2
A response to a Response to "Left-Anarchist" Criticisms of Anarcho-Capitalism
4
This is a reply to the anti-anti-"anarcho"-capitalist FAQ to be
5
found at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/7895 by Chris Wilson.
6
It aims to "correct the misrepresentations of anarcho-capitalism (and
7
"right-wing" libertarianism in general) made by the anarcho-socialists
8
[sic!] who run the Anarchist FAQ webpage, and to counter the
9
criticisms the authors make which happen to be legitimate" which
10
are claimed to be in old section F of our FAQ.
12
The author claims that "[m]uch of the anarcho-socialist FAQ is severely
13
distortive of the position that the authors wish to refute, and the authors
14
provide little textual evidence in support of their preconceived notions
15
of anarcho-capitalism." This has been the first such attempt since the
16
FAQ went on-line in early 1996. If we did produce "mostly strawmen
17
arguments which do not truly address the actual positions that
18
anarcho-capitalists hold" then no "anarcho"-capitalist before
19
Wilson thought it worthwhile to let us know.
21
The author claims that his "FAQ aims to correct these errors, and to set
22
the record straight for once." That is his right. However, when he first
23
approached us with his criticism we said that we were in the process of
24
revising that section and that we would like to hear his comments in order
25
to correct any mistakes or strawmen we may have accidentally placed in
26
our FAQ (after all, this section contains some of the oldest work on the
27
FAQ and it came from our experiences of discussing with "anarcho"-capitalists
28
on-line so mistakes could easily creep in). Instead of providing us
29
with feedback, he decided to place his critique on-line (which again is
30
his right). Here we reply is his criticism's of the old section F.
32
The new section F should also be consulted, which was being revised as
33
Wilson created his critique of the old section F.
35
---------------------------------------------------------
37
* Section F.1 (Are "Anarcho"-Capitalists Really Anarchists?)
39
This section of the FAQ has been extensively revised and so much of the
40
comments made are to text now found in other sections. The new section
41
F.1 is far more explicit on why "anarcho"-capitalism is not part of the
42
anarchist tradition. However, it is worthwhile to discuss the old version.
44
Mr Wilson starts off by noting us "that this FAQ does not begin by giving a
45
general explanation of what anarcho-capitalism is. The authors instead
46
decided to launch right into their rebuttal, without first informing the
47
reader of their opposition's position." Yes, very true. We assumed that
48
the reader would be familiar enough with the concept so that such a
49
general explanation would not be required. In section B, for example,
50
we discuss general capitalist attitudes towards, say, property, wage
51
labour and so as "anarcho"-capitalism bases itself on these concepts
52
it would be unnecessary to repeat them again.
54
He then quotes our FAQ:
56
So-called "anarcho"-capitalists only oppose the centralised state,
57
not the hierarchical-authoritarian capitalist workplace. Thus
58
it is absurd for them to call themselves anarchists, because the
59
capitalist workplace is where the majority of people have their
60
most frequent, direct, personal, and unpleasant experiences of
65
"More accurately, anarcho-capitalists oppose the governing of a person's
66
behaviour by other persons without that first person's prior consent.
67
A-C'ers do not support the centralised state because it holds a geographical
68
monopoly upon the use of force, which infringes upon the individual
69
sovereignty of those living within that area. Regardless of whether the
70
state is a representative democracy or a dictatorship, it necessarily
71
violates the conditions that make consent a possibility. Specifically,
72
the state thrives on a policy of coercion, which consists of initiating
73
interference with the actions and will of individuals and benefiting at
76
So, in other words, "consent" is required and that makes authoritarianism
77
okay. Thus capitalist hierarchy is fine because workers agree to it but
78
state hierarchy is bad because citizens do not "consent". But as we
79
argue in the new section F.2.3 (Can "anarcho"-capitalist theory justify
80
the state?) in a liberal or democratic state citizens are free to move
81
to another state. They can withdraw their "consent" just as a worker
82
can withdraw their "consent" and look for another job. If consent is
83
the key aspect of whether something is evil or not then the modern
84
state is based upon consent. No one forces you to stay in a given
85
state. Thus "consent" is not enough in itself to justify hierarchy.
87
In addition, we should not that the boss also interferes with the actions
88
and will of individuals and benefits at their expense. Indeed, Murray
89
Rothbard actually states that *if* the state legitimately owned the
90
land it claims then it would be perfectly justified in "interfering"
91
with those lived on its property in exactly the same way that any
92
other property does! (see section F.2.3). His opposition to the state
93
is simply that the property it claims was *unjustly* acquired, not
94
that it restricts individual freedom.
96
Thus, for "anarcho"-capitalists, the difference between restrictions
97
on freedom created by property and those created by statism is that
98
the former are caused by a "just" history (and so are fine) while the
99
later are caused by an "unjust" history (and so are bad). However,
100
given that the property regime we live in is deeply affected by past
101
state actions (see section F.8), this criteria is phoney as capitalism
102
shares a history of violence with the state. If state hierarchy is
103
wrong, so is capitalist -- if "history" is actually to account for
104
anything rather than just as rhetoric to justify capitalist
107
Wilson goes on to state that "anarcho"-capitalists "do not wish to
108
abolish the 'hierarchical-authoritarian capitalist workplace', because
109
of the fact that doing so would place a restriction upon the number of
110
alternatives people can choose to improve their situations without
111
violating the liberty of others."
113
Sounds lovely and freedom enhancing does it not? Until you think about
114
it more deeply. Then you realise that such glorification of choice is
115
just a "dismal politics", where most of the choices are bad. After all,
116
in "actually existing" capitalism the percentage of non-wage slaves
117
in the workforce is around 10% (and this figure includes bosses and
118
not just self-employed workers). The percentage of self-employed has
119
steadily decreased from the dawn of capitalism which means that capitalism
120
itself restricts the number of alternatives people have to choice from!
122
And let us see what the "hierarchical-authoritarian capitalist workplace"
123
involves. It is based upon the worker selling their liberty to gain entry
124
to it. Why do they do that? Because the circumstances they face means
125
that they have little choice but to do so. And these circumstances are
126
created by the rights framework within society; in other words *capitalist*
127
property rights. Wilson assumes that abolishing capitalist property rights
128
will involve "violating the liberty of others" but it is clear that
129
that maintaining these rights results in people "voluntarily" selling
130
their liberty due to the circumstances created by these property rights.
131
In other words, the enforcement of property rights involves the
132
violation of liberty of those subject to the rules and regulations
133
of the property owner. For example, the boss can ban numerous free
134
agreements and exchanges on his property -- the joining of a union,
135
free speech, freedom to wear what you like and so on.
137
Wilson goes on to argue that "a person enters into a bilateral exchange with
138
another person out of an expectation that the benefits of the exchange will
139
exceed its costs. . . . He [the capitalist] underwent the expense involved
140
in purchasing and/or producing these capital goods, and if he does not
141
consent to give them up to the workers, any forceful appropriation of
142
them on behalf of the workers would be a violation of his autonomy."
144
So, just to be clear, if the worker has the option of selling her labour
145
and starving to death then the worker "freely" sells her liberty. Any
146
attempt to change the rights framework of society is a "violation" of
147
the capitalist's "autonomy". The same could be said of the state. After all,
148
the state has went to the expense of purchasing and protecting the land
149
it claims. But, of course, this initial claim was invalid and so the
150
state is to be opposed. But the capitalist class has profited from the
151
state's use of force many a time and the economic circumstances it
152
has helped create. After all, it was state enforcement of the "land
153
monopoly" that created a pool of landless workers who had no choice
154
but to enter into wage slavery. The capitalists enriched themselves
155
at the expense of desperate people with no other options, with state
156
aid to repress strikes and unions.
158
If the state's claims of ownership are phoney, then so are the
159
claims of capitalists.
161
Wilson then laments that:
163
"A worker who does not possess the same amount of wealth as an entrepreneur
164
will often consent to what anarcho-socialists would call an 'unequal
165
exchange' because of the fact that he forecasts that an improvement in his
166
situation will result from it. To prevent this type of exchange from
167
occurring would be to constrain the number of options available that one can
168
choose to improve one's lot."
170
As noted above, it is capitalism that constrains the number of options
171
available to "improve one's lot". But Wilson seems to be assuming that
172
anarchists desire to somehow "ban" wage labour. But we made no such claim.
173
We argued that we need to change the rights framework of society and
174
take back that which has been stolen from us. After all, capitalists
175
have used the state to enrich themselves at our expense for hundreds
176
of years (indeed, as we argue in section F.8 the state played a key
177
role in the development of capitalism in the first place).
179
As Nozick argues in _Anarchy, State, and Utopia_, only "justly" acquired
180
property can be legitimately transferred. But under capitalism, property
181
was not justly acquired (indeed, even Nozick's conceptual theory of
182
land acquisition does not justify land ownership -- see section B.3.4).
183
Thus we are not violating the liberty of capitalists if we take their
184
property and modify the rights framework because it was not their
185
property to begin with!
187
Wilson goes on to argue that "Despite the unpleasant rules that a worker may
188
have to follow when on the job, the worker does it for the purpose of
189
securing something greater in the end."
191
The same logic has been used to justify the state. Despite the unpleasant
192
rules that a citizen may have to follow, they do it for the purpose of
193
securing something greater in the end" -- security, liberty, whatever.
194
That is hardly a convincing argument and seems more to do with justifying
195
and rationalising unfreedom than anything else.
197
So what is the "something greater"? Usually to have enough money to buy
198
food, shelter and so on. Most workers are a pay packet away from poverty.
199
As the "something greater" is to be able to live, that suggests that
200
workers do not "consent" freely to become a wage slave. They have little
205
"This is why anarcho-capitalists do not wish to abolish consensual hierarchy
206
or a mutual acceptance of rules (which is what the anarcho-socialists call
207
'authoritarian' in this case). If people consent to such relationships,
208
it's for the purpose of acquiring a higher degree of freedom that will
209
exceed the degree of sacrifice that the transaction involves. They value
210
the projected outcomes of the exchanges they make more than they value the
211
result of not making the exchange at all."
213
And what is the result of not making the exchange? Poverty, starvation.
214
Wow, some "choice". But anarchists do not wish to abolish consensual
215
hierarchy. We wish to give people a real choice. This real choice is
216
impossible under capitalism and so the vast majority sell their liberty.
217
That Wilson ignores the circumstances that force people to wage labour
220
Now, anarchists have no problem with the "mutual acceptance of rules". This
221
does not need to be "authoritarian" (no matter what Wilson claims we think).
222
For example, in a co-operative the members create their own rules by
223
mutual agreement and debate. That is not authoritarian. What *is*
224
authoritarian is when one person says "I make the rules round here and
225
you can love it or leave it". That is what the state does and it is
226
what the capitalist does. It is authoritarian because the rules are
227
imposed on the rest -- who then have the choice of following these
228
rules or leaving. Thus the capitalist workplace is a dictatorship and
231
Moving on, Wilson disagrees with anarchist claims that capitalism is
232
based upon exploitation and oppression. He states that "[w]hat this FAQ
233
does not mention (in this particular section) is that exploitation doctrine
234
is based upon an economic theory of value, which is, shall we say, less
235
than universally accepted by political theorists and economists today.
236
This is the labour theory of value (LTV). . . "
238
Yes, it is true that most economists and political theorists do not
239
accept the Labour Theory of Value. Most do not understand it and present
240
strawmen arguments against it. But small but significant groupings of
241
economists and political theorists do accept it (for example, individualist
242
anarchists, Marxists, many social anarchists, many post-keynesianists). But
243
the question arises, *why* is the LTV rejected? Simply because it argues
244
that capitalism is based upon exploitation and that non-labour income is
245
usury. Unsurprisingly, when it comes to supporting economic theories,
246
the wealthy will pick those which justify their incomes and riches, not
247
those which argue that they are illegitimate. Thus the LTV along with
248
Henry George's ideas would not be selected within the "free marketplace
249
of ideas" -- indeed the followers of George argue that neo-classical
250
economics was deliberately funded by the wealthy to marginalise their
253
So, to state that the LTV is a "less than universally accepted" is like
254
arguing that because democratic theory was "less than universally accepted"
255
in Nazi Germany there must be something wrong with it. Wilson falls into
256
the common fallacy that economic ideas are value free and do not reflect
259
He goes on to state "anarcho"-capitalists do not "accept that theory"
260
(which comes as no surprise as they do not like to think about what
261
goes on at the point of production that much) and even if we *do*
262
accept the LTV that it is "still not obvious that the
263
'profits = exploitation' conclusion follows from it. In his book
264
Hidden Order, David Friedman makes an interesting point that 'the
265
laws of physics tell us that the sum total of energy can neither
266
be increased, nor reduced. What we call 'production' is the rearrangement
267
of matter and energy from less useful to more useful (to us) forms.' [David
268
Friedman, Hidden Order, p 128] Production managers, just like manual
269
labourers, do precisely this. They produce by rearranging matter through
270
time and space, but rather than rearranging constituent parts to produce a
271
good, they rearrange the goods themselves into the hands of customers (which
272
manual labourers do not do)."
274
Funnily enough, the FAQ does not deny the importance of management and
275
administration skills. No anarchist has ever maintained that workplaces
276
do not need to be managed. Nor did we argue that "manual labour" was the
277
only form of labour that added value. Quite the reverse in fact. What we
278
*did* argue was that in a dictatorship those at the top will consider
279
that *their* contribution added most value to a product and reward
280
themselves appropriately. We argued that the higher up the management
281
structure you go, the less value the labour adds to output. Indeed,
282
the basic function of management is to organise labour in such a
283
way as to maximise profits. That is why the hierarchical workplace
284
exists. In the words of one economist:
286
"Managers of a capitalist enterprise are not content simply to respond
287
to the dictates of the market by equating the wage to the value of
288
the marginal product of labour. Once the worker has entered the
289
production process, the forces of the market have, for a time at least,
290
been superseded. The effort-pay relation will depend not only on
291
market relations of exchange but also. . . on the hierarchical relations
292
of production - on the relative power of managers and workers within
293
the enterprise." [William Lazonick, _Business Organisation and the
294
Myth of the Market Economy_, pp. 184-5]
296
Thus profits are maximised by maximising the labour workers do while
297
minimising the amount paid to them. That is what the management structure
298
exists for. That Wilson denies this suggests that he views the firm
299
as some kind of "black-box" within which human social relationships
300
and action are irrelevant. But this is not the case -- what does on
301
in production is the key to profitability. As the early socialist
302
Thomas Hodgskin put it:
304
"Fixed capital does not derive its utility from previous,
305
but present labour; and does not bring its owner a profit because
306
it has been stored up, but because it is a means of obtaining a
307
command over labour."
309
And nothing has changed. As Proudhon long ago argued, only labour
310
is productive. Without labour capital would rust away. Thus the
311
LTV is far more applicable that Wilson would like us to believe.
313
Now, Wilson claims that "manual labourers" do not "rearrange the goods
314
themselves into the hands of customers" but in a co-operative the
315
workforce does just that. They elect managers and take part in the
316
management structure. Wilson fails to notice that workers do not do
317
that in capitalist firms because the management structure is top-down
318
and is designed to disempower workers. So if workers do not do these
319
tasks it is because management has the monopoly of (official) power
320
and decides that *it* adds most value and deserves a higher reward.
321
So, in other words, capitalist property rights create dictatorship
322
and those in the dictatorship enrich themselves. Not a surprising
325
Wilson then argues that "anarcho"-capitalists "reject the labour theory of
326
value in favour of marginal utility theory, which holds that prices are
327
determined by the subjective preferences and plans of individuals."
329
Of course, the LTV also argues that prices are determined by the subjective
330
preferences of individuals. In order to have exchange value, a commodity
331
must have a use value to a customer. And, of course, exchange value does
332
not equal price but is instead an abstraction of the fact that when a
333
commodity is produced a specific set of costs have been spent on it.
334
These costs are objective facts and determine whether a commodity makes
335
a profit or not. In the long term, commodities would exchange at a
336
price equivalent to the abstract exchange value but in the short term
337
they vary according to supply and demand. As we argue in section C,
338
the marginal utility theory ignores the fact that a commodity has an
339
objective cost associated with it which is its exchange value. When
340
it boils down to it, the profit which a product generates is what
341
capitalists "subjectively value" and these profits are dependent on
342
the productivity of labour (i.e. the more workers make in a given
343
period for the same wage, the higher potential profits will be).
345
Wilson goes on to state that "It's obvious that the author has little
346
respect for the reasoned arguments published by free-market economists
347
and political theorists in the last century. It's pretty insulting when
348
somebody responds to a reasoned argument by scoffing at it and referring
349
to it as 'apologetics' or 'rationalisation', rather than giving it serious
350
consideration." But, strangely enough, we discussed why we think the
351
LTV is a better way of analysing capitalism that than those provided
352
by "free-market economists and political theorists" and in our humble
353
opinion, it is apologetics and rationalisations. Sorry is Mr Wilson
354
does not agree, but then again he would not. For example, most of
355
"anarcho"-capitalism seems to involve apologetics and rationalisations
356
for the restrictions of individual liberty associated with capitalism.
357
See, for example, section F.2.1 in which Murray Rothbard rationalises
358
away capitalist oppression even when it clearly has similarities
359
with statist oppression. Similarly, many Stalinists and supporters of
360
Nazism provided many "reasoned arguments" to indicate why the fact
361
of dictatorship was essential. Just because currently capitalist
362
ideology is widely accepted does not make it any less apologetics
363
than these "reasoned arguments." Again, Wilson assumes that economic
364
theory is value free rather than being the "economics of the rich"
365
to use Edward Herman's cutting phrase.
367
Wilson then states that "[t]his paragraph is both a form of argument
368
from intimidation and argument ad hominem, and hence we shall let it pass
369
without further comment." Well, having discussed in section C why we
370
think that capitalism is exploitative we did not think we really had
371
to repeat ourselves. And as far as arguments from intimidation and
372
arguments ad hominem go, Wilson indulges himself in this later with
373
his "parasite", "dictator" and other comments.
375
He then quotes the FAQ:
377
"Anarcho"-capitalists, however, believe that capitalist companies
378
will necessarily remain hierarchical even if the public state has
379
been dissolved. This is because only hierarchical workplaces are
380
"efficient" enough to survive in a 'free' market. This belief
381
reveals the priority of their values: "efficiency" (the bottom
382
line) is considered more important than eliminating the
383
domination, coercion, and exploitation of workers. In addition,
384
such hierarchies will need "defending" from those oppressed by
385
them; and hence, due to its support of private property (and thus
386
authority), "anarcho"-capitalism
387
ends up retaining a state in its "anarchy," namely a private state
388
whose existence its proponents attempt to deny simply by refusing
389
to call it a state, like an ostrich hiding its head in the sand
390
(see section F.6 for more on this and why "anarcho"-capitalism is
391
better described as "private state" capitalism).
393
And argues that "[t]his is rhetoric, not argument. Apparently, the authors
394
would rather rave on about their own beliefs, rather than give a fair
395
representation of anarcho-capitalism. Notice that no assertion in the
396
above quote is defended--not the assertion that capitalist production
397
involves 'domination, coercion, or exploitation', nor the assertion that
398
ownership of private property is 'authoritarian'. Nor do we receive a
399
definition for any of these slippery concepts. Nor do they bother to
400
give a fair explanation as to why anarcho-capitalists disagree with them
403
Now, lets see about these claims. Now, the reason why anarchists think
404
that capitalist production involves "domination, coercion, and exploitation"
405
of workers was discussed at great length in sections B and C of the FAQ.
406
Indeed, it is mentioned in passing in section A on why anarchists are
407
socialists and why anarchists support direct democracy. Apparently we
408
should have repeated all our arguments again in order to meet Wilson's
409
inability to look at the rest of the FAQ. Of course, perhaps, we should
410
have placed links to the appropriate sections but given that we doubted
411
that anyone would jump straight into section F.1 we did not. Now as far
412
as a "fair explanation" as to why "anarcho"-capitalists disagree with
413
real anarchists on these issues we indicate why capitalistic property
414
is wrong (and we argued in section B.3 and B.1 why private property
415
is "authoritarian" -- something, we should note, that "anarcho"-capitalists
416
do not actually disagree with. They just argue that "consent" ensures
417
that the authoritarian relationships it creates are not a restriction
418
of liberty). Now, the aim of section F of the FAQ was to explain why
419
"anarcho"-capitalism was not a form of anarchism. And this is what
420
we did. Hence Wilson's comments are misplaces, to say the least.
422
Wilson then does on to argue that capitalist production "does involve
423
hierarchy, considering that the owners of the means of production must
424
direct the disposal of their resources so that they don't go to waste."
425
So, as noted, he agrees that capitalist private property *is* authoritarian
426
(how could hierarchy be anything else?). Thus his laments that we just
427
"assert" this fact is somewhat strange. He then tries to get out of
430
"the same situation will accrue under worker ownership. All production
431
strategies and guidelines would be established by a system of majority
432
vote, and so it's doubtful that any single individual will have a much
433
greater influence in determining them than one would under a under
434
an hierarchical capitalist corporation."
436
Really? But a key aspect of anarchist ideas of self-management is that
437
capitalist corporations must be broken up and replaced by a confederation
438
of self-managed workplaces. The workers in a given workplace would
439
have extensive control over what affects them directly and the possibility
440
of influencing the decisions of the wider issues that affect their
441
industry. So it is nonsense to say that individuals will not have a
442
greater influence than in a hierarchical capitalist firm. Unlike in
443
a capitalist firm they are not just order takers (and lets not forget
444
that this is what the worker is under capitalism). They can and do
445
have control over many important aspects of their work. This can
446
be seen when limited workers control is introduced into capitalist
447
firms, so Wilson's claims are just an attempt to justify factory
450
Talking of which, he celebrates this when he argues that:
452
"The only difference that might possibly accrue as a result of worker
453
ownership would be a higher degree of gridlock involved in determining
454
company policy. With respect to a political institution, gridlock is
455
good; it prevents any single individual from having too much power and from
456
subsequently passing a great deal of tyrannical statute law. With respect
457
to a business, gridlock is bad, because it prevents business from adapting
458
to constantly changing market conditions."
460
Which is, of course, a fascist argument transferred from the political
461
to the economic regime (which, of course, is something fascists also
462
do). And, as Bob Black argued in _The Libertarian as Conservative_,
463
it is also an argument put forward by Marx, Engels and Lenin. What
464
strange bed-fellows right-libertarians have! Now, Wilson is attacking
465
economic democracy because it creates "grid lock" (although, as all
466
co-operatives indicate, it does nothing of the kind) which, he claims,
467
is good in politics because "it prevents any single individual from
468
having too much power". What "logic". Economic dictatorship *does* place
469
"too much power" in the hands of the boss, that is why anarchists have
470
always recognised that (to use Proudhon's words) that "property is
473
How strange. Identical social relationships switch from being bad to
474
good purely on whether it is a capitalist that has power or a state
475
official. Such is the power of "consent"!
477
Wilson then moves onto bigger and better claims:
479
"Some 'anarchists' claim that there will not be any competition between
480
worker-owned firms under their version of 'anarchy', because all individual
481
firms will be subordinated to the direction of a larger system of worker
482
management. Of course, what this 'larger system of worker management'
483
amounts to is an institution that falls neatly under the Weberian definition
484
of a state. That isn't to say, of course, that the 'anarchists' who
485
advocate this social arrangement aren't opposed to statism. On the
486
contrary, they're vehemently opposed to the state provided that they and
487
their comrades aren't in charge of it."
489
Yes, anarchists who favour workplace self-management *really* want to
490
be "in charge" of a new state! What wonderful logic! Using this logic
491
it would be simple to prove that Hitler was an anarchist (he argued
492
for dictatorship but obviously he favoured anarchy just as the anarchists
493
who argue for self-management desire dictatorship). Moreover, Wilson
494
totally misrepresents anarchist ideas of workplace confederation. The
495
"larger system of worker management" is based upon freely joining a
496
confederation and the individual workplaces within it have as much
497
autonomy as they agree they need. To claim that this is statist is
498
just plain silly -- it is clearly an agreement between groups to
501
Now, let us look at the capitalist workplace or corporation. Within
502
these the boss bans all competition within his/her property he/she
503
does not desire. So if the anarchist system of confederation meets
504
the Weberian definition of a state so does the capitalist firm!
505
Indeed, as we argue in section F.6.4, the property owner can "ban"
506
workers from, say, joining a union or subscribing to specific "defence"
507
firms. In other words, the "anarcho"-capitalist are vehemently
508
opposed to the state provided that the capitalists are not in charge
511
So Wilson highlights the central fallacy of "anarcho"-capitalism, namely
512
that private property some how does not meet the Weberian definition of
513
the state. But, in fact, it clearly does. Something, a may note that
514
Murray Rothbard (in his own way) recognised but did not consider
515
important enough to draw the obvious conclusions from. Which
516
presents us with the question: Is voluntary democracy more libertarian
517
than voluntary dictatorship? Anarchists think that self-management has
518
far more to do with liberty that hierarchy and so oppose capitalism.
519
"Anarcho"-capitalists seem to think that dictatorship has no effect
520
on liberty. Which is somewhat strange, to say the least.
522
Wilson then goes on to state that "worker ownership and even communal
523
ownership of the means of production would be perfectly legitimate under
524
anarcho-capitalism, provided that nobody violates anybody else's consent."
526
Which is ironic, as capitalism was created by violating the rights of
527
working people to worker ownership/control and communal ownership
528
(see section F.8). How that the capitalists have the upper hand,
529
they can embrace "free competition" knowing that their advantage on
530
the market will ensure that workers control will not spread (see
531
sections J.5.11, J.5.12 and J.5.13). Kind of like the thief who
532
argues that you can take back what was stolen from you as long
533
as you do not violate his consent (which he is not going to give)!
535
So Wilson is simply acknowledging that under capitalism you have to
536
buy the freedom which should be your birth right from those who have
537
stolen it! How generous.
539
Wilson then goes to agree with the FAQ by stating that management "does
540
set the terms of the use and disposal of company property (whoever the owners
541
happen to be)" and so workers *are* subject to authoritarian social
542
relationships and so are not free. But, he argues, "according to what
543
standard would the workers have a right to forcibly seize the means of
544
production out of dissatisfaction with the situation?" There are many
545
answers to this (answers which Mr Wilson does not present which means,
546
to paraphrase his good self, "nor does he bother to give a fair explanation
547
as to why anarchists disagree with them on this issue").
549
If we take a Stirnerite point of few, we could argue that workers need
550
no "right" to take them over. They desire them and desire freedom. That
551
is good enough in itself. As the capitalists have no "right" to restrict
552
the liberty of workers, workers have no "right" to stop that restriction.
553
They do it anyway. Or we could take a Proudhonist viewpoint which argues
554
that the land cannot be appropriated and so capitalists have no right to
555
their capital as the initial appropriations were illegitimate and they
556
have enriched themselves by the labour of others who have been placed
557
in evil circumstances by capitalist property rights. Or we could argue
558
along Bakuninist lines that freedom is what we value most and so society
559
should be re-organised so that unnecessary domination is eliminated,
560
particularly the domination that flows from unpaid labour.
562
Of course Wilson assumes that capitalist "rights" to their property are
563
beyond question. Let us turn the question on its head. By what right
564
do capitalists have of oppressing workers and barring people from their
565
property? If we take Rothbard's "Homesteading" conceptual theory (see
566
section F.4.1) then it boils down to "finders keepers" and so humanity
567
will always be enchained by the first people to appropriate land. So
568
living people will see their liberty restricted because of past history.
570
Wilson *does* present one "right", namely:
572
"Because they use it while working on it?" By this criterion, it's
573
acceptable for one to seize anything that one is capable of using, without
574
regard to those who already hold it in their possession. I would imagine
575
that any anarcho-socialist who prefers an arrangement in which there is
576
some form of peaceful social order would hold that certain predatory forms
577
of behaviour are not acceptable, but to grant use-rights to anybody who is
578
capable of using something is to encourage such forms of behaviour. If there
579
are to be rights of usage at all, people must forgo the power involved
580
in appropriating resources that are already in use by other people. If
581
people do not forgo that particular freedom, then nobody will be able to
582
secure access to the resources that they use, or to be able to exercise
583
their freedom in relation to it. The physical objects and resources that
584
one utilises for one's purposes would always be up for claim by the next
585
person who comes along (and may the strongest man win!)."
587
Well, where to start. Anarchists argue that use-rights will ensure that
588
workers self-management is secured. This is because whoever is currently
589
using a resource (as a factory) has the right to take part in the
590
management of that resource. Now, it kind of goes without saying that
591
use rights are based upon respecting other people's use of resources.
592
Thus it is not a case of Hobbesian "anarchy" in which people do not
593
respect others. Thus people will "forgo the power" of taking what other
594
people are using (except in emergencies, of course). Thus the "strongest"
595
would not be able to kick tenants out of the house they are living in.
596
So, use-rights simply means that when using something people manage its
597
use. Workers in a workplace manage its use and anyone who newly joins
598
the co-operative gets to take part in decision making. Use rights are
599
the way of restricting domination by promoting self-management.
601
Wilson argues that granting "use-rights" will encourage Hobbesian behaviour,
602
which suggests that he thinks that people cannot live together peacefully
603
without police forces and laws (well, then again, he *is* an
604
"anarcho"-capitalist). It seems strange to think that an anarchist
605
society would develop in which people would have so little respect
606
for others. Given that the whole point of the expropriation of the
607
capitalists was to maximise individual freedom and dignity, it is
608
doubtful that people would start to violate those values. But Wilson
609
is assuming that without police forces humanity would turn into
610
a Hobbesian war of all against all but this has never been the case
611
of communities based upon use rights (see Kropotkin's _Mutual Aid_
612
for extensive evidence).
614
Wilson, after misrepresenting anarchist ideas, now moves on to justifying
615
capitalist domination:
617
"Abiding by the rules and codes enforced on the job may be irritating at
618
times, but an exchange is a relationship that one enters into voluntarily."
620
But the same could be said of the state. No one forces you to remain in
621
any given state. There are plenty more to choose from. If you do not
622
want to move then you have voluntarily consented to the social contract.
623
So, abiding by the rules and codes enforced in the state may be irritating
624
at times, but an exchange is a relationship that one enters into
625
voluntarily. After all, as Rothbard himself argued, *if* the state had
626
acquired its property "justly" then the "anarcho"-capitalist would
627
have no problems with its laws, rules and codes (see section F.2.3).
629
By stressing "consent" and ignoring the relationships generated by the
630
contract, "anarcho"-capitalism ends up justifying state-like structures.
631
If the current system of states was replaced by, say, 500 large companies,
632
would that make the rules and codes any different from state laws? Of
635
Wilson argues that "if one does not think that the value offered by the
636
other party is sufficient to cover the cost of the transaction, then one
637
should not make the exchange in the first place."
639
How true. The woman who agrees to sleep with her boss to keep her job,
640
the drowning man who agrees to pay a passing boatman $5 million to be
641
saved, the landless peasant who agrees to work in a sweatshop for
642
14 hours a day all "freely" make an exchange. After all, if they do
643
not what they face is even worse than the options of the "exchange".
644
Who can deny that they all think that the "value" offered by the
645
other party makes it worthwhile to enter into the exchange? And who
646
but an "anarcho"-capitalist will deny that these exchanges are
647
evil ones which violate the liberty and dignity of the party in
648
unfortunate circumstances?
650
To concentrate on "exchange" is simply to blind oneself to relations
651
of domination and oppression.
653
Wilson then goes on to wax-lyrical on the "mentality" of the strawman
654
he has created above:
656
"The opinion that one has the right to appropriate from others at whim
657
without their consent whenever one is dissatisfied with one's situation
658
is the doctrine of a thief or a dictator. He who accepts this doctrine
659
possesses the mentality of a parasite and a free-rider, not the mentality
660
of a person who is willing to respect the sovereignty of other people
661
(i.e., a person fit to live in a civilised society)."
663
Now, do anarchists say that we support appropriation from others "at
664
whim"? No, anarchists argue that we support appropriations that stop
665
unnecessary domination and oppression. Thus we argue for the appropriation
666
of the capitalist class because, firstly, their goods are stolen property
667
and, secondly, they create relations of domination and dictatorship
668
between people. It was only a matter of time before Wilson started
669
going on about "free-riders" and "parasites" and we are surprised it
670
has taken this long for him to do so. It is somewhat ironic, to say
671
the least, that supporters of capitalism argue that anarchists are
672
"parasites". Far from it. Anarchists desire to end the system where
673
capitalists are parasites upon the working class. Similarly, we desire
674
to end capitalist property because it does not respect the sovereignty
675
of other people (workers do not have the right of self-management within
676
capitalist workplaces and circumstances force them to sell their liberty
677
to others in order to survive).
679
Actually, it is Wilson who expresses the mentality of a dictator when
680
he attacks use-rights. You can just imagine a feudal lord or aristocrat
681
arguing that just because someone lives on their land, it does not
682
give them any right to determine the laws they are subject to. That
683
rests with the owner, namely the lord or state. Indeed, we have shades
684
of Locke in Wilson's argument. Locke argued that only the wealthy should
685
pass laws within civil society. The poor, while being subject to them,
686
do not have a say in them. They are included within, but not part of,
687
civil society. Wilson's diatribe against use rights exposes the elitist
688
roots of "anarcho"-capitalism and that this regime will universal
689
monarchy and dictatorship in the name of "liberty" (after all, it will
690
be the property owner who determines the laws and rules which those
691
who just happen to work or life there are subject to).
693
Now, as far as people able to "live in a civilised society" goes it is
694
pretty clear that a rights system that can result in famine, hierarchy
695
and extreme poverty is hardly "civilised". Indeed, until the rise of
696
capitalism the idea that people had a right to life was a common one.
697
All that changed and now we face the option "work or starve". How
698
*very* civilised. And, of course, how "civilised" is a system which
699
ensures that the majority has to sell their liberty to others? If
700
civilisation is the progress of individual liberty, then capitalism
701
is not a form of civilisation.
703
Wilson then quotes the FAQ:
705
And, of course, inequalities of power and wealth do not restrict
706
themselves to workplaces nor is the damage of hierarchy upon
707
individuals and their liberty limited to working hours. Both have
708
a deep impact on the rest of society, expanding into all areas of
709
life and restricting liberty everywhere.
713
"Evidence? If people enter into relationships that they perceive as leading
714
to improvements over their initial situation, it's difficult to see how
715
liberty can be restricted as a result. One can make errors of judgement when
716
making these decisions, but one of the conditions of living in a free
717
society is that one possess the freedom to make mistakes (even disastrous
718
ones!) and to learn from them."
720
Evidence? Section B.1 has evidence on the wider effects of capitalism.
721
That inequalities of wealth and power have a deep impact on the rest
722
of society is a truism (see section F.3 for some discussion). Now
723
Wilson claims that "people enter into relationships that they perceive
724
as leading to improvements over their initial situation, it's difficult
725
to see how liberty can be restricted as a result" which is wonderful!
727
Let as see, workers enter into relationships they perceive as leading
728
to improvements over their initial situation (their initial situation
729
is that they will starve to death unless they get money; unsurprisingly
730
they enter into the wage slave relationship). As a result of this
731
relationship, profits accumulate in the hands of the few. This increases
732
inequality within society and, after all, money is power. Thus "bilateral
733
exchanges" can result in restrictions of liberty for those involved
734
and externalities in terms of inequality which affect other people
735
(see section F.2 and F.3). Increasing inequality means that the few have
736
increased clout and so can hang out longer then the less well off.
737
This means that the less well off compromise faster and deeper than
738
they would otherwise do. These compromises increase inequalities
739
and so the process continues, with the few increasing their power
740
within society and the amount of land/resources they own.
742
Yes, indeed, people can make errors of judgement and the freedom to
743
make mistakes is essential, but neither of these facts means that
744
we should support capitalism. If making decisions is the thing we
745
value then supporting a system which actively restricts decision
746
making (for example, in work) is somewhat strange. Similarly,
747
to support a system which promotes inequalities which end up
748
restricting out options to (effectively) choosing which boss
749
will govern us hardly promotes choice. So, in a free society, we
750
must take responsibility for our decisions but capitalism so
751
restricts these decisions as to make a mockery of freedom.
752
That is why anarchists oppose it.
754
Wilson then says that it is "interesting to note that the first person the
755
FAQ quotes in its section on anarcho-capitalism is an anarcho-socialist who
756
understands the position being critiqued about as well as the authors of
757
the FAQ." Actually, Chomsky gets to the root of the problem with
758
"anarcho"-capitalism, it is just "anarchism for the rich" and would
759
soon result in extensive restrictions of liberty for the majority. It
760
is clear that Wilson does not understand this basic point and so ignores
765
"So much for providing textual evidence in support of the position being
766
critiqued. But then again, fair representation of the opposition is obviously
767
not one of the intentions behind the FAQ."
769
But, as Wilson himself as indicated, we have not needed to provide textual
770
support of the position being critiqued. He himself as acknowledged that
771
"anarcho"-capitalism has no problem with capitalist hierarchy and has
772
indeed went out of his way to justify factory fascism. Perhaps he will ask
773
us to provide textual evidence that "anarcho"-capitalism supports
774
capitalism? And the intention of the FAQ? To argue why "anarcho"-capitalism
775
is not anarchist, something Wilson has done so in his critique.
777
Wilson quotes the FAQ:
779
It is clear, then, that "anarcho"-capitalists are not really
780
anti-authoritarians, because they would allow authoritarianism to
781
persist where it has the most direct impact on ordinary people: in
786
"It's not clear from the FAQ at all, considering that it doesn't once site a
787
work written by an anarcho-capitalist in this section, nor does it give a
788
considerate explication of anarcho-capitalist viewpoints."
790
Well, why cite a work on "anarcho"-capitalism which states that they
791
support capitalism? Perhaps we should also cite a work by Marxists
792
which states they support Marxism? As Wilson himself makes clear,
793
our argument that "anarcho"-capitalists are not anarchists
794
because they support capitalist hierarchy is correct. He agrees that
795
"anarcho"-capitalists *are capitalists*! Now, as far as a "considerate
796
explication" of "anarcho"-capitalist viewpoints go we have argued
797
that they are not anarchists because they support capitalist hierarchy.
798
As Wilson agrees, they do support them. We discussed why we fought that
799
capitalist claims that workers "consent" to wage labour were phoney
800
in section B.4 and so did not go into details here. Thus we *did*
801
present the case that capitalist hierarchy was fine because workers
802
"consent" to it (and that, after all, is Wilson's "defence" of capitalist
805
In other words, Wilson "critique" is bogus as he fails to place
806
the section he is critiquing in context.
808
Wilson then states that:
810
"It's much more clear that it would be authoritarian to prevent "capitalist
811
acts among consenting adults" (Nozick's term), because people enter in these
812
relations to improve their lot."
814
But, as noted above, anarchists have no desire to prevent wage labour in
815
an anarchist society. Thus Wilson totally misrepresents anarchist ideas.
816
Moreover it is *capitalism* that actively restricts the number of
817
relationships that people can enter into to improve their lot, *not*
818
anarchism. Similarly, Nozick's argument fails to acknowledge that
819
these "acts" generate authoritarian social relationships and creates
820
circumstances in which the majority have little choice but to "consent"
821
to capitalist acts (i.e. wage labour).
823
Moreover, within the capitalist workplace the capitalist can and does
824
prevent socialist acts among consenting adults (for example, the
825
forming of a union, self-managed work, and so forth). So it is much
826
more clear that capitalism is authoritarian simply because it creates
827
relations of domination between the property owning class and the
828
working class. Wilson fails to understand this because he makes an
829
idol of "consent", an idol which can and has been used to define
830
the state (after all, no one forces you to live in a given state).
832
Thus Wilson's defence of "freedom" indicates a definition of freedom
833
which is little more than the justification of relationships of
834
domination and authority (see section F.2 for more on this).
836
He quotes the FAQ again:
838
But anarchism is, by definition, anti-authoritarian (see sections
839
A.1 and A.2.8). Thus "anarcho"-capitalists have illegitimately
840
appropriated the prefix "anarcho" to describe themselves. In
841
reality they are bogus anarchists.
843
and states, "[i]n reality, the authors of the anarcho-socialist FAQ are
844
offering no more than a bogus critique." Which is funny, as Wilson
845
has agreed with our analysis. Yes, he acknowledges, capitalist workplaces
846
*are* hierarchical. Yes, "anarcho"-capitalists have no problem with
847
them because they are "voluntary". Of course, he fails to note the
848
objective conditions facing those who "consent" and makes no attempt
849
to discover whether "anarcho"-capitalism would reinforce these pressures
850
or not (just as he fails to note we addressed this issue of "consent"
851
in section B.4 of the FAQ).
853
So is this a "bogus critique"? No, far from it. While we have totally
854
revised this section of the FAQ in order to make the differences
855
between anarchism and "anarcho"-capitalism clearer, it cannot be
856
said that it is "bogus". After all, Wilson has agreed with our
857
analysis. He just thinks that "consent" makes unfreedom okay. But
858
for anarchists the circumstances which we face are essential for
859
determining whether something is truly consented to. As Wilson
860
takes capitalism and capitalist property rights as given and
861
unchangeable, his objections are question begging in the extreme.
863
Thus, far from being a "bogus critique" Wilson indicates well
864
why "anarcho"-capitalists are not anarchists. Indeed, their theory
865
is little more than an attempt to justify capitalist domination
866
and cloak it with the title "liberty". As Wilson himself shows.
868
* A Critique of Section F.1.2 (How libertarian is right-Libertarian theory?)
870
Wilson starts off by insults:
872
"Unfortunately, the authors aren't in any position to assess whether or
873
not libertarianism is based upon critical thought, considering that they
874
themselves haven't exercised the critical thought necessary to understand
875
the position they're attempting to critique."
877
Strong words. The truth of this statement will be discussed below. He
878
notes that "As for 'theory based upon assumptions', we will see during
879
the course of this FAQ that once we look at these assumptions, they'll
880
appear to be much more sound than the anarcho-socialists [sic!] have
883
Which, of course, is acknowledging that right-libertarianism *is*
884
built upon assumptions! It is just that these assumptions are
885
considered "sound" by "anarcho"-capitalists.
889
"As far as 'change and the ability to evolve' go, 'right' [sic!]
890
libertarians do not have any problems with it in itself. There are
891
many forms of changes that most anarcho-capitalists avidly support (such
892
as technological development), but they do not advocate change for its
893
own sake, nor do they advocate just any form of change. Change is not
894
desirable if it somehow compromises the individual integrity and autonomy
895
of individuals; that cannot be stressed enough."
897
How true. "Anarcho"-capitalists do stress technological change. After all,
898
that is one of needs of capitalism. But the point is that right-libertarians
899
do not stress change within society's rights framework. They assume that
900
capitalist property rights are unchangeable, regardless of how they
901
compromise "individual integrity and autonomy of individuals." That
902
Wilson starts off by using an example of technology (which has often
903
been used to control workers and compromise their autonomy, by the way)
904
is an example of this. As we will see, the assumption that capitalist
905
property rights are unchangeable is one that is commonplace within
906
right libertarianism (and we wonder why Wilson puts right in quotes.
907
Does he not know that "libertarian" was first used by anarchists in
908
the 1880s and that right-libertarianism has stolen the name?).
910
He quotes the FAQ as follows:
912
Right-Libertarianism is characterised by a strong tendency of
913
creating theories based upon a priori theorems. Robert Nozick in
914
Anarchy, State and Utopia makes no attempt to provide a
915
justification of the property rights his whole theory is based
916
upon. Indeed he states that "we shall not formulate [it] here."
917
[Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 150] Moreover, it is not
918
formulated anywhere else by Nozick either. And if it is not
919
formulated, what is there to defend? His whole theory is based
922
And argues that "It's true that Nozick builds his argument upon certain
923
starting 'assumptions' that go undefended within the course of the book.
924
What the authors do not say is that Nozick's main 'assumption' is that
925
'[i]ndividuals have rights, and [that] there are certain things no person
926
or group may do to them (without violating their rights).' [Anarchy, State,
927
and Utopia, p. ix] This 'assumption' isn't one that turns out to be all
930
Quite. And the question now becomes, what rights do we assume that they
931
have? Do people have a right to be free? Not according to Nozick, as
932
his self-ownership thesis ensures that people will be subject to authoritarian
933
social relationships if they "consent" to them. Similarly, many people
934
think that individuals should have a right to life but that is not one
935
that Nozick accepts. If you are starving to death then it would be a
936
worse evil to tax a millionaire $1 than use that $1 to feed you (see
937
section F.4 for example, or the new section F.1.2).
939
Now, the assumption is "plausible" but that was not the assumption we
940
focused upon. Nozick assumes his property rights system, the whole
941
basis of his theory. Thus his theory of transfer is based upon his
942
theory of appropriation of property, a theory which he clearly states
943
he will not provide us with! Somewhat strange that the crux of his
944
whole theory is just not provided. After all, if his argument for
945
appropriating land is proven false then his whole entitlement theory
946
also falls (indeed, as we argue in section B.3.4, such a defence
947
can be put together from Nozick's work and it does not provide such
948
support). So to just assume its truth is amazing. That Wilson fails
949
to even acknowledge the importance of this omission is not surprising,
950
after all it would mean that our argument was correct -- Nozick
951
assumed *the* key aspect of his theory and that his whole book is
952
built upon an unproven assumption. Little wonder he does off on a
953
tangent and does not address the point we make.
955
Wilson then continues with Nozick's "rights" assumption by stating that
956
"Though this is a moral intuition that Nozick doesn't defend in ASU, it
957
is a sufficiently broad-based intuition to be held securely by a rational
958
person. Is the intuition that people have rights one that the authors of
959
the FAQ would deny? If they don't accept the premise that there ought to be
960
certain obligatory side-constraints upon human behaviour for the purpose of
961
preserving the autonomy of people (i.e., rights), that would seem to suggest
962
that they have a rather weak commitment to the ideal of human freedom."
964
Quite what to make of this is difficult to tell. After all, what (say)
965
Marx, Hitler, J.S. Mill, Bakunin, Stirner and so on would consider
966
as "intuitive" rights and what Nozick would consider as such is open
967
to much debate. A rational person would, perhaps, consider the consequences
968
of these rights and determine whether they actually *did* ensure a
969
strong commitment of the ideal of human freedom. If, for example,
970
Nozick's rights resulted in a society of large scale (voluntary) slavery
971
due to minority control of resources then that society would hardly
972
be based on a commitment to human freedom.
974
Thus a rational person rather than following a train of logic which
975
resulted in massive violations of human liberty would decide to change
976
the rights framework they supported. Such a process could be seen at
977
work in J.S. Mill who realised that under capitalism workers could
978
be in a situation little than slavery. Thus an abstract commitment
979
to liberty may result in circumstances that violated the liberty of
980
the many. Thus to claim that anarchists have a "rather weak commitment
981
to the ideal of human freedom" is nonsense. It is rather the right
982
libertarian whose definition of freedom is such so weak as to make
983
a mockery of freedom in practice.
985
And notice that Wilson has still not addressed the issue of the
986
assumption of capitalist property rights and instead decided to
987
imply that anarchists are into violating the rights of others
988
(these rights, of course, being undefined).
992
"Perhaps they reject Nozick's starting moral premise because it hasn't been
993
rationally validated. The truth is: Neither has any basic moral premise.
994
Hume's dictum that it is impossible to derive a normative statement from a
995
set of descriptive statements (assuming that they're free of normative
996
content) still holds, and I challenge the anarcho-socialists to demonstrate
997
that their most basic normative premises can validated in a way that doesn't
998
rely upon intuition."
1000
Or perhaps not. Perhaps we reject Nozick's starting premise because it
1001
cannot deliver what it promises, namely a free society of free individuals.
1005
"It should also be mentioned that although Nozick assumes premises as basic
1006
as the one that people have rights, he does not simply assume the form they
1007
must take or their form of application. On the contrary, he argues for his
1008
libertarian conception of rights via a critical analysis of other political
1009
conceptions of justice as well as his own, and he does so rigorously and
1012
Actually, quote a lot of ink (and electrons) has been used to indicate
1013
that Nozick's "rigorous" and "brilliant" "critical analysis" is nothing
1014
of the kind. For example, his (in)famous "Wilt Chamberlain" argument
1015
that "liberty upsets patterns" is based on the very capitalist property
1016
rights he is defending. Thus his example is question begging in the
1017
extreme. Indeed, many authors have recognised that his analysis is
1018
little more than a justification of capitalist domination and that
1019
it fails to acknowledge that the consequences of his theory could
1020
result in a society in which the major have little or no option
1021
but to follow the orders of the few (for a decisive critique of
1022
Nozick which shows how weak his theory is see Will Kymlicka's
1023
_Contemporary Political Philosophy_).
1027
"Notice that the authors of the FAQ offer no criticisms of Nozick's actual
1028
arguments, but simply dismiss him as quickly as possible. They quote
1029
isolated sections of text for their own purposes of "refutation",
1030
and completely fail to engage the sections of ASU that really matter. Many
1031
political philosophers have expressed serious disagreement with Nozick over
1032
the past few decades, but unlike the authors of the anarcho-socialist FAQ,
1033
they have critically engaged Nozick's views because they recognised that if
1034
they were to advocate a non-libertarian political theory, Nozick's
1035
objections would have to be answered."
1037
Funnily enough, we have quoted Nozick and his arguments many times and
1038
have attempted to answer his "objections" (for example, sections B.3.4,
1039
J.5.12, J.5.13, F.2 and I.4.12). As for "criticisms" of his "actual
1040
arguments" you can find them there. What this section of the FAQ was
1041
discussing was the starting basis of Nozick's arguments, namely in
1042
assumptions. And as Wilson acknowledges, Nozick does build his system
1043
on assumptions. Now, given that Nozick's whole argument is based on
1044
providing a justification for property rights then this section
1045
"really matters". If he provides no arguments for private property
1046
then the rest of his system is nonsense (after all, as the initial
1047
appropriation was unjust, then all the other transfers are unjust
1048
as well). So for Nozick is state he will not provide it is important.
1049
That Wilson does not recognise this is strange to say the least.
1051
After presenting a list of other right-libertarian theorists (although
1052
see Will Kymlicka's _Contemporary Political Philosophy_ for an
1053
excellently critique of many of these theories along with Nozick)
1054
he then states that "we will eventually arrive at section F.7, which
1055
does an excellent job demolishing a fictitious strawman of the admittedly
1056
elusive concept of 'natural law'. This FAQ will demonstrate why the
1057
anarcho-socialist FAQ doesn't actually refute a moral theory that many
1058
libertarians buy into" although section F.7 does not refute a strawman
1059
unless it is a strawman created by supporters of "Natural Law" themselves.
1061
Wilson then disagrees with Murray Bookchin's arguments against "the law
1062
of identity" arguing that identity "doesn't merely account for an entity's
1063
current state of being. The concept of 'identity' easily accounts for
1064
existential change by subsuming the attribute of potentiality. This
1065
criticism attacks Aristotle's first law of logic while ignoring his
1066
conception of the material cause."
1068
This is strange. If we assume "potentiality" then we are arguing that
1069
"A can *potentially* be A", not that "A is A". Water can "potentially"
1070
be both steam and water, does that mean "water is steam" or "water
1071
is ice"? If you argue that "A is A" and then modify it to acknowledge
1072
that "A can perhaps be A sometime in the future" is somewhat strange.
1073
Either the law of identity states that "A is A" or it does not. Adding
1074
on "potentiality" just indicates how limited the law of identity
1077
He then quotes the FAQ:
1079
In other words, right-Libertarian theory is based upon ignoring
1080
the fundamental aspect of life - namely change and evolution.
1082
And argues that the authors "have in no way demonstrated this. They're
1083
simply pulling arguments out of a hat with out heed to whether or not
1084
they actually apply to the position they're trying to critique."
1086
Now, we argued that must of right-libertarian theory was built upon
1087
assumptions. Indeed, Wilson agrees with us. We argued that by using
1088
assumptions and deducing things from these assumptions means that
1089
you fail to take into account change (this can be clearly seen from
1090
Rothbard's claims on "Natural law" quoted in section F.7). Thus,
1091
using "natural rights" as Nozick, Rand and Rothbard do is to use
1092
the law of identity and this, as Bookchin noted, fails to take
1093
into account change. Thus we are not "pulling arguments out of a
1094
hat" but trying to draw out the implications of the methodology
1095
used. Now, Wilson is free to consider that these points do
1096
not apply to the positions in question, but obviously we do not
1097
agree with him. If you start with certain assumptions about "Man"
1098
and then deduce conclusions from these assumptions then you
1099
fail to see now these assumptions can change in use. For example,
1100
the assumption of self-ownership is all fine and well but in
1101
practice it can become the means of denying liberty, not protecting
1102
it (see section B.4.2 and F.2). Also, to assume "Man's nature"
1103
is unchanging (as Rothbard et al do) is itself to force capitalist
1104
assumptions onto the history of the human race.
1106
Wilson then quotes the FAQ again:
1108
Unfortunately for right-Libertarians (and fortunately for the rest
1109
of humanity), human beings are not mechanical entities but instead
1110
are living, breathing, feeling, hoping, dreaming, changing living
1115
"Where precisely have 'right' libertarians denied any of this, and how is
1116
this supposed to be a rebuttal to 'right' libertarian theory?"
1118
It is true that right-libertarians do pay lip service to human beings
1119
as living organisms but in much of their ideology they deny it. Thus
1120
Rothbard, for example, argues that "natural law" is unchanging, which
1121
is to state that human beings do not change. What inspires people changes.
1122
What people think is right and wrong changes. Thus a theory that
1123
uses the law of identity ("natural rights" and so forth) fails to take
1124
this into account and so there is a mechanical core to the theory. A
1125
core which can be seen from the mechanical attempts to justify capitalist
1126
property rights in ways that can create terrible consequences (see
1127
sections F.4, F.4.2, F.2.3 and F.2.7 for example). Indeed, Robert Anton
1128
Wilson in _Natural Law_ makes a similar point, namely that right
1129
libertarianism is infected with "robot ideologists" and this undermines
1132
So a theory which mechanically argues, for example, that "slave contracts"
1133
are an expression of liberty is simply nonsense. That is how it is supposed
1134
to be a rebuttal to right-libertarian theory -- that it places the theory
1135
above common-sense and justifies extreme unfreedom in the name of liberty.
1137
Wilson goes on to argue that "As of so far, the authors have only given
1138
a single short and out-of-context example of Nozick's as evidence that
1139
'right' libertarians do not base their theory upon facts, and I have
1140
already shown how that example is utterly misleading. Right now, the
1141
authors are doing no more than shooting down imaginary positions and citing
1142
Bookchin quotes that give bad arguments against the law of identity."
1144
Now, was the Nozick example "out-of-context"? Wilson has not even addressed
1145
the example and instead concentrated on another assumption of Nozick's
1146
(namely that people have rights -- an intuitive argument which produces
1147
some very non-intuitive outcomes, we must note). As far as "bad arguments
1148
against the law of identity" goes we have indicated that this is not
1149
the case and that Rothbard and Rand base their arguments on said law.
1150
So, just to be clear, as "evidence" we presented Nozick, Rand and
1151
Rothbard as right-libertarian thinkers who base themselves on assumptions.
1152
Far more evidence than Wilson suggests we present.
1154
Wilson then quotes the FAQ again:
1156
From a wider viewpoint, such a rejection of liberty by
1157
right-libertarians is unsurprising. They do, after all, support
1158
capitalism. Capitalism produces an inverted set of ethics, one in
1159
which capital (dead labour) is more important that people (living
1164
"This makes very little sense. If a business owner both purchased capital
1165
and hired labours to help him produce, there is no economic reason why one
1166
would necessarily be more important than the other."
1168
Actually there is as capital investments are far more valuable than
1169
individual workers. You can easily fire a worker, it is somewhat
1170
harder to dismantle a workplace with millions of dollars of capital
1171
within it. It can also be seen when capitalists hire workers to
1172
labour in unsafe and dangerous conditions as it gives them a competitive
1173
edge that would be eroded if they invested in safe working conditions.
1174
So, there are plenty of economic reasons why capital is more important
1175
than labour -- and history (and current practice) proves this argument
1176
again and again. That Wilson cannot see this says a lot about his ideology.
1178
Moving on Wilson argues:
1180
"The marginal utility of a capital good or a worker would depend upon its
1181
marginal product, i.e., the level of output that increases as a result of
1182
an additional input. Perhaps the authors find something vulgar about this
1183
because certain people are assigning 'utility' to other people. But this
1184
means nothing more than that people obtain a measure of subjective value
1185
from the presence or activities of a person."
1187
Or to translate from marginalist speak, the capitalist employs a worker
1188
because he/she has a *use value* for the capitalist; namely that they
1189
produce more goods than they get paid for in wages (the exchange value
1190
of goods produces is higher than the exchange value of the worker).
1191
We have no problem with individual's subjectively valuing other
1192
individuals but we do have a problem with exploitation. And this is
1193
what the "marginal utility" theory was invented to deny. But it is
1194
clear that the capitalist will only "value" a worker who produces
1195
more than they get paid -- i.e. performs unpaid labour. If this
1196
condition is not meet, then they are fired.
1198
Wilson argues that "This doesn't imply that people are necessarily being
1199
misused, and libertarians hold that they aren't, provided that the value one
1200
derives from the presence or activities of another doesn't entail that that
1201
person's actions are determined in a way that doesn't involve his/her consent."
1203
Which brings us straight back to "consent". So, if the state taxes you
1204
then this is wrong because you do not "consent" to it. However, as
1205
noted above, you are free to leave a state at any time and seek out a
1206
state closer to your desires -- just as the worker is free to seek
1207
out a new capitalist. Since the worker does not do this, "anarcho"
1208
capitalists assume that the worker "consents" to the rules and orders
1209
of her boss. That the same argument can be applied to the state is
1210
one that is hotly denied by "anarcho"-capitalists (see section F.2.3).
1212
Now it could be argued that ordering people about is "misusing" them,
1213
after all you are subjecting them to your will. Similarly, when the boss
1214
orders the worker into dangerous conditions that too could be classed
1215
as "misuse". But "consent" is the key and for anarchists capitalism is
1216
marked by inequalities that make "consent" purely formal (just as
1217
the "consent" associated with the liberal state is purely formal).
1218
We discuss this in section F.2 and F.3 and so will not do so here.
1220
Wilson continues and quotes the FAQ again:
1222
This can be seen when the Ford produced the Pinto. The Pinto had a
1223
flaw in it which meant that if it was hit in a certain way in a
1224
crash the fuel tank exploded. The Ford company decided it was more
1225
"economically viable" to produce that car and pay damages to those
1226
who were injured or the relatives of those who died than pay to
1227
change the invested capital. The needs of capital came before the
1228
needs of the living.
1232
"This is an invalid application of the odd statement the authors made above,
1233
as well as being an odd and nonsensical statement in its own right. Capital
1234
doesn't have needs. Only the living have needs, and the cited case is one
1235
in which one group of people perceived it as being to their advantage to
1236
sell unsafe automobiles to people willing to buy them. This means that
1237
sellers unethically endangered the lives of others for the sake of profit.
1238
Under no social arrangement will such a phenomenon always be avoided, but
1239
the fact is that there will necessarily be much less of it under an
1240
arrangement in which people are legally required to bear the full liability
1241
for the costs of their actions. This is the type of arrangement that
1242
anarcho-capitalists advocate."
1244
Which is an interesting argument. Under "no social arrangement will such
1245
a phenomenon always be avoided"? But it was the desire to make a profit
1246
and so survive on the market that prompted Ford's decision. Such "phenomenon"
1247
would have been avoided in a socialist society simply because competitive
1248
pressures would have been lacking and people would be placed before
1249
profits. And Ford was well aware that it would face "the costs of their
1250
actions" and did those actions anyway. Now as "anarcho"-capitalists
1251
support a market based law system it is not at all clear that a corporation
1252
would "bear full liability for the costs of their actions." After all, the
1253
law system will be marked by inequalities in the bargaining position
1254
and resources of the agents involved. It could be that Ford would be able
1255
to use its market power to undermine the legal system or skew it in its
1256
favour (see section F.6.3) but the fact remains that Ford deliberately
1257
placed profits before human beings. The same occurs everyday in capitalism
1258
where workers are placed in unsafe working conditions.
1260
So our point remains. Capitalism *does* create an environment where
1261
people are used as resources by others and the needs of profit are
1262
placed before people. Wilson sees that this is the case but refuses to
1263
look at why it happens. If he did so then, perhaps, he would realise
1264
that capitalist ideology places property before/above liberty (as
1265
can be seen from their definitions of "freedom" -- see section F.2)
1266
and so the actions of Ford as an expression of a deeper psychosis.
1268
He ends by arguing that:
1270
"It's unclear why the authors need to speak incoherently about 'the needs of
1271
capital' to prove a point. Perhaps it's to single out capitalism as the
1272
primary cause of the type of disaster that they speak of. Contrary to the
1273
false impression that the authors give, such incidents are more likely to
1274
occur under a socialistic economy in which the funding of industries are
1275
guaranteed, and in which workers have nothing to lose from performing the
1276
job in a irresponsible manner. Recently, there have been numerous train
1277
crashes in Italy, and many deaths have occurred as a result. Many of the
1278
engineers were reportedly drunk while operating the trains. These trains
1279
were a part of a socialised railroad scheme. The authors are arbitrarily
1280
and unjustly singling out the free market as a producer of defective
1281
products and services."
1283
Strange, we were not aware that Italy was a socialistic economy. Nor do
1284
we consider *nationalised* industries the same as "socialised" ones. But
1285
let us ignore these obvious points. Wilson presents the example of the
1286
drunk engineers as an example of how a "socialistic" economy would create
1287
more of the Ford Pinto type situations. Now, did the bosses of the
1288
nationalised railways deliberately decide to employ the drunk engineers?
1289
Did they do a cost-benefit analysis and decide that employing drunk
1290
engineers would be more profitable than sacking them? Of course not. What
1291
was a deliberate act on the part of Ford was not done with the nationalised
1292
Italian railways. *If* the managers of the railways *had* acted in the
1293
way that Ford did then Wilson would have had a point, but they did not.
1294
His example seems to be an arbitrary and unjust attempt to whitewash the
1295
actions prompted by free market pressures.
1297
It seems strange that Wilson does not consider the implications of
1298
Ford's acts. After all, most normal people would be horrified by these
1299
acts (like the actions of any capitalist firm that harms people in order
1300
to make a bit more profit) and seek a reason for them (i.e. in the
1301
system that created the pressures Ford and other employers face).
1302
However, rather than look at the pressures that resulted in this act,
1303
he seems to take them as unavoidable and isolated from the economic
1304
system he supports. How strange, but unsurprising.
1306
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
1308
Critique of Section F.1.3 (Is right-Libertarian theory scientific in
1311
Wilson starts by quoting the FAQ:
1313
Usually, no. The scientific approach is inductive, the
1314
right-Libertarian approach is deductive. The first draws
1315
generalisations from the data, the second applies preconceived
1316
generalisations to the data. A completely deductive approach is
1317
pre-scientific, however, which is why right-Libertarians cannot
1318
legitimately claim to use a scientific method. Deduction does
1319
occur in science, but the generalisations are primarily based on
1320
other data, not a priori assumptions.
1324
"This is partially true. It's not true that libertarians reject the method
1325
of drawing generalisations upon the basis of data. What libertarians do
1326
reject is the position that one can approach aggregate and statistical data
1327
with any hope of possibly understanding it if they have not previously laid
1328
down a reliable theoretical grounding for it's interpretation. Economic
1329
data are highly complex, and it's fallacious to believe that one can infer a
1330
causal relationship between two or more macroeconomic phenomena on the basis
1331
of observances of correlations. Too many elements play a role in
1332
constituting the identity of concepts such as "GNP", "GDP", "the money
1333
supply", "consumption", etc., for one to be able to gain an understanding of
1334
them without the aid of "preconceived generalisations". This is why
1335
libertarians hold that it's necessary to apply a microeconomic theory
1336
founded upon generalisations made from simple facts to the study of
1337
macroeconomic data."
1339
Actually, the Austrian school of economics (which has inspired much of
1340
right-libertarianism) argue at great length that you cannot use past
1341
any data to test theories. Murray Rothbard states approvingly that:
1343
"Mises indeed held not only that economic theory does not need to be
1344
'tested' by historical fact but also that it *cannot* be so tested."
1345
["Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics" in _The Foundation
1346
of Modern Austrian Economics_, p. 32]
1348
And this applies to *all* data. Including simple data. They argue,
1349
in effect (and misleadingly), that the econometrician is a historian
1350
*not* a theorist. Moreover, many economists would argue that using
1351
complex data should be taken with care. Now, the claim that it is
1352
"necessary to apply a microeconomic theory founded upon generalisations
1353
made from simple facts to the study of macroeconomic data" is false,
1354
at least from the Austrian school. They explicitly argue that economic
1355
theory *cannot* be tested and that economic theory is *not* built upon
1356
generalisations from simple facts but rather from logical deductions
1357
from assumptions (perhaps these are the "simple facts" that Wilson is
1358
referring to but in that case his "simple facts" is the axiom that
1359
"humans act" and not, say, simple facts/data gathered from the studying
1360
specific events as might be imagined).
1362
Wilson continues by saying "[i]t certainly isn't surprising that the authors
1363
derived their (mis)information concerning Austrian economic theory through
1364
a secondary source written by an author more in their favour. In light of
1365
source of the authors (mis)information, it should be remembered that their
1366
(mis)representation of Austrian economics is no more than an interpretation
1367
of an interpretation."
1369
But as we will see, nothing could be further from the truth. In the new
1370
section F.1.3 we provide more quotes from Austrian sources which state
1371
exactly the same thing as we argue here. The Rothbard quote above
1372
clearly indicates that our comments are correct. Let us not forget
1373
that Austrian economics is based upon deductions from the basis axiom
1376
He states that "we arrive at a commonly made, and yet highly fallacious
1377
criticism of Austrian economics" namely that (quoting von Mises) that
1378
Austrian economics is based upon rejecting any data that conflicts with
1379
their theory. This, Wilson argues "constitutes a serious misunderstanding
1380
of the importance of Mises' method" and states that "[s]ince the authors
1381
do not even mention what Mises' theorems actually are, it's easy for the
1382
uneducated reader to dismiss Mises as a crackpot without first understanding
1383
him. The methodological individualism and methodological subjectivism of
1384
the Austrian school is predicated upon the simple and relatively
1385
uncontroversial premise that humans act."
1387
Is the assumptions of the methodology actually relevant to discussing the
1388
methodology itself? The assumptions may be "uncontroversial" but if the
1389
net result is that you dismiss data that contradicts your theory then
1390
the theory itself and its assumptions cannot be evaluated! As Rothbard
1391
makes clear, "since praxeology begins with a true axiom, A, all that can
1392
be deduced from this axiom must also be true. For if A implies be, and
1393
A is true, then B must also be true." [Op. Cit., pp. 19-20] Now A is
1394
the premise "humans act" but upon this axiom is built a whole series
1395
of other axiom's, all claimed to be true because the first one is true.
1396
Given that this premise of one that Proudhon, Marx, Keynes, Kalecki and
1397
a host of non-free market economists would have agreed too it seems a very
1398
big leap of faith to claim that all the other axioms are true. Now, if the
1399
facts of reality are to be dismissed if your theory is logically
1400
consistent (after all, that is what von Mises is arguing, let us not
1401
forget that) then it is impossible to evaluate your theory and the
1402
axioms you have generated. Hence our comments. The methodology von Mises
1403
supports means that your theories can *never* be revised since A was
1404
correct. This is the opposite of the scientific method, as we argued.
1408
"What the praxeologist methodology intends to do is to explain more holistic
1409
economic phenomenon--such as prices, firms, production, etc--through the
1410
analysis of the discrete components that give rise to them, namely
1411
individual actors purposefully pursuing their own plans and goals on the
1412
basis of the information they have access to. It's a microeconomic approach
1413
that seeks to inquire into the nature of complex entities by analysing the
1414
behaviour of it's simple components. Econometric methods discard human
1415
behaviour as irrelevant, and deal solely with aggregate data while attempting
1416
to draw inferences of causation through observation of statistical
1417
correlation. Too many variables have an influence upon aggregate data for a
1418
methodological holist procedure to yield conclusive results explaining human
1419
behaviour, and this is why Austrians reject this approach."
1421
But that may be what it intends, but that is not what it achieves. What
1422
it achieves is a mindset that prefers to reject facts in favour of theory.
1423
It also ignores the fact that the more holistic phenomenon has an important
1424
impact on discrete components and that by concentrating on these
1425
components important facts are ignored. As we argue in section F.2,
1426
right-libertarians concentrate their analysis on the "discrete component"
1427
of contracts within capitalism. This effectively blinds them to the
1428
way the objective facts of a given society influence these contracts.
1429
For example, contracts made during periods of full employment have
1430
different impacts than those made during high unemployment. The human
1431
behaviour expressed in these contracts are influenced by aggregate
1432
facts which the Austrian analysis discards. Similarly, the aggregate
1433
outcome of these discrete acts may have a distinctly different impact
1434
than we would guess at if we looked at them in isolation and so
1435
aggregate analysis can provide us with insights the microeconomic
1436
approach fails to provide.
1438
Also, when deductively generating axioms from the "simple data" of
1439
"humans act", it is easy to discard or ignore forms of human
1440
behaviour which do have an impact on the final outcome. Dealing
1441
solely with deductive generation can also fail to take into
1442
account human behaviour.
1444
Wilson goes on to argue that:
1446
"If theory is grounded in one's knowledge of simple facts (like human
1447
action) and deductions made from those facts, yes, it would be silly
1448
to accept the validity of aggregate data that conflicts with one's theory.
1449
Data is composed of many elements and components, and is far too complex for
1450
one understand with a greater degree of certainty than basic facts about
1451
human behaviour (e.g. preference, choice, incentives, etc.). If a piece of
1452
statistical data yields conclusions that appear to conflict prima faciae
1453
with a theoretical framework grounded upon simple observations, it is
1454
completely reasonable to either [a] look to see how the statistical data
1455
might be misinterpreted, or [b] reject the data. Knowledge of simple data
1456
is more reliable than Knowledge of complex data, and without knowledge of
1457
simple data it is impossible to interpret complex data. It is always
1458
possible that one's theoretical analysis may be invalid, but within the
1459
context of the social sciences, it's unwise to determine the validity of
1460
one's theory by comparing it to complex data that seems to conflict. One
1461
can demonstrate the invalidity of one's theory through logic and conceptual
1464
But, as noted, Austrians think that *all* economic theories are untestable.
1465
Including those based upon "simple data" as opposed to "aggregate data"
1466
(and simple data is somewhat different than simple facts). However, by
1467
"simple data" Wilson is referring to the axioms derived from the first
1468
axiom "humans act". Thus he is arguing that *if* you base yourself on
1469
deductive logic from an initial axiom, then you will not be inclined
1470
to view experience as being very useful to evaluating. This approach is
1471
taken by most churches who can easily dismiss arguments against the
1472
existence of god as being irrelevant to the first axiom that "god exists".
1473
Wilson is essentially arguing that we perform a "leap of faith" and
1474
join the Austrian school in deductive logic and pre-scientific logic.
1476
Now, the Austrian approach is such that they reject the idea that data
1477
can be used to evaluate their claims. They argue even if the facts
1478
contradict one of their theories that does not mean that their theories
1479
are false, far from it. It just means that in this case their theory
1480
was not applicable (see the new section F.1.3 for a quote on this)! Now
1481
Wilson seems to be trying to present this argument in the best possible
1482
light but it does not change the fact that von Mises and other Austrian's
1483
argue that their theories are true *no matter what*. They are essentially
1484
placing their economic ideas above analysis as all and any evidence can be
1485
ignored as not applicable in this case -- just, as we may note, religions
1488
In contrast to Wilson, we think it is "silly" to have a theory which
1489
is grounded in denying and/or rejecting empirical evidence or
1490
using empirical evidence to inform your theory. It seems "unwise"
1491
to accept a theory which major argument seems to be that it cannot
1492
be tested. After all, logic can lead us to many areas and it is only
1493
by seeing whether our chain of thought approximates reality can
1494
we evaluate the validity of our ideas. If econometric methods
1495
discard human behaviour as irrelevant, then so can the Austrian system
1496
individual acts to yield conclusive results explaining human
1497
behaviour. Indeed, the deductive approach may ignore as irrelevant
1498
certain human motivations which have a decisive impact on an
1499
outcome (there could be a strong tendency to project "Austrian Man"
1500
onto the rest of society and history, for example).
1502
Wilson quotes the FAQ again:
1504
Such an approach makes the search for truth a game without rules.
1505
The Austrian economists (and other right-libertarians) by using
1506
this method are free to theorise anything they want, without such
1507
irritating constrictions as facts, statistics, data, history or
1508
experimental confirmation. Their only guide is logic. But this is
1509
no different from what religions do when they assert the logical
1510
existence of God (or Buddha or Mohammed or Gaia). Theories
1511
ungrounded in facts and data are easily spun into any belief a
1512
person wants. Starting assumptions and trains of logic may contain
1513
inaccuracies so small as to be undetectable, yet will yield
1514
entirely different conclusions.
1518
"It is certainly the case that certain small and undetectable flaws in one's
1519
train of logic can result in horridly inaccurate conclusions, but precisely
1520
the same thing can be said concerning statistical and historical analysis.
1521
The problem is even more pervasive when dealing with statistical and
1522
historical analysis because of the phenomenon of incomplete information.
1523
Certain facts will always be unintentionally discarded from the equation,
1524
and certain factors responsible for the existence of complex facts and
1525
events will always go unaccounted for."
1527
But we are not arguing that we base our theories *totally* on historical
1528
data. Such extreme empiricism is just as false as von Mises method.
1529
What we in fact argued that statistical and historical data should
1530
be used to back-up any theory we have and if this data disproves our
1531
theory then modify the theory, *not* reject the data. Von Mises'
1532
methodology is such that this approach is dismissed (due to the
1533
untestability argument) and that is its problem. Without a founding
1534
in fact, Austrians are free to theorise about whatever they like,
1535
without such irritating constrains as facts, statistics, data,
1536
history and so forth. Wilson's arguments have not refuted our analysis,
1537
rather he has provided apologetics for von Mises' methodology (a
1538
methodology he admits "can result in horridly inaccurate conclusions").
1539
As Austrians can dismiss evidence as "inapplicable" they are in no
1540
position to re-evaluate their ideas in the light of reality and so
1541
their ideas are little more than dogmas.
1543
Now, how logic chains deduced from axioms can also unintentionally
1544
discard certain facts and factors responsible for the existence of
1545
complex facts. And the question remains, how do you evaluate whether
1546
your logical chains are indeed correct? By evaluating them against
1547
reality (i.e. "complex facts"). A given chain of logic does not
1548
provide any idea on the relative strengths of certain derived
1549
factors (which empirical study can indicate). Nor can it indicate
1550
whether the chain is incomplete or missing essential factors. A
1551
given chain may be internally consistent but still miss out
1552
important factors or stress insignificant ones. So deductive
1553
logic has all the problems of statistical analysis and a few
1554
more as statistical analysis at least recognises that theories
1555
must be evaluated using experience rather than reason alone.
1559
"Most libertarians would find it reasonable to rethink the basic principles
1560
or derivations of one's theory if one found them to consistently fail to
1561
explain historical events or macroeconomic data, but those of the Austrian
1562
persuasion, and even to some extent those of the neoclassical persuasion,
1563
would say that the observance of historical and macroeconomic facts is
1564
never, in itself, sufficient to invalidate the conclusions of deductive and
1565
conceptual analysis."
1567
But let us not forgot that many right-libertarians follow the ideas of
1568
Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand, both firm supporters of Austrian economics.
1569
Politically, the dangers of this approach are easily seen. For example,
1570
Wilson himself has indicated how his "basic principles" produce
1571
relations of domination and oppression which are identical to those
1572
created by the state and he sees nothing wrong with this. Similarly,
1573
macroeconomic data indicates that capitalism has done best under
1574
Keynesianism rather than laissez-faire and the current economic
1575
performance in the USA is dependent upon the state maintaining a
1576
"natural" rate of unemployment.
1578
Let us not forget that, as Wilson points out, von Mises' method if one
1579
used by more mainstream economics as well (as pointed out by Homa Katouzian
1580
who, it seems, is are fair more reliable guide than Wilson would like to
1581
admit). So, let us be clear, that the case for "free market" capitalism
1582
often involves theories which "the observance of historical and macroeconomic
1583
facts is never, in itself, sufficient to invalidate." That is some claim.
1584
No matter the evidence, capitalist theory cannot be disproved. That says
1585
a lot about capitalist economic ideology and its role in society.
1587
Moving on, Wilson again quotes the FAQ:
1589
So, von Mises, Hayek and most right-libertarians reject the
1590
scientific method in favour of ideological correctness and so deny
1591
the key aspect of both life (change and evolution) and liberty
1592
(critical analysis and thought). A true libertarian would
1593
approach a contradiction between reality and theory by changing
1594
the theory, not by ignoring reality. Right-Libertarian theory is
1595
neither libertarian nor scientific.
1597
He then states that:
1599
"Here, the authors demonstrate how ignorant they are of the position they're
1600
critiquing. If they had pained themselves to study the primary sources,
1601
they would have learned about how Mises and other Austrians were concerned
1602
with grounding their theory upon simple observable facts of reality so that
1603
they could enable themselves to understand the subjects of macroeconomics
1604
and history--two realms of complexity."
1606
Let us not forget that these "simple observable facts" is "humans act"
1607
and the axioms deduced from this fact. That is it. This is the "two"
1608
realms of complexity -- that individual acts and the resultant of
1609
these acts. Now, von Mises argues that (in the quote we provided)
1610
that no experience can disprove these derived axioms. If we look
1611
at the primary sources (such as these we quote in the new section F.1.3)
1612
we find that Austrians are clear about the use of data and how it
1613
relates to their theories (which are *all* deduced from the axiom
1614
"humans act" and nothing else). This axiom ("humans act") is the
1615
"grounding" of the Austrian theory which Wilson talks about. Everything
1616
else flows from this. And anything else above this axiom (or derived
1617
axioms) is another "realm of complexity" -- so the actual workings and
1618
results of the capitalist system is another realm (which is true,
1619
reality *is* another realm than that of logic deductions within
1622
So, far from showing "ignorance" all we have done is to point out the
1623
implications and religious nature of these perspectives. Austrians
1624
"ground" themselves on the axiom "humans act" and argue that simple
1625
and/or complex observable facts cannot be used to evaluate the axioms
1626
they derive from this initial axiom. Hence our comments and analysis
1627
are painfully accurate. Austrian economics is more like a "free market"
1628
religion than a scientific analysis of capitalism.
1630
So the primary sources argue that because Austrian economics is based
1631
upon the axiom "humans act" all its other axioms and arguments are
1632
correct *and* that these cannot be disproven by experience. Thus
1633
our comments on von Mises seem appropriate and the rationale for
1634
this rejection of experience seems inappropriate.
1636
Wilson goes on to state that:
1638
"The implication of the views being espoused by the authors above is that
1639
it's inappropriate to learn about the world via the application of a
1640
methodology. If the authors would alter their methodology (if they have
1641
one) every time they stumble across a series of facts that that appear,
1642
prima faciae, to conflict with it, then it would appear that the authors
1643
see no need for methodology at all, and would prefer to rush headlong
1644
into the complex realm of the social sciences, unequipped with any
1645
reliable means of interpretation. Now which approach is more closely
1646
connected to reality?"
1648
But such an "implication" is so radically false as to be a misrepresentation
1649
of our argument. We argued that any analysis or theory we have should be
1650
grounded in facts and that if a set of facts contradict our theory then,
1651
assuming that the facts are correct of course, change the theory, *not
1652
deny reality.* Quite simple really and a methodology which most people
1653
would consider as sensible (assuming that you are not an Austrian
1654
economist of course). For example, Proudhon argued that competition
1655
resulted in the undermining of competition. That is a theory which
1656
can be tested against facts. The facts indicate that, over time,
1657
capitalist markets evolve towards oligopoly and that this market
1658
power results in super-profits (see sections C.4 and C.5). Now, if
1659
the facts indicate that a market does not become dominated by a
1660
few firms then we would be inclined to reject that theory. But,
1661
if we were Austrians, we could just argue that our theory is true
1662
but that it has not been applicable! Now, which approach is more
1663
closely connected to reality?
1665
Then, as an aside, Wilson argues that:
1667
(To accuse Hayek, of all people, of denying change and evolution is simply
1668
astounding. When one considers all of his writings on his principle of
1669
'spontaneous order', and on the dispersed evolution of customs within a
1670
society, this charge becomes as absurd as one claiming that Noam Chomsky
1671
doesn't report upon international politics. The authors are ignoring the
1672
primary subject matter of most of Hayek's popular works.)
1674
Now, unlike Kropotkin who also studied evolution, von Hayek used the example
1675
of "evolved" or "spontaneous" order to justify "free market" capitalism
1676
rather than to analyse how society itself was evolving and changing.
1677
Because (according to von Hayek) the "market" is a "spontaneous order"
1678
you should not mess with it. But such an analysis is false as the
1679
"order" on the market is dependent on the state determining the
1680
rights framework in which this order to generated. Thus, rather than
1681
supporting change and evolution, von Hayek's work is about stopping
1682
change and evolution (i.e. the change and evolution of society into
1683
a different, non-capitalist, form). He supported the state and the
1684
capitalist rights it enforces and, moreover, desired to ensure that
1685
capitalist property rights were unchangeable by modifying democracy
1686
as to place effective power into the hands of a few people (for example,
1687
his schemes for using age as a determining factor in voting and
1688
being able to occupy a set in Parliament).
1690
Similarly, his "analysis" of the evolution of customs just assumes
1691
that those customs he dislikes (as socialistic or tribal) have been
1692
made irrelevant by evolution. However, that is the thing about evolution,
1693
you just do not know which of these social customs are required to
1694
progress the species. It could be that the social customs von Hayek
1695
approves off have been generated within society by state action and
1696
would not survive in a truly free society.
1698
And, as the history of capitalism shows, it is very far from an
1699
"evolved" order -- state action played a key role in creating it.
1700
Thus Hayek's claims are somewhat strange, unless you realise his
1701
motivation for them -- namely to counter any attempt to change
1702
capitalism into something better.
1704
Thus von Hayek, unlike Kropotkin, can be said to deny change and
1705
evolution simply because he assumes that we have reached the
1706
"end of history" (to coin a phrase). Just because von Hayek talks
1707
about evolution and change does not mean that he supports it.
1708
In fact, quite the reverse -- he uses the concepts to try and
1709
stop change and evolution.
1711
Wilson concludes as follows:
1713
The real question is why are such theories taken seriously and
1714
arouse such interest. Why are they not simply dismissed out of
1717
"Because more honest and responsible people bothered to first come to an
1718
understanding of them before passing judgement."
1720
Really? But as we have indicated our comments on right-libertarianism
1721
are accurate. That Wilson does not like the way we have presented then,
1722
but that does not make them false. Indeed, his "critique" of our
1723
account has not found anything incorrect about them, which seems
1724
strange for "dishonest" and "irresponsible" people. His comments that
1725
we, for example, ignore Nozick's assumption that "individuals have
1726
rights" ignores the point we made that Nozick *assumes* the property
1727
rights that are the basis of his system. Instead Wilson discusses
1728
something else altogether. Similarly, Wilson's attempt to justify the
1729
axiomatic methodology of von Mises fails to appreciate that this
1730
methodology cannot be evaluated from looking at the starting axiom
1731
as it ensures that its logical chains cannot be tested. Moreover, he
1732
attempts to discredit the strawman of extreme empiricism rather
1733
than truly addressing the issue that von Mises methodology presents
1734
a dogmatic, pre-scientific attitude which has more of a religious
1735
feel than anything else. If anything, his comments actually show that
1736
we were correct in our analysis -- after all, he has indicated that
1737
"anarcho"-capitalists have no problem with capitalist hierarchy, the
1738
right-libertarians *do* based their ideas of assumptions and deductions
1739
from these without regard for consequences and that the Austrian school
1740
rejects the use of empirical evidence to test their theories.
1742
How strange. Could it be that we have just informed people of a
1743
few home truths about right-libertarianism that its supporters
1744
prefer to keep quiet about?