1
D.11 Can politics and economics be separated from each other?
3
A key aspect of anarchism is the idea that the political and economic
4
aspects of society cannot be separated. [1]Section D has been an
5
attempt to show how these two aspects of society interact and influence
6
each other. This means that economic liberty cannot be separated from
7
political liberty and vice versa. If working class people are subject
8
to authoritarian political organisations then their economic liberty
9
will likewise be restricted and, conversely, if their economic freedoms
10
are limited then so, too, will their political freedoms. As Proudhon
11
put it, "industrial liberty is inseparable from political liberty."
12
[quoted by Alan Ritter, The Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph
15
Some disagree, arguing that economic liberty is of primary importance.
16
When Milton Friedman died in 2006, for example, many of his supporters
17
parroted his defence of working with the Pinochet regime and noted that
18
Chile had (eventually) become a democracy. For Friedman, this justified
19
his praise for the "economic liberty" the regime had introduced and
20
rationalised the advice he gave it. For him, Chile provided his earlier
21
assertion that "economic freedom is an indispensable means toward the
22
achievement of political freedom." For while Friedman stated that there
23
was "an intimate connection between economics and politics," he meant
24
simply that capitalism was required to produce democracy (to use his
25
words, "capitalism is a necessary condition for political freedom").
26
[Capitalism and Freedom, p. 8 and p. 10]
28
So it should first be stressed that by "economic liberty" Friedman
29
meant capitalism and by "political liberty" he meant representative
30
government and a democratic state. Anarchists would disagree that
31
either of those institutions have much to do with genuine liberty.
32
However, we will ignore this for the moment and take his general point.
33
Sadly, such a position makes little sense. In fact, Friedman's
34
separation of "economic" and "political" liberties is simply wrong as
35
well as having authoritarian implications and lacking empirical basis.
37
The easiest way of showing that statism and capitalism cannot be
38
separated is to look at a country where "economic liberty" (i.e. free
39
market capitalism) existed but "political liberty" (i.e. a democratic
40
government with basic human rights) did not. The most obvious example
41
is Pinochet's Chile, an experiment which Friedman praised as an
42
"economic miracle" shortly before it collapsed. In [2]section C.11 we
43
discussed the Chilean "economic miracle" at face value, refusing to
44
discuss the issue of whether describing the regime as one of "economic
45
liberty" could be justified. Rather, we exposed the results of applying
46
what leading ideologues of capitalism have called "free market"
47
policies on the country. As would be expected, the results were hardly
48
an "economic miracle" if you were working class. Which shows how little
49
our lives are valued by the elite and their "experts."
51
As to be expected with Friedman, the actual experience of implementing
52
his economic dogmas in Chile refuted them. Much the same can be said of
53
his distinction of "economic" and "political" liberty. Friedman
54
discussed the Chilean regime in 1991, arguing that "Pinochet and the
55
military in Chile were led to adopt free market principles after they
56
took over only because they did not have any other choice." [Economic
57
Freedom, Human Freedom, Political Freedom] This is an interesting
58
definition of "free market principles." It seems to be compatible with
59
a regime in which the secret police can seize uppity workers, torture
60
them and dump their bodies in a ditch as a warning to others.
62
For Friedman, the economic and political regimes could be separated. As
63
he put it, "I have nothing good to say about the political regime that
64
Pinochet imposed. It was a terrible political regime. The real miracle
65
of Chile is not how well it has done economically; the real miracle of
66
Chile is that a military junta was willing to go against its principles
67
and support a free market regime designed by principled believers in a
68
free market." [Op. Cit.] How, exactly, could the political regime not
69
impact on the economic one? How is a "free market" possible if people
70
who make up the labour market are repressed and in fear of their lives?
71
True, the Chilean workers could, as workers in Tsarist Russia, "change
72
their jobs without getting permission from political authorities" (as
73
Friedman put it [Capitalism and Freedom, p. 10]), however this is only
74
a small part of what anarchists consider to be genuine economic
77
To see why, it is useful to show a snapshot of what life was like under
78
Friedman's "economic liberty" for working class people. Once this is
79
done, it is easy to see how incredulous Friedman was being. Peter Winn
80
gives a good description of what Chile's "economic liberty" was based
83
"In the wake of the coup, most of the 'revolutionary' leaders of the
84
textile workers disappeared, some to unmarked graves, jails, or
85
concentration camps, others to exile or the underground resistance.
86
Moreover, when the textile factories resumed production, it was
87
under military administration and with soldiers patrolling the
88
plants. Authoritarian management and industrial discipline were
89
reimposed at the point of a bayonet, and few workers dared to
90
protest. Some feared for their lives or liberty; many more feared
91
for their jobs. Military intelligence officers interrogated the
92
workers one by one, pressing them to inform on each other and then
93
firing those considered to be leftist activists. The dismissals
94
often continued after the mills were returned to their former
95
owners, at first for political reasons or for personal revenge, but,
96
with the recession of 1975, for economic motives as well. The
97
unions, decimated by their leadership losses, intimidated by the
98
repression, and proscribed by military decree from collective
99
bargaining, strikes, or other militant actions, were incapable of
100
defending their members' jobs, wages, or working conditions. With
101
wages frozen and prices rising rapidly, living standards fell
102
precipitously, even for those fortunate enough to keep their jobs."
103
["No Miracle for Us", Peter Winn (ed.), Victims of the Chilean
104
Miracle: Workers and Neoliberalism in the Pinochet Era, 1973-2002,
107
In the copper mines, "[h]undreds of leftist activists were fired, and
108
many were arrested and tortured . . . the military exercised a firm
109
control over union leaders and activity within the unions remained
110
dormant until the 1980s." The "decade following the military coup was
111
defined by intense repression and a generalised climate of terror and
112
fear." Workers recalled that people who spoke at union meetings were
113
detained and until 1980 police permission was required to hold a
114
meeting, which was held under police supervision. At work, "supervisors
115
and foremen ruled with an authoritarian discipline" while miners
116
"reported that spies denounced workers who talked politics or spoke at
117
union meetings to the company administration and police." [Thomas
118
Miller Klubock, "Class, Community, and Neoliberalism in Chile", Winn
119
(ed.), Op. Cit., p. 214 p. 216 and p. 217]
121
Over all, Workers "bore the brunt of the repression during the military
122
take-over and throughout the Pinochet regime. The armed forces viewed
123
workers -- and the level of organisation they had achieved under
124
previous governments -- as the greatest threat to traditional power
125
structure in Chile . . . Armed troops went after workers in general and
126
union members and leaders in particular with a virulence that
127
contradicted their claim to be stamping out 'class hatred.'" As for the
128
relationship between "economic" and "political" liberty, the latter was
129
dependent on the end of the former: "Fear of repression was clearly
130
essential to the implementation of free-market labour policies, but far
131
more pervasive was the fear of unemployment" generated by the so-called
132
"economic miracle." [John Lear and Joseph Collins, "Working in Chile's
133
Free Market", pp. 10-29, Latin American Perspectives, vol. 22, No. 1,
136
Thus the ready police repression made strikes and other forms of
137
protest both impractical and dangerous. When working class people did
138
take to the streets after the economic crash of 1982, they were subject
139
to intense state repression as Pinochet "cracked down, sending in army
140
troops to curb the demonstrators." According to a report by the Roman
141
Catholic Church 113 protesters had been killed during social protest,
142
with several thousand detained for political activity and protests
143
between May 1983 and mid-1984. Thousands of strikers were also fired
144
and union leaders jailed. [Rayack, Op. Cit., p. 70] In fact, the
145
"brutal government repression put even the militant copper miners on
146
the defensive." [Winn, "The Pinochet Era", Winn (ed.), Op. Cit., p. 43]
147
Workers were aware that the regime "was likely to use the full rigour
148
of the law against workers who acted in defence of their interests.
149
Moreover, even though the arbitrary actions of the secret police
150
diminished in the last years of the dictatorship, they did not
151
disappear, nor did their internalised legacy. Fear of becoming a target
152
of repression still exercised a chilling effect on both workers and
153
their leaders." [Winn, "No Miracle for Us", Winn (ed.), Op. Cit., p.
156
All of which puts into stark light Friedman's 1982 comment that "Chile
157
is an even more amazing political miracle. A military regime has
158
supported reforms that sharply reduce the role of the state and replace
159
control from the top with control from the bottom." [quoted by Rayack,
160
Not so Free to Choose, p. 37] Clearly Friedman had no idea what he was
161
talking about. While the "role of the state" was reduced in terms of
162
welfare for the masses, it was obviously massively increased in terms
163
of warfare against them (we will address the "control from the bottom"
166
For anarchists, it is simply common-sense that "economic liberty"
167
cannot exist within an authoritarian state for the mass of the
168
population. In reality, the economic and political regime cannot be so
169
easily compartmentalised. As Malatesta noted, "every economic question
170
of some importance automatically becomes a political question . . .
171
Workers' organisations must therefore, of necessity, adopt a line of
172
action in face of present as well as possible future government
173
action." [Errico Malatesta: His Life and Ideas, pp. 130-1] Such
174
common-sense is sadly lacking with Friedman who seriously seems to
175
believe that "economic liberty" could exist without the freedom of
176
workers to take collective action if they so desired. In other words,
177
the "economic miracle" Friedman praises was built on the corpses, fears
178
and backs of working class people. Unlike Friedman, Chile's workers and
179
bosses know that "employers could count on the backing of the military
180
in any conflict with workers." [Lear and Collins, Op. Cit., p. 13] As
181
can be seen, Malatesta had a much firmer grasp of the question of
182
liberty that Friedman, as expected as the latter equals it with
183
capitalism and its hierarchies while the former spent much of his live
184
in prison and exile trying to increase the freedom of working class
185
people by fighting the former and the state which maintains them.
187
As we argued in [3]section D.1.4, laissez-faire capitalism does not end
188
statism. Rather it focuses it on purely defending economic power (i.e.
189
"economic liberty" for the capitalist class). The example of Chile's
190
"economic liberty" proves this beyond doubt and shows that the
191
separation of economic and political freedom is impossible and,
192
consequently, both capitalism and the state need to be fought and,
193
ultimately, abolished.
195
D.11.1 What does Chile tell us about the right and its vision of liberty?
197
The key to understanding how Friedman managed to ignore the obvious
198
lack of "economic liberty" for the bulk of the population under
199
Pinochet lies in remembering that he is a supporter of capitalism. As
200
capitalism is a hierarchical system in which workers sell their liberty
201
to a boss, it comes as no real surprise that Friedman's concern for
202
liberty is selective.
204
Pinochet did introduce free-market capitalism, but this meant real
205
liberty only for the rich. For the working class, "economic liberty"
206
did not exist, as they did not manage their own work nor control their
207
workplaces and lived under a fascist state. The liberty to take
208
economic (never mind political) action in the forms of forming unions,
209
going on strike, organising go-slows and so on was severely curtailed
210
by the very likely threat of repression. Of course, the supporters of
211
the Chilean "Miracle" and its "economic liberty" did not bother to
212
question how the suppression of political liberty effected the economy
213
or how people acted within it. They maintained that the repression of
214
labour, the death squads, the fear installed in rebel workers could be
215
ignored when looking at the economy. But in the real world, people will
216
put up with a lot more if they face the barrel of a gun than if they do
217
not. So the claim that "economic liberty" existed in Chile makes sense
218
only if we take into account that there was only real liberty for one
219
class. The bosses may have been "left alone" but the workers were not,
220
unless they submitted to authority (capitalist or state). Hardly what
221
most people would term as "liberty".
223
Beyond the ideologues of capitalism who term themselves "economists,"
224
it is generally admitted that the "labour market," if it exists, is a
225
somewhat unique market. As "labour" cannot be separated from its owner,
226
it means that when you "buy" labour you "buy" the time, and so liberty,
227
of the individual involved. Rather than be bought on the market all at
228
once, as with a slave, the wage slave's life is bought piecemeal. This
229
is the key to understanding Friedman's nonsensical claims for never
230
forget that by "economic freedom" he means capitalism. To understand
231
the difference we need only compare two of Friedman's arguments to the
232
reality of capitalism. Once we do that then his blindness to Chile's
233
neo-liberal dictatorship's impact on genuine economic liberty becomes
236
The most obvious fallacy within his argument is this assertion:
238
"A characteristic feature of a free private market is that all
239
parties to a transaction believe that they are going to be better
240
off by that transaction. It is not a zero sum game in which some can
241
benefit only at the expense of others. It is a situation in which
242
everybody thinks he is going to be better off." [Economic Freedom,
243
Human Freedom, Political Freedom]
245
Who can deny that the worker who sells her liberty to the autocrat of a
246
capitalist firm is "going to be better off" than one starving to death?
247
As we noted in [4]section B.4.1, Friedman avoids the obvious fact that
248
a capitalist economy is dependent on there being a class of people who
249
have no means of supporting themselves except by selling their labour
250
(i.e. liberty). While full employment will mitigate this dependency
251
(and, as a result, bring the system to crisis), it never goes away. And
252
given that Pinochet's "free market regime designed by principled
253
believers in a free market" had substantial unemployment, it is
254
unsurprising that the capitalist was "better off" than the worker as a
255
result. As the experience of the "free private market" in Chile
256
suggests, workers need to be free to organise without the fear of death
257
squads otherwise they will be oppressed and exploited by their bosses.
258
By denying that freedom, Pinochet's regime could only be considered
259
"free" by the ideologues and savants of capitalism. The only positive
260
thing that can be said is that it provided empirical evidence that the
261
ideal neo-classical labour market would increase inequality and
262
exploitation (see [5]section C.11.3).
264
The problem with Friedman's argument is that he fails to recognise the
265
hierarchical nature of capitalism and the limited liberty it produces.
266
This can be seen from Friedman's comparison of military dictatorships
269
"Almost all military juntas are adverse to economic freedom for
270
obvious reasons. The military is organised from the top down: the
271
general tells the colonel, the colonel tells the captain, the
272
captain tells the lieutenant, and so on. A market economy is
273
organised from the bottom up: the consumer tells the retailer, the
274
retailer tells the wholesaler, the wholesaler tells the producer,
275
and the producer delivers. The principles underlying a military
276
organisation are precisely the reverse of those underlying a market
277
organisation." [Op. Cit.]
279
Obviously geometry was not Friedman's strong point. A "market economy"
280
is characterised by horizontal links between workplaces and consumers,
281
not vertical ones. However, the key issue is that the dominant "market
282
organisation" under capitalism is marked by the "principles underlying
283
a military organisation." To present a more accurate picture than
284
Friedman, in the "market organisation" of a capitalist firm the boss
285
tells the worker what to do. It is "organised from the top down" just
286
as a military junta is. That Friedman ignores the organisational
287
structure which 90% of the population have to operate within for most
288
of their waking hours is significant. It shows how little he
289
understands of capitalism and "economic freedom."
291
In Pinochet's Chile, the workplace did become more like "a military
292
organisation." Without effective unions and basic human rights, the
293
bosses acted like the autocrats they are. Discussing the textile
294
industry, Peter Winn notes that "most mill owners took full advantage
295
of the regime's probusiness Labour Code . . . At many mills, sweatshop
296
conditions prevailed, wages were low, and management was authoritarian,
297
even tyrannical . . . Workers might resent these conditions, but they
298
often felt powerless to oppose them. Informers and the threat of
299
dismissal kept even alienated and discontented workers in line." ["No
300
Miracle for Us", Winn (ed.), Op. Cit., p. 132 and pp. 132-3] John Lear
301
and Joseph Collins generalise the picture, noting that "[i]n wake of
302
the coup, factory owners suddenly had absolute control over their
303
workers and could fire any worker without case. From 1973 through 1978,
304
practically every labour right for organised and unorganised workers
305
was suspended. All tools of collective bargaining, including of course
306
the right to strike, were outlawed." [Op. Cit., p. 13] The Junta
307
themselves had no illusions about the military-like regime they desired
308
within the workplace, stating in 1974 its intention of "imposing
309
authority and discipline in production and labour relations." [quoted
310
by Joseph Collins and John Lear, Chile's Free-Market Miracle: A Second
313
The reality of life under Pinochet for working class people should make
314
anyone with sense wary of praising the regime in any way, but Friedman
315
argued that the "results were spectacular. Inflation came down sharply.
316
After a transitory period of recession and low output that is
317
unavoidable in the course of reversing a strong inflation, output
318
started to expand, and ever since, the Chilean economy has performed
319
better than any other South American economy." [Op. Cit.] Of course, by
320
downplaying the deep recession caused by applying his recommended
321
"shock-treatment" policies, Friedman can confuse the high growth
322
resulting from coming out of the boom combined with ready repression on
323
labour with sound economic policies. Strangely he failed to mention the
324
"spectacular" recession of 1982 which wiped out the gains of 1976 to
325
1981. As indicated in [6]section C.11, looking over the whole of the
326
Pinochet period the results were hardly "spectacular" (unless you were
327
rich) and the moderate gains were paid for by the working class in
328
terms of longer hours, lower pay and political and economic oppression.
330
In other words, Friedman and the 'Chicago boys' provided an appearance
331
of technical respectability to the dreams, greed and power of the
332
landlords and capitalists who made up the Chilean oligarchy. The
333
military simply applied the brutal force required to achieve those
334
goals. As such, there is only an apparent contradiction between
335
political tyranny and "economic liberty," not a real one. Repression
336
for the working class and "economic liberty" for the elite are two
337
sides of the same coin.
339
This should be common-sense and, as such, it is nonsensical for the
340
likes of Friedman to support an economic policy while pretending to
341
reject the system of terror it required to implement. After all,
342
economic policies do not occur in a social and political vacuum. They
343
are conditioned by, and at the same time modify, the social and
344
political situation where they are put into practice. Thus there cannot
345
be "economic liberty" for workers if they expect a visit from the
346
secret police if they talk back to their boss. Yet for Friedman and
347
those like him, there seems to be a lack of awareness of such basic and
348
obvious facts. There is a necessary connection between economic policy
349
(and its outcome) and the socio-political setting in which it is
352
Friedman exposes the utter hypocrisy of the supporters of capitalism.
353
His myopia about the reality of the regime was expressed in articles
354
which amount to little more than apologetics for the dictatorship. For
355
example, in 1982 he noted in response to the economic problems of the
356
previous year "the opposition to the free-market policies that had been
357
largely silence by success is being given full voice." [quoted by
358
Rayack, Op. Cit., p. p. 63] No mention that the real cause of the
359
"silence" of the opposition was not the "success" of policies which had
360
impoverished the working class and enriched the elite but, rather, the
361
expectation of a visit by the secret police. Given that Pinochet had
362
sent murder squads to kill prominent dissidents abroad, Friedman's
363
comments are incredulous -- particularly as Allende's former foreign
364
minister, Orlando Letelier, was assassinated in Washington in 1976 by a
367
The state terror, the violation of human rights and drastic control and
368
suppression of every form of meaningful dissent is discussed (and often
369
condemned) as something only indirectly linked, or indeed entirely
370
unrelated, to the economic policies that the military imposed. To
371
publicly praise and support the economic policies adopted by the
372
dictatorship while regretting its political regime is simply illogical
373
hypocrisy. However, it does expose the limited nature of the right's
374
concept of liberty as well as its priorities and values.
376
D.11.2 But surely Chile proves that "economic freedom" creates political
379
As noted above, Friedman defended his praise for the Pinochet regime by
380
arguing that its "economic liberty" helped produce the end of the
381
dictatorship. In the words of Friedman:
383
"The economic development and the recovery produced by economic
384
freedom in turn promoted the public's desire for a greater degree of
385
political freedom . . . In Chile, the drive for political freedom,
386
that was generated by economic freedom and the resulting economic
387
success, ultimately resulted in a referendum that introduced
388
political democracy. Now, at long last, Chile has all three things:
389
political freedom, human freedom and economic freedom. Chile will
390
continue to be an interesting experiment to watch to see whether it
391
can keep all three or whether, now that it has political freedom,
392
that political freedom will tend to be used to destroy or reduce
393
economic freedom." [Op. Cit.]
395
It is hard to find an account so skewed by ideological blindness as
396
this. The notion that Chile's "free market" capitalism provided the
397
base for eliminating Pinochet's dictatorship is hard to defend. If it
398
were true then we would expect Pinochet's rule to be substantially
399
shorter than other military dictatorships in the region. However, this
400
is not the case. For example, Argentina's Military Junta lasted from
401
1976 to 1983, 7 years; Peru's 12 years (1968 to 1980); Uruguay's 12
402
years (1973 to 1985); Bolivia's 18 years (1964 to 1982). Pinochet's
403
lasted 17 years, exceeded by Brazil's 21 years (1964 to 1985). If
404
Friedman's argument were valid then Pinochet would have fallen long
405
before the rest. In fact, Chile was one of the last Latin American
406
countries to return to democracy.
408
Nor can it be said that ending of the Pinochet regime was an automatic
409
outcome of economic forces. Rather, it was a product of struggle by
410
ordinary people who took to the streets in the early 1980s to protest
411
in the face of state repression. The regime was subject to popular
412
pressures from below and these, not capitalism, were the key factor.
413
After all, it was not "economic liberty" which produced the desire for
414
"political freedom." Working class people could remember what political
415
freedom was before it was destroyed in order to create Friedman's
416
"economic liberty" and tried to recreate it.
418
In the face of state terror, political activists and trade unionists
419
fought the regime. The 1988 referendum Friedman alludes to was the
420
product of this heroic activity, not some abstract economic force. As
421
Cathy Schneider points out, the 1983-86 "cycle of protests had set the
422
stage for a negotiated transition to democracy in 1990." These
423
protests, it should be noted, were subject to extreme state repression
424
(one demonstration saw Pinochet send 18,000 troops onto the streets,
425
who shot 129 people, 29 fatally, and tortured some of the 1,000
426
arrested). [Shantytown protest in Pinochet's Chile, p. 194 and p. 165]
427
Peter Winn, for example, notes "the resistance of workers to both the
428
dictatorship and its neoliberal policies, often against great odds and
429
at great risks." In fact, "during the Pinochet era, with its repression
430
and restrictions on union activism, Chile's workers displayed great
431
creativity in devising new ways to resist . . . Nor was this resistance
432
confined to the workplace or workers' issues . . . it was Chile's
433
workers who first raised the flag of political resistance against the
434
dictatorship in the 1970s and sustained it during the years when
435
political parties were banned. And it was the copper miners who
436
mobilised the social protests and political opposition to the military
437
regime in the 1980s to demand an end to Pinochet's dictatorship and the
438
restoration of democracy and civil liberties." ["Introduction", Winn
439
(ed.), Op. Cit., p. 11] This is confirmed by John Lear and Joseph
440
Collins, who note that "[d]uring the mid-1980s, unions were fundamental
441
to organising the national protests that led eventually to the
442
negotiations of the 1988 plebiscite." [Op. Cit., p. 20]
444
This, it should be noted, has always been the case. Political freedoms
445
have never been given by the powers that be but rather won by long
446
struggles by working class people. This has always been the case, as
447
Kropotkin stressed basic political liberties were "extorted from
448
parliament by force, by agitations that threatened to become
449
rebellions. It was by establishing trade unions and practising strike
450
action despite the edicts of Parliament and the hangings" that workers
451
"won the right to associate and strike" in Britain for example. [Words
452
of a Rebel, pp. 123-4] To ignore that often heroic struggle shows an
453
ignorance about history which only matches an ignorance about liberty.
454
The history of capitalism is important in this regard. It first
455
developed under Absolutist states which used its power to bolster the
456
position of their capitalist class within both national (against the
457
working class) and international markets (against foreign competitors).
458
As we discuss in [7]section F.8, they actively intervened to create the
459
pre-conditions for generalised wage slavery before becoming a handicap
460
to the rising bourgeoisie. These regimes were generally replaced by
461
liberal states with limited voting rights which generally lifted the
462
burden of state regulation from the capitalist class. The working class
463
had to fight long and hard to win basic civil liberties and the vote.
464
As Chomsky notes, such progress "didn't just happen; it happened
465
through the struggles of the labour movement, and the Civil Rights
466
Movement, and the women's movement, and everything else. It's the
467
popular movements which expanded the domain of freedom of speech [and
468
other liberties] until it began to be meaningful." [Understanding
471
Once these rights were won, the ruling elite has always turned to
472
fascism to control them once they started to threaten their power and
473
wealth. This obviously applies to Chile. Until the coup of 11 September
474
1973, Chile had been seen increasing participation of the working class
475
in economic and social decision making. The coup was, simply, a massive
476
class revenge of the wealthy against a working class which had dared to
477
imagine that another world was possible. Unsurprisingly, given the key
478
role of working class people in the struggle for freedom, "Worker
479
leaders and activists . . . were central targets of the military
480
regime's state terror, whose goal was to intimidate them into
481
passivity, in large part so that neoliberal policies could be imposed."
482
[Peter Winn, "Introduction", Op. Cit., p. 12] Equally unsurprising,
483
those who had taken to the streets aimed for political freedom in order
484
to end the "economic liberty" imposed by the regime.
486
This means that Friedman's maxim that economic liberty is required to
487
produce political liberty is a deeply flawed position to take. Not only
488
does it ignore the popular struggles which have always had to be fought
489
to end minority government, it also allows its advocates to justify and
490
work with authoritarian regimes. At best, this position ensures that
491
you will be indifferent to the destruction of political freedom as long
492
as "economic liberty" (i.e. capitalism) was secured. At worse, it
493
ensures that you would actively support such a destruction as you can
494
justify it in terms of a return to "democracy" in the long run.
495
Friedman and the "Chicago Boys" express both ends of that spectrum.
496
That he can comment on "the paradox that economic freedom produces
497
political freedom but political freedom may destroy economic freedom"
498
in the context of Chile is staggering, as it was the destruction of
499
"political freedom" that allowed "economic freedom" (for the rich) to
500
be imposed. [Op. Cit.] In reality, Chile provides evidence to support
501
the alternative argument that the introduction of free market
502
capitalism requires the elimination or, at best, the reduction of
505
In other words, fascism was an ideal political environment to introduce
506
"economic liberty" because it had destroyed political liberty. Perhaps
507
we should conclude that the denial of political liberty is both
508
necessary and sufficient in order to create (and preserve) "free
509
market" capitalism? After all, the history of capitalism has been
510
marked by the ruling class overthrowing "political liberty" when their
511
power was threatened by popular movements. In other words, that
512
Malatesta was right to argue that the "capitalists can maintain the
513
struggle in the economic field so long as workers demand small . . .
514
improvements; but as soon as they see their profits seriously
515
diminished and the very existence of their privileges threatened, they
516
appeal to government and if it is not sufficiently understanding and
517
not strong enough to defend them . . . they use their own wealth to
518
finance new repressive forces and to set up a new government which will
519
serve them better." [Op. Cit., p. 131]
521
Friedman's argument implies that "economic liberty" is more important
522
than "political liberty," so making people less concerned about
523
dictatorships as long as they support the interests of the capitalist
524
class. While the long list of capitalists, conservatives and right-wing
525
("classical") liberals who supported fascism or fascist-like regimes
526
shows that giving them an ideological prop to justify it is
527
unnecessary, it is hardly wise.
529
Then there is the question of whether Chile does, in fact, have genuine
530
political liberty (i.e. a democratic government). The answer is, not
531
quite. Chile's democracy is a "managed" one, constrained both by the
532
political legacy of Pinochet's constitution and the threat of military
533
intervention. Significantly, Friedman seems unconcerned about the
534
quality of the post-Pinochet democracy Chile experiences. Simply put,
535
the existence of an electoral regime cannot be confused with democracy
536
or "political liberty."
538
It is clear that Pinochet went into the 1988 plebiscite expecting to
539
win (particularly as he tried to rig it like the 1980 one). According
540
to many reports from members of his cabinet and staff, he was
541
absolutely furious and wanted to annul the results. The popular
542
backlash this would have created ensured he abided by the result.
543
Instead, he ensured that the new governments had to accept his
544
authoritarian constitution and decree-laws. In other words, knowing he
545
would be replaced he immediately took steps to limit the subsequent
546
democratically elected governments as well as remaining as the head of
547
the armed forces (as we discuss below, this obviously ensures the
548
threat of a coup hung over the new governments).
550
This means that post-Pinochet Chile is not your typical "democracy."
551
Pinochet became an unelected senator for life after his retirement as
552
armed forces commander in March 1998 and 28% of the Senate is
553
"designated," including four retired military officers named by the
554
National Security Council. Pinochet also imposed a "unique binomial
555
electoral law, [in] which to elect two deputies or senators from the
556
same district, a party or electoral alliance needed to double its
557
opponent's vote -- a difficult feat -- or else the opponent received an
558
equal number of seats in congress." This ensured rightist control of
559
the Senate despite a decade of majority victories by the centre-left in
560
elections and so "Pinochet's 'designated senators' and undemocratic
561
electoral law continued to frustrate the popular will and limit Chile's
562
restored democracy." The majority could not "pass laws without the
563
consent of its rightist opponents." Pinochet used "final months as
564
president to decree laws that would hamstring his opponents, even if a
565
majority of the electorate supported them." In addition, any new
566
government was "confronted by a judiciary and government bureaucracy
567
packed by Pinochet with his own adherents. Moreover, the Right enjoyed
568
a near monopoly of the press and media that grew as the decade
569
advanced." [Winn, "The Pinochet Era", Op. Cit., p. 64 and p. 49]
571
Thus Chile is lumbered with Pinochet's legacy, "the authoritarian
572
constitution of 1980, which sought to create a 'protected democracy'
573
under military tutelage. It was written so as to be difficult to amend
574
and designed to handcuff a future opposition government and frustrate
575
popular will." It "removed the military from civilian control, while
576
submitting future elected governments to a military-dominated National
577
Security Council with a vague but broad purview." It also "banned
578
measures against private property." With some "relative minor
579
modifications of some of its most egregious features during the
580
transition to democracy" it remained "in effect for the rest of the
581
century" and in 2004 was "still Chile's fundamental charter." [Winn,
582
Op. Cit., p. 30] This constitution built upon the work of
583
right-"libertarian" Friedrich von Hayek and, unsurprisingly aimed to
584
insulate "economic liberty" from popular pressures, i.e. to limit and
585
reduce democracy to secure the freedom of capitalism (and, of course,
586
the capitalist class).
588
In addition, the threat of military intervention is always at the
589
forefront of political discussions. For example, on 11 September 1990,
590
Pinochet "warned that he would lead another coup is conditions
591
warranted it. In 1993, when investigations into an arms procurement
592
scandal implicated his son, Pinochet ordered combat-ready troops and
593
tanks onto the streets for an 'exercise' . . . Throughout the Aylwin
594
presidency, Pinochet maintained an army 'shadow cabinet' that acted as
595
a political pressure group." Unsurprisingly, the first post-Pinochet
596
government "often backed down in practice for the sake of social peace
597
-- or out of fear of endangering the transition to democracy. As a
598
result, Aylwin was unable to fulfil his promises of constitutional and
599
institutional reforms that would reverse Pinochet's authoritarian
600
legacy." This was because the new government thought that the coup and
601
dictatorship "reflected the decision of business elites to call in the
602
military, because they could not protect their core interests under
603
Chile's radicalised democracy. The lesson that . . . [they] drew . . .
604
was that to avoid its repetition in the 1990s it was necessary to
605
reassure business that its interests would be protected." [Winn, Op.
606
Cit., p. 50 and p. 53]
608
The limited nature of Chile's democracy was seen in 1998, when Pinochet
609
was arrested in Britain in regard of a warrant issued by a Spanish
610
Judge for the murders of Spanish citizens during his regime.
611
Commentators, particularly those on the right, stressed that Pinochet's
612
arrest could undermine Chile's "fragile democracy" by provoking the
613
military. In other words, Chile is only a democracy in-so-far as the
614
military let it be. Of course, few commentators acknowledged the fact
615
that this meant that Chile was not, in fact, a democracy after all.
617
All of which explains why subsequent governments have only tinkered
618
with the free-market policies introduced by Pinochet. They have dared
619
not reverse them not due to their popular nature but to the obvious
620
fact that recent Chilean history shows that progressive politicians and
621
their supporters have something to fear besides losing an election.
622
Unsurprisingly, workers "socio-economic aspirations were postponed in
623
the interest of not jeopardising the transition and their expectations
624
of labour law reform were sacrificed on the same alter." [Winn,
625
"Introduction", Winn (ed.), Op. Cit., p. 10] While 2002 saw the
626
election of the first socialist president since Allende, it is unlikely
627
that Chile will experience anything beyond minor reforms -- the legacy
628
of fear and political restrictions will ensure that the ruling class
629
will have little to fear from "political liberty" being used by
630
politicians to curb their power and wealth.
632
Then there is the social legacy of 17 years of dictatorship. As one
633
expert on Latin America, Cathy Scheider, noted in 1993, "the
634
transformation of the economic and political system" under Pinochet
635
"has had a profound impact on the world view of the typical Chilean,"
636
with most having "little contact with other workers or with their
637
neighbours, and only limited time with their family. Their exposure to
638
political or labour organisations is minimal. . . they lack either the
639
political resources or the disposition to confront the state. The
640
fragmentation of opposition communities has accomplished what brute
641
military repression could not. It has transformed Chile, both
642
culturally and politically, from a country of active participatory
643
grassroots communities, to a land of disconnected, apolitical
644
individuals. The cumulative impact of this change is such that we are
645
unlikely to see any concerted challenge to the current ideology in the
646
near future." [quoted by Noam Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New, p.
649
In such circumstances, political liberty can be re-introduced, as no
650
one is in a position to effectively use it. In addition, Chileans live
651
with the memory that challenging the state in the near past resulted in
652
a fascist dictatorship murdering thousands of people as well as
653
repeated and persistent violations of human rights by the junta, not to
654
mention the existence of "anti-Marxist" death squads -- for example in
655
1986 "Amnesty International accused the Chilean government of employing
656
death squads." [P. Gunson, A. Thompson, G. Chamberlain, Op. Cit., p.
657
86] According to one Human Rights group, the Pinochet regime was
658
responsible for 11,536 human rights violations between 1984 and 1988
659
alone. [Calculation of "Comite Nacional de Defensa do los Derechos del
660
Pueblo," reported in Fortin, September 23, 1988]
662
These facts that would have a strongly deterrent effect on people
663
contemplating the use of political liberty to actually change the
664
status quo in ways that the military and economic elites did not
665
approve of. This does not mean, of course, that the Chilean people are
666
not resisting oppression and exploitation and rebuilding their
667
organisations, simply that using free speech, striking and other forms
668
of social action is more difficult. That is protects and increases the
669
power, wealth and authority of the employer and state over their wage
670
slaves goes without sating -- it was what was intended. As Kropotkin
671
pointed out years ago, "freedom of press . . . and all the rest, are
672
only respected if the people do not make use of them against the
673
privileged classes. But the day the people begin to take advantage of
674
them to undermine those privileges, then the so-called liberties will
675
be cast overboard." [Op. Cit., p. 42] Chile is a classic example of
676
this, a bloody example which helps deter genuine democracy in that
677
country decades later.
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1. file://localhost/home/mauro/baku/debianize/maint/anarchy/secDcon.html
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