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<title>What caused the degeneration of the Russian Revolution?</title>

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<H1>What caused the degeneration of the Russian Revolution?</H1>

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As is well known, the Russian Revolution failed. Rather than

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produce socialism, the Bolshevik revolution gave birth to an

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autocratic party dictatorship residing over a state capitalist

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economy. In turn, this regime gave rise to the horrors of

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Stalin's system. While Stalinism was denounced by all genuine

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socialists, a massive debate has existed within the Marxist

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movement over when, exactly, the Russian Revolution failed

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and why it did. Some argue around 1924, others say around 1928,

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some (libertarian Marxists) argue from the Bolshevik seizure of

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power. The reasons for the failure tend to be more readily

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agreed upon: isolation, the economic and social costs of civil

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war, the "backward" nature of Russian society and economy are

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usually listed as the key factors. Moreover, what the Stalinist

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regime was is also discussed heatedly in such circles. Some

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(orthodox Trotskyists) claiming it was a "degenerated workers

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state," others (such as the neo-Trotskyist UK SWP) that it was

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"state capitalist."

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For anarchists, however, the failure of Bolshevism did not come

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as a surprise. In fact, just as with the reformist fate of the

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Social Democrats, the failure of the Russian Revolution provided

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empirical evidence for Bakunin's critique of Marx. As Emma Goldman

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recounts in her memoirs

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"Professor Harold Laski . . . expressed the opinion that I ought

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to take some comfort in the vindication anarchism had received

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by the Bolsheviki. I agreed, adding that not only their regime,

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but their stepbrothers as well, the Socialists in power in

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other countries, had demonstrated the failure of the Marxian

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State better than any anarchist argument. Living proof was always

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more convincing than theory. Naturally I did not regret the

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Socialist failure but I could not rejoice in it in the face of

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the Russian tragedy." [Living My Life, vol. 2, p. 969]

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</blockquote>

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Given that Leninists claim that the Russian revolution was a

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success (at least initially) and so proves the validity of

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their ideology, anarchists have a special duty to analysis and

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understand what went wrong. Simply put, if the Russian Revolution

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was a "success," Leninism does not need "failures"!

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This section of the FAQ will discuss these explanations for the

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failure of Bolshevism. Simply put, anarchists are not convinced

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by Leninist explanations on why Bolshevism created a new class

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system, not socialism.

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This subject is very important. Unless we learn the lessons of

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history we will be doomed to repeat them. Given the fact that

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many people who become interested in socialist ideas will come

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across the remnants of Leninist parties it is important that

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anarchists explains clearly and convincingly why the Russian

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Revolution failed and the role of Bolshevik ideology in that

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process. We need to account why a popular revolution became

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in a few short years a state capitalist party dictatorship.

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As Noam Chomsky put it:

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"In the stages leading up to the Bolshevik coup in October 1917,

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there were incipient socialist institutions developing in

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Russia -- workers' councils, collectives, things like that.

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And they survived to an extent once the Bolsheviks took over

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eliminated them as they consolidated their power. I mean,

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you can argue about the justification for eliminating them,

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but the fact is that the socialist initiatives were pretty

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quickly eliminated.

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"Now, people who want to justify it say, 'The Bolsheviks had

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to do it' -- that's the standard justification: Lenin and

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Trotsky had to do it, because of the contingencies of the

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civil war, for survival, there wouldn't have been food

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otherwise, this and that. Well, obviously the question is,

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was that true. To answer that, you've got to look at the

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historical facts: I don't think it was true. In fact, I

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think the incipient socialist structures in Russia were

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dismantles before the really dire conditions arose . . .

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But reading their own writings, my feeling is that Lenin

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and Trotsky knew what they were doing, it was conscious

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and understandable." [Understanding Power, p. 226]

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</blockquote>

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As we discussed in the appendix on

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<a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a>, Chomsky's feelings are more

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than supported by the historical record. The elimination of

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meaningful working class freedom and self-management started

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from the start and was firmly in place before the start of

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the civil war at the end of May, 1918. The civil war simply

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accelerated processes which had already started, strengthened

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policies that had already been applied. And it could be argued

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that rather than impose alien policies onto Bolshevism, the

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civil war simply brought the hidden (and not-so-hidden) state

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capitalist and authoritarian politics of Marxism and Leninism

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to the fore.

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Which is why analysing the failure of the revolution is important.

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If the various arguments presented by Leninists on why Bolshevism

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failed (and, consequently, Stalinism developed) can be refuted,

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then we are left with the key issues of revolutionary politics --

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whether Bolshevik politics had a decisive negative impact on the

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development of the Russian Revolution and, if so, there is an

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alternative to those politics. As regards the first issue, as we

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discussed in the appendix on <a href="append44.html">"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"</a>, anarchists argue that this was the case.

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Bolshevik ideology itself played a key role in the degeneration of

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the revolution. And as regards the second one, anarchists can point

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to the example of the Makhnovists, which proves that alternative

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policies were possible and could be applied with radically different

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outcomes (see the appendix on <a href="append46.html">"Why does the Makhnovist movement show there is an alternative to Bolshevism?"</a> for more on the Makhnovist movement).

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This means that anarchists stress the interplay between the

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"objective factors" and the subjective one (i.e. party ideology).

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Faced with difficult circumstances, people and parties react in

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different ways. If they did not then it would imply what they

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thought has no impact at all on their actions. It also means

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that the politics of the Bolsheviks played no role in their

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decisions. As we discussed in the appendix on

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<a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a>, this position simply

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cannot be maintained. Leninist ideology itself played a key role

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in the rise of Stalinism. A conclusion Leninists reject. They,

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of course, try to distance themselves from Stalinism, correctly

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arguing that it was a brutal and undemocratic system. The

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problem is that it was Lenin and Trotsky rather then Stalin

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who first shot strikers, banned left papers, radical organisations

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and party factions, sent workers and revolutionaries to the gulags,

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advocated and introduced one-man management and piece-work in the

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workplace, eliminated democracy in the military and shut down

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soviets elected with the "wrong" (i.e. non-Bolshevik) delegates.

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Many Leninists know nothing of these facts. Their parties simply

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do not tell them the whole story of when Lenin and Trotsky were

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in power. Others do know and attempt to justify these actions.

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When anarchists discuss why the Russian Revolution failed,

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these Leninists have basically one reply. They argue that

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anarchists never seem to consider the objective forces at play

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during the Russian revolution, namely the civil war, the legacy

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of World War One, the international armies of counter-revolution

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and economic disruption. These "objective factors" meant that the

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revolution was, basically, suffocated and where the overriding

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contribution to the rise of militarism and the crushing of

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democracy within the soviets.

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For anarchists such "objective factors" do not (and must not)

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explain why the Russian Revolution failed. This is because, as

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we argue in the following sections, almost all revolutions

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will face the same, or similar, problems. Indeed, in sections

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<a href="append43.html#app1">1</a> and

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both anarchists like Kropotkin and Marxists

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like Lenin argued that this was the case. As we discussed in

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<a href="secH2.html#sech21">section H.2.1</a>,

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Leninists like to claim that they are "realistic"

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(unlike the "utopian" anarchists) and recognise civil war is

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inevitable in a revolution. As

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<a href="append43.html#app3">section 3</a> indicates, any

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defence of Bolshevism based on blaming the impact of the civil

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war is both factually and logically flawed. As far as economic

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disruption goes, as we discuss in

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<a href="append43.html#app4">section 4</a> this explanation

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of Bolshevik authoritarianism is unconvincing as every revolution

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will face this problem. Then

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<a href="append43.html#app5">section 5</a> analyses the common

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Leninist argument that the revolution failed because the Russian

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working class became "atomised" or "declassed." As that section

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indicates, the Russian working class was more than capable of

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collective action throughout the 1918 to 1921 period (and

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beyond). The problem was that it was directed against the

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Bolshevik party. Finally,

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<a href="append43.html#app6">section 6</a> indicates whether the

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Bolshevik leaders explained their actions in terms of the

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"objective factors" they faced.

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It should be stressed that we are discussing this factors individually

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simply because it is easier to do so. It reality, it is less hard to

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do so. For example, civil war will, undoubtedly, mean economic disruption.

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Economic disruption will mean unemployment and that will affect the

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working class via unemployment and less goods available (for example).

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So just because we separate the specific issues for discussion purposes,

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it should not be taken to imply that we are not aware of their combined

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impact on the Russian Revolution.

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Of course there is the slight possibility that the failure of

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Bolshevism can be explained purely in these terms. Perhaps

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a future revolution will be less destructive, less isolated,

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less resisted than the Russian (although, as we noted in the

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<a href="append43.html#app2">section 2</a>,

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leading Bolsheviks like Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin

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doubted this). That is a possibility. However, should we embrace

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an ideology whose basic, underlying, argument is based on the

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hope that fate will be kinder to them this time? As Lenin argued

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against the Russian left-communists in early 1918:

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"Yes, we shall see the world revolution, but for the time being it

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is a very good fairy-tale . . . But I ask, is it proper for a serious

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revolutionary to believe in fairy-tales? . . . [I]f you tell the

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people that civil war will break out in German and also guarantee

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that instead of a clash with imperialism we shall have a field

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revolution on a world-wide scale, the people will say you are

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deceiving them. In doing this you will be overcoming the difficulties

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with which history has confronted us only in your minds, by your

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wishes . . . You are staking everything on this card! If the

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revolution breaks out, everything is saved . . . But if it does

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not turn out as we desire, if it does not achieve victory tomorrow

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gamblers -- you staked everything on a fortunate turn of events

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that did not take place . . ." [Collected Works, vol. 27,

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p. 102]

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</blockquote>

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Anarchists have always recognised that a revolution would face

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problems and difficult "objective factors" and has developed

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our ideas accordingly. We argue that to blame "objective factors"

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on the failure of the Russian Revolution simply shows that

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believing in fairy-tales is sadly far too common on the "serious"

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Leninist "revolutionary" left. And as we discuss in

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the appendix on <a href="append44.html">"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"</a>,

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the impact of Bolshevik ideology on the failure of the revolution

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was important and decisive. Even if the next revolution is less

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destructive, it cannot be argued that socialism will be the result

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if Bolshevik ideology is reapplied. And as Cornelius Castoriadis

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argues, "this 'response' [of explaining the failure of the Russian

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Revolution on "objective factors"] teaches us nothing we could

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extend beyond the confines of the Russian situation in 1920. The

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sole conclusion to be drawn from this kind of 'analysis' is that

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revolutionaries should ardently hope that future revolutions break

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out in more advanced countries, that they should not remain

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isolated, and that civil wars should not in the least be

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devastating." [The Role of Bolshevik Ideology in the Birth of

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the Bureaucracy, p. 92] While this may be sufficient for the

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followers of Bolshevism, it cannot be sufficient for anyone who

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wants to learn from history, not to repeat it.

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Ultimately, if difficult times back in 1918-21 justified suppressing

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working class freedom and self-management, imprisoning and shooting

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anarchists and other socialists, implementing and glorifying party

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dictatorship, what might we expect in difficult times in the future?

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Simply put, if your defence of the Bolsheviks rests simply on

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"difficult circumstances" then it can only mean one thing, namely

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if "difficult circumstances" occur again we can expect the same

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outcome.

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One last point. We should stress that libertarians do not think any

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future revolution will suffer as terrible conditions as that experienced

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by the Russian one. However, it might and we need to base our politics

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on the worse case possibility. That said, we argue that Bolshevik

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policies made things worse -- by centralising economic and political

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power, they automatically hindered the participation of working class

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people in the revolution, smothering any creative self-activity under

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the dead-weight of state officialdom. As a libertarian revolution would

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be based on maximising working class self-activity (at all levels,

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locally and upwards) we would argue that it would be better placed

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to respond to even the terrible conditions facing the Russian

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Revolution.

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That is not all. As we argue in the appendix on

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<a href="append44.html">"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"</a> we are of the opinion

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that Bolshevism itself undermined the socialist potential of the

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revolution, irrespective of the actual circumstances involved

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(which, to some degree, will affect any revolution). For example,

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the Bolshevik preference for centralisation and nationalisation

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would negatively affect a revolution conducted in even the best

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circumstances, as would the seizure of state power rather than its

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destruction. As is clear from the appendix on

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<a href="append44.html">"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"</a>, only the elimination of

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what makes Bolshevism Bolshevik would ensure that a revolution would

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be truly libertarian. So anarchists stress that rather than be

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forced upon them by "objective factors" many of these policies

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were, in fact, in line with pre-civil war Bolshevik ideas. The

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Bolshevik vision of socialism, in other words, ensured that they

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smothered the (libertarian) socialist tendencies and institutions

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that existed at the time. As Chomsky summarises, "Lenin and

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Trotsky, shortly after seizing state power in 1917, moved to

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dismantle organs of popular control, including factory committees

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and Soviets, thus proceeding to deter and overcome socialist

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tendencies." [Deterring Democracy, p. 361] That they thought

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their system of state capitalism was a form of "socialism" is

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irrelevant -- they systematically combated (real) socialist

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tendencies in favour of state capitalist ones and did so knowingly

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and deliberately (see sections

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<a href="secH3.html#sech31">H.3.1</a> and

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<a href="secH3.html#sech313">H.3.13</a> on the differences

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between real socialism and Marxism in its Bolshevik mode and, of

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course, <a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a> on Bolshevik practice itself).

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So it is important to stress that even if the Russian Revolution

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had occurred in better circumstances, it is unlikely that Bolshevism

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would have resulted in socialism rather than state capitalism. Certain

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Bolshevik principles ensure that any revolution lead by a vanguard party

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would not have succeeded. This can be seen from the experience of

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Bolshevism immediately after it seized power, before the start of

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the civil war and major economic collapse. In the circumstances of

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post-world war I Russia, these principles were attenuated but their

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application in even the best of situations would have undermined

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socialist tendencies in the revolution. Simply put, a statist

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revolution will have statist, not libertarian, ends.

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The focusing on "objective factors" (particularly the civil war)

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has become the traditional excuse for people with a romantic

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attachment to Leninism but who are unwilling to make a stand

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over what the Bolsheviks actually did in power. This excuse is

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not viable if you seek to build a revolutionary movement today:

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you need to choose between the real path of Lenin and the real,

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anarchist, alternative. As Lenin constantly stressed, a revolution

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will be difficult -- fooling ourselves about what will happen now

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just undermines our chances of success in the future and ensure

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that history will repeat itself.

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Essentially, the "objective factors" argument is not a defence

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of Leninism, but rather one that seeks to evade having to make

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such a defence. This is very typical of Leninist parties today.

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Revolutionary politics would be much better served by confronting

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this history and the politics behind it head on. Perhaps, if

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Leninists did do this, they would probably remain Leninists,

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but at least then their party members and those who read their

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publications would have an understanding of what this meant.

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And they would have to dump Lenin's State and Revolution into

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the same place Lenin himself did when in power -- into the rubbish

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bin -- and admit that democracy and Bolshevik revolution do not

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go together.

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It is precisely these rationalisations for Bolshevism based on

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"objective factors" which this section of the FAQ discusses and

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refutes. However, it is important to stress that it was not

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a case of the Bolshevik regime wanting to introduce communism

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but, being isolated, ended up imposing state capitalism instead.

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Indeed, the idea that "objective factors" caused the degeneration

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of the revolution is only valid if and only if the Bolsheviks were

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implementing socialist policies during the period immediately after

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the October revolution. That was not the case. Rather than objective

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factors undermining socialist policies, the facts of the matter are

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that the Bolsheviks pursued a statist and (state) capitalist policy

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from the start. As we discuss in the appendix on

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<a href="append44.html">"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"</a> the likes of Lenin

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explicitly argued for these policies as essential for building

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socialism (or, at best, the preconditions of socialism) in Russia

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and Bolshevik practice flowed from these comments. As we discuss

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in more detail in the appendix on

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<a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a>, the Bolsheviks happily introduced

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authoritarian and state capitalist policies from the start. Many

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of the policies denounced as "Stalinist" by Leninists were being

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advocated and implemented by Lenin in the spring of 1918, i.e.

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before the start of the civil war and massive economic chaos.

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In other words, the usual excuses for Bolshevik tyranny do not hold

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much water, both factually and logically -- as this section of the

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FAQ seeks to show.

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And, ironically, the framework which Leninists use in this discussion

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shows the importance of Bolshevik ideology and the key role it played

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in the outcome of the revolution. After all, pro-Bolsheviks argue that

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the "objective factors" forced the Bolsheviks to act as they did.

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However, the proletariat is meant to be the "ruling class" in the

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"dictatorship of the proletariat." As such, to argue that the

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Bolsheviks were forced to act as they did due to circumstances means

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to implicitly acknowledge that the party held power in Russia,

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not the working class. That a ruling party could become a party

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dictatorship is not that unsurprising. Nor that its vision of what

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"socialism" was would be given preference over the desires of the

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working class in whose name it ruled.

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Ultimately, the discussion on why the Bolshevik party failed shows

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the validity of Bakunin's critique of Marxism. As he put it:

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"Nor can we comprehend talk of freedom of the proletariat or

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true deliverance of the masses within the State and by the State.

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State signifies domination, and all domination implies subjection

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of the masses, and as a result, their exploitation to the

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advantage of some governing minority.

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"Not even as revolutionary transition will we countenance national

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Conventions, nor Constituent Assemblies, nor provisional governments,

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nor so called revolutionary dictatorships: because we are persuaded

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that revolution is sincere, honest and real only among the masses

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and that, whenever it is concentrated in the hands of a few

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governing individuals, it inevitably and immediately turns into

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reaction." [No Gods, No Masters, vol. 1, p. 160]

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</blockquote>

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The degeneration of the Russian Revolution can be traced from when

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the Bolsheviks seized power on behalf of the Russian working

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class and peasantry. The state implies the delegation of power

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and initiative into the hands of a few leaders who form the

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"revolutionary government." Yet the power of any revolution, as

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Bakunin recognised, derives from the decentralisation of power,

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from the active participation of the masses in the collective

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social movement and the direct action it generates. As soon as

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this power passes out of the hands of the working class, the

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revolution is doomed: the counter-revolution has begun and it

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matters little that it is draped in a red flag. Hence anarchist

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opposition to the state.

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Sadly, many socialists have failed to recognise this. Hopefully this

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section of our FAQ will show that the standard explanations of the

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failure of the Russian revolution are, at their base, superficial

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and will only ensure that history will repeat itself.

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<a name="app1"><h2>1 Do anarchists ignore the objective factors facing the

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Russian revolution?</h2>

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It is often asserted by Leninists that anarchists simply ignore

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the "objective factors" facing the Bolsheviks when we discuss the

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degeneration of the Russian Revolution. Thus, according to this

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argument, anarchists present a basically idealistic analysis of

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the failure of Bolshevism, one not rooted in the material

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conditions facing (civil war, economic chaos, etc.) facing Lenin

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and Trotsky.

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According to one Trotskyist, anarchists "do not make the slightest

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attempt at a serious analysis of the situation" and so "other

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considerations, of a different, 'theoretical' nature, are to be

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found in their works." Thus:

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"Bureaucratic conceptions beget bureaucracy just as opium begets

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sleep by virtue of its sleep-inducing properties. Trotsky was

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wrong to explain the proliferation and rise of the bureaucracy

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on the basis of the country's backwardness, low cultural level,

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and the isolation of the revolution. No, what have rise to a

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social phenomenon like Stalinism was a conception or idea . . .

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it is ideas, or deviations from them, that determine the

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character of revolutions. The most simplistic kind of

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philosophical idealism has laid low historical materialism."

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[Pierre Frank, "Introduction," Lenin and Trotsky, Kronstadt,

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pp. 22-3]

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</blockquote>

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Many other Trotskyists take a similar position (although

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most would include the impact of the Civil War on the rise

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of Bolshevik authoritarianism and the bureaucracy). Duncan

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Hallas, for example, argues that the account of the Bolshevik

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counter-revolution given in the Cohn-Bendit brothers' Obsolete

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Communism is marked by a "complete omission of any consideration

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of the circumstances in which they [Bolshevik decisions] took

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place. The ravages of war and civil war, the ruin of Russian

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industry, the actual disintegration of the Russian working

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class: all of this, apparently, has no bearing on the outcome."

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[Towards a Revolutionary Socialist Party, p. 41] Thus the

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"degree to which workers can 'make their own history' depends

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on the weight of objective factors bearing down on them . . .

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To decide in any given circumstance the weight of the subjective

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and objective factors demands a concrete analysis of the

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balance of forces." The conditions in Russia meant that

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the "subjective factor" of Bolshevik ideology "was reduced to

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a choice between capitulation to the Whites or defending the

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revolution with whatever means were at hands. Within these

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limits Bolshevik policy was decisive. But it could not wish

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away the limits and start with a clean sheet. It is a tribute

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to the power of the Bolsheviks' politics and organisation that

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they took the measures necessary and withstood the siege for

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so long." [John Rees, "In Defence of October," pp. 3-82,

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International Socialism, no. 52, p. 30]

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So, it is argued, by ignoring the problems facing the Bolsheviks

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and concentrating on their ideas, anarchists fail to understand

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why the Bolsheviks acted as they did. Unsurprisingly anarchists

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are not impressed with this argument. This is for a simple reason.

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According to anarchist theory the "objective factors" facing

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the Bolsheviks are to be expected in any revolution. Indeed,

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the likes of Bakunin and Kropotkin predicted that a revolution

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would face the very "objective factors" which Leninists use to

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justify and rationalise Bolshevik actions (see

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<a href="append43.html#app2">next section</a>). As

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such, to claim that anarchists ignore the "objective factors"

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facing the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution is simply a

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joke. How can anarchists be considered to ignore what they

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consider to be the inevitable results of a revolution? Moreover,

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these Bolshevik assertions ignore the fact that the anarchists

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who wrote extensively about their experiences in Russia never

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failed to note that difficult objective factors facing it.

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Alexander Berkman in The Bolshevik Myth paints a clear picture

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of the problems facing the revolution, as does Emma Goldman in

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her My Disillusionment in Russia. This is not to mention

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anarchists like Voline, Arshinov and Maximoff who took part in

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the Revolution, experiencing the "objective factors" first hand

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(and in the case of Voline and Arshinov, participating in the

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Makhnovist movement which, facing the same factors, managed not

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to act as the Bolsheviks did).

473

474

However, as the claim that anarchists ignore the "objective

475

circumstances" facing the Bolsheviks is relatively common, it

476

is important to refute it once and for all. This means that

477

while have we discussed this issue in association with Leninist

478

justifications for repressing the Kronstadt revolt (see

479

<a href="append42.html#app12">section 12</a> of the appendix

480

<a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a>),

481

it is worthwhile repeating them here. We are sorry for

482

the duplication.

483

484

Anarchists take it for granted that, to quote Bakunin, revolutions

485

"are not child's play" and that they mean "war, and that implies

486

the destruction of men and things." The "Social Revolution must

487

put an end to the old system of organisation based upon violence,

488

giving full liberty to the masses, groups, communes, and associations,

489

and likewise to individuals themselves, and destroying once and for

490

all the historic cause of all violences, the power and existence of

491

the State." This meant a revolution would be "spontaneous, chaotic,

492

and ruthless, always presupposes a vast destruction of property."

493

[The Political Philosophy of Bakunin, p. 372, p. 373, p. 380]

494

In other words:

495

496

"The way of the anarchist social revolution, which will come

497

from the people themselves, is an elemental force sweeping away

498

all obstacles. Later, from the depths of the popular soul, there

499

will spontaneously emerge the new creative forms of life."

500

[Bakunin on Anarchism, p. 325]

501

</blockquote>

502

He took it for granted that counter-revolution would exist,

503

arguing that it was necessary to "constitute the federation

504

of insurgent associations, communes and provinces . . . to

505

organise a revolutionary force capable of defeating reaction"

506

and "for the purpose of self-defence." [Selected Writings,

507

p. 171]

508

509

It would, of course, be strange if this necessity for defence

510

and reconstruction would have little impact on the economic

511

conditions in the revolutionised society. The expropriation of

512

the means of production and the land by a free federation of

513

workers' associations would have an impact on the economy.

514

Kropotkin built upon Bakunin's arguments, stressing that a

515

social revolution would, by necessity, involve major

516

difficulties and harsh objective circumstances. It is

517

worth quoting one of his many discussions of this at

518

length:

519

520

"Suppose we have entered a revolutionary period, with or

521

without civil war -- it does not matter, -- a period when

522

old institutions are falling into ruins and new ones are

523

growing in their place. The movement may be limited to

524

one State, or spread over the world, -- it will have

525

nevertheless the same consequence: an immediate slackening

526

of individual enterprise all over Europe. Capital will

527

conceal itself, and hundreds of capitalists will prefer to

528

abandon their undertakings and go to watering-places

529

rather than abandon their unfixed capital in industrial

530

production. And we know how a restriction of production in

531

any one branch of industry affects many others, and these

532

in turn spread wider and wider the area of depression.

533

534

"Already, at this moment, millions of those who have created

535

all riches suffer from want of what must be considered

536

necessaries for the life of a civilised man. . . Let the

537

slightest commotion be felt in the industrial world, and it

538

will take the shape of a general stoppage of work. Let the

539

first attempt at expropriation be made, and the capitalist

540

production of our days will at once come to a stop, and

541

millions and millions of 'unemployed' will join the ranks

542

of those who are already unemployed now.

543

544

"More than that . . . The very first advance towards a

545

Socialist society will imply a thorough reorganisation of

546

industry as to what we have to produce. Socialism implies

547

. . . a transformation of industry so that it may be adapted

548

to the needs of the customer, not those of the profit-maker.

549

Many a branch of industry must disappear, or limits its

550

production; many a new one must develop. We are now producing

551

a great deal for export. But the export trade will be the

552

first to be reduced as soon as attempts at Social Revolution

553

are made anywhere in Europe . . .

554

555

"All that can be, and will be reorganised in time -- not

556

by the State, of course (why, then, not say by Providence?),

557

but by the workers themselves. But, in the meantime, the

558

worker . . . cannot wait for the gradual reorganisation of

559

industry. . .

560

561

"The great problem of how to supply the wants of millions

562

will thus start up at once in all its immensity. And the

563

necessity of finding an immediate solution for it is the

564

reason we consider that a step in the direction of

565

[libertarian] Communism will be imposed on the revolted

566

society -- not in the future, but as soon as it applies

567

its crowbar to the first stones of the capitalist edifice."

568

[Act for Yourselves, pp. 57-9]

569

</blockquote>

570

As noted in

571

<a href="append42.html#app12">section 12</a> of the appendix on

572

<a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Uprising?"</a>, the perspective was at the core

573

of Kropotkin's politics. His classic work Conquest of Bread

574

was based on this clear understanding of the nature of a

575

social revolution and the objective problems it will face.

576

As he put it, while a "political revolution can be

577

accomplished without shaking the foundations of industry"

578

a revolution "where the people lay hands upon property will

579

inevitably paralyse exchange and production . . . This point

580

cannot be too much insisted upon; the reorganisation of

581

industry on a new basis . . . cannot be accomplished in a

582

few days." Indeed, he considered it essential to "show how

583

tremendous this problem is." [The Conquest of Bread,

584

pp. 72-3]

585

586

Therefore, "[o]ne of the great difficulties in every Revolution

587

is the feeding of the large towns." This was because the "large

588

towns of modern times are centres of various industries that

589

are developed chiefly for the sake of the rich or for the

590

export trade" and these "two branches fail whenever any crisis

591

occurs, and the question then arises of how these great urban

592

agglomerations are to be fed." This crisis, rather than making

593

revolution impossible, spurred the creation of what Kropotkin

594

terms "the communist movement" in which "the Parisian proletariat

595

had already formed a conception of its class interests and had

596

found men to express them well." [Kropotkin, The Great French

597

Revolution, vol. II, p. 457 and p. 504]

598

599

As for self-defence, he reproached the authors of classic

600

syndicalist utopia How we shall bring about the Revolution

601

for "considerably attenuat[ing] the resistance that the Social

602

Revolution will probably meet with on its way." He stressed

603

that the "check of the attempt at Revolution in Russia has

604

shown us all the danger that may follow from an illusion of

605

this kind." ["preface," Emile Pataud and Emile Pouget, How

606

we shall bring about the Revolution, p. xxxvi]

607

608

It must, therefore, be stressed that the very "objective factors"

609

supporters of Bolshevism use to justify the actions of Lenin and

610

Trotsky were predicted correctly by anarchists decades before

611

hand. Indeed, rather than ignore them anarchists like Kropotkin

612

based their political and social ideas on these difficulties. As

613

such, it seems ironic for Leninists to attack anarchists for

614

allegedly ignoring these factors. It is even more ironic as these

615

very same Leninists are meant to know that any revolution will

616

involve these exact same "objective factors," something that Lenin

617

and other leading Bolsheviks acknowledged (see

618

<a href="append43.html#app2">next section</a>).

619

620

Therefore, as noted, when anarchists like Emma Goldman and

621

Alexander Berkman arrived in Russia they were aware of the

622

problems it, like any revolution, would face. In the words

623

of Berkman, "what I saw and learned as in such crying contrast

624

with my hopes and expectations as to shake the very foundation

625

of my faith in the Bolsheviki. Not that I expected to find

626

Russia a proletarian Eldorado. By no means. I knew how great

627

the travail of a revolutionary period, how stupendous the

628

difficulties to be overcome. Russia was besieged on numerous

629

fronts; there was counter-revolution within and without; the

630

blockade was starving the country and denying even medical

631

aid to sick women and children. The people were exhausted by

632

long war and civil strive; industry was disorganised, the

633

railroads broken down. I fully realised the dire situation,

634

with Russia shedding her blood on the alter of the Revolution."

635

[The Bolshevik Myth, p. 329] Emma Goldman expressed similar

636

opinions. [My Disillusionment in Russia, pp. xlvii-xlix]

637

638

Unsurprisingly, therefore this extremely realistic

639

perspective can be found in their later works. Berkman,

640

for example, stressed that "when the social revolution

641

had become thoroughly organised and production is

642

functioning normally there will be enough for

643

everybody. But in the first stages of the revolution,

644

during the process of re-construction, we must take

645

care to supply the people the best we can, and

646

equally, which means rationing." This was because the

647

"first effect of the revolution is reduced production."

648

This would be initially due to the general strike which

649

is its "starting point." However, "[w]hen the social

650

revolution begins in any land, its foreign commerce

651

stops: the importation of raw materials and finished

652

products is suspended. The country may even be blockaded

653

by the bourgeois governments." In addition, he thought

654

it important not to suppress "small scale industries"

655

as they would be essential when "a country in revolution

656

is attacked by foreign governments, when it is blockaded

657

and deprived of imports, when its large-scale industries

658

threaten to break down or the railways do break down."

659

[ABC of Anarchism, p. 67, p. 74 p. 78-9 and p. 79]

660

661

He, of course, considered it essential that to counteract

662

isolation workers must understand "that their cause is

663

international" and that "the organisation of labour" must

664

develop "beyond national boundaries." However, "the

665

probability is not to be discounted that the revolution

666

may break out in one country sooner than in another" and

667

"in such a case it would become imperative . . . not to

668

wait for possible aid from outside, but immediately to

669

exert all her energies to help herself supply the most

670

essential needs of her people by her own efforts." [Op.

671

Cit., p. 78]

672

673

Emma Goldman, likewise, noted that it was "a tragic fact

674

that all revolutions have sprung from the loins of war.

675

Instead of translating the revolution into social gains

676

the people have usually been forced to defend themselves

677

against warring parties." "It seems," she noted, "nothing

678

great is born without pain and travail" as well as "the

679

imperative necessity of defending the Revolution." However,

680

in spite of these inevitable difficulties she point to

681

how the Spanish anarchists "have shown the first example

682

in history how Revolutions should be made" by "the

683

constructive work" of "socialising of the land, the

684

organisation of the industries." [Vision on Fire, p. 218,

685

p. 222 and p. 55-56]

686

687

These opinions were, as can be seen, to be expected from

688

revolutionary anarchists schooled in the ideas of Bakunin

689

and Kropotkin. Clearly, then, far from ignoring the "objective

690

factors" facing the Bolsheviks, anarchists have based their

691

politics around them. We have always argued that a social

692

revolution would face isolation, economic disruption and

693

civil war and have, for this reason, stressed the importance

694

of mass participation in order to overcome them. As such,

695

when Leninists argue that these inevitable "objective factors"

696

caused the degeneration of Bolshevism, anarchists simply reply

697

that if it cannot handle the inevitable then Bolshevism should

698

be avoided. Just as we would avoid a submarine which worked

699

perfectly well until it was placed in the sea or an umbrella

700

which only kept you dry when it was not raining.

701

702

Moreover, what is to be made of this Leninist argument against

703

anarchism? In fact, given the logic of their claims we have to

704

argument we have to draw the conclusion that the Leninists seem

705

to think a revolution could happen without civil war and

706

economic disruption. As such it suggests that the Leninists

707

have the "utopian" politics in this matter. After all, if

708

they argue that civil war is inevitable then how can they

709

blame the degeneration of the revolution on it? Simply put,

710

if Bolshevism cannot handle the inevitable it should be

711

avoided at all costs.

712

713

Ironically, as indicated in the

714

<a href="append43.html#app2">next section</a>, we can find ample

715

arguments to refute the Trotskyist case against the anarchist

716

analysis in the works of leading Bolsheviks like Lenin, Trotsky

717

aand Bukharin. Indeed, their arguments provide a striking

718

confirmation of the anarchist position as they, like Kropotkin,

719

stress that difficult "objective factors" will face every

720

revolution. This means to use these factors to justify Bolshevik

721

authoritarianism simply results in proving that Bolshevism is

722

simply non-viable or that a liberatory social revolution is,

723

in fact, impossible (and, as a consequence, genuine socialism).

724

725

There are, of course, other reasons why the Leninist critique

726

of the anarchist position is false. The first is theoretical.

727

Simply put, the Leninist position is the crudest form of

728

economic determinism. Ideas do matter and, as Marx himself

729

stressed, can play a key in how a social process develops.

730

As we discuss in the appendix on

731

<a href="append44.html">"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"</a>, Marxist ideology played a key

732

role in the degeneration of the revolution and in laying the

733

groundwork for the rise of Stalinism.

734

735

Ultimately, any Leninist defence of Bolshevism based purely

736

on stressing the "objective factor" implies that Bolshevik

737

ideology played no role in the decisions made by the party

738

leaders, that they simply operated on autopilot from October

739

1917 onwards. Yet, at the same time, they stress the importance

740

of Leninist ideology in ensuring the "victory" of the revolution.

741

They seek to have it both ways. However, as Samuel Farber puts it:

742

743

"determinism's characteristic and systemic failure is to understand

744

that what the masses of people do and think politically is as much

745

part of the process determining the outcome of history as are the

746

objective obstacles that most definitely limit peoples' choices."

747

[Before Stalinism, p. 198]

748

</blockquote>

749

This is equally applicable when discussing the heads of a highly

750

centralised state who have effectively expropriated political,

751

economic and social power from the working class and are ruling

752

in their name. Unsurprisingly, rather than just select policies

753

at random the Bolshevik leadership pursued consistently before,

754

during and after the civil war policies which reflected their

755

ideology. Hence there was a preference in policies which

756

centralised power in the hands of a few (politically and

757

economically), that saw socialism as being defined by

758

nationalisation rather than self-management, that stressed

759

that role and power of the vanguard above that of the working

760

class, that saw class consciousness as being determined by

761

how much a worker agreed with the party leadership rather

762

than whether it expressed the actual needs and interests

763

of the class as a whole.

764

765

Then there is the empirical evidence against the Trotskyist

766

explanation.

767

768

As we indicate in <a href="append43.html#app3">section 3</a>,

769

soviet democracy and workers'

770

power in the workplace was not undermined by the civil war.

771

Rather, the process had began before the civil war started and,

772

equally significantly, continued after its end in November 1920.

773

Moreover, the "gains" of October Trotskyists claim that Stalinism

774

destroyed were, in fact, long dead by 1921. Soviet democracy,

775

working class freedom of speech, association and assembly,

776

workers' self-management or control in the workplace, trade union

777

freedom, the ability to strike, and a host of other, elementary,

778

working class rights had been eliminated long before the end of

779

the civil war (indeed, often before it started) and, moreover,

780

the Bolsheviks did not lament this. Rather, "there is no evidence

781

indicating that Lenin or any mainstream Bolshevik leaders lamented

782

the loss of workers' control or of democracy in the soviets , or

783

at least referred to these losses as a retreat, as Lenin declared

784

with the replacement of War Communism by NEP in 1921." [Samuel

785

Farber, Op. Cit., p. 44]

786

787

And then there is the example of the Makhnovist movement. Operating

788

in the same "objective circumstances," facing the same "objective

789

factors," the Makhnovists did not implement the same policies as

790

the Bolsheviks. As we discussed in the appendix on

791

<a href="append46.html">"Why does the Makhnovist movement show there is an alternative to

792

Bolshevism?"</a>, rather than undermine

793

soviet, soldier and workplace democracy and replace all with party

794

dictatorship, the Makhnovists applied these as fully as they could.

795

Now, if "objective factors" explain the actions of the Bolsheviks,

796

then why did the Makhnovists not pursue identical policies?

797

798

Simply put, the idea that Bolshevik policies did not impact on

799

the outcome of the revolution is a false assertion, as the

800

Makhnovists show. Beliefs are utopian if subjective ideas are

801

not grounded in objective reality. Anarchists hold that part

802

of the subjective conditions required before socialism can

803

exist is the existence of free exchange of ideas and working

804

class democracy (i.e. self-management). To believe that revolution

805

is possible without freedom, to believe those in power can, through

806

their best and genuine intentions, impose socialism from above,

807

as the Bolsheviks did, is indeed utopian. As the Bolsheviks proved.

808

The Makhnovists shows that the received wisdom is that there was

809

no alternative open to the Bolsheviks is false.

810

811

So while it cannot be denied that objective factors influenced how

812

certain Bolshevik policies were shaped and applied, the inspiration

813

of those policies came from Bolshevik ideology. An acorn will grow

814

and develop depending on the climate and location it finds itself

815

in, but regardless of the "objective factors" it will grow into

816

an oak tree. Similarly with the Russian revolution. While the

817

circumstances it faced influenced its growth, Bolshevik ideology

818

could not help but produce an authoritarian regime with no relationship

819

with real socialism.

820

821

In summary, anarchists do not ignore the objective factors

822

facing the Bolsheviks during the revolution. As indicated, we

823

predicted the problems they faced and developed our ideas to

824

counter them. As the example of the Makhnovists showed, our ideas

825

were more than adequate for the task. Unlike the Bolsheviks.

826

827

<a name="app2"><h2>2 Can "objective factors" really explain the failure of Bolshevism?</h2>

828

829

As noted in the

830

<a href="append43.html#app1">previous section</a> Leninists tend to argue that

831

anarchists downplay (at best) or ignore (at worse) the "objective

832

factors" facing the Bolsheviks during the Russian Revolution. As

833

noted in the same section, this argument is simple false. For

834

anarchists have long expected the "objective factors" usually

835

used to explain the degeneration of the revolution.

836

837

However, there is more to it than that. Leninists claim to be

838

revolutionaries. They claim to know that revolutions face problems,

839

the civil war is inevitable and so forth. It therefore strikes

840

anarchists as being somewhat hypocritical for Leninists to blame

841

these very same "objective" but allegedly inevitable factors for

842

the failure of Bolshevism in Russia.

843

844

Ironically enough, Lenin and Trotsky agree with these anarchist

845

arguments. Looking at Trotsky, he dismissed the CNT's leaderships'

846

arguments in favour of collaborating with the bourgeois state:

847

848

"The leaders of the Spanish Federation of Labour (CNT) . . .

849

became, in the critical hour, bourgeois ministers. They explained

850

their open betrayal of the theory of anarchism by the pressure of

851

'exceptional circumstances.' But did not the leaders of the German

852

social democracy invoke, in their time, the same excuse? Naturally,

853

civil war is not a peaceful and ordinary but an 'exceptional

854

circumstance.' Every serious revolutionary organisation, however,

855

prepares precisely for 'exceptional circumstances' . . . We have

856

not the slightest intention of blaming the anarchists for not

857

having liquidated the state with the mere stroke of a pen. A

858

revolutionary party , even having seized power (of which the

859

anarchist leaders were incapable in spite of the heroism of the

860

anarchist workers), is still by no means the sovereign ruler of

861

society. But all the more severely do we blame the anarchist

862

theory, which seemed to be wholly suitable for times of peace,

863

but which had to be dropped rapidly as soon as the 'exceptional

864

circumstances' of the... revolution had begun. In the old days

865

there were certain generals - and probably are now - who

866

considered that the most harmful thing for an army was war.

867

Little better are those revolutionaries who complain that

868

revolution destroys their doctrine." [Stalinism and Bolshevism]

869

</blockquote>

870

Thus to argue that the "exceptional circumstances" caused by the

871

civil war are the only root cause of the degeneration of the Russian

872

Revolution is a damning indictment of Bolshevism. After all, Lenin

873

did not argue in State and Revolution that the application of

874

soviet democracy was dependent only in "times of peace." Rather,

875

he stressed that they were for the "exceptional circumstance" of

876

revolution and the civil war he considered its inevitable consequence.

877

As such, we must note that Trotsky's followers do not apply this

878

critique to their own politics, which are also a form of the

879

"exceptional circumstances" excuse. Given how quickly Bolshevik

880

"principles" (as expressed in The State and Revolution) were

881

dropped, we can only assume that Bolshevik ideas are also suitable

882

purely for "times of peace" as well. As such, we must note the

883

irony of Leninist claims that "objective circumstances" explains

884

the failure of the Bolshevik revolution.

885

886

Saying that, we should not that Trotsky was not above using such

887

arguments himself (making later-day Trotskyists at least ideologically

888

consistent in their hypocrisy). In the same essay, for example, he

889

justifies the prohibition of other Soviet parties in terms of a

890

"measure of defence of the dictatorship in a backward and devastated

891

country, surrounded by enemies on all sides." In other words, an

892

appeal to the exceptional circumstances facing the Bolsheviks!

893

Perhaps unsurprisingly, his followers have tended to stress this

894

(contradictory) aspect of his argument rather than his comments

895

that those "who propose the abstraction of Soviets to the party

896

dictatorship should understand that only thanks to the party

897

dictatorship were the Soviets able to lift themselves out of the

898

mud of reformism and attain the state form of the proletariat. The

899

Bolshevik party achieved in the civil war the correct combination

900

of military art and Marxist politics." [Op. Cit.] Which, of course,

901

suggests that the prohibition of other parties had little impact

902

on levels of soviet "democracy" allowed under the Bolsheviks (see

903

<a href="append41.html#app6">section 6</a> of the appendix on

904

<a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a>for more on this).

905

906

This dismissal of the "exceptional circumstances" argument

907

did not originate with Trotsky. Lenin repeatedly stressed

908

that any revolution would face civil war and economic disruption.

909

In early January, 1918, he was pointing to "the incredibly

910

complications of war and economic ruin" in Russia and noting

911

that "the fact that Soviet power has been established . . . is

912

why civil war has acquired predominance in Russia at the present

913

time." [Collected Works, vol. 26, p. 453 and p. 459]

914

915

A few months later he states quite clearly that "it will never be

916

possible to build socialism at a time when everything is running

917

smoothly and tranquilly; it will never be possible to realise

918

socialism without the landowners and capitalists putting up a

919

furious resistance." He reiterated this point, acknowledging

920

that the "country is poor, the country is poverty-stricken,

921

and it is impossible just now to satisfy all demands; that is

922

why it is so difficult to build the new edifice in the midst

923

of disruption. But those who believe that socialism can be

924

built at a time of peace and tranquillity are profoundly mistake:

925

it will be everywhere built at a time of disruption, at a time

926

of famine. That is how it must be." [Op. Cit., vol. 27, p. 520

927

and p. 517]

928

929

As regards civil war, he noted that "not one of the great revolutions

930

of history has take place" without one and "without which not a

931

single serious Marxist has conceived the transition from capitalism

932

to socialism." Moreover, "there can be no civil war -- the inevitable

933

condition and concomitant of socialist revolution -- without

934

disruption." [Op. Cit., p. 496 and p. 497] He considered this

935

disruption as being applicable to advanced capitalist nations as

936

well:

937

938

"In Germany, state capitalism prevails, and therefore the

939

revolution in Germany will be a hundred times more devastating

940

and ruinous than in a petty-bourgeois country -- there, too,

941

there will be gigantic difficulties and tremendous chaos and

942

imbalance." [Op. Cit., vol. 28, p. 298]

943

</blockquote>

944

And from June, 1918:

945

946

"We must be perfectly clear in our minds about the new disasters

947

that civil war brings for every country. The more cultured a

948

country is the more serious will be these disasters. Let us

949

picture to ourselves a country possessing machinery and

950

railways in which civil war is raging., and this civil war cuts

951

off communication between the various parts of the country.

952

Picture to yourselves the condition of regions which for decades

953

have been accustomed to living by the interchange of manufactured

954

goods and you will understand that every civil war brings forth

955

disasters." [Op. Cit., vol. 27, p. 463]

956

</blockquote>

957

As we discuss in <a href="append43.html#app4">section 4</a>,

958

the economic state of Germany

959

immediately after the end of the war suggests that Lenin had a

960

point. Simply put, the German economy was in a serious state of

961

devastation, a state equal to that of Russia during the equivalent

962

period of its revolution. If economic conditions made party

963

dictatorship inevitable in Bolshevik Russia (as pro-Leninists

964

argue) it would mean that soviet democracy and revolution cannot

965

go together.

966

967

Lenin reiterated this point again and again. He argued that "we

968

see famine not only in Russia, but in the most cultured, advanced

969

countries, like Germany . . . it is spread over a longer period

970

than in Russia, but it is famine nevertheless, still more severe

971

and painful than here." In fact, "today even the richest countries

972

are experiencing unprecedented food shortages and that the

973

overwhelming majority of the working masses are suffering

974

incredible torture." [Op. Cit., vol. 27, p. 460 and p. 461]

975

976

Lenin, unlike many of his latter day followers, did not consider

977

these grim objective conditions are making revolution impossible.

978

Rather, for him, there was "no other way out of this war" which

979

is causing the problems "except revolution, except civil war

980

. . . a war which always accompanies not only great revolutions

981

but every serious revolution in history." He continued by arguing

982

that we "must be perfectly clear in our minds about the new

983

disasters that civil war brings for every country. The more

984

cultured a country is the more serious will be these disasters.

985

Let us picture to ourselves a country possessing machinery and

986

railways in which civil war is raging, and this civil war cuts

987

communication between the various parts of the country. Picture

988

to yourselves the condition of regions which for decades have

989

been accustomed to living by interchange of manufactured goods

990

and you will understand that every civil war brings fresh

991

disasters." [Op. Cit., p. 463] The similarities to Kropotkin's

992

arguments made three decades previously are clear (see

993

<a href="append43.html#app1">section 1</a> for details).

994

995

Indeed, he mocked those who would argue that revolution could

996

occur with "exceptional circumstances":

997

998

"A revolutionary would not 'agree' to a proletarian revolution

999

only 'on the condition' that it proceeds easily and smoothly,

1000

that there is, from the outset, combined action on the part

1001

of proletarians of different countries, that there are

1002

guarantees against defeats, that the road of the revolution is

1003

broad, free and straight, that it will not be necessary during

1004

the march to victory to sustain the heaviest casualties, to

1005

'bide one's time in a besieged fortress,' or to make one's

1006

way along extremely narrow, impassable, winding and dangerous

1007

mountain tracks. Such a person is no revolutionary."

1008

[Selected Works, vol. 2, p. 709]

1009

</blockquote>

1010

He then turned his fire on those who failed to recognise the

1011

problems facing a revolution and instead simply blamed the

1012

Bolsheviks:

1013

1014

"The revolution engendered by the war cannot avoid the terrible

1015

difficulties and suffering bequeathed it by the prolonged,

1016

ruinous, reactionary slaughter of the nations. To blame us

1017

for the 'destruction' of industry, or for the 'terror', is

1018

either hypocrisy or dull-witted pedantry; it reveals an

1019

inability to understand the basic conditions of the fierce

1020

class struggle, raised to the highest degree of intensity,

1021

that is called revolution." [Op. Cit., pp. 709-10]

1022

</blockquote>

1023

Thus industrial collapse and terrible difficulties would face

1024

any revolution. It goes without saying that if it was "hypocrisy"

1025

to blame Bolshevik politics for these problems, it would be the

1026

same to blame these problems for Bolshevik politics. As Lenin

1027

noted, "in revolutionary epochs the class struggle has always,

1028

inevitably, and in every country, assumed the form of

1029

civil war, and civil war is inconceivable without the

1030

severest destruction, terror and the restriction of formal

1031

democracy in the interests of this war." Moreover, "[w]e know

1032

that fierce resistance to the socialist revolution on the part

1033

of the bourgeoisie is inevitable in all countries, and

1034

that this resistance will grow with the growth of the

1035

revolution." [Op. Cit., p. 710 and p. 712] To blame the

1036

inevitable problems of a revolution for the failings of

1037

Bolshevism suggests that Bolshevism is simply not suitable

1038

for revolutionary situations.

1039

1040

At the 1920 Comintern Congress Lenin lambasted a German socialist

1041

who argued against revolution because "Germany was so weakened by

1042

the War" that if it had been "blockaded again the misery of the

1043

German masses would have been even more dreadful." Dismissing this

1044

argument, Lenin argued as follows:

1045

1046

"A revolution . . . can be made only if it does not worsen the

1047

workers' conditions 'too much.' Is it permissible, in a communist

1048

party, to speak in a tone like this, I ask? This is the language

1049

of counter-revolution. The standard of living in Russia is

1050

undoubtedly lower than in Germany, and when we established the

1051

dictatorship, this led to the workers beginning to go more

1052

hungry and to their conditions becoming even worse. The workers'

1053

victory cannot be achieved without sacrificing, without a

1054

temporary deterioration of their conditions. . . If the German

1055

workers now want to work for the revolution, they must make

1056

sacrifices and not be afraid to do so . . . The labour aristocracy,

1057

which is afraid of sacrifices, afraid of 'too great' impoverishment

1058

during the revolutionary struggle, cannot belong to the party.

1059

Otherwise the dictatorship is impossible, especially in western

1060

European countries." [Proceedings and Documents of the Second

1061

Congress 1920, pp. 382-3]

1062

</blockquote>

1063

In 1921 he repeated this, arguing that "every revolution entails

1064

enormous sacrifice on the part of the class making it. . . The

1065

dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia has entailed for the

1066

ruling class -- the proletariat -- sacrifices, want and privation

1067

unprecedented in history, and the case will, in all probability,

1068

be the same in every other country." [Collected Works, vol. 32,

1069

p. 488] Thus Lenin is on record as saying these "objective factors"

1070

will always be the circumstances facing a socialist revolution.

1071

Indeed, in November 1922 he stated that "Soviet rule in Russia is

1072

celebrating its fifth anniversary, It is now sounder than ever."

1073

[Op. Cit., vol. 33, p. 417]

1074

1075

All of which must be deeply embarrassing to Leninists. After all,

1076

here is Lenin arguing that the factors Leninist's list as being

1077

responsible for the degeneration of the Russian Revolution were

1078

inevitable side effects of any revolution!

1079

1080

Nor was this perspective limited to Lenin. The inevitability of

1081

economic collapse being associated with a revolution was not

1082

lost on Trotsky either (see

1083

<a href="append42.html#app12">section 12</a> of the appendix on

1084

<a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a>). Nikolai Bukharin

1085

even wrote the (infamous) The Economics of the Transition

1086

Period to make theoretical sense of (i.e. rationalise and

1087

justify) the party's changing policies and their social

1088

consequences since 1918 in terms of the inevitability of

1089

bad "objective factors" facing the revolution. While some

1090

Leninists like to paint Bukharin's book (like most Bolshevik

1091

ideas of the time) as "making a virtue out of necessity,"

1092

Bukharin (like the rest of the Bolshevik leadership) did not.

1093

As one commentator notes, Bukharin "belive[d] that he was

1094

formulating universal laws of proletarian revolution." [Stephan

1095

F. Cohen, In Praise of War Communism: Bukharin's The

1096

Economics of the Transition Period, p. 195]

1097

1098

Bukharin listed four "real costs of revolution," namely "the

1099

physical destruction or deterioration of material and living elements

1100

of production, the atomisation of these elements and of sectors

1101

of the economy, and the need for unproductive consumption (civil

1102

war materials, etc.). These costs were interrelated and followed

1103

sequentially. Collectively they resulted in 'the curtailment of

1104

the process of reproduction' (and 'negative expanded reproduction')

1105

and Bukharin's main conclusion: 'the production "anarchy" . . . ,

1106

"the revolutionary disintegration of industry," is an historically

1107

inevitable stage which no amount of lamentation will prevent.'"

1108

This was part of a general argument and his "point was that great

1109

revolutions were always accompanied by destructive civil wars . . .

1110

But he was more intent on proving that a proletarian revolution

1111

resulted in an even greater temporary fall in production than did

1112

its bourgeois counterpart." To do this he formulated the "costs of

1113

revolution" as "a law of revolution." [Op. Cit., pp. 195-6 and

1114

p. 195]

1115

1116

Cohen notes that while this "may appear to have been an obvious

1117

point, but it apparently came as something of a revelation to

1118

many Bolsheviks. It directly opposed the prevailing Social

1119

Democratic assumption that the transition to socialism would

1120

be relatively painless . . . Profound or not, Bolsheviks

1121

generally came to accept the 'law' and to regard it as a

1122

significant discovery by Bukharin." [Op. Cit., p. 196] To

1123

quote Bukharin:

1124

1125

"during the transition period the labour apparatus of society

1126

inevitably disintegrates, that reorganisation presupposes

1127

disorganisation, and that there the temporary collapse of

1128

productive forces is a law inherent to revolution." [quoted

1129

by Cohen, Op. Cit., p. 196]

1130

</blockquote>

1131

It would appear that this "obvious point" would still come

1132

"as something of a revelation to many Bolsheviks" today!

1133

Significantly, of course, Kropotkin had formulated this

1134

law decades previously! How the Bolsheviks sought to cope

1135

with this inevitable law is what signifies the difference

1136

between anarchism and Leninism. Simply put, Bukharin endorsed

1137

the coercive measures of war communism as the means to go

1138

forward to socialism. As Cohen summarises, "force and coercion

1139

. . . were the means by which equilibrium was to be forged out

1140

of disequilibrium." [Op. Cit., p. 198] Given that Bukharin

1141

argued that a workers' state, by definition, could not exploit

1142

the workers, he opened up the possibility for rationalising

1143

all sorts of abuses as well as condoning numerous evils

1144

because they were "progressive." Nor was Bukharin alone

1145

in this, as Lenin and Trotsky came out with similar nonsense.

1146

1147

It should be noted that Lenin showed "ecstatic praise for the

1148

most 'war communist' sections" of Bukharin's work. "Almost

1149

every passage," Cohen notes, "on the role of the new state,

1150

statisation in general, militarisation and mobilisation met

1151

with 'very good,' often in three languages, . . . Most

1152

striking, Lenin's greatest enthusiasm was reserved for the

1153

chapter on the role of coercion . . . at the end [of which]

1154

he wrote, 'Now this chapter is superb!'" [Op. Cit., pp. 202-3]

1155

Compare this to Kropotkin's comment that the "revolutionary

1156

tribunal and the guillotine could not make up for the lack

1157

of a constructive communist theory." [The Great French

1158

Revolution, vol. II, p. 519]

1159

1160

Ultimately, claims that "objective factors" caused the

1161

degeneration of the revolution are mostly attempts to

1162

let the Bolsheviks of the hook for Stalinism. This approach

1163

was started by Trotsky and continued to this day. Anarchists,

1164

unsurprisingly, do not think much of these explanations. For

1165

anarchists, the list of "objective factors" listed to explain

1166

the degeneration of the revolution are simply a list of factors

1167

every revolution would (and has) faced -- as Lenin, Bukharin

1168

and Trotsky all admitted at the time!

1169

1170

So we have the strange paradox of Leninists dismissing and

1171

ignoring the arguments of their ideological gurus. For Trotsky,

1172

just as for Lenin, it was a truism that revolutionary politics

1173

had to handle "objective" factors and "exceptional circumstances."

1174

And for both, they thought they had during the Russian revolution.

1175

Yet for their followers, these explain the failure of Bolshevism.

1176

Tony Cliff, one of Trotsky's less orthodox followers, gives us

1177

a means of understanding this strange paradox. Discussing the

1178

Platform of the United Opposition he notes that it "also

1179

suffered from the inheritance of the exceptional conditions

1180

of the civil war, when the one-party system was transformed

1181

from a necessity into a virtue." [Trotsky, vol. 3, pp. 248-9]

1182

Clearly, "exceptional circumstances" explain nothing and are

1183

simply an excuse for bad politics while "exceptional conditions"

1184

explain everything and defeat even the best politics!

1185

1186

As such, it seems to us extremely ironic that Leninists blame

1187

the civil war for the failure of the revolution as they

1188

continually raise the inevitability of civil war in a

1189

revolution to attack anarchism (see

1190

<a href="secH2.html#sech21">section H.2.1</a> for an

1191

example). Did Lenin not explain in State and Revolution

1192

that his "workers' state" was designed to defend the revolution

1193

and suppress capitalist resistance? If it cannot do its

1194

proclaimed task then, clearly, it is a flawed theory.

1195

Ultimately, if "civil war" and the other factors listed by

1196

Leninists (but considered inevitable by Lenin) preclude the

1197

implementation of the radical democracy Lenin argued for

1198

in 1917 as the means to suppress the resistance of the

1199

capitalists then his followers should come clean and say

1200

that that work has no bearing on their vision of revolution.

1201

Therefore, given that the usual argument for the "dictatorship

1202

of the proletariat" is that it is required to repress

1203

counter-revolution, it seems somewhat ironic that the event

1204

it was said to be designed for (i.e. revolution) should be

1205

responsible for its degeneration!

1206

1207

As such, anarchists tend to think these sorts of explanations

1208

of Bolshevik dictatorship are incredulous. After all, as

1209

revolutionaries the people who expound these "explanations"

1210

are meant to know that civil war, imperialist invasion and

1211

blockade, economic disruption, and a host of other "extremely

1212

difficult circumstances" are part and parcel of a revolution.

1213

They seem to be saying, "if only the ruling class had not

1214

acted as our political ideology predicts they would then the

1215

Bolshevik revolution would have been fine"! As Bertrand Russell

1216

argued after his trip to Soviet Russia, while since October

1217

1917 "the Soviet Government has been at war with almost all

1218

the world, and has at the same time to face civil war at

1219

home" this was "not to be regarded as accidental, or as a

1220

misfortune which could not be foreseen. According to Marxian

1221

theory, what has happened was bound to happen." [The Theory

1222

and Practice of Bolshevism, p. 103]

1223

1224

In summary, anarchists are not at all convinced by the claims

1225

that "objective factors" can explain the failure of the Russian

1226

Revolution. After all, according to Lenin and Trotsky these

1227

factors were to be expected in any revolution -- civil war

1228

and invasion, economic collapse and so forth were not restricted

1229

to the Russian revolution. That is why they say they want a

1230

"dictatorship of the proletariat," to defend against

1231

counter-revolution (see

1232

<a href="secH3.html#sech38">section H.3.8</a> on how, once in power,

1233

Lenin and Trotsky revised this position). Now, if Bolshevism

1234

cannot handle what it says is inevitable, then it should be

1235

avoided. To use an analogy:

1236

1237

Bolshevik: "Join with us, we have a great umbrella which will

1238

keep us dry."

1239

1240

Anarchist: "Last time it was used, it did not work. We all got

1241

soaked!"

1242

1243

Bolshevik: "But what our anarchist friend fails to mention is

1244

that it was raining at the time!"

1245

</blockquote>

1246

Not very convincing! Yet, sadly, this is the logic of the common

1247

Leninist justification of Bolshevik authoritarianism during the

1248

Russian Revolution.

1249

1250

<a name="app3"><h2>3 Can the civil war explain the failure of Bolshevism?</h2>

1251

1252

One of the most common assertions against the anarchists case

1253

against Bolshevism is that while we condemn the Bolsheviks,

1254

we fail to mention the civil war and the wars of intervention.

1255

Indeed, for most Leninists the civil war is usually considered

1256

the key event in the development of Bolshevism, explaining and

1257

justifying all anti-socialist acts conducted by them after they

1258

seized power.

1259

1260

For anarchists, such an argument is flawed on two levels, namely

1261

logical and factual. The logical flaw is that Leninist argue

1262

that civil war is inevitable after a revolution. They maintain,

1263

correctly, that it is unlikely that the ruling class will

1264

disappear without a fight. Then they turn round and complain that

1265

because the ruling class did what the Marxists predicted, the

1266

Russian Revolution failed! And they (incorrectly) harp on about

1267

anarchists ignoring civil war (see

1268

<a href="secH2.html#sech21">section H.2.1</a>).

1269

1270

So, obviously, this line of defence is nonsense. If civil war is

1271

inevitable, then it cannot be used to justify the failure of the

1272

Bolshevism. Marxists simply want to have their cake and eat it to.

1273

You simply cannot argue that civil war is inevitable and then blame

1274

it for the failure of the Russian Revolution.

1275

1276

The other flaw in this defence of Bolshevism is the factual one,

1277

namely the awkward fact that Bolshevik authoritarianism started

1278

before the civil war broke out. Simply put, it is difficult to

1279

blame a course of actions on an event which had not started yet.

1280

Moreover, Bolshevik authoritarianism increased after the civil

1281

war finished. This, incidentally, caused anarchists like Alexander

1282

Berkman to re-evaluate their support for Bolshevism. As he put it,

1283

"I would not concede the appalling truth. Still the hope persisted

1284

that the Bolsheviki, though absolutely wrong in principle and

1285

practice, yet grimly held on to some shreds of the revolutionary

1286

banner. 'Allied interference,' 'the blockade and civil war,' 'the

1287

necessity of the transitory stage' -- thus I sought to placate

1288

my outraged conscience . . . At last the fronts were liquidated,

1289

civil war ended, and the country at peace. But Communist policies

1290

did not change. On the contrary . . . The party groaned under the

1291

unbearable yoke of the Party dictatorship. . . . Then came

1292

Kronstadt and its simultaneous echoes throughout the land . . .

1293

Kronstadt was crushed as ruthlessly as Thiers and Gallifet

1294

slaughtered the Paris Communards. And with Kronstadt the entire

1295

country and its last hope. With it also my faith in the

1296

Bolsheviki." [The Bolshevik Myth, p. 331]

1297

1298

If Berkman had been in Russia in 1918, he may have realised that

1299

the Bolshevik tyranny during the civil war (which climaxed, post

1300

civil war, with the attack on Kronstadt -- see the appendix on

1301

<a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a> for

1302

more on the Kronstadt rebellion) was not at odds with their

1303

pre-civil war activities to maintain their power. The simple

1304

fact is that Bolshevik authoritarianism was not caused by the

1305

pressures of the civil war, rather they started before then. All

1306

the civil war did was strengthen certain aspects of Bolshevik

1307

ideology and practice which had existed from the start (see

1308

the appendix on <a href="append44.html">"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"</a>).

1309

1310

While we discuss the Russian Revolution in more detail in

1311

the appendix on <a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a>, it is

1312

useful to summarise the Bolshevik attacks

1313

on working class power and autonomy before the civil war broke

1314

out (i.e. before the end of May 1918).

1315

1316

The most important development during this period was the

1317

suppression of soviet democracy and basic freedoms. As

1318

we discuss in <a href="append41.html#app6">section 6</a> of

1319

the appendix on <a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a>,

1320

the Bolsheviks pursued a

1321

policy of systematically undermining soviet democracy

1322

from the moment they seized power. The first act was the

1323

creation of a Bolshevik government over the soviets, so

1324

marginalising the very organs they claimed ruled in Russia.

1325

The process was repeated in the local soviets, with the

1326

executive committees holding real power while the plenary

1327

sessions become infrequent and of little consequence.

1328

Come the spring of 1918, faced with growing working class

1329

opposition they started to delay soviet elections. When

1330

finally forced to hold elections, the Bolsheviks responded

1331

in two ways to maintain their power. Either they gerrymandered

1332

the soviets, packing them with representatives of Bolshevik

1333

dominated organisation or they simply disbanded them by

1334

force if they lost the soviet elections (and repressed by

1335

force any protests against this). This was the situation

1336

at the grassroots. At the summit of the soviet system,

1337

the Bolsheviks simply marginalised the Central Executive

1338

Committee of the soviets. Real power was held by the

1339

Bolshevik government. The power of the soviets had simply

1340

become a fig-leaf for a "soviet power" -- the handful of

1341

Bolsheviks who made up the government and the party's

1342

central committee.

1343

1344

It should be stressed that the Bolshevik assault on the soviets

1345

occurred in March, April and May 1918. That is, before the

1346

Czech uprising and the onset of full-scale civil war. So, to

1347

generalise, it cannot be said that it was the Bolshevik party

1348

that alone whole-heartedly supported Soviet power. The facts

1349

are that the Bolsheviks only supported "Soviet power" when the

1350

soviets were Bolshevik. As recognised by the left-Menshevik

1351

Martov, who argued that the Bolsheviks loved Soviets only when

1352

they were "in the hands of the Bolshevik party." [quoted by

1353

Getzler, Martov, p. 174] If the workers voted for others,

1354

"soviet power" was quickly replaced by party power (the real

1355

aim). The Bolsheviks had consolidated their position in early

1356

1918, turning the Soviet State into a de facto one party state

1357

by gerrymandering and disbanding of soviets before the start of

1358

the Civil War.

1359

1360

Given this legacy of repression, Leninist Tony Cliff's assertion

1361

that it was only "under the iron pressure of the civil war [that]

1362

the Bolshevik leaders were forced to move, as the price of survival,

1363

to a one-party system" needs serious revising. Similarly, his

1364

comment that the "civil war undermined the operation of the

1365

local soviets" is equally inaccurate, as his is claim that "for

1366

some time -- i.e. until the armed uprising of the Czechoslovak

1367

Legion -- the Mensheviks were not much hampered in their

1368

propaganda work." Simply put, Cliff's statement that "it was

1369

about a year after the October Revolution before an actual

1370

monopoly of political power was held by one party" is false.

1371

Such a monopoly existed before the start of the civil war,

1372

with extensive political repression existing before the

1373

uprising of the Czechoslovak Legion which began it. There

1374

was a de facto one-party state by the spring of 1918.

1375

[Lenin, vol. 3, p. 163, p. 150, p. 167 and p. 172]

1376

1377

The suppression of Soviet democracy reached it logical conclusion

1378

in 1921 when the Kronsdadt soviet, heart of the 1917 revolution, was

1379

stormed by Bolshevik forces, its leaders executed or forced into

1380

exile and the rank and file imprisoned, and scattered all over the

1381

USSR. Soviet democracy was not just an issue of debate but one many

1382

workers died in fighting for. As can be seen, similar events to

1383

those at Kronstadt had occurred three years previously.

1384

1385

Before turning to other Bolshevik attacks on working class power

1386

and freedom, we need to address one issue. It will be proclaimed

1387

that the Mensheviks (and SRs) were "counter-revolutionaries" and

1388

so Bolshevik actions against them were justified. However, the

1389

Bolsheviks' started to suppress opposition soviets before the

1390

civil war broke out, so at the time neither group could be called

1391

"counter-revolutionary" in any meaningful sense of the word. The

1392

Civil War started on the 25th of May and the SRs and Mensheviks

1393

were expelled from the Soviets on the 14th of June. While the

1394

Bolsheviks "offered some formidable fictions to justify the

1395

expulsions" there was "of course no substance in the charge

1396

that the Mensheviks had been mixed in counter-revolutionary

1397

activities on the Don, in the Urals, in Siberia, with the

1398

Czechoslovaks, or that they had joined the worst Black Hundreds."

1399

[Getzler, Op. Cit., p. 181] The charge that the Mensheviks

1400

"were active supporters of intervention and of counter-revolution"

1401

was "untrue . . . and the Communists, if they ever believed it,

1402

never succeeded in establishing it." [Schapiro, Op. Cit., p. 193]

1403

The Bolsheviks expelled the Mensheviks in the context of political

1404

loses before the Civil War. As Getzler notes the Bolsheviks "drove

1405

them underground, just on the eve of the elections to the Fifth

1406

Congress of Soviets in which the Mensheviks were expected to make

1407

significant gains." [Op. Cit., p. 181]

1408

1409

Attacks on working class freedoms and democracy were not limited

1410

to the soviets. As well as the gerrymandering and disbanding of

1411

soviets, the Bolsheviks had already presented economic visions

1412

much at odds with what most people consider as fundamentally

1413

socialist. Lenin, in April 1918, was arguing for one-man

1414

management and "[o]bedience, and unquestioning obedience at

1415

that, during work to the one-man decisions of Soviet directors,

1416

of the dictators elected or appointed by Soviet institutions,

1417

vested with dictatorial powers." [Six Theses on the Immediate

1418

Tasks of the Soviet Government, p. 44] His support for a new

1419

form of wage slavery involved granting state appointed "individual

1420

executives dictatorial powers (or 'unlimited' powers)." Large-scale

1421

industry ("the foundation of socialism") required "thousands

1422

subordinating their will to the will of one," and so the revolution

1423

"demands" that "the people unquestioningly obey the single will

1424

of the leaders of labour." Lenin's "superior forms of labour

1425

discipline" were simply hyper-developed capitalist forms. The

1426

role of workers in production was the same, but with a novel

1427

twist, namely "unquestioning obedience to the orders of individual

1428

representatives of the Soviet government during the work." [Lenin,

1429

Selected Writings, vol. 2, p. 610, p. 611, p. 612]

1430

1431

This simply replaced private capitalism with state

1432

capitalism. "In the shops where one-man management

1433

(Lenin's own preference) replaced collegial management,"

1434

notes Diane Koenker, "workers faced the same kinds of

1435

authoritarian management they thought existed only under

1436

capitalism." [Labour Relations in Socialist Russia,

1437

p. 177] If, as many Leninists claim, one-man management

1438

was a key factor in the rise of Stalinism and/or

1439

"state-capitalism" in Russia, then, clearly, Lenin's

1440

input in these developments cannot be ignored. After

1441

advocating "one-man management" and "state capitalism"

1442

in early 1918, he remained a firm supporter of them.

1443

In the light of this it is bizarre that some later day

1444

Leninists claim that the Bolsheviks only introduced one-man

1445

management because of the Civil War. Clearly, this was not

1446

the case. It was this period (before the civil war) that saw

1447

Lenin advocate and start to take the control of the economy

1448

out of the hands of the workers and placed into the hands of

1449

the Bolshevik party and the state bureaucracy.

1450

1451

Needless to say, the Bolshevik undermining of the factory

1452

committee movement and, consequently, genuine worker's

1453

self-management of production in favour of state capitalism

1454

cannot be gone into great depth here (see the appendix on <a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a>,

1455

for a

1456

fuller discussion). Suffice to say, the factory committees

1457

were deliberately submerged in the trade unions and state

1458

control replaced workers' control. This involved practising

1459

one-man management and, as Lenin put in at the start of May

1460

1918, "our task is to study the state capitalism of the

1461

Germans, to spare no effort in copying it and not to shrink

1462

from adopting dictatorial methods to hasten the copying of

1463

it." He stressed that this was no new idea, rather he "gave

1464

it before the Bolsheviks seized power." [Selected Writings,

1465

vol. 2, p. 635 and p. 636]

1466

1467

It will be objected that Lenin advocated "workers' control."

1468

This is true, but a "workers' control" of a very limited

1469

nature. As we discuss in

1470

<a href="secH3.html#sech314">section H.3.14</a>, rather than seeing

1471

"workers' control" as workers managing production directly,

1472

he always saw it in terms of workers' "controlling" those who

1473

did and his views on this matter were radically different

1474

to those of the factory committees. This is not all, as

1475

Lenin always placed his ideas in a statist context -- rather

1476

than base socialist reconstruction on working class

1477

self-organisation from below, the Bolsheviks started "to

1478

build, from the top, its 'unified administration'" based on

1479

central bodies created by the Tsarist government in 1915 and

1480

1916. [Maurice Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control,

1481

p. 36] The institutional framework of capitalism would

1482

be utilised as the principal (almost exclusive) instruments

1483

of "socialist" transformation. Lenin's support for "one-man

1484

management" must be seen in this context, namely his

1485

vision of "socialism."

1486

1487

Bolshevik advocating and implementing of "one-man management" was

1488

not limited to the workplace. On March 30th Trotsky, as Commissar

1489

of Military Affairs, set about reorganising the army. The death

1490

penalty for disobedience under fire was reintroduced, as was

1491

saluting officers, special forms of address, separate living

1492

quarters and privileges for officers. Officers were no longer

1493

elected. Trotsky made it clear: "The elective basis is politically

1494

pointless and technically inexpedient and has already been set

1495

aside by decree." [quoted by Brinton, Op. Cit., pp. 37-8] The

1496

soldiers were given no say in their fate, as per bourgeois armies.

1497

1498

Lenin's proposals also struck at the heart of workers' power

1499

in other ways. For example, he argued that "we must raise the

1500

question of piece-work and apply it . . . in practice." [The

1501

Immediate Tasks Of The Soviet Government, p. 23] As Leninist

1502

Tony Cliff (of all people) noted, "the employers have at

1503

their disposal a number of effective methods of disrupting th[e]

1504

unity [of workers as a class]. Once of the most important of these

1505

is the fostering of competition between workers by means of

1506

piece-work systems." He notes that these were used by the Nazis

1507

and the Stalinists "for the same purpose." [State Capitalism in

1508

Russia, pp. 18-9] Obviously piece-work is different when Lenin

1509

introduces it!

1510

1511

Finally, there is the question of general political freedom. It

1512

goes without saying that the Bolsheviks suppressed freedom of

1513

the press (for left-wing opposition groups as well as capitalist

1514

ones). It was also in this time period that the Bolsheviks first

1515

used the secret police to attack opposition groups. Unsurprisingly,

1516

this was not directed against the right. The anarchists in Moscow

1517

were attacked on the night of April 11-12, with armed detachments

1518

of the Cheka raiding 26 anarchist centres, killing or wounding 40

1519

and jailing 500. Shortly afterwards the Cheka carried out similar

1520

raids in Petrograd and in the provinces. In May Burevestnik,

1521

Anarkhiia, Golos Truda and other leading anarchist periodicals

1522

closed down. [Paul Avrich, The Russian Anarchists, pp. 184-5]

1523

It must surely be a coincidence that there had been a "continued

1524

growth of anarchist influence among unskilled workers" after

1525

the October revolution and, equally coincidentally, that "[b]y

1526

the spring of 1918, very little was heard from the anarchists in

1527

Petrograd." [David Mandel, The Petrograd Workers and the Soviet

1528

Seizure of Power, p. 357]

1529

1530

All this before the Trotsky provoked revolt of the Czech legion

1531

at the end of May, 1918, and the consequent "democratic

1532

counter-revolution" in favour of the Constituent Assembly (which

1533

the right-Socialist Revolutionaries led). This, to repeat, was

1534

months before the rise of the White Armies and Allied intervention.

1535

In summary, it was before large-scale civil war took place,

1536

in an interval of relative peace, that we see the introduction of

1537

most of the measures Leninists now try and pretend were

1538

necessitated by the Civil War itself.

1539

1540

So if anarchists appear to "downplay" the effects of the civil war

1541

it is not because we ignore. We simply recognise that if you think

1542

it is inevitable, you cannot blame it for the actions of the

1543

Bolsheviks. Moreover, when the Bolsheviks eliminated military

1544

democracy, undermined the factory committees, started to disband

1545

soviets elected with the "wrong" majority, repress the anarchists

1546

and other left-wing opposition groups, and so on, the civil war

1547

had not started yet. So the rot had started before civil war

1548

(and consequent White Terror) and "imperialist intervention"

1549

started. Given that Lenin said that civil war was inevitable,

1550

blaming the inevitable (which had not even started yet!) for

1551

the failure of Bolshevism is not very convincing.

1552

1553

This factual problem with the "civil war caused Bolshevik

1554

authoritarianism" is the best answer to it. If the Bolsheviks

1555

pursued authoritarian policies before the civil war started,

1556

it is hard to justify their actions in terms of something that

1557

had not started yet. This explains why some Leninists have

1558

tried to muddy the waters somewhat by obscuring when the

1559

civil war started. For example, John Rees states that "[m]ost

1560

historians treat the revolution and the civil war as separate

1561

processes" yet "[i]n reality they were one." He presents a

1562

catalogue of "armed resistance to the revolution," including

1563

such "precursors of civil war before the revolution" as the

1564

suppression after the July days and the Kornilov revolt in 1917.

1565

[John Rees, "In Defence of October," pp. 3-82, International

1566

Socialism, no. 52, p. 31-2]

1567

1568

Ironically, Rees fails to see how this blurring of when the

1569

civil war started actually harms Leninism. After all, most

1570

historians place the start of the civil war when the Czech

1571

legion revolted because it marked large-scale conflict

1572

between armies. It is one thing to say that authoritarianism

1573

was caused by large-scale conflict, another to say any form

1574

of conflict caused it. Simply put, if the Bolshevik state could

1575

not handle relatively minor forms of counter-revolution then

1576

where does that leave Lenin's State and Revolution? So while

1577

the period from October to May of 1918 was not trouble free,

1578

it was not one where the survival of the new regime looked

1579

to be seriously threatened as it was after that, particularly

1580

in 1919 and 1920. Thus "civil war" will be used, as it is

1581

commonly done, to refer to the period from the Czech revolt

1582

(late May 1918) to the final defeat of Wrangel (November 1920).

1583

1584

So, the period from October to May of 1918, while not trouble

1585

free, was not one where the survival of the new regime looked

1586

to be seriously threatened as it was to be in 1919 and 1920.

1587

This means attempts to push the start of the civil war back

1588

to October 1917 (or even earlier) simply weakens the Leninist

1589

argument. It still leaves the major problem for the "blame it

1590

on the civil war" Leninists, namely to explain why the months

1591

before May of 1918 saw soviets being closed down, the start

1592

of the suppression of the factory committees, restrictions on

1593

freedom of speech and association, plus the repression of

1594

opposition groups (like the anarchists). Either any level of

1595

"civil war" makes Lenin's State and Revolution redundant or

1596

the source of Bolshevik authoritarianism must be found elsewhere.

1597

1598

That covers the period before the start of the civil war.

1599

we now turn to the period after it finished. Here we find

1600

the same problem, namely an increase of authoritarianism

1601

even after the proclaimed cause for it (civil war) had ended.

1602

1603

After the White General Wrangel was forced back into the Crimea,

1604

he had to evacuate his forced to Constantinople in November 1920.

1605

With this defeat the Russian civil war had come to an end. Those

1606

familiar with the history of the revolution will realise that

1607

it was some 4 months later that yet another massive strike wave

1608

occurred, the Kronstadt revolt took place and the 10th Party

1609

Congress banned the existence of factions within the Bolshevik

1610

party itself. The repression of the strikes and Kronstadt revolt

1611

effectively destroying hope for mass pressure for change from

1612

below and the latter closing off the very last "legal" door for

1613

those who opposed the regime from the left.

1614

1615

It could be argued that the Bolsheviks were still fighting peasant

1616

insurrections and strikes across the country, but this has

1617

everything to do with Bolshevik policies and could only be

1618

considered "counter-revolutionary" if you think the Bolsheviks

1619

had a monopoly of what socialism and revolution meant. In the

1620

case of the Makhnovists in the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks started

1621

that conflict by betraying them once Wrangel had been defeated.

1622

As such, any resistance to Bolshevik rule by the working class

1623

and peasantry of Russia indicated the lack of democracy within

1624

the country rather than some sort of "counter-revolutionary"

1625

conflict.

1626

1627

So even the end of the Civil War causes problems for this

1628

defence of the Bolsheviks. Simply put, with the defeat of

1629

the Whites it would be expected that some return to democratic

1630

norms would happen. It did not, in fact the reverse happened.

1631

Factions were banned, even the smallest forms of opposition

1632

was finally eliminated from both the party and society as a

1633

whole. Those opposition groups and parties which had been

1634

tolerated during the civil war were finally smashed. Popular

1635

revolts for reform, such as the Kronstadt rebellion and the

1636

strike wave which inspired it, were put down by force (see

1637

<a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a> on

1638

these events). No form of opposition was

1639

tolerated, no freedom allowed. If civil war was the cause

1640

of Bolshevik authoritarianism, it seems strange that it got

1641

worse after it was finished.

1642

1643

So, to conclude. Bolshevik authoritarianism did not begun with

1644

the start of the civil war. Anti-socialist policies were being

1645

implemented before it started. Similarly, these policies did

1646

not stop when the civil war ended, indeed the reverse happened.

1647

This, then, is the main factual problem with the "blame the civil

1648

war" approach. Much of the worst of the suppression of working

1649

class democracy either happened before the Civil War started

1650

or after it had finished.

1651

1652

As we discuss in

1653

<a href="append44.html">"How did Bolshevik ideology contribute to the failure of the Revolution?"</a>, the root causes for Bolshevik

1654

authoritarian post-October was Bolshevik ideology combined with

1655

state power. After all, how "democratic" is it to give all power

1656

to the Bolshevik party central committee? Surely socialism

1657

involves more than voting for a new government? Is it not about

1658

mass participation, the kind of participation centralised

1659

government precludes and Bolshevism fears as being influenced

1660

by "bourgeois ideology"? In such circumstances, moving from party

1661

rule to party dictatorship is not such leap.

1662

1663

That "civil war" cannot explain what happened can be shown by a

1664

counter-example which effectively shows that civil war did not

1665

inevitably mean party dictatorship over a state capitalist

1666

economy (and protesting workers and peasants!). The Makhnovists

1667

(an anarchist influenced partisan army) managed to defend the

1668

revolution and encourage soviet democracy, freedom of speech,

1669

and so on, while doing so (see the appendix <a href="append46.html">"Why does the Makhnovist movement show there is an alternative to

1670

Bolshevism?"</a> discusses the Makhnovists

1671

in some detail). In fact, the Bolsheviks tried to ban their

1672

soviet congresses. Which, of course, does not really fit in

1673

with the Bolsheviks being forced to be anti-democratic due to

1674

the pressures of civil war.

1675

1676

So, in summary, civil war and imperialist intervention cannot be

1677

blamed for Bolshevik authoritarianism simply because the latter

1678

had started before the former existed. Moreover, the example of

1679

the Makhnovists suggests that Bolshevik policies during the civil

1680

war were also not driven purely by the need for survival. As

1681

Kropotkin argued at the time, "all foreign armed intervention

1682

necessarily strengthens the dictatorial tendencies of the

1683

government . . . The evils inherent in a party dictatorship

1684

have been accentuated by the conditions of war in which this

1685

party maintains its power. This state of war has been the pretext

1686

for strengthening dictatorial methods which centralise the control

1687

of every detail of life in the hands of the government, with the

1688

effect of stopping an immense part of the ordinary activity of

1689

the country. The evils natural to state communism have been

1690

increased ten-fold under the pretext that all our misery is

1691

due to foreign intervention." [Kropotkin's Revolutionary

1692

Pamphlets, p. 253]

1693

1694

In other words, while the civil war may have increased Bolshevik

1695

authoritarianism, it did not create it nor did it end with the

1696

ending of hostilities.

1697

1698

<a name="app4"><h2>4 Did economic collapse and isolation destroy the revolution?</h2>

1699

1700

One of the most common explanations for the failure revolution is

1701

that the Bolsheviks faced a terrible economic conditions, which

1702

forced them to be less than democratic. Combined with the failure

1703

of the revolution to spread to more advanced countries, party

1704

dictatorship, it is argued, was inevitable. In the words of

1705

one Leninist:

1706

1707

"In a country where the working class was a minority of the

1708

population, where industry had been battered by years of war

1709

and in conditions of White and imperialist encirclement, the

1710

balance gradually titled towards greater coercion. Each

1711

step of the way was forced on the Bolsheviks by dire and

1712

pressing necessities." [John Rees, "In Defence of October,"

1713

International Socialism, no. 52, p. 41]

1714

</blockquote>

1715

He talks of "economic devastation" [p. 31] and quotes various

1716

sources, including Victor Serge. According to Serge, the

1717

"decline in production was uninterrupted. It should be noted

1718

that this decline had already begun before the revolution.

1719

In 1916 the output of agricultural machinery, for example, was

1720

down by 80 per cent compared with 1913. The year 1917 had been

1721

marked by a particularly general, rapid and serious downturn.

1722

The production figures for the principal industries in 1913 and

1723

1918 were, in millions of poods: coal, from 1,738 to 731

1724

(42 per cent); iron ore, from 57, 887 to 1,686; cast-iron,

1725

from 256 to 31.5 (12.3 per cent); steel, from 259 to 24.5;

1726

rails, from 39.4 to 1.1. As a percentage of 1913 production,

1727

output of linen fell to 75 per cent, of sugar to 24 per cent,

1728

and tobacco to 19 per cent." Moreover, production continued

1729

"to fall until the end of civil war . . . For 1920, the following

1730

indices are given as a percentage of output in 1913: coal, 27

1731

per cent; cast iron, 2.4 per cent; linen textiles, 38 per cent."

1732

[Year One of the Russian Revolution, p. 352 and p. 425]

1733

1734

According to Tony Cliff (another of Rees's references), the

1735

war-damaged industry "continued to run down" in the spring of

1736

1918: "One of the causes of famine was the breakdown of

1737

transport . . . Industry was in a state of complete collapse.

1738

Not only was there no food to feed the factory workers; there

1739

was no raw material or fuel for industry . . . The collapse

1740

of industry meant unemployment for the workers." Cliff provides

1741

economic indexes. For large scale industry, taking 1913 as the

1742

base, 1917 saw production fall to 77%. In 1918, it was at 35%

1743

of the 1913 figure, 1919 it was 26% and 1920 was 18%.

1744

Productivity per worker also fell, from 85% in 1917, to

1745

44% in 1918, 22% in 1919 and then 26% in 1920. [Lenin,

1746

vol. 3, pp. 67-9, p. 86 and p. 85]

1747

1748

In such circumstances, it is argued, how can you expect the

1749

Bolsheviks to subscribe to democratic and socialist norms?

1750

This meant that the success or failure of the revolution

1751

depended on whether the revolution spread to more advanced

1752

countries. Leninist Duncan Hallas argues that the "failure

1753

of the German Revolution in 1918-19 . . . seems, in retrospect,

1754

to have been decisive . . . for only substantial economic aid

1755

from an advanced economy, in practice from a socialist

1756

Germany, could have reversed the disintegration of the

1757

Russian working class." ["Towards a revolutionary socialist

1758

party," pp. 38-55, Party and Class, Alex Callinicos (ed.),

1759

p. 44]

1760

1761

Anarchists are not convinced by these arguments. This is for

1762

two reasons.

1763

1764

Firstly, we are aware that revolutions are disruptive no matter

1765

where they occur (see

1766

<a href="append43.html#app1">section 1</a>) Moreover, Leninists are

1767

meant to know this to. Simply put, there is a certain incredulous

1768

element to these arguments. After all, Lenin himself had argued

1769

that "[e]very revolution . . . by its very nature implies a

1770

crisis, and a very deep crisis at that, both political and

1771

economic. This is irrespective of the crisis brought about

1772

by the war." [Collected Works, vol. 30, p. 341] Serge

1773

also considered crisis as inevitable, arguing that the

1774

"conquest of production by the proletariat was in itself a

1775

stupendous victory, one which saved the revolution's life.

1776

Undoubtedly, so thorough a recasting of all the organs of

1777

production is impossible without a substantial decline in

1778

output; undoubtedly, too, a proletariat cannot labour and

1779

fight at the same time." [Op. Cit., p. 361] As we discussed in

1780

detail in

1781

<a href="append43.html#app2">section 2</a>,

1782

this was a common Bolshevik position

1783

at the time (which, in turn, belatedly echoed anarchist

1784

arguments -- see

1785

<a href="append43.html#app1">section 1</a>). And if we look at other

1786

revolutions, we can say that this is the case.

1787

1788

Secondly, and more importantly, every revolution or near

1789

revolutionary situation has been accompanied by economic

1790

crisis. For example, as we will shortly prove, Germany

1791

itself was in a state of serious economic collapse in 1918

1792

and 1919, a collapse which would have got worse is a

1793

Bolshevik-style revolution had occurred there. This means

1794

that if Bolshevik authoritarianism is blamed on the

1795

state of the economy, it is not hard to conclude that

1796

every Bolshevik-style revolution will suffer the same

1797

fate as the Russian one.

1798

1799

As we noted in

1800

<a href="append43.html#app1">section 1</a>, Kropotkin had argued from the

1801

1880s that a revolution would be accompanied by economic

1802

disruption. Looking at subsequent revolutions, he has been

1803

vindicated time and time again. Every revolution has been

1804

marked by economic disruption and falling production. This

1805

suggests that the common Leninist idea that a successful

1806

revolution in, say, Germany would have ensured the success

1807

of the Russian Revolution is flawed. Looking at Europe

1808

during the period immediately after the first world war, we

1809

discover great economic hardship. To quote one Trotskyist

1810

editor:

1811

1812

"In the major imperialist countries of Europe, production still

1813

had not recovered from wartime destruction. A limited economic

1814

upswing in 1919 and early 1920 enabled many demobilised

1815

soldiers to find work, and unemployment fell somewhat.

1816

Nonetheless, in 'victorious' France overall production in

1817

1920 was still only two-thirds its pre-war level. In Germany

1818

industrial production was little more than half its 1914

1819

level, human consumption of grains was down 44 per cent,

1820

and the economy was gripped by spiralling inflation. Average

1821

per capita wages in Prague in 1920, adjusted for inflation,

1822

were just over one-third of pre-war levels." [John Riddell,

1823

"Introduction," Proceedings and Documents of the Second

1824

Congress, 1920, vol. I, p. 17]

1825

</blockquote>

1826

Now, if economic collapse was responsible for Bolshevik

1827

authoritarianism and the subsequent failure of the revolution,

1828

it seems hard to understand why an expansion of the revolution

1829

into similarly crisis ridden countries would have had a major

1830

impact in the development of the revolution. Since most Leninists

1831

agree that the German Revolution, we will discuss this in more

1832

detail before going onto other revolutions.

1833

1834

By 1918, Germany was in a bad state. Victor Serge noted "the

1835

famine and economic collapse which caused the final ruin of

1836

the Central Powers." [Op. Cit., p. 361] The semi-blockade of

1837

Germany during the war badly effected the economy, the

1838

"dynamic growth" of which before the war "had been largely

1839

dependent on the country's involvement in the world market".

1840

The war "proved catastrophic to those who had depended on

1841

the world market and had been involved in the production of

1842

consumer goods . . . Slowly but surely the country slithered

1843

into austerity and ultimately economic collapse." Food

1844

production suffered, with "overall food production declined

1845

further after poor harvests in 1916 and 1917. Thus grain

1846

production, already well below its prewar levels, slumped

1847

from 21.8 million to 14.9 million tons in those two years."

1848

[V. R. Berghahn, Modern Germany, p. 47, pp. 47-8, p. 50]

1849

1850

The parallels with pre-revolution Russia are striking and

1851

it is hardly surprising that revolution did break out in

1852

Germany in November 1918. Workers' councils sprang up all

1853

across the country, inspired in part by the example of the

1854

Russian soviets (and what people thought was going on in

1855

Russia under the Bolsheviks). A Social-Democratic government

1856

was founded, which used the Free Corps (right-wing volunteer

1857

troops) to crush the revolution from January 1919 onwards.

1858

This meant that Germany in 1919 was marked by extensive civil

1859

war within the country. In January 1920, a state of siege

1860

was re-introduced across half the country.

1861

1862

This social turmoil was matched by economic turmoil. As in

1863

Russia, Germany faced massive economic problems, problems

1864

which the revolution inherited. Taking 1928 as the base year,

1865

the index of industrial production in Germany was slightly

1866

lower in 1913, namely 98 in 1913 to 100 in 1928. In other

1867

words, Germany effectively lost 15 years of economic

1868

activity. In 1917, the index was 63 and by 1918 (the year

1869

of the revolution), it was 61 (i.e. industrial production

1870

had dropped by nearly 40%). In 1919, it fell again to 37,

1871

rising to 54 in 1920 and 65 in 1921. Thus, in 1919, the

1872

"industrial production reached an all-time low" and it

1873

"took until the late 1920s for [food] production to recover

1874

its 1912 level . . . In 1921 grain production was still . . .

1875

some 30 per cent below the 1912 figure." Coal production

1876

was 69.1% of its 1913 level in 1920, falling to 32.8% in

1877

1923. Iron production was 33.1% in 1920 and 25.6% in 1923.

1878

Steel production likewise fell to 48.5% in 1920 and fell

1879

again to 36% in 1923. [V. R. Berghahn, Op. Cit., p. 258,

1880

pp. 67-8, p. 71 and p. 259]

1881

1882

Significantly, one of the first acts of the Bolshevik government

1883

towards the new German government was to "the offer by the

1884

Soviet authorities of two trainloads of grain for the

1885

hungry German population. It was a symbolical gesture and,

1886

in view of desperate shortages in Russia itself, a generous

1887

one." The offer, perhaps unsurprisingly, was rejected in

1888

favour of grain from America. [E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik

1889

Revolution, vol. 3, p. 106]

1890

1891

The similarities between Germany and Russia are clear. As

1892

noted above, in Russia, the index for large scale industry

1893

fell to 77 in 1917 from 100 in 1913, falling again to 35 in

1894

1918, 26 in 1919 and 18 in 1920. [Tony Cliff, Lenin, vol. 3,

1895

p. 86] In other words, a fall of 23% between 1913 and 1917,

1896

54.5% between 1917 and 1918, 25.7% in 1918 and 30.8% in 1919.

1897

A similar process occurred in Germany, where the fall

1898

production was 37.7% between 1913 and 1917, 8.2% between

1899

1917 and 1918 and 33.9% between 1918 and 1919 (the year of

1900

revolution). While production did rise in 1920 by 45.9%,

1901

production was still around 45% less than before the war.

1902

1903

Thus, comparing the two countries we discover a similar

1904

picture of economic collapse. In the year the revolution

1905

started, production had fallen by 23% in Russia (from

1906

1913 to 1917) and by 43% in Germany (from 1913 to 1918).

1907

Once revolution had effectively started, production fell

1908

even more. In Russia, it fell to 65% of its pre-war level

1909

in 1918, in Germany it fell to 62% of its pre-war level

1910

in 1919. Of course, in Germany revolution did not go as

1911

far as in Russia, and so production did rise somewhat in

1912

1920 and afterwards. What is significant is that in 1923,

1913

production fell dramatically by 34% (from around 70% of its

1914

pre-war level to around 45% of that level). This economic

1915

collapse did not deter the Communists from trying to provoke

1916

a revolution in Germany that year, so suggesting that economic

1917

disruption played no role in their evaluation of the success

1918

of a revolution.

1919

1920

This economic chaos in Germany is never mentioned by Leninists

1921

when they discuss the "objective factors" facing the Russian

1922

Revolution. However, once these facts are taken into account,

1923

the superficiality of the typical Leninist explanation for the

1924

degeneration of the revolution becomes obvious. The very

1925

problems which, it is claimed, forced the Bolsheviks to

1926

act as they did also were rampant in Germany. If economic

1927

collapse made socialism impossible in Russia, it would

1928

surely have had the same effect in Germany (and any social

1929

revolution would also have faced more disruption than actually

1930

faced post 1919 in Germany). This means, given that the economic

1931

collapse in both 1918/19 and 1923 was as bad as that facing

1932

Russia in 1918 and that the Bolsheviks had started to undermine

1933

soviet and military democracy along with workers' control by

1934

spring and summer of that year (see

1935

<a href="append43.html#app5">section 5</a>), to blame

1936

Bolshevik actions on economic collapse would mean that any

1937

German revolution would have been subject to the same

1938

authoritarianism if the roots of Bolshevik authoritarianism

1939

were forced by economic events rather than a product of applying

1940

a specific political ideology via state power. Few Leninists

1941

draw this obvious conclusion from their own arguments although

1942

there is no reason for them not to.

1943

1944

So the German Revolution was facing the same problems the

1945

Russian one was. It seems unlikely, therefore, that a

1946

successful German revolution would have been that much aid

1947

to Russia. This means that when John Rees argues that giving

1948

machinery or goods to the peasants in return for grain instead

1949

of simply seizing it required "revolution in Germany, or at

1950

least the revival of industry" in Russia, he completely fails

1951

to indicate the troubles facing the German revolution. "Without

1952

a successful German revolution," he writes, "the Bolsheviks

1953

were thrown back into a bloody civil war with only limited

1954

resources. The revolution was under siege." [John Rees, "In

1955

Defence of October," pp. 3-82, International Socialism,

1956

no. 52, p. 40 and p. 29] Yet given the state of the German

1957

economy at the time, it is hard to see how much help a

1958

successful German revolution would have been. As such, his

1959

belief that a successful German Revolution would have mitigated

1960

Bolshevik authoritarianism seems exactly that, a belief without

1961

any real evidence to support it (and let us not forget, Bolshevik

1962

authoritarianism had started before the civil war broke out --

1963

see

1964

<a href="append43.html#app3">section 3</a>).

1965

Moreover, if the pro-Bolshevik argument

1966

Rees is expounding is correct, then the German Revolution

1967

would have been subject to the same authoritarianism as befell

1968

the Bolshevik one simply because it was facing a similar economic

1969

crisis. Luckily, anarchists argue, that this need not be the case

1970

if libertarian principles are applied in a revolution:

1971

1972

"The first months of emancipation will inevitably increase

1973

consumption of goods and production will diminish. And,

1974

furthermore, any country achieving social revolution will be

1975

surrounded by a ring of neighbours either unfriendly or

1976

actually enemies . . . The demands upon products will increase

1977

while production decreases, and finally famine will come. There

1978

is only one way of avoiding it. We should understand that as

1979

soon as a revolutionary movement begins in any country the only

1980

possible way out will consist in the workingmen [and women]

1981

and peasants from the beginning taking the whole national

1982

economy into their hands and organising it themselves . . .

1983

But they will not be convinced of this necessity except when

1984

all responsibility for national economy, today in the hands of

1985

a multitude of ministers and committees, is presented in a

1986

simple form to each village and city, in every factory and shop,

1987

as their own affair, and when they understand that they must

1988

direct it themselves." [Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets,

1989

pp. 77-8]

1990

</blockquote>

1991

So, as regards the Russian and German revolution, Kropotkin's

1992

arguments were proven correct. The same can be said of other

1993

revolutions as well. Basing himself on the actual experiences

1994

of both the French Revolution and the Paris Commune, we can

1995

see why Kropotkin argued as he did. The Paris Commune, for

1996

example, was born after a four-month-long siege "had left

1997

the capital in a state of economic collapse. The winter had

1998

been the severest in living memory. Food and fuel had been

1999

the main problems . . . Unemployment was widespread. Thousands

2000

of demobilised soldiers wandered loose in Paris and joined in

2001

the general hunt for food, shelter and warmth. For most working

2002

men the only source of income was the 1.50 francs daily pay

2003

of the National Guard, which in effect had become a form of

2004

unemployment pay." The city was "near starving" and by March

2005

it was "in a state of economic and political crisis." [Stewart

2006

Edwards, "Introduction," The Communards of Paris, 1871,

2007

p. 23] Yet this economic collapse and isolation did not stop

2008

the commune from introducing and maintaining democratic forms

2009

of decision making, both political and economic. A similar

2010

process occurred during the French Revolution, where mass

2011

participation via the "sections" was not hindered by economic

2012

collapse. It was finally stopped by state action organised by

2013

the Jacobins to destroy popular participation and initiative

2014

(see Kropotkin's The Great French Revolution for details).

2015

2016

During the Spanish Revolution, "overall Catalan production

2017

fell in the first year of war by 30 per cent, and in the

2018

cotton-working sector of the textile industry by twice as

2019

much. Overall unemployment (complete and partial) rose by

2020

nearly a quarter in the first year, and this despite the

2021

military mobilisation decreed in September 1936. The cost

2022

of living quadrupled in just over two years; wages . . .

2023

only doubled." [Ronald Fraser, Blood of Spain, p. 234]

2024

Markets, both internally and externally, for goods and raw

2025

materials were disrupted, not to mention the foreign blockade

2026

and the difficulties imposed in trying to buy products from

2027

other countries. These difficulties came on top of problems

2028

caused by the great depression of the 1930s which affected

2029

Spain along with most other countries. Yet, democratic norms

2030

of economic and social decision making continued in spite of

2031

economic disruption. Ironically, given the subject of this

2032

discussion, it was only once the Stalinist counter-revolution

2033

got going were they fatally undermined or destroyed.

2034

2035

Thus economic disruption need not automatically imply

2036

authoritarian policies. And just as well, given the fact that

2037

revolution and economic disruption seem to go hand in hand.

2038

2039

Looking further afield, even revolutionary situations can

2040

be accompanied with economic collapse. For example, the

2041

Argentine revolt which started in 2001 took place in the face

2042

of massive economic collapse. The economy was a mess, with

2043

poverty and unemployment at disgusting levels. Four years of

2044

recession saw the poverty rate balloon from 31 to 53 percent

2045

of the population of 37 million, while unemployment climbed

2046

from 14 to 21.4 percent, according to official figures. Yet

2047

in the face of such economic problems, working class people

2048

acted collectively, forming popular assemblies and taking

2049

over workplaces.

2050

2051

The Great Depression of the 1930s in America saw a much deeper

2052

economic contradiction. Indeed, it was as bad as that associated

2053

with revolutionary Germany and Russia after the first world war.

2054

According to Howard Zinn, after the stock market crash in 1929

2055

"the economy was stunned, barely moving. Over five thousand

2056

banks closed and huge numbers of businesses, unable to get

2057

money, closed too. Those that continued laid off employees and

2058

cut the wages of those who remained, again and again. Industrial

2059

production fell by 50 percent, and by 1933 perhaps 15 million

2060

(no knew exactly) -- one-forth or one-third of the labour

2061

force -- were out of work." [A People's History of the

2062

United States, p. 378]

2063

2064

Specific industries were badly affected. For example, total GNP

2065

fell to 53.6% in 1933 compared to its 1929 value. The production

2066

of basic goods fell by much more. Iron and Steel saw a 59.3%

2067

decline, machinery a 61.6% decline and "non-ferrous metals and

2068

products" a 55.9% decline. Transport was also affected, with

2069

transportation equipment declining by 64.2% railroad car

2070

production dropping by 73.6% and locomotion production declining

2071

by 86.4%. Furniture production saw a decline of 57.9%. The

2072

workforce was equally affected, with unemployment reaching 25%

2073

in 1933. In Chicago 40% of the workforce was unemployed. Union

2074

membership, which had fallen from 5 million in 1920 to 3.4

2075

million in 1929 fell to less than 3 million by 1933. [Lester

2076

V. Chandler, America's Greatest Depression, 1929-1941, p. 20,

2077

p. 23, p. 34, p. 45 and p. 228]

2078

2079

Yet in the face of this economic collapse, no Leninist proclaimed

2080

the impossibility of socialism. In fact, the reverse what the case.

2081

Similar arguments could apply to, say, post-world war two Europe,

2082

when economic collapse and war damage did not stop Trotskyists

2083

looking forward to, and seeking, revolutions there. Nor did the

2084

massive economic that occurred after the fall of Stalinism in

2085

Russia in the early 1990s deter Leninist calls for revolution.

2086

Indeed, you can rest assured that any drop in economic activity,

2087

no matter how large or small, will be accompanied by Leninist

2088

articles arguing for the immediate introduction of socialism.

2089

And this was the case in 1917 as well, when economic crisis had

2090

been a fact of Russian life throughout the year. Lenin, for

2091

example, argued at the end of September of that "Russia is

2092

threatened with an inevitable catastrophe . . .A catastrophe

2093

of extraordinary dimensions, and a famine, are unavoidably

2094

threatening . . . Half a year of revolution has passed. The

2095

catastrophe has come still closer. Things have come to a state

2096

of mass unemployment. Think of it: the country is suffering from

2097

a lack of commodities." [The Threatening Catastrophe and how

2098

to Fight It, p. 5] This did not stop him calling for revolution

2099

and seizing power. Nor did this crisis stop the creation of

2100

democratic working class organisations, such as soviets, trade

2101

unions and factory committees being formed. It did not stop mass

2102

collective action to combat those difficulties. It appears,

2103

therefore, that while the economic crisis of 1917 did not stop

2104

the development of socialist tendencies to combat it, the

2105

seizure of power by a socialist party did.

2106

2107

Given that no Leninist has argued that a revolution could take

2108

place in Germany after the war or in the USA during the darkest

2109

months of the Great Depression, the argument that the grim economic

2110

conditions facing Bolshevik Russia made soviet democracy impossible

2111

seem weak. By arguing that both Germany and the USA could create

2112

a viable socialist revolution in economic conditions just as bad

2113

as those facing Soviet Russia, the reasons why the Bolsheviks

2114

created a party dictatorship must be looked for elsewhere. Given

2115

this support for revolution in 1930s America and post-world war

2116

I and II Europe, you would have to conclude that, for Leninists,

2117

economic collapse only makes socialism impossible once they are

2118

in power! Which is hardly convincing, or inspiring.

2119

2120

<a name="app5"><h2>5 Was the Russian working class atomised or "declassed"?</h2>

2121

2122

A standard Leninist explanation for the dictatorship of the

2123

Bolshevik party (and subsequent rise of Stalinism) is based

2124

on the "atomisation" or "declassing" of the proletariat. John

2125

Rees summarises this argument as follows:

2126

2127

"The civil war had reduced industry to rubble. The working

2128

class base of the workers' state, mobilises time and again

2129

to defeat the Whites, the rock on which Bolshevik power

2130

stood, had disintegrated. The Bolsheviks survived three

2131

years of civil war and wars in intervention, but only at

2132

the cost of reducing the working class to an atomised,

2133

individualised mass, a fraction of its former size, and

2134

no longer able to exercise the collective power that it

2135

had done in 1917 . . . The bureaucracy of the workers'

2136

state was left suspended in mid-air, its class base

2137

eroded and demoralised. Such conditions could not help

2138

but have an effect on the machinery of the state and

2139

organisation of the Bolshevik Party." ["In Defence of

2140

October," pp. 3-82, International Socialism, no. 52,

2141

p. 65]

2142

</blockquote>

2143

It is these objective factors which, it is argued, explain why

2144

the Bolshevik party substituted itself for the Russian working

2145

class. "Under such conditions," argues Tony Cliff, "the class

2146

base of the Bolshevik Party disintegrated -- not because of

2147

some mistakes in the policies of Bolshevism, not because of one

2148

or another conception of Bolshevism regarding the role of the

2149

party and its relation to the class -- but because of mightier

2150

historical factors. The working class had become declassed . . .

2151

Bolshevik 'substitutionism' . . . did not jump out of Lenin's

2152

head as Minerva out of Zeus's, but was born of the objective

2153

conditions of civil war in a peasant country, where a small

2154

working class, reduced in weight, became fragmented and

2155

dissolved into the peasant masses." [Trotsky on Substitutionism,

2156

pp. 62-3] In other words, because the working class was so

2157

decimated the replacement of class power by party power was

2158

inevitable.

2159

2160

Before discussing this argument, we should point out that this

2161

argument dates back to Lenin. For example, he argued in 1921

2162

that the proletariat, "owning to the war and to the desperate

2163

poverty and ruin, has become declassed, i.e. dislodged from

2164

its class groove, and had ceased to exist as proletariat . . .

2165

the proletariat has disappeared." [Collected Works, vol. 33,

2166

p. 66] However, unlike his later-day followers, Lenin was sure

2167

that while it "would be absurd and ridiculous to deny that the

2168

fact that the proletariat is declassed is a handicap" it could

2169

still "fulfil its task of wining and holding state power."

2170

[Op. Cit., vol. 32, p. 412] As we will see, the context in

2171

which Lenin started to make these arguments is important.

2172

2173

Anarchists do not find these arguments particularly convincing.

2174

This is for two reasons. Firstly, it seems incredulous to

2175

blame the civil war for the "substitution" of Bolshevik power

2176

for working class power as party power had been Lenin's stated

2177

aim in 1917 and October saw the seizure of power by the

2178

Bolsheviks, not the soviets. As we saw in

2179

<a href="append43.html#app3">section 3</a>,

2180

the Bolsheviks started to gerrymander and disband soviets to

2181

remain in power before the civil war started. As such, to

2182

blame the civil war and the problems it caused for the usurpation

2183

of power by the Bolsheviks seems unconvincing. Simply put, the

2184

Bolsheviks had "substituted" itself for the proletariat from

2185

the start, from the day it seized power in the October revolution.

2186

2187

Secondly, the fact is the Russian working class was far from

2188

"atomised." Rather than being incapable of collective action,

2189

as Leninists assert, Russia's workers were more than capable

2190

of taking collective action throughout the civil war period.

2191

The problem is, of course, that any such collective action

2192

was directed against the Bolshevik party. This caused the

2193

party no end of problems. After all, if the working class

2194

was the ruling class under the Bolsheviks, then who was

2195

it striking against? Emma Goldman explains the issue well:

2196

2197

"In my early period the question of strikes had puzzled me

2198

a great deal. People had told me that the least attempt of

2199

that kind was crushed and the participants sent to prison.

2200

I had not believed it, and, as in all similar things, I

2201

turned to Zorin [a Bolshevik] for information. 'Strikes under

2202

the dictatorship of the proletariat!' he had proclaimed;

2203

'there's no such thing.' He had even upbraided me for

2204

crediting such wild and impossible tales. Against whom,

2205

indeed, should the workers strike in Soviet Russia, he

2206

argued. Against themselves? They were the masters of the

2207

country, politically as well as industrially. To be sure,

2208

there were some among the toilers who were not yet fully

2209

class-conscious and aware of their own true interests.

2210

These were sometimes disgruntled, but they were elements

2211

incited by . . . self-seekers and enemies of the Revolution."

2212

[Living My Life, vol. 2, p. 872]

2213

</blockquote>

2214

This, unfortunately, still seems to be the case in pro-Bolshevik

2215

accounts of the Revolution and its degeneration. After the

2216

Bolshevik seizure of power, the working class as an active

2217

agent almost immediately disappears from the accounts. This

2218

is unsurprising, as it does not bode well for maintaining the

2219

Bolshevik Myth to admit that workers were resisting the

2220

so-called "proletarian dictatorship" from the start. The notion

2221

that the working class had "disappeared" fits into this selective

2222

blindness well. Why discuss the actions of a class which did not

2223

exist? Thus we have a logical circle from which reality can be

2224

excluded: the working class is "atomised" and so cannot take

2225

industrial action, evidence of industrial action need not be

2226

looked for because the class is "atomised."

2227

2228

This can be seen from Lenin. For example, he proclaimed in

2229

October 1921 that "the proletariat had disappeared." Yet

2230

this non-existent class had, in early 1921, taken collective

2231

action which "encompassed most of the country's industrial

2232

regions." [J. Aves, Workers Against Lenin, p. 111]

2233

Significantly, the Communists (then and now) refused to call

2234

the movement a strike, preferring the word "volynka" which

2235

means "go-slow." The Menshevik leader Dan explained why:

2236

"The Bolshevik press carefully tried, at first, to hush up

2237

the movement, then to hide its real size and character.

2238

Instead of calling the strike a strike, they thought up

2239

various new terms -- yolynka, buza and so on." [quoted

2240

by Aves, Op. Cit., p. 112] As Russian anarchist Ida Mett

2241

succinctly put it: "And if the proletariat was that exhausted

2242

how come it was still capable of waging virtually total general

2243

strikes in the largest and most heavily industrialised cities?"

2244

[Ida Mett, The Kronstadt Rebellion, p. 81]

2245

2246

The year after Lenin proclaimed the proletariat "disappeared"

2247

we discover similar evidence of working class collective

2248

action. Ironically, it is Leninist Tony Cliff who presents

2249

the evidence that "the number of workers involved in labour

2250

conflicts was three and a half million, and in 1923, 1,592,800."

2251

Strikes in state-owned workplaces in 1922 involved 192,000

2252

workers. [State Capitalism in Russia, p. 28] Given that

2253

Cliff states that in 1921 there was only "one and a quarter

2254

million" industrial workers "proper" (compared to over

2255

three million in 1917), this level of strikes is extremely

2256

large -- particular for members of a class which did not,

2257

according to Lenin which had "disappeared"!

2258

2259

Before providing more evidence for the existence of working

2260

class collective struggle throughout the period 1918 to 1923,

2261

it is necessary to place Lenin's comments on the "declassing"

2262

of the working class in context. Rather than being the result

2263

of a lack of industrial protest, Lenin's arguments were the

2264

product of its opposite -- the rise in collective struggle by

2265

the Russian working class. As one historian notes: "As

2266

discontent amongst workers became more and more difficult to

2267

ignore, Lenin . . . began to argue that the consciousness of

2268

the working class had deteriorated . . . workers had become

2269

'declassed.'" "Lenin's analysis," he continues, "had a

2270

superficial logic but it was based on a false conception of

2271

working-class consciousness. There is little evidence to suggest

2272

that the demands that workers made at the end of 1920 . . .

2273

represented a fundamental change in aspirations since 1917

2274

. . . [Moreover] an analysis of the industrial unrest in 1921

2275

shows that long-standing workers were prominent in protest."

2276

[J. Aves, Op. Cit., p. 90 and pp. 90-1]

2277

2278

Lenin's pessimistic analysis of 1921 is in sharp contrast to

2279

the optimistic mood of early 1920, reproduced by the defeat

2280

of the White armies, in Bolshevik ranks. For example, writing

2281

in May, 1920, Trotsky seemed oblivious to the "atomisation"

2282

of the Russian working class, arguing that "in spite of

2283

political tortures, physical sufferings and horrors, the

2284

labouring masses are infinitely distinct from political

2285

decomposition, from moral collapse, or from apathy . . . Today,

2286

in all branches of industry, there is going on an energetic

2287

struggle for the establishment of strict labour discipline,

2288

and for the increase of the productivity of labour. The party

2289

organisations, the trade unions, the factory and workshop

2290

administrative committees, rival each one another in this

2291

respect, with the undivided support of the working class as

2292

a whole." Indeed, they "concentrate their attention and will

2293

on collective problems" ("Thanks to a regime which . . .

2294

given their life a pursue"!). Needless to say, the party had

2295

"the undivided support of the public opinion of the working

2296

class as a whole." [Terrorism and Communism, p. 6]

2297

2298

The turn around in perspective after this period did not happen

2299

by accident, independently of the working class resistance to

2300

Bolshevik rule. After all, the defeat of the Whites in early

2301

of 1920 saw the Bolsheviks take "victory as a sign of the

2302

correctness of its ideological approach and set about the task

2303

of reconstruction on the basis of an intensification of War

2304

Communism policies with redoubled determination." This led

2305

to "an increase in industrial unrest in 1920," including

2306

"serious strikes." The resistance was "becoming increasingly

2307

politicised." Thus, the stage was set for Lenin's turn around

2308

and his talk of "declassing." In early 1921 "Lenin argued that

2309

workers, who were no more demoralised than they were in early

2310

1920, had become 'declassed' in order to justify a political

2311

clamp-down." [J. Aves, Op. Cit., p. 37, p. 80 and p. 18]

2312

2313

Other historians also note this context. For example, while the

2314

"working class had decreased in size and changed in composition,

2315

. . . the protest movement from late 1920 made clear that it was

2316

not a negligible force and that in an inchoate way it retained a

2317

vision of socialism which was not identified entirely with Bolshevik

2318

power . . . Lenin's arguments on the declassing of the proletariat

2319

was more a way of avoiding this unpleasant truth than a real

2320

reflection of what remained, in Moscow at least, a substantial

2321

physical and ideological force." [Richard Sakwa, Soviet

2322

Communists in Power, p. 261] In the words of Diane Koenker,

2323

"[i]f Lenin's perceptions of the situation were at all

2324

representative, it appears that the Bolshevik party made

2325

deurbanisation and declassing the scapegoat for its political

2326

difficulties, when the party's own policies and its unwillingness

2327

to accept changing proletarian attitudes were also to blame."

2328

Ironically, this was not the first time that the Bolsheviks

2329

had blamed its problems on the lack of a "true" proletariat

2330

and its replacement by "petty-bourgeois" elements, "[t]his

2331

was the same argument used to explain the Bolsheviks' lack

2332

of success in the early months of 1917 -- that the cadres of

2333

conscious proletarians were diluted by non-proletarian

2334

elements." ["Urbanisation and Deurbanisation in the Russian

2335

Revolution and Civil War," pp. 424-450, The Journal of

2336

Modern History, vol. 57, no. 3, p. 449 and p. 428]

2337

2338

It should be noted that the "declassing" argument does have a

2339

superficial validity if you accept the logic of vanguardism.

2340

After all, if you accept the premise that the party alone

2341

represents socialist consciousness and that the working class,

2342

by its own efforts, can only reach a reformist level of

2343

political conscious (at best), then any deviation in working

2344

class support for the party obviously represents a drop in

2345

class consciousness or a "declassing" of the proletariat (see

2346

section H.5.1 -- <a href="secH5.html#sech51">"Why are

2347

vanguard parties anti-socialist?"</a>).

2348

Thus working class protest against the party can be dismissed

2349

as evidence of "declassing" which has to be suppressed rather

2350

than what it really is, namely evidence of working class

2351

autonomy and collective struggle for what it considers its

2352

interests to be against a new master class. In fact, the

2353

"declassing" argument is related to the vanguardist position

2354

which, in turn, justifies the dictatorship of the party over

2355

the class (see section H.5.3 -- <a href="secH5.html#sech53">"Why

2356

does vanguardism imply party power?"</a>).

2357

2358

So the "declassing" argument is not some neutral statement of

2359

fact. It was developed as a weapon on the class struggle, to

2360

justify Bolshevik repression of collective working class

2361

struggle. To justify the continuation of Bolshevik party

2362

dictatorship over the working class. This in turn explains

2363

why working class struggle during this period generally fails

2364

to get mentioned by later day Bolsheviks -- it simply undermines

2365

their justifications for Bolshevik dictatorship. After all,

2366

how can they say that the working class could not exercise

2367

"collective power" when it was conducting mass strikes

2368

throughout Russia during the period 1918 to 1923?

2369

2370

As such, it does not seem that strange that in most Leninist

2371

account of the revolution post-October rarely, if ever, mention

2372

what the working class was actually doing. We do get statistics

2373

on the drop of the numbers of industrial workers in the cities

2374

(usually Petrograd and Moscow), but any discussion on working

2375

class protest and strikes is generally, at best, mentioned in

2376

passing or, usually, ignored utterly. Given this was meant to

2377

be a "proletarian" dictatorship, it seems strange this silence.

2378

It could be argued that this silence is due to the working class

2379

being decimated in number and/or "declassed" in terms of itself

2380

perspective. This, however, seems unlikely, as collective working

2381

class protest was common place in Bolshevik Russia. The silence

2382

can be better understood by the fact this protest was directed

2383

against the Bolsheviks.

2384

2385

Which shows the bankruptcy of what can be called the "statistical

2386

tendency" of analysing the Russian working class. While statistics

2387

can tell us how many workers remained in Russia in, say, 1921,

2388

it does not prove any idea of their combativeness or their

2389

ability to take collective decisions and action. If numbers alone

2390

indicated the ability of workers to take part in collective

2391

struggle, then the massive labour struggles in 1930s American

2392

would not have taken place. Millions had been made redundant.

2393

At the Ford Motor Company, 128,000 workers had been employed in

2394

the spring of 1929. There were only 37,000 by August of 1931 (only

2395

29% of the 1929 figure). By the end of 1930, almost half of the

2396

280,000 textile mill workers in New England were out of work.

2397

[Howard Zinn, A People's History of the United States, p. 378]

2398

Yet in the face of these massive redundancies, the workers organised

2399

themselves and fought back. As we will indicate, the reduction in

2400

the number of Russian workers did not restrict their ability to

2401

make collective decisions and act collectively on them -- Bolshevik

2402

repression did.

2403

2404

Moreover, while Leninists usually point to the fall in population in

2405

Petrograd and Moscow during the civil war, concentrating on

2406

these cities can be misleading. "Using the Petrograd figures,"

2407

notes Daniel R. Bower, "historians have painted a lurid picture of

2408

flight from the cities. In 1918 alone the former capital

2409

lost 850,000 people and was by itself responsible for

2410

one-half of the total urban population decline of the

2411

Civil War years. If one sets aside aggregate figures to

2412

determine the trend characteristic of most cities, however,

2413

the experiences of Petrograd appears exception. Only a

2414

handful of cities . . . lost half their population between

2415

1917 and 1920, and even Moscow, which declined by over

2416

40 percent, was not typical of most towns in the northern,

2417

food-importing areas. A study of all cities . . . found

2418

that the average decline in the north (167 towns in all,

2419

excluding the capital cities) amounted to 24 percent

2420

between 1917 and 1920. Among the towns in the food-producing

2421

areas in the southern and eastern regions of the Russian

2422

Republic (a total of 128), the average decline came to

2423

only 14 percent." ["'The city in danger': The Civil War

2424

and the Russian Urban Population," Party, State, and

2425

Society in the Russian Civil War, Diane P. Koenker,

2426

William G. Rosenberg and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.),

2427

p. 61] Does this mean that the possibility of soviet

2428

democracy declined less in these towns? Yet the Bolsheviks

2429

applied their dictatorships even there, suggesting that

2430

declining urban populations was not the source of their

2431

authoritarianism.

2432

2433

Equally, what are we to make of towns and cities which

2434

increased their populations? Some towns and cites actually

2435

grew in size. For example, Minsk, Samara, Khar'kov, Tiflis, Baku,

2436

Rostov-on-don, Tsaritsyn and Perm all grew in population

2437

(often by significant amounts) between 1910 and 1920 while other

2438

cities shrunk. [Diane Koenker, "Urbanisation and Deurbanisation

2439

in the Russian Revolution and Civil War," pp. 424-450, The

2440

Journal of Modern History, vol. 57, no. 3, p. 425] Does that

2441

mention soviet democracy was possible in those towns but not

2442

in Petrograd or Moscow? Or does the fact that the industrial

2443

workforce grew by 14.8% between October 1920 and April 1921

2444

mean that the possibility for soviet democracy also grew by

2445

a similar percentage? [J. Aves, Workers Against Lenin,

2446

p. 159]

2447

2448

Then there is the question of when the reduction of workers

2449

makes soviet democracy impossible. After all, between May 1917

2450

and April 1918 the city of Moscow lost 300,000 of its two

2451

million inhabitants. Was soviet democracy impossible in April

2452

1918 because of this? During the civil war, Moscow lost

2453

another 700,000 by 1920 (which is basically the same amount

2454

per year). [Diane Koenker, Op. Cit., p. 424] When did this

2455

fall in population mean that soviet democracy was impossible?

2456

Simply put, comparing figures of one year to another simply

2457

fails to understand the dynamics at work, such as the impact

2458

of "reasons of state" and working class resistance to Bolshevik

2459

rule. It, in effect, turns the attention away from the state

2460

of working class autonomy and onto number crunching.

2461

2462

Ultimately, the question of whether the working class was too

2463

"atomised" to govern can only be answered by looking at the

2464

class struggle in Russia during this period, by looking at

2465

the strikes, demonstrations and protests that occurred.

2466

Something Leninists rarely do. Needless to say, certain

2467

strike waves just cannot be ignored. The most obvious case

2468

is in Petrograd just before the Kronstadt revolt in early

2469

1921. After all, the strikes (and subsequent Bolshevik

2470

repression) inspired the sailors to revolt in solidarity

2471

with them. Faced with such events, the scale of the protest

2472

and Bolshevik repression is understated and the subject quickly

2473

changed. As we noted in

2474

<a href="append42.html#app10">section 10</a> of the appendix on

2475

<a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a>, John Rees states that

2476

Kronstadt was "preceded by a wave of serious but quickly

2477

resolved strikes." [Rees, Op. Cit., p. 61] Needless to say,

2478

he does not mention that the strikes were "resolved" by

2479

"serious" force. Nor does he explain how "an atomised,

2480

individualised mass" could conduct such "serious" strikes,

2481

strikes which required martial law to break. Little wonder,

2482

then, Rees does expound on the strikes and what they meant

2483

in terms of the revolution and his own argument.

2484

2485

Similarly, we find Victor Serge arguing that the "working class

2486

often fretted and cursed; sometimes it lent an ear to the Menshevik

2487

agitators, as in the great strikes at Petrograd in the spring of

2488

1919. But once the choice was posed as that between the dictatorship

2489

of the White Generals and the dictatorship of its own party -- and

2490

there was not and could not be any other choice -- every fit man

2491

. . . came to stand . . . before the windows of the local party

2492

offices." [Year One of the Russian Revolution, pp. 365-6] An

2493

exhausted and atomised working class capable of "great strikes"?

2494

That seems unlikely. Significantly, Serge does not mention the

2495

Bolshevik acts of repression used against the rebel workers (see

2496

below). This omission cannot help distort any conclusions to be

2497

drawn from his account.

2498

2499

Which, incidentally, shows that the civil war was not all bad news

2500

for the Bolsheviks. Faced with working class protest, they could

2501

play the "White card" -- unless the workers went back to work, the

2502

Whites would win. This explains why the strikes of early 1921

2503

were larger than before and explains why they were so important.

2504

As the "White card" could no longer be played, the Bolshevik

2505

repression could not be excused in terms of the civil war. Indeed,

2506

given working class opposition to the party, it would be fair to

2507

say that civil war actually helped the Bolsheviks remain in power.

2508

Without the threat of the Whites, the working class would not have

2509

tolerated the Bolsheviks longer than the Autumn of 1918.

2510

2511

The fact is that working class collective struggle against the new

2512

regime and, consequently, Bolshevik repression, started before the

2513

outbreak of the civil war. It continued throughout the civil war

2514

period and reached a climax in the early months of 1921. Even the

2515

repression of the Kronstadt rebellion did not stop it, with strikes

2516

continuing into 1923 (and, to a lesser degree, afterward). Indeed,

2517

the history of the "workers' state" is a history of the state

2518

repressing the revolt of the workers.

2519

2520

Needless to say, it would be impossible to give a full account

2521

of working class resistance to Bolshevism. All we can do here is

2522

give a flavour of what was happening and the sources for further

2523

information. What should be clear from our account is that the

2524

idea that the working class in this period was incapable of

2525

collective organisation and struggle is false. As such, the idea

2526

that Bolshevik "substitutionism" can be explained in such term is

2527

also false. In addition, it will become clear that Bolshevik

2528

repression explicitly aimed to break the ability of workers to

2529

organise and exercise collective power. As such, it seems

2530

hypocritical for modern-day Leninists to blame Bolshevik power

2531

on the "atomisation" of the working class when Bolshevik power

2532

was dependent on smashing working class collective organisation

2533

and resistance. Simply put, to remain in power Bolshevism, from

2534

the start, had to crush working class power. This is to be

2535

expected, given the centralised nature of the state and the

2536

assumptions of vanguardism. If you like, October 1917 did not

2537

see the end of "dual power." Rather the Bolshevik state replaced

2538

the bourgeois state and working class power (as expressed in its

2539

collective struggle) came into conflict with it.

2540

2541

This struggle of the "workers' state" against the workers started

2542

early in 1918. "By the early summer of 1918," records one historian,

2543

"there were widespread anti-Bolshevik protests. Armed clashes

2544

occurred in the factory districts of Petrograd and other industrial

2545

centres. Under the aegis of the Conference of Factory and Plant

2546

Representatives . . . a general strike was set for July 2."

2547

[William Rosenberg, "Russian labour and Bolshevik Power,"

2548

pp. 98-131, The Workers' revolution in Russia, 1917, Daniel H.

2549

Kaiser (ed.), p. 107] According to another historian, economic

2550

factors "were soon to erode the standing of the Bolsheviks

2551

among Petrograd workers . . . These developments, in turn,

2552

led in short order to worker protests, which then precipitated

2553

violent repressions against hostile workers. Such treatment

2554

further intensified the disenchantment of significant segments

2555

of Petrograd labour with Bolshevik-dominated Soviet rule."

2556

[Alexander Rabinowitch, Early Disenchantment with Bolshevik

2557

Rule, p. 37]

2558

2559

The reasons for these protest movement were both political and

2560

economic. The deepening economic crisis combined with protests

2561

against Bolshevik authoritarianism to produce a wave of strikes

2562

aiming for political change. Feeling that the soviets were

2563

distant and unresponsive to their needs (with good reason, given

2564

Bolshevik postponement of soviet elections and gerrymandering

2565

of the soviets), workers turned to direct action and the

2566

initially Menshevik inspired "Conference of Factory and Plant

2567

Representatives" (also known as the "Extraordinary Assembly of

2568

Delegates from Petrograd Factories and Plants") to voice their

2569

concerns. At its peak, reports "estimated that out of 146,000

2570

workers still in Petrograd, as many as 100,000 supported the

2571

conference's goals." [Op. Cit., p. 127] The aim of the Conference

2572

(as per Menshevik policy) was to reform the existing system

2573

"from within" and, as such, the Conference operated openly.

2574

As Alexander Rabinowitch notes, "[F]or the Soviet authorities

2575

in Petrograd, the rise of the Extraordinary Assembly of

2576

Delegates from Petrograd Factories and Plants was an ominous

2577

portent of worker defection." [Op. Cit., p. 37]

2578

2579

The first wave of outrage and protests occurred after Bolshevik

2580

Red Guards opened fire on a demonstration for the Constituent

2581

Assembly in early January (killing 21, according to Bolshevik

2582

sources). This demonstration "was notable as the first time

2583

workers came out actively against the new regime. More ominously,

2584

it was also the first time forces representing soviet power used

2585

violence against workers." [David Mandel, The Petrograd Workers

2586

and the Soviet Seizure of Power, p. 355] It would not be the

2587

last -- indeed repression by the "workers' state" of working

2588

class protest became a recurring feature of Bolshevism.

2589

2590

By April "it appeared that the government was now ready to go to

2591

whatever extremes it deemed necessary (including sanctioning the

2592

arrest and even shooting of workers) to quell labour unrest. This

2593

in turn led to intimidation, apathy, lethargy and passivity of

2594

other workers. In these circumstances, growth in support of the

2595

Assembly slowed down." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 40] The Assembly

2596

aborted its plans for a May Day demonstration to protest the

2597

government's policies were cancelled because of workers did not

2598

respond to the appeals to demonstrate (in part because of

2599

"Bolshevik threats against 'protesters'" [Op. Cit., pp. 40-1]).

2600

2601

This apathy did not last long. After early May events "served

2602

to reinvigorate and temporarily radicalise the Assembly. These

2603

developments included yet another drastic drop in food supplies,

2604

the shooting of protesting housewives and workers in the

2605

Petrograd suburb of Kolpino, the arbitrary arrest and abuse of

2606

workers in another Petrograd suburb, Sestroresk, the closure of

2607

newspapers and the arrests of individuals who had denounced the

2608

Kolpino and Sestroresk events, the intensification of labour

2609

unrest and conflict with the authorities in the Obukhov plant

2610

and in other Petrograd factories and districts." [Op. Cit.,

2611

p. 41]

2612

2613

So the next major protest wave occurred in early May, 1918, after

2614

armed guards opened fire on protesting workers in Kolpino --

2615

"while the incident was hardly the first of its kind, it

2616

triggered a massive wave of indignation." Work temporarily

2617

stopped in a number of plants. Between Kolpino and early July,

2618

more than seventy incidents occurred in Petrograd, including

2619

strikes, demonstrations and anti-Bolshevik meetings. Many of

2620

these meetings "were protests against some form of Bolshevik

2621

repression: shootings, incidents of 'terroristic activities,'

2622

and arrests." In some forty incidents "worker's protests

2623

focused on these issues, and the data is surely understate

2624

the actual number by a wide margin. There were as well some

2625

eighteen separate strikes or some other work stoppages with

2626

an explicitly anti-Bolshevik character." [Rosenberg, Op. Cit.,

2627

p. 123 and pp. 123-4] Then, "[a]t the very end of May and the

2628

beginning of June, when a wave of strikes to protest at bread

2629

shortages broke out in the Nevskii district, a majority of

2630

Assembly delegates . . . resolved to call on striking Nevskii

2631

district workers to return to work and continue preparation

2632

for a general city-wide strike." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 42]

2633

Unfortunately, for the Assembly postponing the strikes until

2634

a "better time" rather than encouraging them gave the authorities

2635

time to prepare.

2636

2637

Things came to a head during and after the soviet elections in

2638

June. On June 20th the Obukhov works issued an appeal to the

2639

Conference of Factory and Plant Representatives "to declare a

2640

one-day strike of protest on June 25th" against Bolshevik

2641

reprisals for the assassination of a leading Bolshevik. "The

2642

Bolsheviks responded by 'invading' the whole Nevskii district

2643

with troops and shutting down Obukhov completely. Meetings

2644

everywhere were forbidden." The workers were not intimidated

2645

and "[i]n scores of additional factories and shops protests

2646

mounted and rapidly spread along the railroads." At the June

2647

26th "extraordinary session" of the Conference a general strike

2648

was declared for July 2nd. Faced with this, the Bolsheviks set up

2649

"machine guns . . . at main points throughout the Petrograd and

2650

Moscow railroad junctions, and elsewhere in both cities as well.

2651

Controls were tightened in factories. Meetings were forcefully

2652

dispersed." [Rosenberg, Op. Cit., pp. 126-7 and p. 127] In

2653

other words, "as a result of extreme government intimidation,

2654

the response to the Assembly's strike call on 2 July was

2655

negligible." [Rabinowitch, Op. Cit., p. 42] This repression

2656

was not trivial:

2657

2658

"Among other things, all newspapers were forced to print on

2659

their front pages Petrograd soviet resolutions condemning the

2660

Assembly as part of the domestic and foreign counter-revolution.

2661

Factories participating in the strike were warned that they

2662

would be shut down and individual strikers were threatened

2663

with the loss of work -- threats that were subsequently made

2664

good. Printing plants suspected of opposition sympathies were

2665

sealed, the offices of hostile trade unions were raided,

2666

martial law declared on rail lines, and armed strike-breaking

2667

patrols with authority to take whatever action was necessary

2668

to prevent work stoppages were formed and put on 24-hour

2669

duty at key points throughout Petrograd." [Op. Cit., p. 45]

2670

</blockquote>

2671

Needless to say, "the Petrograd authorities drew on the dubious

2672

mandate provided by the stacked soviet elections to justify

2673

banning the Extraordinary Assembly." [Op. Cit., p. 42] While

2674

the Bolsheviks had won around 50% of workplace votes, as we

2675

note in <a href="append41.html#app6">section 6</a> of the appendix

2676

on <a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a> they had gerrymandered the soviet

2677

making the election results irrelevant. The fact the civil

2678

war had started undoubtedly aided the Bolsheviks during this

2679

election and the fact that the Mensheviks and SRs had campaigned

2680

on a platform to win the soviet elections as the means of

2681

replacing soviet democracy by the Constituent Assembly. Many

2682

workers still viewed the soviets are their organisations

2683

and aimed for a functioning soviet system rather than its end.

2684

2685

The Bolsheviks turned on the Conference, both locally and

2686

nationally, and arrested its leading activists, so decapitating

2687

the only independent working class organisation left in Russia.

2688

As Rabinowitch argues, "the Soviet authorities were profoundly

2689

worried by the threat posed by the Assembly and fully aware if

2690

their growing isolation from workers (their only real social

2691

base) . . . Petrograd Bolsheviks developed a siege mentality

2692

and a corresponding disposition to consider any action -- from

2693

suppression of the opposition press and manipulation of

2694

elections to terror even against workers -- to be justified

2695

in the struggle to retain power until the start of the

2696

imminent world revolution." [Op. Cit., pp. 43-4]

2697

2698

Similar events happened in other cities. As we discuss in

2699

<a href="append41.html#app6">section 6</a> of the appendix on

2700

<a href="append41.html">"What happened during the Russian Revolution?"</a>, the Bolsheviks had disbanded soviets elected

2701

with non-Bolshevik majorities all across Russia and suppressed

2702

the resulting working class protest. In Moscow, workers also

2703

organised a "Conference" movement and "[r]esentment against

2704

the Bolsheviks was expressed through strikes and disturbances,

2705

which the authorities treated as arising from supply

2706

difficulties, from 'lack of consciousness,' and because of

2707

the 'criminal demagogy' of certain elements. Lack of support

2708

for current Bolshevik practices was treated as the absence

2709

of worker consciousness altogether, but the causes of the

2710

unrest was more complicated. In 1917 political issues

2711

gradually came to be perceived through the lens of party

2712

affiliation, but by mid-1918 party consciousness was

2713

reversed and a general consciousness of workers' needs

2714

restored. By July 1918 the protest movement had lost its

2715

momentum in the face of severe repression and was engulfed

2716

by the civil war." In the light of the fate of workers'

2717

protest, the May 16th resolution by the Bogatyr' Chemical

2718

Plant calling (among other things) for "freedom of

2719

speech and meeting, and an end to the shooting of

2720

citizens and workers" seems to the point. Unsurprisingly,

2721

"[f]aced with political opposition within the soviets

2722

and worker dissatisfaction in the factories Bolshevik

2723

power increasingly came to reply on the party apparatus

2724

itself." [Richard Sakwa, "The Commune State in Moscow in

2725

1918," pp. 429-449, Slavic Review, vol. 46, no. 3/4,

2726

p. 442-3, p. 442 and p. 443]

2727

2728

Repression occurred elsewhere: "In June 1918 workers in

2729

Tula protested a cut in rations by boycotting the local

2730

soviet. The regime declared martial law and arrested

2731

the protestors. Strikes followed and were suppressed by

2732

violence. In Sormovo, when a Menshevik-Social Revolutionary

2733

newspaper was closed, 5,000 workers went on strike. Again

2734

firearms were used to break the strike." Other techniques

2735

were used to break resistance. For example, the regime

2736

often threatened rebellious factories with a lock out,

2737

which involved numerous layouts, new rules of discipline,

2738

purges of workers' organisations and the introduction of

2739

piece work. [Thomas F. Remington, Building Socialism in

2740

Bolshevik Russia, p. 105 and p. 107]

2741

2742

Rather than the Civil War disrupting the relationship between

2743

the vanguard party and the class it claimed to lead, it was

2744

in fact the Bolsheviks who did so in face of rising working

2745

class dissent and disillusionment in the spring of 1918. In

2746

fact, "after the initial weeks of 'triumph' . . . Bolshevik

2747

labour relations after October" changed and "soon lead to

2748

open conflict, repression, and the consolidation of Bolshevik

2749

dictatorship over the proletariat in place of proletarian

2750

dictatorship itself." [Rosenberg, Op. Cit., p. 117]

2751

2752

Given this, the outbreak of the civil war consolidated workers

2753

support for the Bolsheviks and saved it from even more

2754

damaging workers' unrest. As Thomas F. Remington puts it:

2755

2756

"At various times groups of workers rebelled against Bolshevik

2757

rule But for the most part, forced to choose between 'their'

2758

regime and the unknown horrors of a White dictatorship,

2759

most willingly defended the Bolshevik cause. The effect of

2760

this dilemma may be seen in the periodic swings in the

2761

workers' political temper. When Soviet rule stood in peril,

2762

the war simulated a spirit of solidarity and spared the

2763

regime the defection of its proletarian base. During lulls

2764

in the fighting, strikes and demonstrations broke out."

2765

[Op. Cit., p. 101]

2766

</blockquote>

2767

Which, as we will discuss, explains the increased repression

2768

in 1921 and onwards. Without the Whites, the Bolsheviks had

2769

to enforce their rule directly onto workers who did not want

2770

it. Ironically, the Whites helped the Bolsheviks remain in

2771

power. Without the start of the civil war, labour protest

2772

would have either ended Bolshevik rule or exposed it as a

2773

dictatorial regime.

2774

2775

This process of workers protest and state repression continued

2776

in 1919 and subsequent years. It followed a cyclical pattern.

2777

There was a "new outbreak of strikes in March 1919 after the

2778

collapse of Germany and the Bolshevik re-conquest of the

2779

Ukraine. The pattern of repression was also repeated. A strike

2780

at a galosh factory in early 1919 was followed by the closing

2781

of the factory, the firing of a number of workers, and

2782

the supervised re-election of its factory committee. The

2783

Soviet garrison at Astrakhan mutinied after its bread ration

2784

was cut. A strike among the city's workers followed in support.

2785

A meeting of 10,000 Astrakhan workers was suddenly surrounded

2786

by loyal troops, who fired on the crowd with machine guns and

2787

hand grenades, killing 2,000. Another 2,000, taken prisoner,

2788

were subsequently executed. In Tula, when strikes at the defence

2789

factories stopped production for five days, the government

2790

responded by distributing more grain and arresting the strike

2791

organisers . . . strikes at Putilov again broke out, at first

2792

related to the food crisis . . . The government treated the

2793

strike as an act of counter-revolution and responded with a

2794

substantial political purge and re-organisation. An official

2795

investigation . . . concluded that many shop committees were

2796

led by [Left] Social Revolutionaries . . . These committees

2797

were abolished and management representatives were appointed

2798

in their stead." [Remington, Op. Cit., pp. 109-10]

2799

2800

The strikes in Petrograd centred around the Putilov shows the

2801

response of the authorities to the "atomised" workers who

2802

were taking collective action. "In March fifteen factories

2803

struck together (roughly 35,000 workers were involved) . . .

2804

workers at Putilov assembled and sent a delegation to the

2805

works committee . . .and put forward a number of demands

2806

. . . On 12 March Putilov stopped work. Its workers called

2807

to others to join them, and some of them came out in a

2808

demonstration where they were fired upon by Cheka troops.

2809

Strikes then broke out at fourteen other enterprises . . .

2810

On Sunday 16 March an appeal was made to the Putilovtsy

2811

to return to normal working the following day or . . .

2812

the sailors and soldiers would be brought in. After a

2813

poor showing on the Monday, the sailor went in, and

2814

120 workers were arrested; the sailors remained until the

2815

21st and by the 22nd normal work had been resumed." In

2816

July strikes broke out again in response to the cancellation

2817

of holidays which involved 25,000 workers in 31 strikes.

2818

[Mary McAuley, Bread and Justice, pp. 251-253 and p. 254]

2819

2820

In the Moscow area, while it is "impossible to say what proportion

2821

of workers were involved in the various disturbances," following

2822

the lull after the defeat of the workers' conference movement in

2823

mid-1918 "each wave of unrest was more powerful than the last,

2824

culminating in the mass movement from late 1920." For example,

2825

at the end of June 1919, "a Moscow committee of defence (KOM)

2826

was formed to deal with the rising tide of disturbances . . .

2827

KOM concentrated emergency power in its hands, overriding the

2828

Moscow Soviet, and demanding obedience from the population. The

2829

disturbances died down under the pressure of repression."

2830

[Richard Sakwa, Soviet Communists in Power, p. 94 and pp. 94-5]

2831

2832

Vladimir Brovkin summarises the data he provides in his

2833

essay "Workers' Unrest and the Bolshevik Response in 1919"

2834

(reproduced along with data from other years in his book

2835

Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War) as follows:

2836

2837

"Data on one strike in one city may be dismissed as incidental.

2838

When, however, evidence is available from various sources on

2839

simultaneous independent strikes in different cities and

2840

overall picture begins to emerge . . . Workers' unrest took

2841

place in Russia's biggest and most important industrial

2842

centres: Moscow, Petrograd, Tver', Tula, Briansk, and Sormovo.

2843

Strikes affected the largest industries . . . Workers'

2844

demands reflected their grievances . . . The greatest

2845

diversity was in workers' explicitly political demands or

2846

expression of political opinion . . . all workers' resolutions

2847

demanded free and fair elections to the soviets . . . some

2848

workers . . . demanded the Constituent Assembly . . .

2849

2850

"The strikes of 1919 . . . fill an important gap in the

2851

development of the popular movement between October 1917

2852

and February 1921. On the one hand, they should be seen as

2853

antecedents of similar strikes in February 1921, which

2854

forced the Communists to abandon war communism. In the

2855

capitals, workers, just as the Kronstadt sailors had,

2856

still wanted fairly elected soviets and not a party

2857

dictatorship. On the other hand, the strikes continued

2858

the protests that had began in the summer of 1918. The

2859

variety of behavioural patterns displayed during the

2860

strikes points to a profound continuity. . .

2861

2862

"In all known cases the Bolsheviks' initial response to

2863

strikes was to ban public meetings and rallies . . . In

2864

several cities . . . the authorities confiscated strikers'

2865

food rations in order to suppress the strike. In at least

2866

five cities . . . the Bolsheviks occupied the striking

2867

plant and dismissed the strikers en masse . . . In all

2868

known cases the Bolsheviks arrested strikers . . . In

2869

Petrograd, Briansk, and Astrakhan' the Bolsheviks executed

2870

striking workers." [Slavic Review, vol. 49, no. 3,

2871

pp. 370-2]

2872

b'</blockquote>'

2873

Nor was this collective struggle stop in 1919 -- "strike action

2874

remained endemic in the first nine months of 1920" and "in the

2875

first six months of 1920 strikes had occurred in seventy-seven

2876

per cent of middle-sized and large works." For the Petrograd

2877

province, soviet figures state that in 1919 there were 52 strikes

2878

with 65,625 participants and in 1920 73 strikes with 85,645, both

2879

high figures as according to one set of figures, which are by no

2880

means the lowest, there were 109,100 workers there. "Strikes

2881

in 1920," recounts Aves, "were frequently a direct protest

2882

against the intensification of War Communist labour policies,

2883

the militarisation of labour, the implementation of one-man

2884

management and the struggle against absenteeism, as well as

2885

food supply difficulties. The Communist Party press carried

2886

numerous articles attacking the slogan of 'free labour.'"

2887

[J. Aves, Workers Against Lenin, p. 69 and p. 74]

2888

2889

The spring of 1920 "saw discontent on the railways all over

2890

the country." This continued throughout the year. For example,

2891

the Aleksansrovskii locomotive works at the end of August,

2892

workers sent three representatives to the works commissar

2893

who had them arrested. Three days later, the workers stopped

2894

work and demanded their release. The authorities locked the

2895

workers out of the works and a guard of 70 sailors were placed

2896

outside the enterprise. The Cheka arrested the workers' soviet

2897

delegates (who were from the SR (Minority) list) as well as

2898

thirty workers. "The opportunity was taken to carry out a

2899

general round-up" and arrests were made at other works.

2900

After the arrests, "a meeting was held to elect new soviet

2901

delegates but the workers refused to co-operate and a

2902

further 150 were arrested and exiled to Murmansk or

2903

transferred to other workshops." [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 44

2904

and pp. 46-7]

2905

2906

Strikes occurred in other places, such as Tula were the

2907

workforce "contained a high proportion of skilled,

2908

long-standing, hereditary workers." The "all-out strike"

2909

started at the start of June and on 8 June the local

2910

newspaper published a declaration from the Tula soviet

2911

threatening the strikers with "the most repressive measures,

2912

including the application of the highest measure of

2913

punishment" (i.e. executions). The following day the

2914

city was declared to be under a "state of siege" by the

2915

local military authorities. The strikers lost ration cards

2916

and by 11 June there had been a return to work. Twenty-three

2917

workers were sentenced to a forced labour camp until the

2918

end of the war. However, the "combined impact of these

2919

measures did not prevent further unrest and the workers

2920

put forward new demands." On 19 June, the soviet approved

2921

"a programme for the suppression of counter-revolution"

2922

and "the transfer of Tula to the position of an armed

2923

camp." The Tula strike "highlights the way in which workers,

2924

particularly skilled workers who were products of

2925

long-standing shop-floor subcultures and hierarchies,

2926

retained the capability as well as the will to defend

2927

their interests." [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 50-55]

2928

2929

While strike activity "was most common in Petrograd,

2930

where there had been 2.5 strikers for every workman,"

2931

the figure for Moscow was 1.75 and 1.5 in Kazan. In

2932

early March "a wave of strikes hit the Volga town of

2933

Samara" when a strike by printers in spread to other

2934

enterprises. "Strike action in Moscow did not just

2935

include traditionally militant male metal workers."

2936

Textile workers, tram workers and printers all took

2937

strike action. [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 69, p. 72 and

2938

pp. 77-8]

2939

2940

Thus strike action was a constant feature of civil war

2941

Bolshevik Russia. Rather than being an "atomised" mass,

2942

the workers repeatedly organised themselves, made their

2943

demands and took collective action to achieve them. In

2944

response, the Bolshevik regime used state repression to

2945

break this collective activity. As such, if the rise

2946

of Stalinism can, as modern-day Leninists argue, be

2947

explained by the "atomisation" of the working class

2948

during the civil war then the Bolshevik regime and its

2949

repression should be credited with ensuring this happened.

2950

2951

The end of the civil war did not see the end of working

2952

class protest. Quite the reverse. In February and March 1921

2953

"industrial unrest broke out in a nation-wide wave of

2954

discontent . . . General strikes, or very widespread

2955

unrest, hit Petrograd, Moscow, Saratov and Ekaterinoslavl."

2956

Only one major industrial region was unaffected. As noted

2957

above, the Bolsheviks refused to call this movement a

2958

strike wave, preferring the term volynka (which means

2959

"go-slow"), yet "the continued use of the term can be

2960

justified not to hide its significance but to show that

2961

workers' protest consisted not just of strikes but also

2962

of factory occupations, 'Italian strikes,' demonstrations,

2963

mass meetings, the beating up of communists and so on."

2964

[Aves, Op. Cit., p. 109 and p. 112]

2965

2966

In Petrograd in the beginning of February "strikes were

2967

becoming an everyday occurrence" and by "the third week

2968

of February the situation rapidly deteriorated." The city

2969

was rocked by strikes, meetings and demonstrations. In

2970

response to the general strike the Bolsheviks replied

2971

with a "military clamp-down, mass arrests and other coercive

2972

measures, such as the closure of enterprises, the purging of

2973

the workforce and stopping of rations which accompanied

2974

them." As we discuss in <a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a>,

2975

these strikes produced the Kronstadt revolt (and, as noted in

2976

<a href="append42.html#app10">section 10</a> of that appendix, the

2977

Bolshevik repression ensured the Petrograd workers did not

2978

act with the sailors). [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 113, p. 120]

2979

2980

A similar process of workers revolt and state repression

2981

occurred in Moscow at the same time. There "industrial

2982

unrest" also "turned into open confrontation and protest

2983

spilled on to the streets." Meetings were held, followed

2984

by demonstrations and strikes. Over the next few days

2985

strikes spread to other districts. Workers demanded now

2986

elections to the soviets be held. Striking railway workers

2987

sent emissaries along the railway to spread the strike

2988

and strikes spread to outside Moscow city itself and into

2989

the surrounding provinces. Unsurprisingly, Moscow and

2990

Moscow province were put under martial law and SR and

2991

menshevik leaders were arrested. [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 130

2992

pp. 139-144] However, "military units called in" against

2993

striking workers "refused to open fire, and they were

2994

replaced by the armed communist detachments" who did.

2995

"The following day several factories went on strike"

2996

and troops "disarmed and locked in as a precaution" by

2997

the government against possible fraternising. On February

2998

23rd, "Moscow was placed under martial law with a 24-hour

2999

watch on factories by the communist detachments and

3000

trustworthy army units." [Richard Sakwa, Soviet

3001

Communists in Power, p. 94 and pp. 94-5 and p. 245] The

3002

mixture of (economic) concessions and coercion broke the

3003

will of the strikers.

3004

3005

Strikes and protests occurred all across Russia at this

3006

time (see Aves, Op. Cit.). In Saratov, the strike started

3007

on March 3 when railroad shop workers did not return to

3008

their benches and instead rallied to discuss an anticipated

3009

further reduction in food rations. "Led by a former

3010

Communist, the railroad workers debated resolutions recently

3011

carried by the Moscow proletariat . . . The next day the

3012

strike spread to the metallurgical plants and to most other

3013

large factories, as Saratov workers elected representatives

3014

to an independent commission charged with evaluating the

3015

functioning of all economic organs. When it convened, the

3016

body called for the re-election of the soviets and immediate

3017

release of political prisoners." The ration cut "represent[ed]

3018

the catalyst, but not the cause, of the labour unrest."

3019

While "the turmoil touched all strata of the proletariat,

3020

male and female alike, the initiative for the disturbances

3021

came from the skilled stratum that the Communists normally

3022

deemed the most conscious." The Communists shut down the

3023

commission and they "expected workers to protest the

3024

dissolution of their elected representatives" and so they

3025

"set up a Provincial Revolutionary Committee . . . which

3026

introduced martial law both in the city and the garrison.

3027

It arrested the ringleaders of the workers' movement . . .

3028

the police crackdown depressed the workers' movement and

3029

the activities of the rival socialist parties." The

3030

Cheka sentenced 219 people to death. [Donald J. Raleigh,

3031

Experiencing Russia's Civil War, p. 379, p. 387, p. 388,

3032

pp. 388-9]

3033

3034

A similar "little Kronstadt" broke out in the Ukrainian town

3035

of Ekaterinoslavl at the end of May. The workers there

3036

"clearly had strong traditions of organisation" and elected

3037

a strike committee of fifteen which "put out a series of

3038

political ultimatums that were very similar in content to

3039

the demands of the Kronstadt rebels." On 1 June, "by a

3040

pre-arranged signal" workers went on strike throughout the

3041

town, with workers joining a meeting of the railway workers.

3042

The local Communist Party leader was instructed "to put

3043

down the rebellion without mercy . . . Use Budennyi's

3044

cavalry." The strikers prepared a train and its driver

3045

instructed to spread the strike throughout the network.

3046

Telegraph operators were told to send messages throughout

3047

the Soviet Republic calling for "free soviets" and soon

3048

an area up to fifty miles around the town was affected.

3049

The Communists used the Cheka to crush the movement,

3050

carrying out mass arrests and shooting 15 workers (and

3051

dumping their bodies in the River Dnepr). [Aves, Op. Cit.,

3052

pp. 171-3]

3053

3054

So faced with an "atomised" working class during the period

3055

of 1918 and 1921, the Bolsheviks had to respond with martial

3056

law, mass arrests and shootings:

3057

3058

"It is not possible to estimate with any degree of accuracy

3059

how many workers were shot by the Cheka during 1918-1921 for

3060

participation in labour protest. However, an examination of

3061

individual cases suggests that shootings were employed to

3062

inspire terror and were not simply used in the occasional

3063

extreme case." [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 35]

3064

</blockquote>

3065

Post-Kronstadt, similar Bolshevik responses to labour unrest

3066

continued. The economic crisis of 1921 which accompanied the

3067

introduction of the NEP saw unemployment rise yet "[d]espite

3068

the heavy toll of redundancies, the ability to organise strikes

3069

did not disappear. Strike statistics for 1921 continue to

3070

provide only a very rough indicator of the true scale of

3071

industrial unrest and appear not to include the first half

3072

of the year." The spring of 1922 saw Soviet Russia "hit by

3073

a new strike wave" and the strikes "continued to reflect

3074

enterprise traditions." That year saw 538 strikes with

3075

197,022 participants recorded. [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 183 and

3076

p. 184]

3077

3078

The following year saw more strikes: "In July 1923 more than

3079

100 enterprises employing a total of some 50,000 people were

3080

on strike. In August figures totalled some 140 enterprises

3081

and 80,00 workers. In September and November the strike

3082

wave continued unabated." As in the civil war, the managers

3083

shut down plants, fired the workers and rehired them on an

3084

individual basis. In this way, trouble-makers were dismissed

3085

and "order" restored. "The pattern of workers' action and

3086

Bolshevik reaction played itself out frequently in dozens of

3087

other strikes. The Bolsheviks acted with the explicit purpose

3088

of rooting out the possibility of further protest. They tried

3089

to condition workers that labour protest was futile." The

3090

GPU "used force to disperse workers demonstrating with the

3091

arrested strike leaders." [Vladimir Brovkin, Russia

3092

After Lenin, p. 174, pp. 174-5 and p. 175]

3093

3094

In Moscow, for example, "[b]etween 1921 and 1926, all branches

3095

of industry and transport . . . experienced wildcat strikes

3096

or other spontaneous labour disturbances. Strike waves peaked

3097

in the winter of 1920-21 . . . and in the summer and fall of

3098

1922 and 1923 . . . during July-December 1922, for example,

3099

65 strikes and 209 other industrial disturbances were recorded

3100

in Moscow's state enterprises." Metalworkers were arguably

3101

the most active sector at this time while "a number of large

3102

strikes" took place in the textile industry (where "strikes

3103

were sometimes co-ordinated by spontaneously organised strike

3104

committees or 'parallel' factory committees"). And in spite

3105

of repression, "politicisation continued to characterise many

3106

labour struggles" and, as before, "spontaneous labour activism

3107

hindered not only the party's economic program but also the

3108

political and social stabilisation of the factories." [John

3109

B. Hatch, Labour Conflict in Moscow, 1921-1925, p. 62, p. 63,

3110

p. 65, pp. 66-7 and p. 67]

3111

3112

Given this collective rebellion all across the industrial centres

3113

of Russia throughout the Civil War and after, it hard to take

3114

seriously claims that Bolshevik authoritarian was the product

3115

of an "atomisation" or "declassing" of the working class or

3116

that it had ceased to exist in any meaningful sense. Clearly it

3117

had and was capable of collective action and organisation --

3118

until it was repressed by the Bolsheviks and even then it keep

3119

returning. This implies that a key factor in rise of Bolshevik

3120

authoritarian was political -- the simple fact that the workers

3121

would not vote Bolshevik in free soviet and union elections and

3122

so they were not allowed to. As one Soviet Historian put it,

3123

"taking the account of the mood of the workers, the demand for

3124

free elections to the soviets [raised in early 1921] meant the

3125

implementation in practice of the infamous slogan of soviets

3126

without communists," although there is little evidence that the

3127

strikers actually raised that "infamous" slogan. [quoted by Aves,

3128

Op. Cit., p. 123] It should also be noted that Bolshevik orthodoxy

3129

at the time stressed the necessity of Party dictatorship over

3130

the workers (see <a href="secH1.html#sech12">section H.1.2</a> for details).

3131

3132

Nor can it be said that this struggle can be blamed on "declassed"

3133

elements within the working class itself. In her study of this

3134

question, Diane Koenker notes that 90% of the change in the number

3135

of workers in Moscow "is accounted for by men. Working women did

3136

not leave the city," their numbers dropping from 90,000 in 1918

3137

to 80,000 in 1920. Why these 80,000 women workers should be denied

3138

a say in their own revolution is not clear, given the arguments of

3139

the pro-Bolshevik left. After all, the same workers remained in

3140

roughly the same numbers. Looking at the male worker population,

3141

their numbers fell from 215,000 to 124,000 during the same period.

3142

However, "the skilled workers whose class consciousness and

3143

revolutionary zeal had helped win the October revolution did not

3144

entirely disappear, and the women who remained were likely to

3145

be family members of these veterans of 1917." It was "the loss

3146

of young activists rather than all skilled and class conscious

3147

urban workers that caused the level of Bolshevik support to

3148

decline during the civil war." Indeed "the workers who remained

3149

in the city were among the most urbanised elements." In summary,

3150

"the deurbanisation of those years represented a change in

3151

quantity but not entirely in quality in the cities. The proletariat

3152

declined in the city, but it did not wither away . . . a core

3153

of the city's working class remained." [Op. Cit., p. 440, p. 442,

3154

p. 447 and p. 449]

3155

3156

As Russian anarchist Ida Mett argued decades before in relation

3157

to the strikes in early 1921:

3158

3159

"The population was drifting away from the capital. All who had

3160

relatives in the country had rejoined them. The authentic

3161

proletariat remained till the end, having the most slender

3162

connections with the countryside.

3163

3164

"This fact must be emphasised, in order to nail the official lies

3165

seeking to attribute the Petrograd strikes that were soon to break

3166

out to peasant elements, 'insufficiently steeled in proletarian

3167

ideas.' The real situation was the very opposite. A few workers

3168

were seeking refuge in the countryside. The bulk remained. There

3169

was certainly no exodus of peasants into the starving towns! . . .

3170

It was the famous Petrograd proletariat, the proletariat which had

3171

played such a leading role in both previous revolutions, that was

3172

finally to resort to the classical weapon of the class struggle:

3173

the strike." [The Kronstadt Uprising, p. 36]

3174

</blockquote>

3175

In terms of struggle, links between the events in 1917 and

3176

those during the civil war also exist. For example Jonathan

3177

Aves writes that there were "distinct elements of continuity

3178

between the industrial unrest in 1920 and 1917. This is not

3179

surprising since the form of industrial unrest in 1920, as

3180

in the pre-revolutionary period and in 1917, was closely

3181

bound up with enterprise traditions and shop-floor

3182

sub-cultures. The size of the Russian industrial workforce

3183

had declined steeply during the Civil War but where enterprises

3184

stayed open . . . their traditions of industrial unrest in

3185

1920 shows that such sub-cultures were still capable of

3186

providing the leaders and shared values on which resistance

3187

to labour policies based on coercion and Communist Party

3188

enthusiasm could be organised. As might be anticipated,

3189

the leaders of unrest were often to be found amongst the

3190

skilled male workers who enjoyed positions of authority

3191

in the informal shop-floor hierarchies." Moreover, "despite

3192

intense repression, small groups of politicised activists

3193

were also important in initiating protest and some enterprises

3194

developed traditions of opposition to the communists."

3195

[Op. Cit., p. 39]

3196

3197

Looking at the strike wave of early 1921 in Petrograd, the

3198

"strongest reason for accepting the idea that it was established

3199

workers who were behind the volynka [i.e. the strike wave] is

3200

the form and course of protest. Traditions of protest reaching

3201

back through the spring of 1918 to 1917 and beyond were an

3202

important factor in the organisation of the volynka. . . .

3203

There was also a degree of organisation . . . which belies the

3204

impression of a spontaneous outburst." [Aves, Op. Cit., p. 126]

3205

3206

Clearly, then, the idea that the Russian working class was

3207

atomised or declassed cannot be defended given this series of

3208

struggles and state repression. In fact, as noted, the notion

3209

that the workers were "declassed" was used to justify state

3210

repression of collective working class struggle. "The thought

3211

oppressed me," wrote Emma Goldman, "that what [the Bolsheviks]

3212

called 'defence of the Revolution' was really only the defence

3213

of [their] party in power." [My Disillusionment in Russia,

3214

p. 57] She was right -- the class struggle in Bolshevik Russia

3215

did not stop, it continued except the ruling class had changed

3216

from bourgeoisie to Bolshevik dictatorship.

3217

3218

Faced with this collective resistance to Bolshevism, the Leninist

3219

could argue that while the working class was capable of collective

3220

decision making and action, the nature of that action was suspect.

3221

This arguments rests on the premise that the "advanced" workers

3222

(i.e. party members) left the workplace for the front or for

3223

government posts, leaving the "backward" workers behind. This

3224

argument is often used, particularly in regard to the Kronstadt

3225

revolt of 1921 (see <a href="append42.html#app8">section 8</a> of the

3226

appendix on <a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a>).

3227

3228

Of course, this argument raises more problems that its solves.

3229

In any revolution the "most politically consciousness" tend

3230

to volunteer to go to the front first and, of course, tend to

3231

be elected as delegates to committees of various kinds (local,

3232

regional and national). There is little that can be done about it.

3233

Needless to say, if "soviet democracy" depends on the "advanced"

3234

workers being there in order for it to work, then it suggests that

3235

the commitment to democracy is lacking in those who argue along

3236

these lines. It suggests that if the "backward" masses reject

3237

the "advanced" ones then the latter have the right, even the

3238

duty, to impose their will on the former. And it also begs the

3239

question of who determines what constitutes "backward" -- if it

3240

means "does not support the party" then it becomes little more

3241

than a rationale for party dictatorship (as it did under Lenin

3242

and Trotsky).

3243

3244

Writing in 1938, Trotsky inadvertently exposes the logic of

3245

this position. Asserting that a "revolution is 'made' directly

3246

by a minority," he argued that the "success" of a revolution

3247

is "possible" when "this minority finds more or less support, or

3248

at least friendly neutrality, on the part of the majority." So

3249

what happens if the majority expresses opposition to the party?

3250

Unfortunately Trotsky does not raise this question, but he does

3251

answer it indirectly. As we discuss in

3252

<a href="append42.html#app15">section 15</a> of the appendix on

3253

<a href=append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a>, Trotsky

3254

argues that "to free the soviets from the leadership [sic!] of

3255

the Bolsheviks would have meant within a short time to demolish

3256

the soviets themselves. The experience of the Russian soviets

3257

during the period of Menshevik and SR domination and, even more

3258

clearly, the experience of the German and Austrian soviets under

3259

the domination of the Social Democrats, proved this. Social

3260

Revolutionary-anarchist soviets could only serve as a bridge

3261

from the proletarian dictatorship. They could play no other role,

3262

regardless of the 'ideas' of their participants." [Lenin and

3263

Trotsky, Kronstadt, p. 85 and p. 90]

3264

3265

Thus to let the working masses (the "majority") have free soviet

3266

elections and reject the vanguard (the "minority") would mean the

3267

end of soviet power. Thus allowing the proletariat a say in

3268

progress of the revolution means the end of the "proletarian

3269

dictatorship"! Which, of course, is interesting logic. The

3270

authoritarian core of the Bolshevik vision of revolution is

3271

thus exposed.

3272

3273

Victor Serge also presents an insight into the Bolshevik

3274

perspective on the revolution. He states that "[a]gitation

3275

conducted by the SRs and Mensheviks called demonstrations

3276

in the streets and prepared for a general strike. The

3277

demands were: free trade, wage increases, payment of wages

3278

one, two or three months in advance and 'democracy.' The

3279

intention was to incite the working class itself against

3280

the revolution." Which only makes sense once you realise

3281

that by "the revolution" Serge simply meant "the Bolsheviks"

3282

and the obvious truth that the working class was not

3283

managing the revolution at all, was not, in any sense,

3284

"in power." "The best elements among the workers," explains

3285

Serge, "were away fighting; those in the factories were

3286

precisely the less energetic, less revolutionary sections,

3287

along with the petty folk, yesterday's small shopkeepers

3288

and artisans, who had come there to find refuge. This

3289

proletariat of the reserve often allowed itself to fall

3290

under the sway of Menshevik propaganda." [Year One of the

3291

Russian Revolution, p. 229]

3292

3293

Given that Serge is discussing the period before the

3294

Czechoslovak revolt, a greater indictment of Bolshevism

3295

cannot be found. After all, what does "workers' democracy"

3296

mean unless the proletariat can vote for its own delegates?

3297

Little wonder Daniel Guerin described Serge's book as

3298

"largely a justification of the liquidation of the soviets

3299

by Bolshevism." [Anarchism, p. 97] After all, what point

3300

is there having genuine soviet elections if the "less

3301

revolutionary sections" (i.e. Trotsky's "majority") will

3302

not vote for the vanguard? And can socialism exist without

3303

democracy? Can we expect an unaccountable vanguard to

3304

govern in the interests of anyone but its own? Of course

3305

not!

3306

3307

Thus the Bolsheviks did not solve the answer the questions

3308

Malatesta raised in 1891, namely "if you consider these

3309

worthy electors as unable to look after their own interests

3310

themselves, how is it that they will know how to choose for

3311

themselves the shepherds who must guide them? And how will

3312

they be able to solve this problem of social alchemy, of

3313

producing the election of a genius from the votes of a

3314

mass of fools?" [Anarchy, p. 53]

3315

3316

Given this, is it surprising that the Bolsheviks revised

3317

the Marxist theory of the state to justify elite rule? As

3318

discussed in

3319

<a href="secH3.html#sech38">section H.3.8</a>, once in power Lenin and Trotsky

3320

stressed that the "workers' state" had to be independent of

3321

the working class in order to overcome the "wavering" and

3322

"vacillation of the masses themselves." Or, to quote Serge,

3323

the "party of the proletariat must know, at hours of decision,

3324

how to break the resistance of the backward elements among the

3325

masses; it must know how to stand firm sometimes against the

3326

masses . . . it must know how to go against the current, and

3327

cause proletarian consciousness to prevail against lack of

3328

consciousness and against alien class influences." [Op. Cit.,

3329

p. 218] Of course, by definition, every group is "backward"

3330

compared to the vanguard and so Serge's argument amounts to

3331

little more than a justification for party dictatorship

3332

over the proletariat.

3333

3334

The reason why such a system would not result in socialism does

3335

not take long to discover. For anarchists, freedom is not just

3336

a goal, a noble end to be achieved, but rather a necessary

3337

part of the process of creating socialism. Eliminate freedom

3338

(and, as a necessary result, workplace and community

3339

self-management) and the end result will be anything but

3340

socialism. Ultimately, as Malatesta argued, "the only way that

3341

the masses can raise themselves" is by freedom "for it is only

3342

through freedom that one educates oneself to be free." [Op. Cit.,

3343

p. 52] Ironically, by using state repression to combat "backward"

3344

elements, the Bolsheviks ensured that they stayed that way and,

3345

more importantly, disempowered the whole working class so

3346

ensuring that Bolshevik dictatorship came into constant conflict

3347

with it and its continuing struggle for autonomy. Rather than

3348

base itself on the creative powers of the masses, Bolshevism

3349

crushed it as a threat to its power and so ensured that the

3350

economic and social problems affecting Russia increased.

3351

3352

And need it be pointed out that "low" culture and/or "backward"

3353

social life have been used by numerous imperialist and authoritarian

3354

states to justify their rule over a given population? It matters

3355

little whether the population are of the same nationality of the

3356

rulers or from a subjugated people, the arguments and the logic are

3357

the same. Whether dressed up in racist or classist clothing, the

3358

same elitist pedigree lies behind the pro-Bolshevik argument that

3359

democracy would have brought "chaos" or "capitalist restoration."

3360

The implicit assumption that working class people are not fit for

3361

self-government is clear from these rationales. Equally obvious

3362

is the idea that the party knows better than working class people

3363

what is best for them.

3364

3365

Sounding like Bolshevik Henry Kissingers, the Leninists argue that

3366

Lenin and Trotsky had to enforce their dictatorship over the

3367

proletariat to stop a "capitalist restoration" (Kissinger was the

3368

US state's liaison with the Chilean military when it helped their

3369

coup in 1973 and infamously stated that the country should not be

3370

allowed to turn communist due to the stupidity of its own people).

3371

Needless to say, anarchists argue that even if the Bolshevik

3372

regime had not already need capitalist (specifically, state

3373

capitalist) this logic simply represents an elitist position

3374

based on "socialism from above." Yes, soviet democracy may have

3375

resulted in the return of (private) capitalism but by maintaining

3376

party dictatorship the possibility of socialism was automatically

3377

nullified. Simply put, the pro-Leninist argument implies that

3378

socialism can be implemented from above as long as the right

3379

people are in power. The authoritarian core of Leninism is

3380

exposed by these arguments and the repression of working class

3381

revolt which they justified.

3382

3383

Given this, it seems incredulous for Leninists like Chris Harman

3384

to argue that it was the "decimation of the working class" which

3385

caused (by "necessity") the "Soviet institutions" to take "on a

3386

life independently of the class they had arisen from. Those workers

3387

and peasants who fought the Civil War could not govern themselves

3388

collectively from their places in the factories." [How the

3389

revolution was lost] Given that this "independent" life is

3390

required to allow the party to "go against the current," Harman

3391

simply fails to understand the dynamics of the revolution, the

3392

position of the vanguard and the resistance of the working class

3393

subject to it. Moreover, the reason why the "workers and peasants"

3394

could not govern themselves collectively was because the party

3395

had seized power for itself and systematically destroyed soviet,

3396

workplace and military democracy to remain there. Then there is

3397

the way the Bolsheviks reacted to such collective unrest. Simply

3398

put, they sought to break the workers as a collective force. The

3399

use of lockouts, re-registration was typical, as was the arresting

3400

of "ringleaders." It seems ironic, therefore, to blame "objective

3401

factors" for the "atomisation" of the working class when, in fact,

3402

this was a key aim of Bolshevik repression of labour protest.

3403

3404

Little wonder, then, that the role of the masses in the Russian

3405

Revolution after October 1917 is rarely discussed by pro-Bolshevik

3406

writers. Indeed, the conclusion to be reached is simply that their

3407

role is to support the party, get it into power and then do what

3408

it tells them. Unfortunately for the Bolsheviks, the Russian

3409

working class refused to do this. Instead they practised collective

3410

struggle in defence of their economic and political interests,

3411

struggle which inevitably brought them into conflict both with

3412

the "workers' state" and their role in Bolshevik ideology. Faced

3413

with this collective action, the Bolshevik leaders (starting with

3414

Lenin) started to talk about the "declassing" of the proletariat

3415

to justify their repression of (and power over) the working class.

3416

Ironically, it was the aim of Bolshevik repression to "atomise"

3417

the working class as, fundamentally, their rule depended on it.

3418

While Bolshevik repression did, in the end, win out it cannot be

3419

said that the working class in Russia did not resist the usurpation

3420

of power by the Bolshevik party. As such, rather than "atomisation"

3421

or "declassing" being the cause for Bolshevik power and repression,

3422

it was, in fact, one of results of them.

3423

3424

<a name="app6"><h2>6 Did the Bolsheviks blame "objective factors" for their actions?</h2>

3425

3426

In a word, no. At the time of the revolution and for some period

3427

afterwards, the idea that "objective factors" were responsible for

3428

their policies was one which few, if any, Bolshevik leaders

3429

expressed. As we discussed in <a href="append43.html#app2">section 2</a>, Bolsheviks like

3430

Lenin, Trotsky and Bukharin argued that any revolution would

3431

face civil war and economic crisis. Lenin did talk about the

3432

"declassing" of the proletariat from 1920 onwards, but that did

3433

not seem to affect the proletarian and socialist character of his

3434

regime (as we noted in <a href="append43.html#app5">section 5</a>, Lenin's argument was developed

3435

in the context of increasing working class collective action,

3436

not its absence).

3437

3438

This is not to say that the Bolshevik leaders were 100% happy with

3439

the state of their revolution. Lenin, for example, expressed concern

3440

about the rising bureaucratic deformations he saw in the soviet state

3441

(particularly after the end of the civil war). Yet Lenin, while

3442

concerned about the bureaucracy, was not concerned about the Party's

3443

monopoly of power. Unsurprisingly, he fought the bureaucracy by

3444

"top-down" and, ironically, bureaucratic methods, the only ones left

3445

to him. A similar position was held by Trotsky, who was quite explicit

3446

in supporting the party dictatorship throughout the 1920s (and, indeed,

3447

the 1930s). Needless to say, both failed to understand how bureaucracy

3448

arises and how it could be effectively fought.

3449

3450

This position started to change, however, as the 1920s drew on and

3451

Trotsky was increasingly sidelined from power. Then, faced with the

3452

rise of Stalinism, Trotsky had to find a theory which allowed him

3453

to explain the degeneration of the revolution and, at the same time,

3454

absolve Bolshevik ideology (and his own actions and ideas!) from

3455

all responsibility for it. He did so by invoking the objective

3456

factors facing the revolution. Since then, his various followers

3457

have utilised this argument, with various changes in emphasis, to

3458

attack Stalinism while defending Bolshevism.

3459

3460

The problem with this type of argument is that all the major evils

3461

usually associated with Stalinism already existed under Lenin and

3462

Trotsky. Party dictatorship, one-man management, repression of

3463

opposition groups and working class protest, state bureaucracy

3464

and so on all existed before Stalin manoeuvred himself into

3465

absolute power. And with the exception of state bureaucracy, none

3466

of the mainstream Bolshevik leaders found anything to complain

3467

about. Indeed, the reverse. Whether it is Lenin or Trotsky, the

3468

sad fact of the matter is that a party dictatorship presiding

3469

over an essentially state capitalism economy was not considered

3470

a bad thing. Which, of course, causes problems for those who

3471

seek to distance Lenin and Trotsky from Stalinism and claim that

3472

Bolshevism is fundamentally "democratic" in nature.

3473

3474

The knots Leninists get into to do this can be ludicrous. A

3475

particularly crazy example of this can be seen from the UK's

3476

Socialist Workers' Party. For John Rees, it is a truism that

3477

"it was overwhelmingly the force of circumstance which obliged

3478

the Bolsheviks to retreat so far from their own goals. They

3479

travelled this route in opposition to their own theory, not

3480

because of it -- no matter what rhetorical justifications were

3481

given at the time." ["In Defence of October," pp. 3-82,

3482

International Socialism, no. 52, p. 70]

3483

3484

However, this sort of position has little substance to it.

3485

It is both logically and factually flawed. Logically, it

3486

simply makes little sense as anything but an attempt to

3487

narrow political discussion and whitewash Bolshevik practice

3488

and politics. Rees, in effect, is saying that not only are

3489

we not to judge the Bolsheviks by their actions, we must

3490

also discount what they said -- unless it was something modern

3491

day Leninists approve of! Given that Leninists constantly

3492

quote from Lenin's (and Trotsky's) post-1918 works, it seems

3493

strange that they try to stop others so doing! Strange, but

3494

not surprising, given their task is to perpetuate the Bolshevik

3495

Myth. Where that leaves revolutionary politics is left unsaid,

3496

but it seems to involve worshipping at the shrine of October

3497

and treating as a heretic anyone who dares suggest we analysis

3498

it in any depth and perhaps learn lessons from it and the

3499

Bolshevism that dominated it.

3500

3501

Of course Rees' comments are little more than assertions. Given

3502

that he dismisses the idea that we can actually take what any

3503

Bolshevik says at face value, we are left with little more than

3504

a mind reading operation in trying to find out what the likes

3505

of Lenin and Trotsky "really" thought. Perhaps the root explanation

3506

of Rees' position is the awkward fact that there are no quotes

3507

from any of the leading Bolsheviks which support it? After all,

3508

if they were quotes from the hallowed texts expounding the position

3509

Rees says the Bolshevik leaders "really" held then he would have

3510

provided them. The simple fact is that Lenin and Trotsky, like

3511

all the Bolshevik leaders, considered a one-party dictatorship

3512

ruling over a state capitalist economy as some form of "socialism."

3513

That was certainly Trotsky's position and he was not shy in

3514

expressing. But, of course, we can dismiss this simply as

3515

"rhetorical justifications" rather than an expression of

3516

"their own theory"! We will never know, as they never expressed

3517

"their own theory" and instead made do with the "rhetorical

3518

justifications" Rees is at such pains for us to ignore!

3519

3520

Which shows that a major problem in discussing the failure of the

3521

Russian Revolution is the attitude of modern day Leninists. Rees

3522

presents us with another example when he asserts that "what is

3523

required of historians, particularly Marxists, is to separate

3524

phrase from substance." The Bolsheviks, Rees argues, were

3525

"inclined to make a virtue of necessity, to claim that the harsh

3526

measures of the civil war were the epitome of socialism." Thus the

3527

Bolsheviks cannot be blamed either for what they did or what they

3528

said. Indeed, he states that non-Leninists "take Lenin or Trotsky's

3529

shouts of command in the midst of battle and portray them as

3530

considered analyses of events." [Op. Cit., p. 46]

3531

3532

This argument is simply incredulous. After all, neither Lenin nor

3533

Trotsky could be said to be anything but political activists

3534

who took the time to consider events and analyse them in detail.

3535

Moreover, they defended their arguments in terms of Marxism. Would

3536

Rees consider Lenin's State and Revolution as an unimportant work?

3537

After all, this was produced in the midst of the events of 1917, in

3538

often difficult circumstances. If so, then why not his other, less

3539

appealing, political proclamations (never mind actions)? Moreover,

3540

looking at some of the works produced in this period it is clear

3541

that they are anything but "shouts of command in the midst of

3542

battle." Trotsky's Terrorism and Communism is a substantial book,

3543

for example It was not an ad hoc comment made during a conference

3544

or "in the midst of battle." Quite the reverse, it was a detailed,

3545

substantial and thought-out reply to the criticism by the influential

3546

German social democrat Karl Kaustky (and, before Lenin, the most

3547

internationally respected Marxist thinker). Indeed, Trotsky

3548

explicitly asks the question "[i]s there still theoretical

3549

necessity to justify revolutionary terrorism?" and answers yes,

3550

his "book must serve the ends of an irreconcilable struggle against

3551

the cowardice, half-measures, and hypocrisy of Kautskianism in all

3552

countries." [Terrorism and Communism, p. 9 and p. 10]

3553

3554

Therefore, on the face of it, Rees's comments are hard to take

3555

seriously. It is even harder to take when it becomes clear that

3556

Rees does not apply his comments consistently or logically. He

3557

does not object to quoting Lenin and Trotsky during this period

3558

when they say something he approves of, regardless of how well

3559

it fits into their actions. It would be no exaggeration to say

3560

that his "argument" is simply an attempt to narrow the area of

3561

debate, marking off limits any comments by his heroes which would

3562

place his ideology in a bad light. It is hardly convincing,

3563

particularly when their "good" quotes are so at odds with their

3564

practice and their "bad" quotes so in line with them. And as

3565

Marx argued, we should judge people by what they do, not by

3566

what they say. This seems a basic principle of scientific

3567

analysis and it is significant, if not surprising, that Leninists

3568

like Rees want to reject it.

3569

3570

Ultimately, the theoretical problem with this position is that

3571

it denies the importance of implementing ideas. After all, even

3572

if it where true that the "theory" of Bolshevism was different

3573

to its practice and the justifications for that practice, it

3574

would leave us with the conclusion that this "theory" was not

3575

sufficient when faced with the rigours of reality. In other

3576

words, that it is impractical. A conclusion that Leninists do

3577

not want to draw, hence the stress on "objective factors" to

3578

explain the failure of Bolshevism. As Marx said, judge people

3579

by what they do, not what they say (unless, of course, as with

3580

the Bolsheviks post-October, what they said reflects what they

3581

did!)

3582

3583

Similarly, there seems to be an idealist tint to Leninist

3584

accounts of the Russian Revolution. After all, they seem to

3585

think that the Lenin of 1921 was, essentially, the same person

3586

as the Lenin of 1917! That seems to violate the basic ideas

3587

of materialism. As Herbert Read points out, "the phrase 'the

3588

dictatorship of the proletariat' . . . became fatal through the

3589

interventions of two political expedients -- the identification

3590

of the proletariat with the Bolshevik Party, and the use of the

3591

State as an instrument of revolution. Expedients and compromises

3592

may have been necessary for the defeat of the reactionary

3593

forces; but there is no doubt whatsoever that what took place

3594

was a progressive brutalisation of Lenin's own mind under the

3595

corrupting influence of the exercise of power." [A One-Man

3596

Manifesto, p. 51] It seems common sense that if a political

3597

strategy exposes its followers to the corrupting effects of

3598

power we should factor this into any evaluation of it. Sadly,

3599

Leninists fail to do this -- even worse, they attempt to

3600

whitewash the post-October Lenin (and Trotsky) by excluding

3601

the "bad" quotes which reflect their practice, a practice

3602

which they are at pains to downplay (or ignore)!

3603

3604

Then, of course, there is the attitude of the Bolshevik leaders

3605

themselves to these so-called "shouts of command in the midst of

3606

battle." Rather than dismiss them as irrelevant, they continued

3607

to subscribe to them years later. For example, Trotsky was still

3608

in favour of party dictatorship in the late 1930s (see

3609

<a href="secH1.html#sech12">section H.1.2</a>). Looking at his justly infamous Terrorism and Communism,

3610

we discover Trotsky in the 1930s reiterating his support for his

3611

arguments of 1920. His preface to the 1936 French edition sees

3612

him state that it was "devoted to a clarification of the methods

3613

of the proletariat's revolutionary policy in our epoch." He

3614

concluded as follows: "Victory is conceivable only on the

3615

basis of Bolshevik methods, to the defence of which the present

3616

work is devoted." The previous year, in his introduction to

3617

the second English edition, he was equally unrepentant. "The

3618

British proletariat," he argued, "will enter upon a period of

3619

political crisis and theoretical criticism . . . The teachings

3620

of Marx and Lenin for the first time will find the masses as

3621

their audience. Such being the case, it may be also that the

3622

present book will turn out to be not without its use." He

3623

dismissed the "consoling illusion" that "the arguments of this

3624

book [were] true for backward Russia" but "utterly without

3625

application to advanced lands." The "wave of Fascist or

3626

militarised police dictatorships" in the 1920s and 1930s was

3627

the reason. It seems ironic that Trotsky's self-proclaimed

3628

followers are now repeating the arguments of what he termed

3629

"incurable Fabians." [Terrorism and Communism, p. xix,

3630

p. xxxv, p. xlvii and p. xxxix]

3631

3632

Rather than distance himself from the authoritarian and state

3633

capitalist policies modern day Leninists claim were thrust upon

3634

an unwilling Bolshevik party by "objective factors," Trotsky

3635

defends them! Moreover, as we noted in

3636

<a href="append42.html#app12">section 12</a> of the appendix on

3637

<a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a>, Trotsky

3638

himself argues that these "objective factors" would face every

3639

revolution. As it is, he argues that it was only the "slow

3640

development of the revolution in the West" which stopped "a

3641

direct passage from military Communism to a Socialistic system

3642

of production." Rather than admit to "illusions" caused by the

3643

"iron necessity" of willing the civil war, he talks about "those

3644

economic hopes which were bound up with the development of the

3645

world revolution." He even links Bolshevik practice with Stalinism,

3646

noting that the "idea of five-year plans was not only formulated

3647

in that period [1918-1920], but in some economic departments it

3648

was also technically worked out." [Op. Cit., p. xliii]

3649

3650

Even his essay outlining what he considers the differences between

3651

Stalinism and Bolshevism does not see him fundamentally distancing

3652

himself from the positions modern day Leninists like to explain by

3653

"objective factors." He stated that the "Bolshevik party achieved

3654

in the civil war the correct combination of military art and Marxist

3655

politics." What did that involve? Immediately before making that

3656

claim he argued that the "Bolshevik party has shown the entire world

3657

how to carry out armed insurrection and the seizure of power. Those

3658

who propose the abstraction of the Soviets from the party dictatorship

3659

should understand that only thanks to the party dictatorship were the

3660

Soviets able to lift themselves out of the mud of reformism and attain

3661

the state form of the proletariat." Thus the "party dictatorship" is

3662

seen as being an example of "Marxist politics" being successfully

3663

applied and not something to be opposed. Moreover, "the Bolshevik

3664

party was able to carry on its magnificent 'practical' work only

3665

because it illuminated all its steps with theory." [Stalinism and

3666

Bolshevism] Clearly, rather than denounce the power of the party

3667

as being against Bolshevik theory, as Rees claims, for Trotsky it

3668

represented its application. While he excuses some Bolshevik actions

3669

(such as the banning of opposition groups) as a product of "objective

3670

factors," he clearly sees the degeneration of the revolution coming

3671

after the civil war and its "correct combination" of "Marxist

3672

politics" and "military art," which included "party dictatorship"

3673

over the soviets.

3674

3675

This lack of distancing is to be expected. After, the idea that

3676

"objective factors" caused the degeneration of the Russian

3677

Revolution was first developed by Trotsky to explain, after his

3678

fall from power) the rise of Stalinism. While he was head of

3679

the Soviet state no such "objective" factors seemed to be

3680

required to "explain" the party dictatorship over the working

3681

class. Indeed, quite the reverse. As he argued in 1923 "[i]f

3682

there is one question which basically not only does not require

3683

revision but does not so much as admit the thought of revision,

3684

it is the question of the dictatorship of the Party." [Leon

3685

Trotsky Speaks, p. 158]

3686

3687

Trotsky was just stating mainstream Bolshevik ideology, echoing

3688

a statement made in March 1923 by the Central Committee (of

3689

which he and Lenin were members) to mark the 25th anniversary

3690

of the founding of the Communist Party. It sums up the lessons

3691

gained from the revolution and states that "the party of the

3692

Bolsheviks proved able to stand out fearlessly against the

3693

vacillations within its own class, vacillations which, with

3694

the slightest weakness in the vanguard, could turn into an

3695

unprecedented defeat for the proletariat." Vacillations, of

3696

course, are expressed by workers' democracy. Little wonder the

3697

statement rejects it: "The dictatorship of the working class

3698

finds its expression in the dictatorship of the party." ["To

3699

the Workers of the USSR" in G. Zinoviev, History of the

3700

Bolshevik Party, p. 213, p. 214] It should be noted that

3701

Trotsky had made identical comments before and immediately

3702

after the civil war -- as well as long after (see

3703

<a href="secH3.html#sech38">section H.3.8</a>

3704

for details).

3705

3706

So, as with all the leading Bolsheviks, he considered the party

3707

dictatorship as an inevitable result of any proletarian revolution

3708

Moreover, he did not question the social relationships within

3709

production either. One-man management held no fears for him

3710

and he called the state capitalist regime under himself and

3711

Lenin as "socialist" and defended it as such. He was fully

3712

supportive of one-man management. Writing in 1923, he argued

3713

that the "system of actual one-man management must be applied

3714

in the organisation of industry from top to bottom. For leading

3715

economic organs of industry to really direct industry and to

3716

bear responsibility for its fate, it is essential for them to

3717

have authority over the selection of functionaries and their

3718

transfer and removal." These economic organs must "in actual

3719

practice have full freedom of selection and appointment."

3720

[quoted by Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History of

3721

Communism, vol. 1, p. 237]

3722

3723

All of these post-civil war opinions of course, fit in well

3724

with his civil war opinions on the matter. Which, incidentally,

3725

explains why, to quote a Leninist, Trotsky "continued to

3726

his death to harbour the illusion that somehow, despite the

3727

lack of workers' democracy, Russia was a 'workers' state.'"

3728

Simply put, there had been no workers' democracy under

3729

Lenin and Trotsky and he considered that regime a "workers'

3730

state." The question arises why Harman thinks Lenin's Russia

3731

was some kind of "workers' state" if workers' democracy is the

3732

criteria by which such things are to be judged. But, then

3733

again, he thinks Trotsky's Left Opposition "framed a policy

3734

along [the] lines" of "returning to genuine workers' democracy"!

3735

[Chris Harman,Bureaucracy and Revolution in Eastern Europe,

3736

p. 20 and p. 19]

3737

3738

Now, it seems strange that rather than present what he "really"

3739

thought, Trotsky expounded what presumably is the opposite of

3740

it. Surely the simplistic conclusion to draw is that Trotsky said

3741

what he really did think and that this was identical to his

3742

so-called "shouts of command" made during the civil war? But,

3743

of course, all these comments can be dismissed as "rhetorical

3744

justifications" and not reflective of Trotsky's real "theory." Or

3745

can they? Ultimately, either you subscribe to the idea that Lenin

3746

and Trotsky were able to express their ideas themselves or you

3747

subscribe to the notion that they hid their "real" politics and

3748

only modern-day Leninists can determine what they, in fact, "really"

3749

meant to say and what they "really" stood for. And as for all those

3750

"awkward" quotes which express the opposite of the divined true

3751

faith, well, they can be ignored.

3752

3753

Which is, of course, hardly a convincing position to take.

3754

Particularly as Lenin and Trotsky were hardly shy in justifying

3755

their authoritarian policies and expressing a distinct lack of

3756

concern over the fate of any meaningful working class conquest

3757

of the revolution like, say, soviet democracy. As Samuel Farber

3758

notes that "there is no evidence indicating that Lenin or any of

3759

the mainstream Bolshevik leaders lamented the loss of workers'

3760

control or of democracy in the soviets, or at least referred to

3761

these losses as a retreat, as Lenin declared with the replacement

3762

of War Communism by NEP in 1921." [Before Stalinism, p. 44]

3763

3764

The sad fact is that the inter-party conflicts of the 1920s

3765

were not about "workers' democracy," rather party democracy.

3766

The Bolsheviks simply relabelled "party democracy" as "workers'

3767

democracy." Little wonder in 1925 that Max Eastman, one of

3768

Trotsky's main supporters at the time, stated "this programme of

3769

democracy within the party [was] called 'Workers' Democracy' by

3770

Lenin" and that "Trotsky merely revived this original plea."

3771

[Since Lenin Died, p. 35] Trotsky held this position throughout

3772

the 1920s and 1930s. As we noted in

3773

<a href="append42.html#app13">section 13</a> of the appendix on

3774

<a href="append42.html">"What was the Kronstadt Rebellion?"</a>, the 1927

3775

Platform of the Opposition restated its belief in party

3776

dictatorship and argued that Stalin was undermining it in

3777

favour of rule by the bureaucracy. Ironically, Trotskyists

3778

in soviet prisons in the early 1930s "continued to consider

3779

that 'Freedom to choose one's party -- that is Menshevism'"

3780

and this was their "final verdict." [Ante Ciliga, The Russian

3781

Enigma, p. 280] No wonder they seemed surprised to be there!

3782

3783

Trotsky's issue with Stalinism was not based on real socialist

3784

principles, such as meaningful working class freedoms and power.

3785

Rather it was a case of "the political centre of gravity ha[ving]

3786

shifted from the proletarian vanguard to the bureaucracy" and

3787

this caused "the party" to change "its social structure as

3788

well as in its ideology." [Stalinism and Bolshevism] The

3789

party dictatorship had been replaced by the dictatorship of

3790

the state bureaucracy, in other words. Once this happened,

3791

Trotsky sought to explain it. As analysing the impact of

3792

Bolshevik ideology and practice were, by definition, out

3793

of the question, that left the various objective factors

3794

Trotsky turned to to explain developments after 1923. Now the

3795

concern for "objective factors" appeared, to explain Stalinism

3796

while keeping true to Bolshevik ideology and practice.

3797

3798

So, in summary, the leading Bolsheviks did not view "objective

3799

factors" as explaining the failure of the revolution. Indeed,

3800

until Trotsky was squeezed out of power they did not think that

3801

the revolution had failed. Party dictatorship and one-man

3802

management were not considered as expressions of a failed

3803

revolution, rather a successful one. Trotsky's issue with

3804

Stalinism was simply that the bureaucracy had replaced the

3805

"the proletarian vanguard" (i.e. himself and his followers)

3806

as the dominant force in the Soviet State and it had started

3807

to use the techniques of political repression developed against

3808

opposition parties and groups against him. The idea that

3809

"objective factors" caused the failure of the revolution was

3810

not used until the late 1920s and even then not used to explain

3811

the party dictatorship but rather the usurpation of its

3812

power by the bureaucracy.

3813

3814

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3815

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