing that we ignore the problems facing the

817

Russian Revolution in our discussion. Harman argues that

818

it was "not the form of the party that produces party as

819

opposed to soviet rule, but the decimation of the working

820

class" that occurred during the Russian Revolution. [Op. Cit.,

821

p. 37] This is false. As noted, Lenin was always explicit

822

about the fact that the Bolshevik's sought party rule ("full

823

state power") and that their rule was working class rule.

824

As such, we have the first, most basic, substitution of party

825

power for workers power. Secondly, as we discuss in

826

<a href="secH6.html#sech61">section H.6.1</a>,

827

the Bolshevik party had been gerrymandering and disbanding

828

soviets before the start of the Civil War, so proving that the

829

war cannot be held accountable for this process of substitution.

830

Thirdly, Leninists are meant to know that civil war is

831

inevitable during a revolution. To blame the inevitable for

832

the degeneration of the revolution is hardly convincing

833

(particularly as the degeneration started before the civil

834

war broke out).

835

836

Unsurprisingly, anarchists reject the underlying basis of

837

this progression, the idea that the working class, by its

838

own efforts, is incapable of developing beyond a "trade

839

union consciousness." The actions of the working class

840

itself condemned these attitudes as outdated and simply

841

wrong long before Lenin's infamous comments were put on

842

paper. In every struggle, the working class has created

843

its own organisations to co-ordinate its struggle. In

844

the process of struggle, the working class changes

845

its perspectives. This process is uneven in both quantity

846

and quality, but it does happen. However, anarchists do

847

not think that all working class people will, at

848

the same time, spontaneously become anarchists.

849

If they did, we would be in an anarchist society today! As

850

we argue in <a href="secH3.html">section J.3</a>, anarchists

851

acknowledge that political development within the working

852

class is uneven. The difference between anarchism and Leninism

853

is how we see socialist ideas developing and how revolutionaries

854

influence that process.

855

856

In every class struggle there is a radical minority which takes

857

the lead and many of this minority develop revolutionary conclusions

858

from their experiences. As such, members of the working class develop

859

their own revolutionary theory and it does not need bourgeois

860

intellectuals to inject it into them. Anarchists go on to argue that

861

this minority (along with any members of other classes who have broken

862

with their background and become libertarians) should organise and

863

work together. The role of this revolutionary organisation is to

864

spread, discuss and revise its ideas and help others draw the

865

same conclusions as they have from their own, and others,

866

experiences. The aim of such a group is, by word and deed,

867

to assist the working class in its struggles and to draw out

868

and clarify the libertarian aspects of this struggle. It seeks to

869

abolish the rigid division between leaders and led which is the

870

hallmark of class society by drawing the vast majority of the

871

working class into social struggle and revolutionary politics by

872

encouraging their direct management of the struggle. Only this

873

participation and the political discussion it generates will allow

874

revolutionary ideas to become widespread.

875

876

In other words, anarchists argue that precisely because of

877

political differences ("unevenness") we need the fullest possible

878

democracy and freedom to discuss issues and reach agreements. Only

879

by discussion and self-activity can the political perspectives of

880

those in struggle develop and change. In other words, the fact

881

Bolshevism uses to justify its support for party power is

882

the strongest argument against it.

883

884

Our differences with vanguardism could not be more clear.

885

886

<a name="sech54"><h2>H.5.4 Did Lenin abandon vanguardism?</h2></a>

887

888

889

Vanguardism rests on the premise that the working class cannot emancipate

890

itself. As such, the ideas of Lenin as expounded in What is to be

891

Done? (WITBD) contradicts the key idea of Marx that the emancipation

892

of the working class is the task of the working class itself. Thus the

893

paradox of Leninism. On the one hand, it subscribes to an ideology

894

allegedly based on working class self-liberation. On the other, the

895

founder of that school wrote an obviously influential work whose

896

premise not only logically implies that they cannot, it also provides

897

the perfect rationale for party dictatorship over the working class

898

(and as the history of Leninism in power shows, this underlying premise

899

was much stronger than any democratic-sounding rhetoric).

900

901

It is for this reason that many Leninists are somewhat embarrassed

902

by Lenin's argument in that key text. Hence we see Chris Harman writing

903

that "the real theoretical basis for [Lenin's] argument on the

904

party is not that the working class is incapable on its own of coming

905

to theoretical socialist consciousness . . . The real basis for his

906

argument is that the level of consciousness in the working class is

907

never uniform." [Party and Class, pp. 25-6] In other words,

908

Harman changes the focus of the question away from the point explicitly

909

and repeatedly stated by Lenin that the working class was incapable

910

on its own of coming to socialist consciousness and that he was simply

911

repeating Marxist orthodoxy when he did.

912

913

Harman bases his revision on Lenin's later comments regarding

914

his book, namely that he sought to "straighten matters out"

915

by "pull[ing] in the other direction" to the "extreme"

916

which the "economists" had went to. [Collected Works,

917

vol. 6, p. 491] He repeated this in 1907, as we will discuss

918

shortly. While Lenin may have been right to attack the

919

"economists", his argument that socialist consciousness

920

comes to the working class only "from without" is not a

921

case of going too far in the other direction; it is wrong.

922

Simply put, you do not attack ideas you disagree with by arguing

923

an equally false set of ideas. This suggests that Harman's

924

attempt to downplay Lenin's elitist position is flawed. Simply

925

put, the "real theoretical basis" of the argument was precisely

926

the issue Lenin himself raised, namely the incapacity of the

927

working class to achieve socialist consciousness by itself.

928

It is probably the elitist conclusions of this argument which

929

drives Harman to try and change the focus to another issue,

930

namely the political unevenness within the working class.

931

932

Some go to even more extreme lengths, denying that Lenin

933

even held such a position. For example, Hal Draper argued at

934

length that Lenin did not, in fact, hold the opinions he

935

actually expressed in his book! While Draper covers many

936

aspects of what he called the "Myth of Lenin's 'Concept of

937

The Party'" in his essay of the same name, we will

938

concentrate on the key idea, namely that socialist ideas

939

are developed outside the class struggle by the radical

940

intelligentsia and introduced into the working class from

941

without. Here, as argued in

942

<a href="secH5.html#sech51">section H.5.1</a>, is the root of

943

the anti-socialist basis of Leninism.

944

945

So what did Draper say? On the one hand, he denied that Lenin

946

held this theory (he states that it is a "virtually non-existent

947

theory" and "non-existent after WITBD"). He argued that

948

those who hold the position that Lenin actually meant what he said

949

in his book "never quote anything other than WITBD," and

950

stated that this is a "curious fact" (a fact we will disprove

951

shortly). Draper argued as follows: "Did Lenin put this theory

952

forward even in WITBD? Not exactly." He then noted that Lenin

953

"had just read this theory in the most prestigious theoretical

954

organ of Marxism of the whole international socialist movement"

955

and it had been "put forward in an important article by the

956

leading Marxist authority," Karl Kautsky and so "Lenin first

957

paraphrased Kautsky" before "quot[ing] a long passage from

958

Kautsky's article."

959

960

This much, of course, is well known by anyone who has read Lenin's

961

book. By paraphrasing and quoting Kautsky as he does, Lenin is

962

showing his agreement with Kautsky's argument. Indeed, Lenin

963

states before quoting Kautsky that his comments are "profoundly

964

true and important". [Essential Works of Lenin, p. 79]

965

By explicitly agreeing with Kautsky, it can be said that it also

966

becomes Lenin's theory as well! Over time, particularly after

967

Kautsky had been labelled a "renegade" by Lenin, Kautsky's

968

star waned and Lenin's rose. Little wonder the argument became

969

associated with Lenin rather than the discredited Kautsky. Draper

970

then speculated that "it is curious . . . that no one has sought

971

to prove that by launching this theory . . . Kautsky was laying the

972

basis for the demon of totalitarianism." A simply reason exists

973

for this, namely the fact that Kautsky, unlike Lenin, was never

974

the head of a one-party dictatorship and justified this system

975

politically. Indeed, Kautsky attacked the Bolsheviks for this,

976

which caused Lenin to label him a "renegade." Kautsky, in this

977

sense, can be considered as being inconsistent with his political

978

assumptions, unlike Lenin who took these assumptions to their

979

logical conclusions.

980

981

How, after showing the obvious fact that "the crucial 'Leninist'

982

theory was really Kautsky's," he then wondered: "Did Lenin,

983

in WITBD, adopt Kautsky's theory?" He answered his own question

984

with an astounding "Again, not exactly"! Clearly, quoting

985

approvingly of a theory and stating it is "profoundly true"

986

does not, in fact, make you a supporter of it! What evidence

987

does Draper present for his amazing answer? Well, Draper argued

988

that Lenin "tried to get maximum mileage out of it against the

989

right wing; this was the point of his quoting it. If it did

990

something for Kautsky's polemic, he no doubt figured that it

991

would do something for his." Or, to present a more simple and

992

obvious explanation, Lenin agreed with Kautsky's "profoundly

993

true" argument!

994

995

Aware of this possibility, Draper tried to combat it. "Certainly,"

996

he argued, "this young man Lenin was not (yet) so brash as to

997

attack his 'pope' or correct him overtly. But there was obviously

998

a feeling of discomfort. While showing some modesty and attempting

999

to avoid the appearance of a head-on criticism, the fact is that

1000

Lenin inserted two longish footnotes rejecting (or if you wish,

1001

amending) precisely what was worst about the Kautsky theory on

1002

the role of the proletariat." So, here we have Lenin quoting

1003

Kautsky to prove his own argument (and noting that Kautsky's

1004

words were "profoundly true and important"!) but "feeling

1005

discomfort" over what he has just approvingly quoted! Incredible!

1006

1007

So how does Lenin "amend" Kautsky's "profoundly true and

1008

important" argument? In two ways, according to Draper.

1009

Firstly, in a footnote which "was appended right after

1010

the Kautsky passage" Lenin quoted. Draper argued that

1011

it "was specifically formulated to undermine and weaken

1012

the theoretical content of Kautsky's position. It began:

1013

'This does not mean, of course, that the workers have no

1014

part in creating such an ideology.' But this was exactly

1015

what Kautsky did mean and say. In the guise of offering

1016

a caution, Lenin was proposing a modified view. 'They

1017

[the workers] take part, however,' Lenin's footnote

1018

continued, 'not as workers, but as socialist theoreticians,

1019

as Proudhons and Weitlings; in other words, they take part

1020

only when they are able . . .' In short, Lenin was

1021

reminding the reader that Kautsky's sweeping statements

1022

were not even 100% true historically; he pointed to

1023

exceptions." Yes, Lenin did point to exceptions in

1024

order to refute objections to Kautsky's argument before

1025

they were raised! It is clear that Lenin was not

1026

refuting Kautsky. Thus Proudhon adds to socialist ideology

1027

in so far as he is a "socialist theoretician" and not a

1028

worker! How clear can you be? This can be seen from the rest

1029

of the sentence Draper truncates. Lenin continued by noting

1030

that people like Proudhon "take part only to the extent that

1031

they are able, more or less, to acquire the knowledge of their

1032

age and advance that knowledge." {Op. Cit., p. 82f]

1033

In other words, insofar as they learn from the "vehicles

1034

of science." Neither Kautsky or Lenin denied that it was

1035

possible for workers to acquire such knowledge and pass it on

1036

(sometimes even develop it). However this does not mean

1037

that they thought workers, as part of their daily life and

1038

struggle as workers, could develop "socialist theory."

1039

Thus Lenin's footnote reiterated Kautsky's argument rather

1040

than, as Draper hoped, refute it.

1041

1042

Draper turns to another footnote, which he noted "was not directly

1043

tied to the Kautsky article, but discussed the 'spontaneity' of the

1044

socialist idea. 'It is often said,' Lenin began, 'that the working

1045

class spontaneously gravitates towards socialism. This is

1046

perfectly true in the sense that socialist theory reveals the

1047

causes of the misery of the working class . . . and for that

1048

reason the workers are able to assimilate it so easily,' but he

1049

reminded that this process itself was not subordinated to mere

1050

spontaneity. 'The working class spontaneously gravitates towards

1051

socialism; nevertheless, . . . bourgeois ideology spontaneously

1052

imposes itself upon the working class to a still greater degree.'"

1053

Draper argued that this "was obviously written to modify and

1054

recast the Kautsky theory, without coming out and saying that

1055

the Master was wrong." So, here we have Lenin approvingly quoting

1056

Kautsky in the main text while, at the same time, providing a

1057

footnote to show that, in fact, he did not agree with what he

1058

has just quoted! Truly amazing - and easily refuted.

1059

1060

Lenin's footnote stressed, in a part Draper did not consider it wise

1061

to quote, that workers appreciate socialist theory "provided,

1062

however, that this theory does not step aside for spontaneity and

1063

provided it subordinates spontaneity to itself."

1064

[Op. Cit., p. 84f] In other words, workers "assimilate"

1065

socialist theory only when socialist theory does not adjust itself

1066

to the "spontaneous" forces at work in the class struggle.

1067

The workers adjust to socialist theory, they do not create it. Thus,

1068

rather than refuting Kautsky by the backdoor, Lenin in this footnote

1069

still agreed with him. Socialism does not develop, as Kautsky stressed,

1070

from the class struggle but rather has to be injected into it. This means,

1071

by necessity, the party "subordinates spontaneity to itself."

1072

1073

Draper argued that this "modification" simply meant that there

1074

"are several things that happen 'spontaneously,' and what will

1075

win out is not decided only by spontaneity" but as can be seen,

1076

this is not the case. Only when "spontaneity" is subordinated to

1077

the theory (i.e. the party) can socialism be won, a totally

1078

different position. As such, when Draper asserted that "[a]ll

1079

that was clear at this point was that Lenin was justifiably

1080

dissatisfied with the formulation of Kautsky's theory," he was

1081

simply expressing wishful thinking. This footnote, like the first

1082

one, continued the argument developed by Lenin in the main text

1083

and in no way is in contradiction to it. As is obvious.

1084

1085

Draper as final evidence of his case asserted that it "is a curious

1086

fact that no one has ever found this alleged theory anywhere else

1087

in Lenin's voluminous writings, not before and not after [WITBD].

1088

It never appeared in Lenin again. No Leninologist has ever quoted

1089

such a theory from any other place in Lenin." However, as this

1090

theory was the orthodox Marxist position, Lenin had no real need to

1091

reiterate this argument continuously. After all, he had quoted the

1092

acknowledged leader of Marxism on the subject explicitly to show the

1093

orthodoxy of his argument and the non-Marxist base of those

1094

he argued against. Once the debate had been won and orthodox Marxism

1095

triumphant, why repeat the argument again? This, as we will see, was

1096

exactly the position Lenin did take in 1907 when he wrote an

1097

introduction to a book which contained What is to Be Done?.

1098

1099

In contradiction to Draper's claim, Lenin did return to this

1100

matter. In October 1905 he wrote an a short article in praise of an

1101

article by Stalin on this very subject. Stalin had sought to explain

1102

Lenin's ideas to the Georgian Social-Democracy and, like Lenin, had

1103

sought to root the argument in Marxist orthodoxy (partly to justify

1104

the argument, partly to expose the Menshevik opposition as being

1105

non-Marxists). Stalin argued along similar lines to Lenin:

1106

1107

"the question now is: who works out, who is able to work out

1108

this socialist consciousness (i.e. scientific socialism)?

1109

Kautsky says, and I repeat his idea, that the masses of

1110

proletarians, as long as they remain proletarians, have

1111

neither the time nor the opportunity to work out socialist

1112

consciousness . . . The vehicles of science are the

1113

intellectuals . . . who have both the time and opportunity

1114

to put themselves in the van of science and workout socialist

1115

consciousness. Clearly, socialist consciousness is worked

1116

out by a few Social-Democratic intellectuals who posses the

1117

time and opportunity to do so." [Collected Works, vol. 1,

1118

p. 164]

1119

</blockquote>

1120

Stalin stressed the Marxist orthodoxy by stating Social-Democracy

1121

"comes in and introduces socialist consciousness into the working

1122

class movement. This is what Kautsky has in mind when he says

1123

'socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian

1124

class struggle from without.'" [Op. Cit., pp. 164-5]

1125

That Stalin was simply repeating Lenin's and Kautsky's arguments

1126

is clear, as is the fact it was considered the orthodox position

1127

within social-democracy.

1128

1129

If Draper was right, then Lenin would have taken the opportunity

1130

to attack Stalin's article and express the alternative viewpoint

1131

Draper was convinced he held. Lenin, however, put pen to paper to

1132

praise Stalin's work, noting "the splendid way in which the

1133

problem of the celebrated 'introduction of a consciousness from

1134

without' had been posed." Lenin explicitly agreed with Stalin's

1135

summary of his argument, writing that "social being determines

1136

consciousness . . . Socialist consciousness corresponds to the

1137

position of the proletariat" before quoting Stalin: "'Who can

1138

and does evolve this consciousness (scientific socialism)?'" He

1139

answers by again approvingly quoting Stalin: "its 'evolution' is

1140

a matter for a few Social-Democratic intellectuals who posses the

1141

necessary means and time.'" Lenin did argue that Social-Democracy

1142

meets "an instinctive urge towards socialism" when it

1143

"comes to the proletariat with the message of socialism,"

1144

but this does not counter the main argument that the working class

1145

cannot develop socialist consciousness by it own efforts and the,

1146

by necessity, elitist and hierarchical politics that flow from

1147

this position. [Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 9, p. 388]

1148

1149

That Lenin did not reject his early formulations can also be

1150

seen from in his introduction to the pamphlet "Twelve Years"

1151

which contained What is to be Done?. Rather than explaining

1152

the false nature of that work's more infamous arguments, Lenin

1153

in fact defended them. For example, as regards the question

1154

of professional revolutionaries, he argued that the statements

1155

of his opponents now "look ridiculous" as "today

1156

the idea of an organisation of professional revolutionaries has

1157

already scored a complete victory," a victory which

1158

"would have been impossible if this idea had not been pushed to

1159

the forefront at the time." He noted that his work had

1160

"vanquished Economism . . . and finally created this

1161

organisation." On the question of socialist consciousness,

1162

he simply reiterated the Marxist orthodoxy of his position,

1163

noting that its "formulation of the relationship between

1164

spontaneity and political consciousness was agreed upon by

1165

all the Iskra editors . . . Consequently, there could be

1166

no question of any difference in principle between the draft

1167

Party programme and What is to be Done? on this issue." So

1168

while Lenin argued that his book "straightens out what had

1169

been twisted by the Economists," (who had "gone to one

1170

extreme") he did not correct his earlier arguments.

1171

[Collected Works, vol. 13, p. 101, p. 102 and p. 107]

1172

1173

Looking at Lenin's arguments at the Communist International on

1174

the question of the party we see an obvious return to the ideas

1175

of WITBD (see <a href="secH5.html#sech55">section H.5.5</a>).

1176

Here was have a similar legal/illegal duality, strict centralism,

1177

strong hierarchy and the vision of the party as the "head"

1178

of the working class (i.e. its consciousness). In Left-Wing

1179

Communism, Lenin mocks those who reject the idea that

1180

dictatorship by the party is the same as that of the class

1181

(see <a href="secH3.html#sech33">section H.3.3</a>).

1182

1183

For Draper, the key problem was that critics of Lenin "run two

1184

different questions together: (a) What was, historically, the

1185

initial role of intellectuals in the beginnings of the

1186

socialist movement, and (b) what is - and above all, what

1187

should be - the role of bourgeois intellectuals in a working-class

1188

party today." He argued that Kautsky did not believe that

1189

"if it can be shown that intellectuals historically

1190

played a certain initiatory role, they must and should

1191

continue to play the same role now and forever. It does not follow;

1192

as the working class matured, it tended to throw off leading strings."

1193

However, this is unconvincing. If socialist consciousness cannot

1194

be generated by the working class by its own struggles then this

1195

is applicable now and in the future. Thus workers who join the

1196

socialist movement will be repeating the party ideology, as

1197

developed by intellectuals in the past. If they do develop

1198

new theory, it would be, as Lenin stressed, "not as workers,

1199

but as socialist theoreticians" and so socialist consciousness

1200

still does not derive from their own class experiences. This

1201

places the party in a privileged position vis-�-vis the working

1202

class and so the elitism remains.

1203

1204

Somewhat ironically given how much Draper is at pains to distance his

1205

hero Lenin from claims of elitism, he himself agreed with the

1206

arguments of Kautsky and Lenin. For Draper socialism did not

1207

develop out of the class struggle: "As a matter of fact, in the

1208

International of 1902 no one really had any doubts about the historical

1209

facts concerning the beginnings of the movement." This was true.

1210

Plekhanov, the father of Russian Marxism, made similar arguments to

1211

Kautsky's before Lenin put pen to paper. For Plekhanov, the socialist

1212

intelligentsia "will bring consciousness into the working

1213

class." It must "become the leader of the working class"

1214

and "explain to it its political and economic interests."

1215

This would "prepare them to play an independent role in the

1216

social life of Russia." [quoted by Neil Harding, Lenin's

1217

Political Thought, vol. 1, p. 50 and p. 51]

1218

1219

As one expert notes, "Lenin's position . . . did not differ in

1220

any essentials" from those "Plekhanov had himself expressed."

1221

Its "basic theses were his own", namely that it is "clear

1222

from Plekhanov's writing that it was the intelligentsia which virtually

1223

created the working class movement in its conscious form. It brought

1224

it science, revolutionary theory and organisation." In summary,

1225

"Lenin's views of the Party . . . are not to be regarded as

1226

extraordinary, innovatory, perverse, essentially Jacobin or unorthodox.

1227

On the contrary" they were "the touchstone of orthodoxy" and

1228

so "what it [What is to be Done?] presented at the time"

1229

was "a restatement of the principles of Russian Marxist orthodoxy."

1230

By quoting Kautsky, Lenin also proved that he was simply repeating the

1231

general Marxist orthodoxy: "Those who dispute Lenin's conclusions on

1232

the genesis of socialist consciousness must it seems, also dispute

1233

Kautsky's claim to represent Social-Democratic orthodoxy." [Harding,

1234

Op. Cit., p. 170, p. 172, pp. 50-1, p. 187, p. 188, p. 189 and

1235

p. 169]

1236

1237

Moreover, Engels wrote some interesting words in the 1840s on this

1238

issue which places the subsequent development of Marxism into sharper

1239

light. He noted that "it is evident that the working-men's movement

1240

is divided into two sections, the Chartists and the Socialists. The

1241

Chartists are theoretically the more backward, the less developed,

1242

but they are genuine proletarians . . . The Socialists are more

1243

far-seeing . . . but proceeding originally from the bourgeoisie,

1244

are for this reason unable to amalgamate completely with the working

1245

class. The union of Socialism with Chartism . . . will be the next step

1246

. . . Then, only when this has been achieved, will the working class be

1247

the true intellectual leader of England." Thus socialist ideas have

1248

to be introduced into the proletariat, as they are "more backward"

1249

and cannot be expected to develop theory for themselves! In the same year,

1250

he expounded on what this "union" would entail, writing in an

1251

Owenite paper that "the union between the German philosophers . . .

1252

and the German working men . . . is all but accomplished. With the

1253

philosophers to think, and the working mean to fight for us, will any

1254

earthly power be strong enough to resist our progress?" [Collected

1255

Works, vol. 4, pp. 526-7 and p. 236] This, of course, fits in with

1256

the Communist Manifesto's assertion that "a small section of

1257

the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the revolutionary class."

1258

Today, this "portion of the bourgeois ideologists" have "raised

1259

themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical

1260

movement as a whole." [The Marx-Engels Reader, p. 481] This,

1261

needless to say, places "bourgeois ideologists" (like Marx, Engels,

1262

Kautsky and Lenin) in a privileged position within the movement and has

1263

distinctly vanguardist undercurrents.

1264

1265

Seemingly unaware how this admission destroyed his case, Draper went on to

1266

ask: "But what followed from those facts?" To which he argued that

1267

Marx and Engels "concluded, from the same facts and subsequent

1268

experiences, that the movement had to be sternly warned against the

1269

influence of bourgeois intellectuals inside the party." (We wonder

1270

if Marx and Engels included themselves in the list of "bourgeois

1271

intellectuals" the workers had to be "sternly warned" about?)

1272

Thus, amusingly enough, Draper argued that Marx, Engels, Kautsky and

1273

Lenin all held to the "same facts" that socialist consciousness

1274

developed outside the experiences of the working classes!

1275

1276

Ultimately, the whole rationale for the kind of wishful thinking

1277

that Draper inflicted on us is flawed. As noted above, you do not

1278

combat what you think is an incorrect position with one which

1279

you consider as also being wrong or do not agree with! You

1280

counter what you consider as an incorrect position with one

1281

you consider correct and agree with. As Lenin, in WITBD,

1282

explicitly did. This means that later attempts by his followers

1283

to downplay the ideas raised in Lenin's book are unconvincing.

1284

Moreover, as he was simply repeating Social-Democratic orthodoxy

1285

it seems doubly unconvincing.

1286

1287

Clearly, Draper was wrong. Lenin did, as indicated above, actually meant

1288

what he said in WITBD. The fact that Lenin quoted Kautsky simply

1289

shows, as Lenin intended, that this position was the orthodox Social

1290

Democratic one, held by the mainstream of the party (one with roots in

1291

Marx and Engels). Given that Leninism was (and still is) a "radical"

1292

offshoot of this movement, this should come as no surprise. However,

1293

Draper's comments remind us how religious many forms of Marxism are -

1294

why do we need facts when we have the true faith?

1295

1296

<a name="sech55"><h2>H.5.5 What is "democratic centralism"?</h2></a>

1297

1298

1299

Anarchists oppose vanguardism for three reasons, one of which is the

1300

way it recommends how revolutionaries should organise to influence the

1301

class struggle.

1302

1303

So how is a "vanguard" party organised? To quote the Communist

1304

International's 1920 resolution on the role of the Communist

1305

Party in the revolution, the party must have a "centralised

1306

political apparatus" and "must be organised on the basis of

1307

iron proletarian centralism." This, of course, suggests a

1308

top-down structure internally, which the resolution explicitly

1309

calls for. In its words, "Communist cells of every kind must be

1310

subordinate to one another as precisely as possible in a strict

1311

hierarchy." [Proceedings and Documents of the Second Congress

1312

1920, vol. 1, p. 193, p. 198 and p. 199] Therefore, the vanguard

1313

party is organised in a centralised, top-down way. However, this

1314

is not all, as well as being "centralised," the party is also meant

1315

to be democratic, hence the expression "democratic centralism."

1316

On this the resolution states:

1317

1318

"The Communist Party must be organised on the basis of democratic

1319

centralism. The most important principle of democratic centralism

1320

is election of the higher party organs by the lowest, the fact

1321

that all instructions by a superior body are unconditionally and

1322

necessarily binding on lower ones, and existence of a strong

1323

central party leadership whose authority over all leading party

1324

comrades in the period between one party congress and the next

1325

is universally accepted." [Op. Cit., p. 198]

1326

</blockquote>

1327

For Lenin, speaking in the same year, democratic centralism meant

1328

"only that representatives from the localities meet and elect a

1329

responsible body which must then govern . . . Democratic centralism

1330

consists in the Congress checking on the Central Committee, removing

1331

it and electing a new one." [quoted by Robert Service, The

1332

Bolshevik Party in Revolution, p. 131] Thus, "democratic

1333

centralism" is inherently top-down, although the "higher"

1334

party organs are, in principle, elected by the "lower." However,

1335

the key point is that the central committee is the active element, the

1336

one whose decisions are implemented and so the focus of the structure

1337

is in the "centralism" rather than the "democratic" part

1338

of the formula.

1339

1340

As we noted in <a href="secH2.html#sech214">section H.2.14</a>,

1341

the Communist Party was expected to have a dual structure, one legal

1342

and the other illegal. It goes without saying that the illegal

1343

structure is the real power in the party and that it cannot be

1344

expected to be as democratic as the legal party, which in turn

1345

would be less than democratic as the illegal would have the real

1346

power within the organisation.

1347

1348

All this has clear parallels with Lenin's What is to be done?,

1349

where he argued for "a powerful and strictly secret organisation,

1350

which concentrates in its hands all the threads of secret activities,

1351

an organisation which of necessity must be a centralised organisation."

1352

This call for centralisation is not totally dependent on secrecy,

1353

though. As he noted, "specialisation necessarily presupposes

1354

centralisation, and in its turn imperatively calls for it." Such

1355

a centralised organisation would need leaders and Lenin argued that

1356

"no movement can be durable without a stable organisation of

1357

leaders to maintain continuity." As such, "the organisation

1358

must consist chiefly of persons engaged in revolutionary activities

1359

as a profession." Thus, we have a centralised organisation which

1360

is managed by specialists, by "professional revolutionaries."

1361

This does not mean that these all come from the bourgeoisie or petit

1362

bourgeoisie. According to Lenin a "workingman agitator who is at

1363

all talented and 'promising' must not be left to work eleven

1364

hours a day in a factory. We must arrange that he be maintained by

1365

the Party, that he may in due time go underground." [Essential

1366

Works of Lenin, p. 158, p. 153, p. 147, p. 148 and p. 155]

1367

</blockquote>

1368

Thus the full time professional revolutionaries are drawn from

1369

all classes into the party apparatus. However, in practice

1370

the majority of such full-timers were/are middle class. Trotsky

1371

noted that "just as in the Bolshevik committees, so at the

1372

[1905] Congress itself, there were almost no workingmen. The

1373

intellectuals predominated." [Stalin, vol. 1, p. 101]

1374

This did not change, even after the influx of working class members

1375

in 1917 the "incidence of middle-class activists increases at

1376

the highest echelons of the hierarchy of executive committees."

1377

[Robert Service, Op. Cit., p. 47] An ex-worker was a rare

1378

sight in the Bolshevik Central Committee, an actual worker

1379

non-existent. However, regardless of their original class

1380

background what unites the full-timers is not their origin

1381

but rather their current relationship with the working class,

1382

one of separation and hierarchy.

1383

1384

The organisational structure of this system was made clear

1385

at around the same time as What is to be Done?, with

1386

Lenin arguing that the factory group (or cell) of the

1387

party "must consist of a small number of revolutionaries,

1388

receiving direct from the [central] committee orders and

1389

power to conduct the whole social-democratic work in the

1390

factory. All members of the factory committee must regard

1391

themselves as agents of the [central] committee, bound to

1392

submit to all its directions, bound to observe all 'laws

1393

and customs' of this 'army in the field' in which they

1394

have entered and which they cannot leave without permission

1395

of the commander." [quoted by E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik

1396

Revolution, vol. 1, p. 33] The similarities to the structure

1397

proposed by Lenin and agreed to by the Comintern in 1920 is

1398

obvious. Thus we have a highly centralised party, one run by

1399

"professional revolutionaries" from the top down.

1400

1401

It will be objected that Lenin was discussing the means of

1402

party building under Tsarism and advocated wider democracy

1403

under legality. However, given that in 1920 he universalised

1404

the Bolshevik experience and urged the creation of a dual

1405

party structure (based on legal and illegal structures), his

1406

comments on centralisation are applicable to vanguardism in

1407

general. Moreover, in 1902 he based his argument on experiences

1408

drawn from democratic capitalist regimes. As he argued, "no

1409

revolutionary organisation has ever practised broad

1410

democracy, nor could it, however much it desired to do so."

1411

This was not considered as just applicable in Russia under the

1412

Tsar as Lenin then goes on to quote the Webb's "book on trade

1413

unionism" in order to clarify what he calls "the confusion of

1414

ideas concerning the meaning of democracy." He noted that

1415

"in the first period of existence in their unions, the

1416

British workers thought it was an indispensable sign of

1417

democracy for all members to do all the work of managing the

1418

unions." This involved "all questions [being] decided by the

1419

votes of all the members" and all "official duties" being

1420

"fulfilled by all the members in turn." He dismissed "such

1421

a conception of democracy" as "absurd" and "historical

1422

experience" made them "understand the necessity for

1423

representative institutions" and "full-time professional

1424

officials." [Essential Works of Lenin, p. 161 and pp. 162-3]

1425

1426

Needless to say, Lenin linked this to Kautsky, who "shows the

1427

need for professional journalists, parliamentarians, etc.,

1428

for the Social-Democratic leadership of the proletarian class

1429

struggle" and who "attacks the 'socialism of anarchists and

1430

litterateurs' who . . . proclaim the principle that laws

1431

should be passed directly by the whole people, completely failing

1432

to understand that in modern society this principle can have only

1433

a relative application." The universal nature of his dismissal

1434

of self-management within the revolutionary organisation in favour of

1435

representative forms is thus stressed. Significantly, Lenin stated

1436

that this "'primitive' conception of democracy" exists in

1437

two groups, the "masses of the students and workers" and the

1438

"Economists of the Bernstein persuasion" (i.e. reformists).

1439

Thus the idea of directly democratic working class organisations

1440

is associated with opportunism. He was generous, noting that he

1441

"would not, of course, . . . condemn practical workers who have

1442

had too few opportunities for studying the theory and practice of

1443

real democratic [sic!] organisation" but individuals "play[ing]

1444

a leading role" in the movement should be so condemned!

1445

[Op. Cit., p. 163] These people should know better! Thus

1446

"real" democratic organisation implies the restriction of

1447

democracy to that of electing leaders and any attempt to widen the

1448

input of ordinary members is simply an expression of workers who

1449

need educating from their "primitive" failings!

1450

1451

In summary, we have a model of a "revolutionary" party which is

1452

based on full-time "professional revolutionaries" in which the

1453

concept of direct democracy is replaced by a system of, at

1454

best, representative democracy. It is highly centralised, as

1455

befitting a specialised organisation. As noted in

1456

<a href="secH3.html#sech33">section H.3.3</a>,

1457

the "organisational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy"

1458

was "to proceed from the top downward" rather than "from the

1459

bottom upward." [Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 7, pp. 396-7]

1460

Rather than being only applicable in Tsarist Russia, Lenin

1461

drew on examples from advanced, democratic capitalist countries

1462

to justify his model in 1902 and in 1920 he advocated a similar

1463

hierarchical and top-down organisation with a dual secret and

1464

public organisation in the Communist International. The

1465

continuity of ideas is clear.

1466

1467

<a name="sech56"><h2>H.5.6 Why do anarchists oppose "democratic centralism"?</h2></a>

1468

1469

1470

What to make of Lenin's suggested model of "democratic

1471

centralism" discussed in the

1472

<a href="secH5.html#sech55">last section</a>? It is, to use

1473

Cornelius Castoriadis's term, a "revolutionary party

1474

organised on a capitalist manner" and so in practice

1475

the "democratic centralist" party, while being

1476

centralised, will not be very democratic. In fact, the

1477

level of democracy would reflect that in a capitalist

1478

republic rather than a socialist society:

1479

1480

"The dividing up of tasks, which is indispensable wherever there

1481

is a need for co-operation, becomes a real division of labour,

1482

the labour of giving orders being separate from that of carrying

1483

them out . . . this division between directors and executants

1484

tends to broaden and deepen by itself. The leaders specialise

1485

in their role and become indispensable while those who carry

1486

out orders become absorbed in their concrete tasks. Deprived

1487

of information, of the general view of the situation, and of

1488

the problems of organisation, arrested in their development by

1489

their lack of participation in the overall life of the Party,

1490

the organisation's rank-and-file militants less and less have

1491

the means or the possibility of having any control over those at

1492

the top.

1493

1494

"This division of labour is supposed to be limited by 'democracy.'

1495

But democracy, which should mean that the majority rules, is

1496

reduced to meaning that the majority designates its rulers;

1497

copied in this way from the model of bourgeois parliamentary

1498

democracy, drained of any real meaning, it quickly becomes a

1499

veil thrown over the unlimited power of the rulers. The base

1500

does not run the organisation just because once a year it elects

1501

delegates who designate the central committee, no more than the

1502

people are sovereign in a parliamentary-type republic because

1503

they periodically elect deputies who designate the government.

1504

1505

"Let us consider, for example, 'democratic centralism' as it

1506

is supposed to function in an ideal Leninist party. That the

1507

central committee is designated by a 'democratically elected'

1508

congress makes no difference since, once it is elected, it

1509

has complete (statutory) control over the body of the Party

1510

(and can dissolve the base organisations, kick out militants,

1511

etc.) or that, under such conditions, it can determine the

1512

composition of the next congress. The central committee

1513

could use its powers in an honourable way, these powers

1514

could be reduced; the members of the Party might enjoy

1515

'political rights' such as being able to form factions,

1516

etc. Fundamentally this would not change the situation,

1517

for the central committee would still remain the organ

1518

that defines the political line of the organisation and

1519

controls its application from top to bottom, that, in a

1520

word, has permanent monopoly on the job of leadership. The

1521

expression of opinions only has a limited value once the

1522

way the group functions prevents this opinion from forming

1523

on solid bases, i.e. permanent participation in the

1524

organisation's activities and in the solution of problems

1525

that arise. If the way the organisation is run makes the

1526

solution of general problems the specific task and permanent

1527

work of a separate category of militants, only their opinion

1528

will, or will appear, to count to the others." [Castoriadis,

1529

Social and Political Writings, vol. 2, pp. 204-5]

1530

</blockquote>

1531

Castoriadis' insight is important and strikes at the heart of

1532

the problem with vanguard parties. They simply reflect the

1533

capitalist society they claim to represent. As such, Lenin's

1534

argument against "primitive" democracy in the revolutionary

1535

and labour movements is significant. When he asserts that

1536

those who argue for direct democracy "completely" fail to

1537

"understand that in modern society this principle can have

1538

only a relative application," he is letting the cat out of

1539

the bag. [Lenin, Op. Cit., p. 163] After all, "modern society"

1540

is capitalism, a class society. In such a society, it is

1541

understandable that self-management should not be applied

1542

as it strikes at the heart of class society and how it

1543

operates. That Lenin can appeal to "modern society" without

1544

recognising its class basis says a lot. The question becomes,

1545

if such a "principle" is valid for a class system, is it

1546

applicable in a socialist society and in the movement aiming to

1547

create such a society? Can we postpone the application of our

1548

ideas until "after the revolution" or can the revolution

1549

only occur when we apply our socialist principles in resisting

1550

class society?

1551

1552

In a nutshell, can the same set of organisational structures

1553

be used for the different ends? Can bourgeois structures be

1554

considered neutral or have they, in fact, evolved to ensure and

1555

protect minority rule? Ultimately, form and content are not

1556

independent of each other. Form and content adapt to fit each

1557

other and they cannot be divorced in reality. Thus, if the

1558

bourgeoisie embrace centralisation and representation they have

1559

done so because it fits perfectly with their specific form of

1560

class society. Neither centralisation and representation can

1561

undermine minority rule and, if they did, they would quickly be

1562

eliminated.

1563

1564

Interestingly, both Bukharin and Trotsky acknowledged that

1565

fascism had appropriated Bolshevik ideas. The former demonstrated

1566

at the 12th Congress of the Communist Party in 1923 how Italian

1567

fascism had "adopted and applied in practice the experiences of

1568

the Russian revolution" in terms of their "methods of combat." In

1569

fact, "[i]f one regards them from the formal point of view, that

1570

is, from the point of view of the technique of their political

1571

methods, then one discovers in them a complete application of

1572

Bolshevik tactics. . . in the sense of the rapid concentration of

1573

forced [and] energetic action of a tightly structured military

1574

organisation." [quoted by R. Pipes, Russia Under the Bolshevik

1575

Regime, 1919-1924, p. 253] The latter, in his uncompleted

1576

biography on Stalin noted that "Mussolini stole from the

1577

Bolsheviks . . . Hitler imitated the Bolsheviks and Mussolini."

1578

[Stalin, vol. 2, p. 243] The question arises as to whether the

1579

same tactics and structures serve both the needs of fascist

1580

reaction and socialist revolution? Now, if Bolshevism can

1581

serve as a model for fascism, it must contain structural and

1582

functional elements which are also common to fascism. After

1583

all, no one has detected a tendency of Hitler or Mussolini, in

1584

their crusade against democracy, the organised labour movement

1585

and the left, to imitate the organisational principles of

1586

anarchism.

1587

1588

Surely we can expect decisive structural differences

1589

to exist between capitalism and socialism if these societies

1590

are to have different aims. Where one is centralised to

1591

facilitate minority rule, the other must be decentralised and

1592

federal to facilitate mass participation. Where one is top-down,

1593

the other must be from the bottom-up. If a "socialism" exists

1594

which uses bourgeois organisational elements then we should not

1595

be surprised if it turns out to be socialist in name only. The

1596

same applies to revolutionary organisations. As the anarchists

1597

of Trotwatch explain:

1598

1599

"In reality, a Leninist Party simply reproduces and

1600

institutionalises existing capitalist power relations

1601

inside a supposedly 'revolutionary' organisation:

1602

between leaders and led; order givers and order takers;

1603

between specialists and the acquiescent and largely

1604

powerless party workers. And that elitist power relation

1605

is extended to include the relationship between the party

1606

and class." [Carry on Recruiting!, p. 41]

1607

</blockquote>

1608

If you have an organisation which celebrates centralisation,

1609

having an institutionalised "leadership" separate from the

1610

mass of members becomes inevitable. Thus the division of

1611

labour which exists in the capitalist workplace or state is

1612

created. Forms cannot and do not exist independently of

1613

people and so imply specific forms of social relationships

1614

within them. These social relationships shape those subject

1615

to them. Can we expect the same forms of authority to have

1616

different impacts simply because the organisation has

1617

"socialist" or "revolutionary" in its name? Of course not.

1618

It is for this reason that anarchists argue that only in

1619

a "libertarian socialist movement the workers learn about

1620

non-dominating forms of association through creating and

1621

experimenting with forms such as libertarian labour

1622

organisations, which put into practice, through struggle

1623

against exploitation, principles of equality and free

1624

association." [John Clark, The Anarchist Moment, p. 79]

1625

1626

As noted above, a "democratic centralist" party requires that

1627

the "lower" party bodies (cells, branches, etc.) should be

1628

subordinate to the higher ones (e.g. the central committee).

1629

The higher bodies are elected at the (usually) annual

1630

conference. As it is impossible to mandate for future

1631

developments, the higher bodies therefore are given

1632

carte blanche to determine policy which is binding on the

1633

whole party (hence the "from top-down" principle). In between

1634

conferences, the job of full time (ideally elected, but not

1635

always) officers is to lead the party and carry out the

1636

policy decided by the central committee. At the next

1637

conference, the party membership can show its approval of

1638

the leadership by electing another. The problems with this

1639

scheme are numerous:

1640

1641

"The first problem is the issue of hierarchy. Why should

1642

'higher' party organs interpret party policy any more

1643

accurately than 'lower' ones? The pat answer is that the

1644

'higher' bodies compromise the most capable and experienced

1645

members and are (from their lofty heights) in a better

1646

position to take an overall view on a given issue. In fact

1647

what may well happen is that, for example, central committee

1648

members may be more isolated from the outside world than

1649

mere branch members. This might ordinarily be the case

1650

because given the fact than many central committee members

1651

are full timers and therefore detached from more real issues

1652

such as making a living . . ." [ACF, Marxism and its

1653

Failures, p. 8]

1654

</blockquote>

1655

Equally, in order that the "higher" bodies can evaluate the

1656

situation they need effective information from the "lower"

1657

bodies. If the "lower" bodies are deemed incapable of formulating

1658

their own policies, how can they be wise enough, firstly, to

1659

select the right leaders and, secondly, determine the appropriate

1660

information to communicate to the "higher" bodies? Given

1661

the assumptions for centralised power in the party, can we not

1662

see that "democratic centralised" parties will be

1663

extremely inefficient in practice as information and knowledge

1664

is lost in the party machine and whatever decisions which are

1665

reached at the top are made in ignorance of the real situation

1666

on the ground? As we discuss in

1667

<a href="secH5.html#sech58">section H.5.8</a>, this is usually

1668

the fate of such parties.

1669

1670

Within the party, as noted, the role of "professional revolutionaries"

1671

(or "full timers") is stressed. As Lenin argued, any worker which

1672

showed any talent must be removed from the workplace and become a

1673

party functionary. Is it surprising that the few Bolshevik cadres

1674

(i.e. professional revolutionaries) of working class origin soon

1675

lost real contact with the working class? Equally, what will their

1676

role within the party be? As we discuss in

1677

<a href="sech5.html#sech512">section H.5.12</a>,

1678

their role in the Bolshevik party was essentially conservative in

1679

nature and aimed to maintain their own position.

1680

1681

That the anarchist critique of "democratic centralism" is valid,

1682

we need only point to the comments and analysis of numerous

1683

members (and often soon to be ex-members) of such parties. Thus

1684

we get a continual stream of articles discussing why specific

1685

parties are, in fact, "bureaucratic centralist" rather than

1686

"democratic centralist" and what is required to reform them.

1687

That every "democratic centralist" party in existence is

1688

not that democratic does not hinder their attempts to create one

1689

which is. In a way, the truly "democratic centralist" party is

1690

the Holy Grail of modern Leninism. As we discuss in

1691

<a href="secH5.html#sech510">section H.5.10</a>,

1692

their goal may be as mythical as that of the Arthurian

1693

legends.

1694

1695

<a name="sech57"><h2>H.5.7 Is the way revolutionaries organise important?</h2></a>

1696

1697

1698

As we discussed in the

1699

<a href="secH5.html#sech56">last section</a>, anarchists argue that

1700

the way revolutionaries organise today is important. However,

1701

according to some of Lenin's followers, the fact that the

1702

"revolutionary" party is organised in a non-revolutionary

1703

manner does not matter. In the words of Chris Harman, a leading

1704

member of the British Socialist Workers Party, "[e]xisting

1705

under capitalism, the revolutionary organisation [i.e. the

1706

vanguard party] will of necessity have a quite different

1707

structure to that of the workers' state that will arise in

1708

the process of overthrowing capitalism." [Party and Class,

1709

p. 34]

1710

1711

However, in practice this distinction is impossible to make. If the

1712

party is organised in specific ways then it is so because this is

1713

conceived to be "efficient," "practical" and so on.

1714

Hence we find Lenin arguing against "backwardness in organisation"

1715

and that the "point at issue is whether our ideological struggle is

1716

to have forms of a higher type to clothe it, forms of Party

1717

organisation binding on all." Why would the "workers' state" be

1718

based on "backward" or "lower" kinds of organisational forms? If, as

1719

Lenin remarked, "the organisational principle of revolutionary

1720

Social-Democracy" was "to proceed from the top downward",

1721

why would the party, once in power, reject its "organisational

1722

principle" in favour of one it thinks is "opportunist,"

1723

"primitive" and so on? [Collected Works, vol. 7, p. 389,

1724

p. 388 and pp. 396-7]

1725

1726

Therefore, as the vanguard the party represents the level

1727

to which the working class is supposed to reach then its

1728

organisational principles must, similarly, be those which

1729

the class must reach. As such, Harman's comments are

1730

incredulous. How we organise today is hardly irrelevant,

1731

particularly if the revolutionary organisation in question

1732

seeks (to use Lenin's words) to "tak[e] full state power

1733

alone." [Op. Cit., vol. 26, p. 94] These prejudices

1734

(and the political and organisational habits they generate)

1735

will influence the shaping of the "workers' state" by the

1736

party once it has taken power. This decisive influence of

1737

the party and its ideological as well as organisational

1738

assumptions can be seen when Trotsky argued in 1923 that

1739

"the party created the state apparatus and can rebuild it

1740

anew . . . from the party you get the state, but not the

1741

party from the state." [Leon Trotsky Speaks, p. 161] This

1742

is to be expected, after all the aim of the party is to take,

1743

hold and execute power. Given that the vanguard party is

1744

organised as it is to ensure effectiveness and efficiency,

1745

why should we assume that the ruling party will not seek to

1746

recreate these organisational principles once in power? As

1747

the Russian Revolution proves, this is the case (see <a href="secH6.html">section H.6</a>)

1748

1749

To claim how we organise under capitalism is not important to a

1750

revolutionary movement is simply not true. The way revolutionaries

1751

organise have an impact both on themselves and how they will view

1752

the revolution developing. An ideological prejudice for centralisation

1753

and "top-down" organisation will not disappear once the revolution starts.

1754

Rather, it will influence the way the party acts within it and, if it aims

1755

to seize power, how it will exercise that power once it has.

1756

1757

For these reasons anarchists stress the importance of building

1758

the new world in the shell of the old (see <a href="secH1.html#sech16">section H.1.6</a>).

1759

All organisations create social relationships which shape their memberships.

1760

As the members of these parties will be part of the revolutionary process,

1761

they will influence how that revolution will develop and any "transitional"

1762

institutions which are created. As the aim of such organisations is to

1763

facilitate the creation of socialism, the obvious implication

1764

is that the revolutionary organisation must, itself, reflect

1765

the society it is trying to create. Clearly, then, the idea that

1766

how we organise as revolutionaries today can be considered somehow

1767

independent of the revolutionary process and the nature of

1768

post-capitalist society and its institutions cannot be maintained

1769

(particularly if the aim of the "revolutionary" organisation is

1770

to seize power on behalf of the working class).

1771

1772

As we argue elsewhere (see <a href="secJ3.html">section J.3</a>) anarchists

1773

argue for revolutionary groups based on self-management, federalism and

1774

decision making from below. In other words, we apply within our

1775

organisations the same principles as those which the working

1776

class has evolved in the course of its own struggles. Autonomy

1777

is combined with federalism, so ensuring co-ordination of decisions

1778

and activities is achieved from below upwards by means of mandated

1779

and recallable delegates. Effective co-operation is achieved as

1780

it is informed by and reflects the needs on the ground. Simply

1781

put, working class organisation and discipline - as exemplified

1782

by the workers' council or strike committee - represents a

1783

completely different thing from capitalist organisation and

1784

discipline, of which Leninists are constantly asking for more

1785

(albeit draped with the Red Flag and labelled "revolutionary").

1786

And as we discuss in the

1787

<a href="secH5.html#sech58">next section</a>, the Leninist model of

1788

top-down centralised parties is marked more by its failures

1789

than its successes, suggesting that not only is the vanguard

1790

model undesirable, it is also unnecessary.

1791

1792

<a name="sech58"><h2>H.5.8 Are vanguard parties effective?</h2></a>

1793

1794

1795

In a word, no. Vanguard parties have rarely been proven to be

1796

effective organs for fermenting revolutionary change which is,

1797

let us not forget, their stated purpose. Indeed, rather than

1798

being in the vanguard of social struggle, the Leninist parties

1799

are often the last to recognise, let alone understand, the

1800

initial stirrings of important social movements and events.

1801

It is only once these movements have exploded in the streets

1802

that the self-proclaimed "vanguards" notice them and decide

1803

they require the party's leadership.

1804

1805

Part of this process are constant attempts to install their

1806

political program onto movements that they do not understand,

1807

movements that have proven to be successful using different

1808

tactics and methods of organisation. Rather than learn from

1809

the experiences of others, social movements are seen as raw

1810

material, as a source of new party members, to be used in order

1811

to advance the party rather than the autonomy and combativeness

1812

of the working class. This process was seen in the "anti-globalisation"

1813

or "anti-capitalist" movement at the end of the 20th century.

1814

This started without the help of these self-appointed vanguards, who

1815

once it appeared spent a lot of time trying to catch up with the

1816

movement while criticising its proven organisational principles

1817

and tactics.

1818

1819

The reasons for such behaviour are not too difficult to find. They

1820

lie in the organisational structure favoured by these parties and the

1821

mentality lying behind them. As anarchists have long argued, a

1822

centralised, top-down structure will simply be unresponsive to

1823

the needs of those in struggle. The inertia associated with the

1824

party hierarchy will ensure that it responds slowly to new

1825

developments and its centralised structure means that the

1826

leadership is isolated from what is happening on the ground

1827

and cannot respond appropriately. The underlying assumption of

1828

the vanguard party, namely that the party represents the interests

1829

of the working class, makes it unresponsive to new developments

1830

within the class struggle. As Lenin argued that spontaneous

1831

working class struggle tends to reformism, the leaders of a

1832

vanguard party automatically are suspicious of new developments

1833

which, by their very nature, rarely fit into previously agreed

1834

models of "proletarian" struggle. The example of Bolshevik

1835

hostility to the soviets spontaneously formed by workers during

1836

the 1905 Russian revolution is one of the best known examples of

1837

this tendency.

1838

1839

Murray Bookchin is worth quoting at length on this subject:

1840

1841

"The 'glorious party,' when there is one, almost invariably lags

1842

behind the events . . . In the beginning . . . it tends to have an

1843

inhibitory function, not a 'vanguard' role. Where it exercises

1844

influence, it tends to slow down the flow of events, not 'co-

1845

ordinate' the revolutionary forces. This is not accidental. The

1846

party is structured along hierarchical lines that reflect the very

1847

society it professes to oppose. Despite its theoretical pretensions,

1848

it is a bourgeois organism, a miniature state, with an apparatus

1849

and a cadre whose function it is to seize power, not dissolve

1850

power. Rooted in the pre-revolutionary period, it assimilates all

1851

the forms, techniques and mentality of bureaucracy. Its membership

1852

is schooled in obedience and in the preconceptions of a rigid dogma

1853

and is taught to revere the leadership. The party's leadership,

1854

in turn, is schooled in habits born of command, authority,

1855

manipulation and egomania. This situation is worsened when the

1856

party participates in parliamentary elections. In election

1857

campaigns, the vanguard party models itself completely on

1858

existing bourgeois forms and even acquires the paraphernalia

1859

of the electoral party. . .

1860

1861

"As the party expands, the distance between the leadership and

1862

the ranks inevitably increases. Its leaders not only become

1863

'personages,' they lose contact with the living situation below.

1864

The local groups, which know their own immediate situation better

1865

than any remote leaders, are obliged to subordinate their insights

1866

to directives from above. The leadership, lacking any direct

1867

knowledge of local problems, responds sluggishly and prudently.

1868

Although it stakes out a claim to the 'larger view,' to greater

1869

'theoretical competence,' the competence of the leadership tends

1870

to diminish as one ascends the hierarchy of command. The more

1871

one approaches the level where the real decisions are made, the

1872

more conservative is the nature of the decision-making process,

1873

the more bureaucratic and extraneous are the factors which come

1874

into play, the more considerations of prestige and retrenchment

1875

supplant creativity, imagination, and a disinterested dedication

1876

to revolutionary goals.

1877

1878

"The party becomes less efficient from a revolutionary point of

1879

view the more it seeks efficiency by means of hierarchy, cadres

1880

and centralisation. Although everyone marches in step, the orders

1881

are usually wrong, especially when events begin to move rapidly

1882

and take unexpected turns - as they do in all revolutions. . .

1883

1884

"On the other hand, this kind of party is extremely vulnerable

1885

in periods of repression. The bourgeoisie has only to grab its

1886

leadership to destroy virtually the entire movement. With its

1887

leaders in prison or in hiding, the party becomes paralysed;

1888

the obedient membership has no one to obey and tends to flounder.

1889

Demoralisation sets in rapidly. The party decomposes not only

1890

because of the repressive atmosphere but also because of its

1891

poverty of inner resources.

1892

1893

"The foregoing account is not a series of hypothetical inferences,

1894

it is a composite sketch of all the mass Marxian parties of the

1895

past century - the Social Democrats, the Communists and the

1896

Trotskyist party of Ceylon (the only mass party of its kind). To

1897

claim that these parties failed to take their Marxian principles

1898

seriously merely conceals another question: why did this failure

1899

happen in the first place? The fact is, these parties were

1900

co-opted into bourgeois society because they were structured

1901

along bourgeois lines. The germ of treachery existed in them

1902

from birth." [Post-Scarcity Anarchism, pp. 123-6]

1903

</blockquote>

1904

The evidence Bookchin summarises suggests that vanguard

1905

parties are less than efficient in promoting revolutionary change.

1906

Sluggish, unresponsive, undemocratic, they simply cannot

1907

adjust to the dynamic nature of social struggle, never mind

1908

revolution. This is to be expected:

1909

1910

"For the state centralisation is the appropriate form of

1911

organisation, since it aims at the greatest possible uniformity

1912

in social life for the maintenance of political and social

1913

equilibrium. But for a movement whose very existence depends

1914

on prompt action at any favourable moment and on the independent

1915

thought and action of its supporters, centralism could but be a

1916

curse by weakening its power of decision and systematically

1917

repressing all immediate action. If, for example, as was the

1918

case in Germany, every local strike had first to be approved

1919

by the Central, which was often hundreds of miles away and was

1920

not usually in a position to pass a correct judgement on the

1921

local conditions, one cannot wonder that the inertia of the

1922

apparatus of organisation renders a quick attack quite impossible,

1923

and there thus arises a state of affairs where the energetic and

1924

intellectually alert groups no longer serve as patterns for the

1925

less active, but are condemned by these to inactivity, inevitably

1926

bringing the whole movement to stagnation. Organisation is, after

1927

all, only a means to an end. When it becomes an end in itself, it

1928

kills the spirit and the vital initiative of its members and

1929

sets up that domination by mediocrity which is the characteristic

1930

of all bureaucracies." [Rudolf Rocker, Anarcho-Syndicalism,

1931

p. 61]

1932

</blockquote>

1933

As we discuss in

1934

<a href="secH5.html#sech512">section H.5.12</a>, the example of the Bolshevik

1935

party during the Russian Revolution amply proves Rocker's point.

1936

Rather than being a highly centralised, disciplined vanguard

1937

party, the Bolshevik party was marked by extensive autonomy

1938

throughout its ranks. Party discipline was regularly ignored,

1939

including by Lenin in his attempts to get the central party

1940

bureaucracy to catch up with the spontaneous revolutionary

1941

actions and ideas of the Russian working class. As Bookchin

1942

summarised, the "Bolshevik leadership was ordinarily extremely

1943

conservative, a trait that Lenin had to fight throughout 1917

1944

- first in his efforts to reorient the Central Committee

1945

against the provisional government (the famous conflict

1946

over the 'April Theses'), later in driving the Central

1947

Committee toward insurrection in October. In both cases he

1948

threatened to resign from the Central Committee and bring

1949

his views to 'the lower ranks of the party.'" Once in power,

1950

however, "the Bolsheviks tended to centralise their party to

1951

the degree that they became isolated from the working class."

1952

[Op. Cit., pp. 126 and p. 127]

1953

1954

The "vanguard" model of organising is not only inefficient

1955

and ineffective from a revolutionary perspective, it

1956

generates bureaucratic and elitist tendencies which undermine

1957

any revolution unfortunate enough to be dominated by such a

1958

party. For these extremely practical and sensible reasons

1959

anarchists reject it wholeheartedly. As we discuss in the

1960

<a href="secH5.html#sech59">next section</a>,

1961

the only thing vanguard parties

1962

are effective at is to supplant the diversity produced and

1963

required by revolutionary movements with the drab conformity

1964

produced by centralisation and to replace popular power and

1965

freedom with party power and tyranny.

1966

1967

<a name="sech59"><h2>H.5.9 What are vanguard parties effective at?</h2></a>

1968

1969

1970

As we discussed the <a href="secH5.html#sech58">last section</a>,

1971

vanguard parties are not

1972

efficient as agents of revolutionary change. So, it may be

1973

asked, what are vanguard parties effective at? If they

1974

are harmful to revolutionary struggle, what are they good

1975

at? The answer to this is simple. No anarchist would deny

1976

that vanguard parties are extremely efficient and effective

1977

at certain things, most notably reproducing hierarchy and

1978

bourgeois values into so-called "revolutionary" organisations

1979

and movements. As Murray Bookchin put it, the party "is

1980

efficient in only one respect - in moulding society in its

1981

own hierarchical image if the revolution is successful. It

1982

recreates bureaucracy, centralisation and the state. It

1983

fosters the very social conditions which justify this

1984

kind of society. Hence, instead of 'withering away,' the

1985

state controlled by the 'glorious party' preserves the very

1986

conditions which 'necessitate' the existence of a state -

1987

and a party to 'guard' it." [Post-Scarcity Anarchism,

1988

pp. 125-6]

1989

1990

By being structured along hierarchical lines that reflect

1991

the very system that it professes to oppose, the vanguard

1992

party very "effectively" reproduces that system within both

1993

the current radical social movements and any revolutionary

1994

society that may be created. This means that once in power,

1995

it shapes society in its own image. Ironically, this tendency

1996

towards conservatism and bureaucracy was noted by Trotsky:

1997

1998

"As often happens, a sharp cleavage developed between the

1999

classes in motion and the interests of the party machines.

2000

Even the Bolshevik Party cadres, who enjoyed the benefit

2001

of exceptional revolutionary training, were definitely

2002

inclined to disregard the masses and to identify their own

2003

special interests and the interests of the machine on the

2004

very day after the monarchy was overthrown. What, then,

2005

could be expected of these cadres when they became an

2006

all-powerful state bureaucracy?" [Stalin, vol. 1, p. 298]

2007

</blockquote>

2008

In such circumstances, it is unsurprising that urging party

2009

power and identifying it with working class power would have

2010

less than revolutionary results. Discussing the Bolsheviks

2011

in 1905 Trotsky points out this tendency existed from the

2012

start:

2013

2014

"The habits peculiar to a political machine were already

2015

forming in the underground. The young revolutionary

2016

bureaucrat was already emerging as a type. The conditions

2017

of conspiracy, true enough, offered rather merge scope

2018

for such formalities of democracy as electiveness,

2019

accountability and control. Yet, undoubtedly the

2020

committeemen narrowed these limitations considerably

2021

more than necessity demanded and were far more intransigent

2022

and severe with the revolutionary workingmen than with

2023

themselves, preferring to domineer even on occasions

2024

that called for lending an attentive ear to the voice

2025

of the masses." [Op. Cit., p. 101]

2026

</blockquote>

2027

He quoted Krupskaya, a party member, on these party bureaucrats,

2028

the "committeemen." Krupskaya stated that "as a rule"

2029

they "did not recognise any party democracy" and "did

2030

not want any innovations. The 'committeeman' did not desire,

2031

and did not know how to, adapt himself to rapidly changing

2032

conditions." [quoted by Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 101]

2033

This conservatism played havoc in the party during 1917,

2034

incidentally. It would be no exaggeration to argue that

2035

the Russian revolution occurred in spite of, rather than

2036

because of, Bolshevik organisational principles (see

2037

<a href="secH5.html#sech512">section H.5.12</a>).

2038

These principles, however, came into their own

2039

once the party had seized power, ensuring the consolidation

2040

of bureaucratic rule by an elite.

2041

2042

That a vanguard party helps to produces a bureaucratic regime

2043

once in power should not come as a surprise. If the party,

2044

to use Trotsky's expression, exhibits a "caste tendency of

2045

the committeemen" can we be surprised if once in power it

2046

reproduces such a tendency in the state it is now the master

2047

of? [Op. Cit., p. 102] And this "tendency" can be seen today

2048

in the multitude of Leninist sects that exist.

2049

2050

<a name="sech510"><h2>H.5.10 Why does "democratic centralism" produce "bureaucratic centralism"?</h2></a>

2051

2052

2053

In spite of the almost ritualistic assertions that vanguard

2054

parties are "the most democratic the world has seen," an

2055

army of ex-members, expelled dissidents and disgruntled

2056

members testify that they do not live up to the hype. They

2057

argue that most, if not all, "vanguard" parties are not

2058

"democratic centralist" but are, in fact, "bureaucratic

2059

centralist." Within the party, in other words, a bureaucratic

2060

clique controls it from the top-down with little democratic

2061

control, never mind participation. For anarchists, this is hardly

2062

surprising. The reasons why this continually happens are rooted in

2063

the nature of "democratic centralism" itself.

2064

2065

Firstly, the assumption of "democratic centralism" is that

2066

the membership elect a leadership and give them the power to

2067

decide policy between conferences and congresses. This has

2068

a subtle impact on the membership, as it is assumed that the

2069

leadership has a special insight into social problems above

2070

and beyond that of anyone else, otherwise they would not

2071

have been elected to such an important position. Thus many

2072

in the membership come to believe that disagreements with

2073

the leadership's analysis, even before they had been clearly

2074

articulated, are liable to be wrong. Doubt dares not speak

2075

its name. Unquestioning belief in the party leadership has

2076

been an all to common recurring theme in many accounts of

2077

vanguard parties. The hierarchical structure of the party

2078

promotes a hierarchical mentality in its members.

2079

2080

Conformity within such parties is also reinforced by the

2081

intense activism expected by members, particularly leading

2082

activists and full-time members. Paradoxically, the more

2083

deeply people participate in activism, the harder it becomes

2084

to reflect on what they are doing. The unrelenting pace

2085

often induces exhaustion and depression, while making it

2086

harder to "think your way out" - too many commitments have

2087

been made and too little time is left over from party activity

2088

for reflection. Moreover, high levels of activism prevent

2089

many, particularly the most committed, from having a personal

2090

life outside their role as party members. This high-speed

2091

political existence means that rival social networks

2092

atrophy through neglect, so ensuring that the party line

2093

is the only perspective which members get exposed to. Members

2094

tend to leave, typically, because of exhaustion, crisis, even

2095

despair rather than as the result of rational reflection

2096

and conscious decision.

2097

2098

Secondly, given that vanguard parties are based on the belief

2099

that they are the guardians of "scientific socialism," this

2100

means that there is a tendency to squeeze all of social life

2101

into the confines of the party's ideology. Moreover, as the

2102

party's ideology is a "science" it is expected to explain

2103

everything (hence the tendency of Leninists to expound on

2104

every subject imaginable, regardless of whether the author

2105

knows enough about the subject to discuss it in an informed

2106

way). The view that the party's ideology explains everything

2107

eliminates the need for fresh or independent thought, precludes

2108

the possibility of critically appraising past practice or

2109

acknowledging mistakes, and removes the need to seek meaningful

2110

intellectual input outside the party's own ideological fortress.

2111

As Victor Serge, anarchist turned Bolshevik, admitted in his

2112

memoirs: "Bolshevik thinking is grounded in the possession of

2113

the truth. The Party is the repository of truth, and any

2114

form of thinking which differs from it is a dangerous or

2115

reactionary error. Here lies the spiritual source of its

2116

intolerance. The absolute conviction of its lofty mission

2117

assures it of a moral energy quite astonishing in its

2118

intensity - and, at the same time, a clerical mentality

2119

which is quick to become Inquisitorial." [Memoirs of

2120

a Revolutionary, p. 134]

2121

2122

The intense level of activism means that members are bombarded

2123

with party propaganda, are in endless party meetings, or

2124

spend time reading party literature and so, by virtue of the

2125

fact that there is not enough time to read anything, members

2126

end up reading nothing but party publications. Most points of

2127

contact with the external world are eliminated or drastically

2128

curtailed. Indeed, such alternative sources of information

2129

and such thinking is regularly dismissed as being contaminated

2130

by bourgeois influences. This often goes so far as to label

2131

those who question any aspect of the party's analysis

2132

revisionists or deviationists, bending to the "pressures

2133

of capitalism," and are usually driven from the ranks as

2134

heretics. All this is almost always combined with contempt

2135

for all other organisations on the Left (indeed, the closer

2136

they are to the party's own ideological position the more

2137

likely they are to be the targets of abuse).

2138

2139

Thirdly, the practice of "democratic centralism" also aids this

2140

process towards conformity. Based on the idea that the party must

2141

be a highly disciplined fighting force, the party is endowed with

2142

a powerful central committee and a rule that all members must

2143

publicly defend the agreed-upon positions of the party and the

2144

decisions of the central committee, whatever opinions they might

2145

hold to the contrary in private. Between conferences, the party's

2146

leading bodies usually have extensive authority to govern the

2147

party's affairs, including updating party doctrine and deciding

2148

the party's response to current political events.

2149

2150

As unity is the key, there is a tendency to view any opposition

2151

as a potential threat. It is not at all clear when "full freedom

2152

to criticise" policy internally can be said to disturb the unity

2153

of a defined action. The norms of democratic centralism confer

2154

all power between conferences onto a central committee, allowing

2155

it to become the arbiter of when a dissident viewpoint is in

2156

danger of weakening unity. The evidence from numerous vanguard

2157

parties suggest that their leaderships usually view any

2158

dissent as precisely such a disruption and demand that dissidents

2159

cease their action or face expulsion from the party.

2160

2161

It should also be borne in mind that Leninist parties also view

2162

themselves as vitally important to the success of any future

2163

revolution. This cannot help but reinforce the tendency to view

2164

dissent as something which automatically imperils the future of

2165

the planet and, therefore, something which must be combated at all

2166

costs. As Lenin stressed an a polemic directed to the international

2167

communist movement in 1920, "[w]hoever brings about even the

2168

slightest weakening of the iron discipline of the party of the

2169

proletariat (especially during its dictatorship) is actually

2170

aiding the bourgeoisie against the proletariat." [Collected

2171

Works, vol. 31, p. 45] As can be seen, Lenin stresses the

2172

importance of "iron discipline" at all times, not only during

2173

the revolution when "the party" is applying "its dictatorship"

2174

(see <a href="secH3.html#sech38">section H.3.8</a>

2175

for more on this aspect of Leninism). This

2176

provides a justification of whatever measures are required to

2177

restore the illusion of unanimity, including the trampling

2178

underfoot of whatever rights the membership may have on paper

2179

and the imposition of any decisions the leadership considers

2180

as essential between conferences.

2181

2182

Fourthly, and more subtly, it is well known that when people take

2183

a public position in defence of a proposition, there is a

2184

strong tendency for their private attitudes to shift so that

2185

they harmonise with their public behaviour. It is difficult to

2186

say one thing in public and hold to a set of private beliefs at

2187

variance with what is publicly expressed. In short, if people

2188

tell others that they support X (for whatever reason), they will

2189

slowly begin to change their own opinions and, indeed, internally

2190

come to support X. The more public such declarations have been,

2191

the more likely it is that such a shift will take place. This has

2192

been confirmed by empirical research (see R. Cialdini's Influence:

2193

Science and Practice). This suggests that if, in the name of

2194

democratic centralism, party members publicly uphold the party line,

2195

it becomes increasingly difficult to hold a private belief at

2196

variance with publicly expressed opinions. The evidence suggests

2197

that it is not possible to have a group of people presenting a

2198

conformist image to society at large while maintaining an

2199

inner party regime characterised by frank and full discussion.

2200

Conformity in public tends to produce conformity in private. So

2201

given what is now known of social influence, "democratic

2202

centralism" is almost certainly destined to prevent genuine

2203

internal discussion. This is sadly all too often confirmed

2204

in the internal regimes of vanguard parties, where debate is

2205

often narrowly focused on a few minor issues of emphasis

2206

rather than fundamental issues of policy and theory.

2207

2208

It has already been noted (in

2209

<a href="secH5.html#sech55">section H.5.5</a>) that the

2210

organisational norms of democratic centralism imply a

2211

concentration of power at the top. There is abundant

2212

evidence that such a concentration has been a vital feature

2213

of every vanguard party and that such a concentration limits

2214

party democracy. An authoritarian inner party regime is

2215

maintained, which ensures that decision making is

2216

concentrated in elite hands. This regime gradually dismantles

2217

or ignores all formal controls on its activities. Members are

2218

excluded from participation in determining policy, calling

2219

leaders to account, or expressing dissent. This is usually

2220

combined with persistent assurances about the essentially

2221

democratic nature of the organisation, and the existence of

2222

exemplary democratic controls - on paper. Correlated with this

2223

inner authoritarianism is a growing tendency toward the abuse

2224

of power by the leaders, who act in arbitrary ways, accrue

2225

personal power and so on (as noted by Trotsky with regards

2226

to the Bolshevik party machine). Indeed, it is often the case

2227

that activities that would provoke outrage if engaged in by

2228

rank-and-file members are tolerated when their leaders do it.

2229

As one group of Scottish libertarians noted:

2230

2231

"Further, in so far as our Bolshevik friends reject and defy

2232

capitalist and orthodox labourist conceptions, they also

2233

are as much 'individualistic' as the anarchist. Is it not

2234

boasted, for example, that on many occasions Marx, Lenin

2235

and Trotsky were prepared to be in a minority of one - if

2236

they thought they were more correct than all others on the

2237

question at issue? In this, like Galileo, they were quite

2238

in order. Where they and their followers, obsessed by the

2239

importance of their own judgement go wrong, is in their

2240

tendency to refuse this inalienable right to other

2241

protagonists and fighters for the working class." [APCF,

2242

"Our Reply," Class War on the Home Front, p. 70]

2243

</blockquote>

2244

As in any hierarchical structure, the tendency is for those in

2245

power to encourage and promote those who agree with them.

2246

This means that members usually find their influence and position

2247

in the party dependent on their willingness to conform to the

2248

hierarchy and its leadership. Dissenters will rarely find their

2249

contribution valued and advancement is limited, which produces

2250

a strong tendency not to make waves. As Miasnikov, a working

2251

class Bolshevik dissident, argued in 1921, "the regime within

2252

the party" meant that "if someone dares to have the courage of

2253

his convictions," they are called either a self-seeker or, worse,

2254

a counter-revolutionary, a Menshevik or an SR. Moreover, within

2255

the party, favouritism and corruption were rife. In Miasnikov's

2256

eyes a new type of Communist was emerging, the toadying careerist

2257

who "knows how to please his superiors." [quoted by Paul

2258

Avrich, Bolshevik Opposition to Lenin, p. 8 and p. 7] At

2259

the last party congress Lenin attended, Miasnikov was expelled.

2260

Only one delegate, V. V. Kosior, "argued that Lenin had taken

2261

the wrong approach to the question of dissent. If someone . . . had

2262

the courage to point out deficiencies in party work, he was marked

2263

down as an oppositionist, relieved of authority, placed under

2264

surveillance, and - a reference to Miasnikov - even expelled

2265

from the party." [Paul Avrich, Op. Cit., p. 15] Serge

2266

noted about the same period that Lenin "proclaimed a purge of

2267

the Party, aimed at those revolutionaries who had come in from other

2268

parties - i.e. those who were not saturated with the Bolshevik

2269

mentality. This meant the establishment within the Party of a

2270

dictatorship of the old Bolsheviks, and the direction of

2271

disciplinary measures, not against the unprincipled careerists

2272

and conformist late-comers, but against those sections with a

2273

critical outlook." [Op. Cit., p. 135]

2274

2275

This, of course, also applies to the party congress, on paper

2276

the sovereign body of the organisation. All too often

2277

resolutions at party conferences will either come from the

2278

leadership or be completely supportive of its position. If

2279

branches or members submit resolutions which are critical of

2280

the leadership, enormous pressure is exerted to ensure that

2281

they are withdrawn. Moreover, often delegates to the congress

2282

are not mandated by their branches, so ensuring that rank and

2283

file opinions are not raised, never mind discussed. Other,

2284

more drastic measures have been known to occur. Victor Serge

2285

saw what he termed the "Party steamroller" at work in early

2286

1921 when "the voting [was] rigged for Lenin's and Zinoviev's

2287

'majority'" in one of the districts of Petrograd. [Op. Cit.,

2288

p.123]

2289

2290

All to often, such parties have "elected" bodies which have,

2291

in practice, usurped the normal democratic rights of members

2292

and become increasingly removed from formal controls. All

2293

practical accountability of the leaders to the membership

2294

for their actions is eliminated. Usually this authoritarian

2295

structure is combined with militaristic sounding rhetoric and

2296

the argument that the "revolutionary" movement needs to be

2297

organised in a more centralised way than the current class

2298

system, with references to the state's forces of repression

2299

(notably the army). As Murray Bookchin argued, the Leninist

2300

"has always had a grudging admiration and respect for that

2301

most inhuman of all hierarchical institutions, the military."

2302

[Toward an Ecological Society, p. 254f]

2303

2304

The modern day effectiveness of the vanguard party can be

2305

seen by the strange fact that many Leninists fail to join

2306

any of the existing parties due to their bureaucratic

2307

internal organisation and that many members are expelled

2308

(or leave in disgust) as a result of their failed attempts to

2309

make them more democratic. If vanguard parties are such positive

2310

organisations to be a member of, why do they have such big

2311

problems with member retention? Why are there so many vocal

2312

ex-members? Why are so many Leninists ex-members of vanguard

2313

parties, desperately trying to find an actual party which

2314

matches their own vision of democratic centralism rather

2315

than the bureaucratic centralism which seems the norm?

2316

2317

Our account of the workings of vanguard parties explains, in

2318

part, why many anarchists and other libertarians voice concern

2319

about them and their underlying ideology. We do so because

2320

their practices are disruptive and alienate new activists,

2321

hindering the very goal (socialism/revolution) they claim

2322

to be aiming for. As anyone familiar with the numerous groupings

2323

and parties in the Leninist left will attest, the anarchist

2324

critique of vanguardism seems to be confirmed in reality while

2325

the Leninist defence seems sadly lacking (unless, of course,

2326

the person is a member of such a party and then their

2327

organisation is the exception to the rule!).

2328

2329

<a name="sech511"><h2>H.5.11 Can you provide an example of the negative nature of vanguard parties?</h2></a>

2330

2331

2332

Yes. Our theoretical critique of vanguardism we have presented

2333

in the last few sections is more than proved by the empirical

2334

evidence of such parties in operation today. Rarely do

2335

"vanguard" parties reach in practice the high hopes their

2336

supporters like to claim for them. Such parties are usually

2337

small, prone to splitting as well as leadership cults, and

2338

usually play a negative role in social struggle. A long line

2339

of ex-members complain that such parties are elitist,

2340

hierarchical and bureaucratic.

2341

2342

Obviously we cannot hope to discuss all such parties. As such,

2343

we will take just one example, namely the arguments of one

2344

group of dissidents of the biggest British Leninist party,

2345

the Socialist Workers Party. It is worth quoting their

2346

account of the internal workings of the SWP at length:

2347

2348

"The SWP is not democratic centralist but bureaucratic

2349

centralist. The leadership's control of the party is

2350

unchecked by the members. New perspectives are initiated

2351

exclusively by the central committee (CC), who then

2352

implement their perspective against all party opposition,

2353

implicit or explicit, legitimate or otherwise.

2354

2355

"Once a new perspective is declared, a new cadre is selected

2356

from the top down. The CC select the organisers, who select the

2357

district and branch committees - any elections that take place

2358

are carried out on the basis of 'slates' so that it is virtually

2359

impossible for members to vote against the slate proposed by the

2360

leadership. Any members who have doubts or disagreements are

2361

written off as 'burnt out' and, depending on their reaction to

2362

this, may be marginalised within the party and even expelled.

2363

2364

"These methods have been disastrous for the SWP in a number of

2365

ways: Each new perspective requires a new cadre (below the

2366

level of the CC), so the existing cadre are actively

2367

marginalised in the party. In this way, the SWP has failed

2368

to build a stable and experienced cadre capable of acting

2369

independently of the leadership. Successive layers of cadres

2370

have been driven into passivity, and even out of the

2371

revolutionary movement altogether. The result is the loss

2372

of hundreds of potential cadres. Instead of appraising the

2373

real, uneven development of individual cadres, the history

2374

of the party is written in terms of a star system (comrades

2375

currently favoured by the party) and a demonology (the

2376

'renegades' who are brushed aside with each turn of the

2377

party). As a result of this systematic dissolution of the

2378

cadre, the CC grows ever more remote from the membership

2379

and increasingly bureaucratic in its methods. In recent

2380

years the national committee has been abolished (it obediently

2381

voted for its own dissolution, on the recommendation of the

2382

CC), to be replaced by party councils made up of those

2383

comrades active at any one time (i.e. those who already

2384

agree with current perspectives); district committees are

2385

appointed rather than elected; the CC monopolise all

2386

information concerning the party, so that it is impossible

2387

for members to know much about what happens in the party

2388

outside their own branch; the CC give a distorted account

2389

of events rather than admit their mistakes . . . history

2390

is rewritten to reinforce the prestige of the CC . . . The

2391

outcome is a party whose conferences have no democratic

2392

function, but serve only to orientate party activists to carry

2393

out perspectives drawn up before the delegates even set out

2394

from their branches. At every level of the party, strategy and

2395

tactics are presented from the top down, as pre-digested

2396

instructions for action. At every level, the comrades 'below'

2397

are seen only as a passive mass to be shifted into action,

2398

rather than as a source of new initiatives . . .

2399

2400

"The only exception is when a branch thinks up a new tactic

2401

to carry out the CC's perspective. In this case, the CC may

2402

take up this tactic and apply it across the party. In no way

2403

do rank and file members play an active role in determining

2404

the strategy and theory of the party - except in the negative

2405

sense that if they refuse to implement a perspective eventually

2406

even the CC notice, and will modify the line to suit. A political

2407

culture has been created in which the leadership outside of the

2408

CC consists almost solely of comrades loyal to the CC, willing

2409

to follow every turn of the perspective without criticism . . .

2410

Increasingly, the bureaucratic methods used by the CC to enforce

2411

their control over the political direction of the party have

2412

been extended to other areas of party life. In debates over

2413

questions of philosophy, culture and even anthropology an

2414

informal party 'line' emerged (i.e. concerning matters in

2415

which there can be no question of the party taking a 'line').

2416

Often behind these positions lay nothing more substantial

2417

than the opinions of this or that CC member, but adherence

2418

to the line quickly became a badge of party loyalty,

2419

disagreement became a stigma, and the effect was to close

2420

down the democracy of the party yet further by placing

2421

even questions of theory beyond debate. Many militants,

2422

especially working class militants with some experience

2423

of trade union democracy, etc., are often repelled by the

2424

undemocratic norms in the party and refuse to join, or

2425

keep their distance despite accepting our formal politics."

2426

[ISG, Discussion Document of Ex-SWP Comrades]

2427

</blockquote>

2428

The dissidents argue that a "democratic" party would involve

2429

the "[r]egular election of all party full-timers, branch and

2430

district leadership, conference delegates, etc. with the right of

2431

recall," which means that in the SWP appointment of full-timers,

2432

leaders and so on is the norm. They argue for the "right of

2433

branches to propose motions to the party conference" and for

2434

the "right for members to communicate horizontally in the party,

2435

to produce and distribute their own documents." They stress

2436

the need for "an independent Control Commission to review all

2437

disciplinary cases (independent of the leadership bodies that

2438

exercise discipline), and the right of any disciplined comrades

2439

to appeal directly to party conference." They argue that in

2440

a democratic party "no section of the party would have a

2441

monopoly of information" which indicates that the SWP's

2442

leadership is essentially secretive, withholding information from

2443

the party membership. Even more significantly, given our discussion

2444

on the influence of the party structure on post-revolutionary society in

2445

<a href="secH5.html#sech57">section H.5.7</a>,

2446

they argue that "[w]orst of all, the SWP are training a

2447

layer of revolutionaries to believe that the organisational norms

2448

of the SWP are a shining example of proletarian democracy, applicable

2449

to a future socialist society. Not surprisingly, many people are

2450

instinctively repelled by this idea."

2451

2452

Some of these critics of specific Leninist parties do not give up

2453

hope and still look for a truly democratic centralist party rather

2454

than the bureaucratic centralist ones which seem so common. For

2455

example, our group of ex-SWP dissidents argue that "[a]nybody

2456

who has spent time involved in 'Leninist' organisations will have

2457

come across workers who agree with Marxist politics but refuse to

2458

join the party because they believe it to be undemocratic and

2459

authoritarian. Many draw the conclusion that Leninism itself is

2460

at fault, as every organisation that proclaims itself Leninist

2461

appears to follow the same pattern." [ISG, Lenin vs. the

2462

SWP: Bureaucratic Centralism Or Democratic Centralism?] This

2463

is a common refrain with Leninists - when reality says

2464

one thing and the theory another, it must be reality that

2465

is at fault. Yes, every Leninist organisation may be

2466

bureaucratic and authoritarian but it is not the theory's

2467

fault that those who apply it are not capable of actually

2468

doing so successfully. Such an application of scientific

2469

principles by the followers of "scientific socialism" is

2470

worthy of note - obviously the usual scientific method

2471

of generalising from facts to produce a theory is

2472

inapplicable when evaluating "scientific socialism" itself.

2473

However, rather than ponder the possibility that "democratic

2474

centralism" does not actually work and automatically generates

2475

the "bureaucratic centralism," they point to the example of the

2476

Russian revolution and the original Bolshevik party as proof

2477

of the validity of their hopes.

2478

2479

Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to argue that the only reason

2480

people take the vanguard party organisational structure seriously

2481

is the apparent success of the Bolsheviks in the Russian revolution.

2482

However, as noted above, even the Bolshevik party was subject

2483

to bureaucratic tendencies and as we discuss in the

2484

<a href="secH5.html#secH512">next section</a>,

2485

the experience of the 1917 Russian Revolutions disprove the

2486

effectiveness of "vanguard" style parties. The Bolshevik party

2487

of 1917 was a totally different form of organisation than the

2488

ideal "democratic centralist" type argued for by Lenin in 1902

2489

and 1920. As a model of revolutionary organisation, the

2490

"vanguardist" one has been proven false rather than confirmed

2491

by the experience of the Russian revolution. Insofar as the

2492

Bolshevik party was effective, it operated in a non-vanguardist

2493

way and insofar as it did operate in such a manner, it held back

2494

the struggle.

2495

2496

<a name="sech512"><h2>H.5.12 Surely the Russian Revolution proves

2497

that vanguard parties work?</h2></a>

2498

2499

2500

No, far from it. Looking at the history of vanguardism we

2501

are struck by its failures, not its successes. Indeed, the

2502

proponents of "democratic centralism" can point to only one

2503

apparent success of their model, namely the Russian Revolution.

2504

Strangely, though, we are warned by Leninists that failure to use

2505

the vanguard party will inevitably condemn future revolutions to

2506

failure:

2507

2508

"The proletariat can take power only through its vanguard. . .

2509

Without the confidence of the class in the vanguard, without

2510

support of the vanguard by the class, there can be no talk

2511

of the conquest of power . . . The Soviets are the only

2512

organised form of the tie between the vanguard and the

2513

class. A revolutionary content can be given to this form

2514

only by the party. This is proved by the positive

2515

experience of the October Revolution and by the negative

2516

experience of other countries (Germany, Austria, finally,

2517

Spain). No one has either shown in practice or tried to

2518

explain articulately on paper how the proletariat can

2519

seize power without the political leadership of a party

2520

that knows what it wants." [Trotsky, Writings

2521

1936-37, p. 490]

2522

</blockquote>

2523

To anarchist ears, such claims seem out of place. After all,

2524

did the Russian Revolution actually result in socialism or

2525

even a viable form of soviet democracy? Far from it. Unless

2526

you picture revolution as simply the changing of the party

2527

in power, you have to acknowledge that while the Bolshevik

2528

party did take power in Russian in November 1917, the net

2529

effect of this was not the stated goals that justified

2530

that action. Thus, if we take the term "effective" to mean

2531

"an efficient means to achieve the desired goals" then

2532

vanguardism has not been proven to be effective, quite

2533

the reverse (assuming that your desired goal is a socialist

2534

society, rather than party power). Needless to say, Trotsky

2535

blames the failure of the Russian Revolution on "objective"

2536

factors rather than Bolshevik policies and practice, an

2537

argument we address in <a href="secH6.html">section H.6</a> and will not

2538

do so here.

2539

2540

So while Leninists make great claims for the effectiveness of

2541

their chosen kind of party, the hard facts of history are

2542

against their positive evaluation of vanguard parties.

2543

Ironically, even the Russian Revolution disproves the claims

2544

of Leninists. The fact is that the Bolshevik party in 1917

2545

was very far from the "democratic centralist" organisation

2546

which supporters of vanguardism like to claim it is. As

2547

such, its success in 1917 lies more in its divergence from

2548

the principles of "democratic centralism" than in their

2549

application. The subsequent degeneration of the revolution

2550

and the party is marked by the increasing application

2551

of those principles in the life of the party.

2552

2553

Thus, to refute the claims of the "effectiveness" and

2554

"efficiency" of vanguardism, we need to look at its one

2555

and only success, namely the Russian Revolution. As the Cohen-Bendit

2556

brothers argued, "far from leading the Russian Revolution forwards,

2557

the Bolsheviks were responsible for holding back the struggle of the

2558

masses between February and October 1917, and later for turning the

2559

revolution into a bureaucratic counter-revolution - in both cases

2560

because of the party's very nature, structure and ideology." Indeed,

2561

"[f]rom April to October, Lenin had to fight a constant battle

2562

to keep the Party leadership in tune with the masses." [Obsolete

2563

Communism, p. 183 and p. 187] It was only by continually violating

2564

its own "nature, structure and ideology" that the Bolshevik

2565

party

2566

played an important role in the revolution. Whenever the principles

2567

of "democratic centralism" were applied, the Bolshevik party

2568

played

2569

the role the Cohen-Bendit brothers subscribed to it (and once in

2570

power, the party's negative features came to the fore).

2571

2572

Even Leninists acknowledge that, to quote Tony Cliff, throughout

2573

the history of Bolshevism, "a certain conservatism arose."

2574

Indeed,

2575

"[a]t practically all sharp turning points, Lenin had to rely on

2576

the lower strata of the party machine against the higher, or on

2577

the rank and file against the machine as a whole." [Lenin,

2578

vol. 2, p. 135] This fact, incidentally, refutes the basic

2579

assumptions of Lenin's party schema, namely that the broad party

2580

membership, like the working class, was subject to bourgeois

2581

influences so necessitating central leadership and control from

2582

above.

2583

2584

Looking at both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, we are struck

2585

by how often this "conservatism" arose and how often the higher

2586

bodies lagged behind the spontaneous actions of the masses and

2587

the party membership. Looking at the 1905 revolution, we discover

2588

a classic example of the inefficiency of "democratic centralism."

2589

Facing the rise of the soviets, councils of workers'

2590

delegates elected to co-ordinate strikes and other forms of

2591

struggle, the Bolsheviks did not know what to do. "The

2592

Petersburg Committee of the Bolsheviks," noted Trotsky, "was

2593

frightened at first by such an innovation as a non-partisan

2594

representation of the embattled masses, and could find nothing

2595

better to do than to present the Soviet with an ultimatum:

2596

immediately adopt a Social-Democratic program or disband. The

2597

Petersburg Soviet as a whole, including the contingent of

2598

Bolshevik workingmen as well ignored this ultimatum without

2599

batting an eyelash." [Stalin, vol. 1, p. 106] More than

2600

that, "[t]he party's Central Committee published the resolution

2601

on October 27, thereby making it the binding directive for all

2602

other Bolshevik organisations." [Oskar Anweiler, The

2603

Soviets,

2604

p. 77] It was only the return of Lenin which stopped the

2605

Bolshevik's open attacks against the Soviet. As we discuss

2606

in <a href="secH6.html#sech62">section H.6.2</a>, the rationale

2607

for these attacks is significant as they were based on arguing

2608

that the soviets could not reflect workers' interests because

2609

they were elected by the workers! The implications of this

2610

perspective came clear in 1918, when the Bolsheviks gerrymandered

2611

and disbanded soviets to remain in power (see

2612

<a href="secH6.html#sech61">section H.6.1</a>). That the Bolshevik's

2613

position flowed naturally from Lenin's arguments in What is to be

2614

Done? is clear. Thus the underlying logic of Lenin's

2615

vanguardism ensured that the Bolsheviks played a negative

2616

role with regards the soviets which, combined with "democratic

2617

centralism" ensured that it was spread far and wide. Only by

2618

ignoring their own party's principles and staying in the

2619

Soviet did rank and file Bolsheviks play a positive role in

2620

the revolution. This divergence of top and bottom would be

2621

repeated in 1917.

2622

2623

Given this, perhaps it is unsurprising that Leninists started

2624

to rewrite the history of the 1905 revolution. Victor Serge, an

2625

anti-Stalinist Leninist, asserted in the late 1920s that in

2626

1905 the Petrograd Soviet was "led by Trotsky and inspired

2627

by the Bolsheviks." [Year One of the Russian Revolution,

2628

p. 36]. While the former claim is partially correct, the latter

2629

is not. As noted, the Bolsheviks were initially opposed the

2630

soviets and systematically worked to undermine them.

2631

Unsurprisingly, Trotsky at that time was a Menshevik, not

2632

a Bolshevik. After all, how could the most revolutionary

2633

party that ever existed have messed up so badly? How could

2634

democratic centralism faired so badly in practice? Best,

2635

then, to suggest that it did not and give the Bolsheviks

2636

a role better suited to the rhetoric of Bolshevism than

2637

its reality.

2638

2639

Trotsky was no different. He, needless to say, denied the obvious implications

2640

of these events in 1905. While admitting that the Bolsheviks "adjusted

2641

themselves more slowly to the sweep of the movement" and that the Mensheviks

2642

"were preponderant in the Soviet," he tries to save vanguardism

2643

by asserting that "the general direction of the Soviet's

2644

policy proceeded in the main along Bolshevik lines." So, in

2645

spite of the lack of Bolshevik influence, in spite of the

2646

slowness in adjusting to the revolution, Bolshevism was, in

2647

fact, the leading set of ideas in the revolution! Ironically,

2648

a few pages later, he mocks the claims of Stalinists that Stalin

2649

had "isolated the Mensheviks from the masses" by noting that

2650

the "figures hardly bear [the claims] out." [Op. Cit., p.

2651

112

2652

and p. 117] Shame he did not apply this criteria to his own assertions.

2653

2654

Of course, every party makes mistakes. The question is,

2655

how did the "most revolutionary party of all time" fare

2656

in 1917. Surely that revolution proves the validity of

2657

vanguardism and "democratic centralism"? After all, there

2658

was a successful revolution, the Bolshevik party did seize

2659

power. However, the apparent success of 1917 was not due

2660

to the application of "democratic centralism," quite the

2661

reverse. While the myth of 1917 is that a highly efficient,

2662

democratic centralist vanguard party ensured the overthrow

2663

of the Provisional Government in November 1917 in favour

2664

of the Soviets (or so it seemed at the time) the facts are

2665

somewhat different. Rather, the Bolshevik party throughout

2666

1917 was a fairly loose collection of local organisations

2667

(each more than willing to ignore central commands and

2668

express their autonomy), with much internal dissent and

2669

infighting and no discipline beyond what was created by

2670

common loyalty. The "democratic centralist" party, as

2671

desired by Lenin, was only created in the course of the

2672

Civil War and the tightening of the party dictatorship.

2673

In other words, the party became more like a "democratic

2674

centralist" one as the revolution degenerated. As such,

2675

the various followers of Lenin (Stalinists, Trotskyists

2676

and their multitude of offshoots) subscribe to a myth,

2677

which probably explains their lack of success in

2678

reproducing a similar organisation since. So assuming

2679

that the Bolsheviks did play an important role in the

2680

Russian revolution, it was because it was not the

2681

centralised, disciplined Bolshevik party of Leninist

2682

myth. Indeed, when the party did operate in a vanguardist

2683

manner, failure was soon to follow.

2684

2685

This claim can be proven by looking at the history of the 1917

2686

revolution. The February revolution started with a spontaneous

2687

protests and strikes yet "the Petrograd organisation of the

2688

Bolsheviks opposed the calling of strikes precisely on the eve

2689

of the revolution which was destined to overthrow the Tsar.

2690

Fortunately, the workers ignored the Bolshevik 'directives'

2691

and went on strike anyway. In the events which followed, no one

2692

was more surprised by the revolution than the 'revolutionary'

2693

parties, including the Bolsheviks." [Murray Bookchin,

2694

Post-Scarcity Anarchism, p. 123] Trotsky quoted one

2695

of the Bolshevik leaders at the time:

2696

2697

"Absolutely no guiding initiative from the party centres

2698

was felt . . . the Petrograd Committee had been arrested

2699

and the representative of the Central Committee . . . was

2700

unable to give any directives for the coming day." [quoted

2701

by Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, vol. 1,

2702

p. 147]

2703

</blockquote>

2704

Not the best of starts. Of course rank and file Bolsheviks

2705

took part in the demonstrations, street fights and strikes

2706

and so violated the principles their party was meant

2707

to be based on. As the revolution progressed, so did the

2708

dual nature of the Bolshevik party (i.e. its practical

2709

divergence from "democratic centralism" in order to be

2710

effective and attempts to force it back into that schema

2711

which handicapped the revolution). However, during 1917,

2712

"democratic centralism" was ignored in order to ensure

2713

the Bolsheviks played any role at all in the revolution.

2714

As one historian of the party makes clear, in 1917 and

2715

until the outbreak of the Civil War, the party operated

2716

in ways that few modern "vanguard" parties would tolerate:

2717

2718

"The committees were a law unto themselves when it came to

2719

accepting orders from above. Democratic centralism, as

2720

vague a principle of internal administration as there ever

2721

has been, was commonly held at least to enjoin lower

2722

executive bodies that they should obey the behests of all

2723

higher bodies in the organisational hierarchy. But town

2724

committees in practice had the devil's own job in imposing

2725

firm leadership . . . Insubordination was the rule of the

2726

day whenever lower party bodies thought questions of

2727

importance were at stake.

2728

2729

"Suburb committees too faced difficulties in imposing

2730

discipline. Many a party cell saw fit to thumb its nose

2731

at higher authority and to pursue policies which it

2732

felt to be more suited to local circumstances or more

2733

desirable in general. No great secret was made of this.

2734

In fact, it was openly admitted that hardly a party

2735

committee existed which did not encounter problems

2736

in enforcing its will even upon individual activists."

2737

[Robert Service, The Bolshevik Party in Revolution

2738

1917-1923, pp. 51-2]

2739

</blockquote>

2740

So while Lenin's ideal model of a disciplined, centralised

2741

and top-down party had been expounded since 1902, the

2742

operation of the party never matched his desire. As Service

2743

notes, "a disciplined hierarchy of command stretching down

2744

from the regional committees to party cells" had "never

2745

existed in Bolshevik history." In the heady days of the

2746

revolution, when the party was flooded by new members, Bolshevik

2747

party life was the exact opposite of that usually considered

2748

(by both opponents and supporters of Bolshevism) as it

2749

normal mode of operation. "Anarchist attitudes to higher

2750

authority," he argues, "were the rule of the day" and

2751

"no Bolshevik leader in his right mind could have

2752

contemplated a regular insistence upon rigid standards of

2753

hierarchical control and discipline unless he had abandoned

2754

all hope of establishing a mass socialist party." This

2755

meant that "in the Russia of 1917 it was the easiest thing

2756

in the world for lower party bodies to rebut the demands and

2757

pleas by higher authority." He stresses that "[s]uburb and

2758

town committees . . . often refused to go along with official

2759

policies . . . they also . . . sometimes took it into their

2760

heads to engage in active obstruction." [Op. Cit., p. 80,

2761

p. 62 p. 56 and p. 60]

2762

2763

This worked both ways, of course. Town committees did "snub

2764

their nose at lower-echelon viewpoints in the time before the

2765

next election. Try as hard as they might, suburb committees

2766

and ordinary cells could meanwhile do little to rectify

2767

matters beyond telling their own representative on their

2768

town committee to speak on their behalf. Or, if this too

2769

failed, they could resort to disruptive tactics by

2770

criticising it in public and refusing it all collaboration."

2771

[Op. Cit., pp. 52-3] Even by early 1918, the Bolshevik

2772

party bore little resemblance to the "democratic centralist"

2773

model desires by Lenin:

2774

2775

"The image of a disciplined hierarchy of party committees was

2776

therefore but a thin, artificial veneer which was used by

2777

Bolshevik leaders to cover up the cracked surface of the

2778

real picture underneath. Cells and suburb committees saw

2779

no reason to kow-tow to town committees; nor did town

2780

committees feel under compulsion to show any greater respect

2781

to their provincial and regional committees than before."

2782

[Op. Cit., p. 74]

2783

</blockquote>

2784

It is this insubordination, this local autonomy and action

2785

in spite of central orders which explains the success of

2786

the Bolsheviks in 1917. Rather than a highly centralised

2787

and disciplined body of "professional" revolutionaries,

2788

the party saw a "significant change . . . within

2789

the membership of the party at local level . . . From the

2790

time of the February revolution requirements for party

2791

membership had been all but suspended, and now Bolshevik

2792

ranks swelled with impetuous recruits who knew next to

2793

nothing about Marxism and who were united by little more

2794

than overwhelming impatience for revolutionary action."

2795

[Alexander Rabinowitch, Prelude to Revolution, p. 41]

2796

2797

This mass of new members (many of whom were peasants who

2798

had just recently joined the industrial workforce) had a

2799

radicalising effect on the party's policies and structures.

2800

As even Leninist commentators argue, it was this influx of

2801

members who allowed Lenin to gain support for his radical

2802

revision of party aims in April. However, in spite of this

2803

radicalisation of the party base, the party machine still

2804

was at odds with the desires of the party. As Trotsky

2805

acknowledged, the situation "called for resolute

2806

confrontation of the sluggish Party machine with

2807

masses and ideas in motion." He stressed that "the

2808

masses were incomparably more revolutionary than the

2809

Party, which in turn was more revolutionary than its

2810

committeemen." Ironically, given the role Trotsky usually

2811

gave the party, he admits that "[w]ithout Lenin, no one

2812

had known what to make of the unprecedented situation."

2813

[Stalin, vol. 1, p. 301, p. 305 and p. 297]

2814

2815

Which is significant in itself. The Bolshevik party is

2816

usually claimed as being the most "revolutionary" that

2817

ever existed, yet here is Trotsky admitting that its

2818

leading members did not have a clue what to do. He even

2819

argued that "[e]very time the Bolshevik leaders had to

2820

act without Lenin they fell into error, usually inclining

2821

to the Right." [Op. Cit., p. 299] This negative opinion

2822

of the Bolsheviks applied even to the "left Bolsheviks,

2823

especially the workers" whom we are informed "tried with

2824

all their force to break through this quarantine" created

2825

by the Bolshevik leaders policy "of waiting, of accommodation,

2826

and of actual retreat before the Compromisers" after the

2827

February revolution and before the arrival of Lenin.

2828

Trotsky argued that "they did not know how to refute the

2829

premise about the bourgeois character of the revolution

2830

and the danger of an isolation of the proletariat. They

2831

submitted, gritting their teeth, to the directions of

2832

their leaders." [History of the Russian Revolution,

2833

vol. 1, p. 273] It seems strange, to say the least, that

2834

without one person the whole of the party was reduced to

2835

such a level given that the aim of the "revolutionary"

2836

party was to develop the political awareness of its

2837

members.

2838

2839

Lenin's arrival, according to Trotsky, allowed the influence

2840

of the more radical rank and file to defeat the conservatism

2841

of the party machine. By the end of April, Lenin had managed

2842

to win over the majority of the party leadership to his

2843

position. However, this "April conflict between Lenin and

2844

the general staff of the party was not the only one of its

2845

kind. Throughout the whole history of Bolshevism . . . all

2846

the leaders of the party at all the most important moments

2847

stood to the right of Lenin." [Op. Cit.,

2848

p. 305] As such, if "democratic centralism" had worked as

2849

intended, the whole party would have been arguing for

2850

incorrect positions the bulk of its existence (assuming, of

2851

course, that Lenin was correct most of the time).

2852

2853

For Trotsky, "Lenin exerted influence not so much as an

2854

individual but because he embodied the influence of the

2855

class on the Party and of the Party on its machine."

2856

Yet, this was the machine which Lenin had forged, which

2857

embodied his vision of how a "revolutionary" party should

2858

operate and was headed by him. To argue that the party machine

2859

was behind the party membership and the membership behind the

2860

class shows the bankruptcy of Lenin's organisational scheme.

2861

This "backwardness", moreover, indicates an independence of

2862

the party bureaucracy from the membership and the membership

2863

from the masses. As Lenin's constantly repeated aim was for

2864

the party to seize power (based on the dubious assumption

2865

that class power would only be expressed, indeed was identical

2866

to, party power) this independence held serious dangers,

2867

dangers which became apparent once this goal was achieved.

2868

This is confirmed when Trotsky asked the question "by what

2869

miracle did Lenin manage in a few short weeks to turn the Party's

2870

course into a new channel?" Significantly, he answers as follows:

2871

"Lenin's personal attributes and the objective situation."

2872

[Stalin, vol. 1, p. 299] No mention is made of the

2873

democratic features of the party organisation, which suggests

2874

that without Lenin the rank and file party members would not

2875

have been able to shift the weight of the party machine in their

2876

favour. Trotsky seemed close to admitting this:

2877

2878

"As often happens, a sharp cleavage developed between the

2879

classes in motion and the interests of the party machines.

2880

Even the Bolshevik Party cadres, who enjoyed the benefit

2881

of exceptional revolutionary training, were definitely

2882

inclined to disregard the masses and to identify their own

2883

special interests and the interests of the machine on the

2884

very day after the monarchy was overthrown." [Op. Cit.,

2885

vol. 1, p. 298]

2886

</blockquote>

2887

Thus the party machine, which embodied the principles of

2888

"democratic centralism" proved less than able to the task

2889

assigned it in practice. Without Lenin, it is doubtful

2890

that the party membership would have overcome the party

2891

machine:

2892

2893

"Lenin was strong not only because he understood the laws

2894

of the class struggle but also because his ear was

2895

faultlessly attuned to the stirrings of the masses in

2896

motion. He represented not so much the Party machine as

2897

the vanguard of the proletariat. He was definitely

2898

convinced that thousands from among those workers who

2899

had borne the brunt of supporting the underground Party

2900

would now support him. The masses at the moment were

2901

more revolutionary than the Party, and the Party more

2902

revolutionary than its machine. As early as March the

2903

actual attitude of the workers and soldiers had in many

2904

cases become stormily apparent, and it was widely at

2905

variance with the instructions issued by all the parties,

2906

including the Bolsheviks." [Op. Cit., p. 299]

2907

</blockquote>

2908

Little wonder the local party groupings ignored the

2909

party machine, practising autonomy and initiative in

2910

the face of a party machine inclined to conservatism,

2911

inertia, bureaucracy and remoteness. This conflict

2912

between the party machine and the principles it was

2913

based on and the needs of the revolution and party

2914

membership was expressed continually throughout 1917:

2915

2916

"In short, the success of the revolution called for action

2917

against the 'highest circles of the party,' who, from

2918

February to October, utterly failed to play the

2919

revolutionary role they ought to have taken in theory.

2920

The masses themselves made the revolution, with or even

2921

against the party - this much at least was clear to

2922

Trotsky the historian. But far from drawing the correct

2923

conclusion, Trotsky the theorist continued to argue

2924

that the masses are incapable of making a revolution

2925

without a leader." [Daniel & Gabriel Cohn-Bendit,

2926

Op. Cit., p. 188]

2927

</blockquote>

2928

Looking at the development of the revolution from April

2929

onwards, we are struck by the sluggishness of the party

2930

hierarchy. At every revolutionary upsurge, the party

2931

simply was not to the task of responding to the needs of

2932

masses and the local party groupings closest to them.

2933

The can be seen in June, July and October itself. At

2934

each turn, the rank and file groupings or Lenin had to

2935

constantly violate the principles of their own party

2936

in order to be effective.

2937

2938

For example, when discussing the cancellation by the central

2939

committee of a demonstration planned for June 10th by

2940

the Petrograd Bolsheviks, the unresponsiveness of the

2941

party hierarchy can be seen. The "speeches by Lenin and

2942

Zinoviev [justifying their actions] by no means satisfied

2943

the Petersburg Committee. If anything, it appears that

2944

their explanations served to strengthen the feeling that

2945

at best the party leadership had acted irresponsibly and

2946

incompetently and was seriously out of touch with reality."

2947

Indeed, many "blamed the Central Committee for taking so

2948

long to respond to Military Organisation appeals for a

2949

demonstration." During the discussions in late June,

2950

1917, on whether to take direct action against the Provisional

2951

Government there was a "wide gulf" between lower organs

2952

evaluations of the current situation and that of the Central

2953

Committee. [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 88, p. 92 and

2954

p. 129] Indeed, among the delegates from the Bolshevik military

2955

groups, only Lashevich (an old Bolshevik) spoke in favour of the

2956

Central Committee position and he noted that "[f]requently it

2957

is impossible to make out where the Bolshevik ends and the Anarchist

2958

begins." [quoted by Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 129]

2959

2960

In the July days, the breach between the local party groups

2961

and the central committee increased. This spontaneous uprising

2962

was opposed to by the Bolshevik leadership, in spite of the

2963

leading role of their own militants (along with anarchists)

2964

in fermenting it. While calling on their own activists to

2965

restrain the masses, the party leadership was ignored by

2966

the rank and file membership who played an active role in

2967

the event. Sickened by being asked to play the role of

2968

"fireman", the party militants rejected party discipline in

2969

order to maintain their credibility with the working class.

2970

Rank and file activists, pointing to the snowballing of

2971

the movement, showed clear dissatisfaction with the Central

2972

Committee. One argued that it "was not aware of the latest

2973

developments when it made its decision to oppose the movement

2974

into the streets." Ultimately, the Central Committee appeal

2975

"for restraining the masses . . . was removed from"

2976

Pravda "and so the party's indecision was reflected

2977

by a large blank space on page one." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit.,

2978

p. 150, p. 159 and p. 175] Ultimately, the indecisive nature

2979

of the leadership can be explained by the fact it did not

2980

think it could seize state power for itself ("the state of

2981

popular consciousness . . . made impossible the seizure of power

2982

by the Bolsheviks in July." [Trotsky, History of the

2983

Russian Revolution, vol. 2, p. 81]).

2984

2985

The indecision of the party hierarchy did have an effect,

2986

of course. While the anarchists at Kronstadt looked at the

2987

demonstration as the start of an uprising, the Bolsheviks

2988

there were "wavering indecisively in the middle" between

2989

them and the Left-Social Revolutionaries who saw it as a

2990

means of applying pressure on the government. This was because

2991

they were "hamstrung by the indecision of the party Central

2992

Committee." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 187] Little wonder

2993

so many Bolshevik party organisations developed and protected

2994

their own autonomy and ability to act!

2995

2996

Significantly, one of the main Bolshevik groupings

2997

which helped organise and support the July uprising,

2998

the Military Organisation, started their own paper

2999

after the Central Committee had decreed after the

3000

failed revolt that neither it, nor the Petersburg

3001

Committee, should be allowed to have one. It "angrily

3002

insisted on what it considered its just prerogatives"

3003

and in "no uncertain terms it affirmed its right to

3004

publish an independent newspaper and formally protested

3005

what is referred to as 'a system of persecution and repression

3006

of an extremely peculiar character which had begun with

3007

the election of the new Central Committee.'" [Rabinowitch,

3008

Op. Cit., p. 227] The Central Committee backed down,

3009

undoubtedly due to the fact it could not enforce its

3010

decision.

3011

3012

This was but one example of what the Cohn-Bendit brothers pointed

3013

to, namely that "five months after the Revolution and three months

3014

before the October uprising, the masses were still governing themselves,

3015

and the Bolshevik vanguard simply had to toe the line." [Op. Cit.,

3016

p. 186] Within that vanguard, the central committee proved to be out of

3017

touch with the rank and file, who ignored it rather than break with their

3018

fellow workers.

3019

3020

Even by October, the party machine still lagged behind the

3021

needs of the revolution. In fact, Lenin could only impose

3022

his view by going over the head of the Central Committee.

3023

According to Trotsky's account, "this time he [wa]s not

3024

satisfied with furious criticism" of the "ruinous Fabianism

3025

of the Petrograd leadership" and "by way of protest he

3026

resign[ed] from the Central Committee." [History of the

3027

Russian Revolution, vol. 3, p. 131] Trotsky quoted

3028

Lenin as follows:

3029

3030

"I am compelled to request permission to withdraw from

3031

the Central Committee, which I hereby do, and leave

3032

myself freedom of agitation in the lower ranks of the

3033

party and at the party congress." [quoted by Trotsky,

3034

Op. Cit., p. 131]

3035

</blockquote>

3036

Thus the October revolution was precipitated by a blatant

3037

violation of the principles Lenin spent his life advocating.

3038

Indeed, if someone else other than Lenin had done this we

3039

are sure that Lenin, and his numerous followers, would have

3040

dismissed it as the action of a "petty-bourgeois intellectual"

3041

who cannot handle party "discipline." This is itself is

3042

significant, as is the fact that he decided to appeal to

3043

the "lower ranks" of the party - rather than

3044

being "democratic" the party machine effectively blocked

3045

communication and control from the bottom-up. Looking to

3046

the more radical party membership, he "could only impose

3047

his view by going over the head of his Central Committee."

3048

[Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Op. Cit., p. 187] He

3049

made sure to send his letter of protest to "the Petrograd

3050

and Moscow committees" and also made sure that "copies fell

3051

into the hands of the more reliable party workers of the

3052

district locals." By early October (and "over the heads of

3053

the Central Committee") he wrote "directly to the Petrograd

3054

and Moscow committees" calling for insurrection. He also

3055

"appealed to a Petrograd party conference to speak a firm

3056

word in favour of insurrection." [Trotsky, Op. Cit.,

3057

p. 131 and p. 132]

3058

3059

In October, Lenin had to fight what he called "a wavering"

3060

in the "upper circles of the party" which lead to a "sort

3061

of dread of the struggle for power, an inclination to replace this

3062

struggle with resolutions protests, and conferences." [quoted

3063

by Trotsky, Op. Cit., p. 132] For Trotsky, this represented

3064

"almost a direct pitting of the party against the Central

3065

Committee," required because "it was a question of the fate

3066

of the revolution" and so "all other considerations fell

3067

away." On October 8th, when Lenin addressed the Bolshevik

3068

delegates of the forthcoming Northern Congress of Soviets on this

3069

subject, he did so "personally" as there "was no party

3070

decision" and the "higher institutions of the party had not

3071

yet expressed themselves." [Trotsky, Op. Cit., pp. 132-3

3072

and p. 133] Ultimately, the Central Committee came round to Lenin's

3073

position but they did so under pressure of means at odds with the

3074

principles of the party.

3075

3076

This divergence between the imagine and reality of the Bolsheviks

3077

explains their success. If the party had applied or had remained

3078

true to the principles of "democratic centralism" it is doubtful

3079

that it would have played an important role in the movement. As

3080

Alexander Rabinowitch argues, Bolshevik organisational unity and

3081

discipline is "vastly exaggerated" and, in fact, Bolshevik

3082

success in 1917 was down to "the party's internally relatively

3083

democratic, tolerant, and decentralised structure and method of

3084

operation, as well as its essentially open and mass character -

3085

in striking contrast to the traditional Leninist model."

3086

In 1917, he goes on, "subordinate party bodies like the

3087

Petersburg Committee and the Military Organisation were

3088

permitted considerable independence and initiative . . .

3089

Most importantly, these lower bodies were able to tailor

3090

their tactics and appeals to suit their own particular

3091

constituencies amid rapidly changing conditions. Vast

3092

numbers of new members were recruited into the party . . . The

3093

newcomers included tens of thousands of workers and soldiers . . .

3094

who knew little, if anything, about Marxism and cared nothing

3095

about party discipline." For example, while the slogan

3096

"All Power to the Soviets" was "officially withdrawn

3097

by the Sixth [Party] Congress in late July, this change did not

3098

take hold at the local level." [The Bolsheviks Come to

3099

Power, p. 311, p. 312 and p. 313]

3100

3101

It is no exaggeration to argue that if any member of a current

3102

vanguard party acted as the Bolshevik rank and file did in 1917,

3103

they would quickly be expelled (this probably explains why no

3104

such party has been remotely successful since). However, this

3105

ferment from below was quickly undermined within the party

3106

with the start of the Civil War. It is from this period when

3107

"democratic centralism" was actually applied within the party

3108

and clarified as an organisational principle:

3109

3110

"It was quite a turnabout since the anarchic days before the

3111

Civil War. The Central Committee had always advocated the

3112

virtues of obedience and co-operation; but the rank-and-filers

3113

of 1917 had cared little about such entreaties as they did

3114

about appeals made by other higher authorities. The wartime

3115

emergency now supplied an opportunity to expatiate on this

3116

theme at will." [Service, Op. Cit., p. 91]

3117

</blockquote>

3118

Service stresses that "it appears quite remarkable how

3119

quickly the Bolsheviks, who for years had talked idly

3120

about a strict hierarchy of command inside the party, at

3121

last began to put ideas into practice." [Op. Cit., p. 96]

3122

3123

In other words, the conversion of the Bolshevik party into a

3124

fully fledged "democratic centralist" party occurred

3125

during the degeneration of the Revolution. This was both a

3126

consequence of the rising authoritarianism within the party,

3127

state and society as well as one of its causes so it

3128

is quite ironic that the model used by modern day followers

3129

of Lenin is that of the party during the decline of the

3130

revolution, not its peak. This is not surprising. Once in

3131

power, the Bolshevik party imposed a state capitalist regime

3132

onto the Russian people. Can it be surprising that the party

3133

structure which it developed to aid this process was also

3134

based on bourgeois attitudes and organisation? The party model

3135

advocated by Lenin may not have been very effective during a

3136

revolution but it was exceedingly effective at promoting

3137

hierarchy and authority in the post-revolutionary regime.

3138

It simply replaced the old ruling elite with another, made

3139

up of members of the radical intelligentsia and the odd

3140

ex-worker or ex-peasant.

3141

3142

This was due to the hierarchical and top-down nature of

3143

the party Lenin had created. While the party base was

3144

largely working class, the leadership was not. Full-time

3145

revolutionaries, they were either middle-class intellectuals

3146

or (occasionally) ex-workers and (even rarer) ex-peasants

3147

who had left their class to become part of the party machine.

3148

Even the delegates at the party congresses did not truly

3149

reflect class basis of the party membership. For example,

3150

the number of delegates was still dominated by white-collar

3151

or others (59.1% to 40.9%) at the sixth party congress at

3152

the end of July 1917. [Cliff, Lenin, vol. 2, p. 160] So

3153

while the party gathered more working class members in

3154

1917, it cannot be said that this was reflected in the

3155

party leadership which remained dominated by non-working

3156

class elements. Rather than being a genuine working class

3157

organisation, the Bolshevik party was a hierarchical group

3158

headed by non-working class elements whose working class

3159

base could not effectively control them even during the

3160

revolution in 1917. It was only effective because these

3161

newly joined and radicalised working class members

3162

ignored their own party structure and its defining

3163

ideology.

3164

3165

After the revolution, the Bolsheviks saw their membership

3166

start to decrease. Significantly, "the decline in numbers

3167

which occurred from early 1918 onwards" started happening

3168

"contrary to what is usually assumed, some months before

3169

the Central Committee's decree in midsummer that the party

3170

should be purged of its 'undesirable' elements." These lost

3171

members reflected two things. Firstly, the general decline in

3172

the size of the industrial working class. This meant that the

3173

radicalised new elements from the countryside which had flocked

3174

to the Bolsheviks in 1917 returned home. Secondly, the lost of

3175

popular support due to the realities of the Bolshevik regime.

3176

This can be seen from the fact that while the Bolsheviks were

3177

losing members, the Left SRS almost doubled in size to 100,000

3178

(the Mensheviks claimed to have a similar number). Rather

3179

than non-proletarians leaving, "[i]t is more probable by

3180

far that it was industrial workers who were leaving in

3181

droves. After all, it would have been strange if the

3182

growing unpopularity of Sovnarkom in factory milieu

3183

had been confined exclusively to non-Bolsheviks."

3184

Unsurprisingly, given its position in power, "[a]s the

3185

proportion of working-class members declined, so that

3186

of entrants from the middle-class rose; the steady drift

3187

towards a party in which industrial workers no longer

3188

numerically predominated was under way." By late 1918

3189

membership started to increase again but "[m]ost newcomers

3190

were not of working-class origin . . . the proportion of

3191

Bolsheviks of working-class origin fell from 57 per cent

3192

at the year's beginning to 48 per cent at the end." It

3193

should be noted that it was not specified how many were

3194

classed as having working-class origin were still employed

3195

in working-class jobs. [Robert Service, Op. Cit., p. 70,

3196

pp. 70-1 and p. 90] A new ruling elite was thus born,

3197

thanks to the way vanguard parties are structured and the

3198

application of vanguardist principles which had previously

3199

been ignored.

3200

3201

In summary, the experience of the Russian Revolution does

3202

not, in fact, show the validity of the "vanguard" model.

3203

The Bolshevik party in 1917 played a leading role in the

3204

revolution only insofar as its members violated its own

3205

organisational principles (Lenin included). Faced with a

3206

real revolution and an influx of more radical new members,

3207

the party had to practice anarchist ideas of autonomy,

3208

local initiative and the ignoring of central orders which

3209

had no bearing to reality on the ground. When the party

3210

did try to apply the top-down and hierarchical principles

3211

of "democratic centralism" it failed to adjust to the

3212

needs of the moment. Moreover, when these principles were

3213

finally applied they helped ensure the degeneration of

3214

the revolution. This was to be expected, given the nature

3215

of vanguardism and the Bolshevik vision of socialism.

3216

3217

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3218

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