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<title>11 What is the myth of "Natural Law"?
7
<h1>11 What is the myth of "Natural Law"?</h1>
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Natural Law, and the related concept of Natural Rights, play an important
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part in Libertarian and "anarcho"-capitalist ideology. Right-libertarians
11
are not alone in claiming that their particular ideology is based on the
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"law of nature". Hitler, for one, claimed the same thing for Nazi ideology.
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So do numerous other demagogues, religious fanatics, and political
14
philosophers. However, each likes to claim that only <b>their</b> "natural
15
law" is the "real" one, all the others being subjective impositions. We
16
will ignore these assertions (they are not arguments) and concentrate
17
on explaining why natural law, in all its forms, is a myth. In addition,
18
we will indicate its authoritarian implications.
20
Instead of such myths anarchists urge people to "work it out for themselves"
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and realise that any ethical code is subjective and not a law of nature.
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If its a good "code", then others will become convinced of it by your
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arguments and their intellect. There is no need to claim its a function
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The following books discuss the subject of "Natural Law" in greater depth
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and are recommended for a fuller discussion of the issues raised in this
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Robert Anton Wilson, <b>Natural Law</b> and L.A. Rollins, <b>The Myth of
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We should note that these books are written by people associated, to some
34
degree, with right-libertarianism and, of course, we should point out that
35
not all right-libertarians subscribe to "natural law" theories (David
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Friedman, for example, does not). However, such a position seems to be
37
the minority in right-Libertarianism (Ayn Rand, Robert Nozick and Murray
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Rothbard, among others, did subscribe to it). We should also point out that
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the Individualist Anarchist Lysander Spooner also subscribed to "natural
40
laws" (which shows that, as we noted above, the concept is not limited to
41
one particular theory or ideology). We present a short critique of Spooner's
42
ideas on this subject in section <a href="secG7.html">G.7</a>.
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Lastly, it could be maintained that it is a common "straw man" to maintain
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that supporters of Natural Law argue that their Laws are like the laws of
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physics (and so are capable of stopping people's actions just as the law
47
of gravity automatically stops people flying from the Earth). But that is
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the whole point -- using the term "Natural Law" implies that the moral
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rights and laws that its supporters argue for are to be considered just
50
like the law of gravity (although they acknowledge, of course, that unlike
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gravity, <b>their</b> <i>"natural laws"</i> <b>can be violated in nature</b>). Far from
52
saying that the rights they support are just that (i.e. rights <b>they</b> think
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are good) they try to associate them with universal facts. For example,
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Lysander Spooner (who, we must stress, used the concept of "Natural law"
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to <b>oppose</b> the transformation of America into a capitalist society, unlike
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Rand, Nozick and Rothbard who use it to defend capitalism) stated that:
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<i>"the true definition of law is, that it is a fixed, immutable, natural
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principle; and not anything that man ever made, or can make, unmake, or
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alter. Thus we speak of the laws of matter, and the laws of mind; of the
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laws of gravitation, the laws of light, heat, and electricity. . .etc.,
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etc. . . . The law of justice is just as supreme and universal in the moral
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world, as these others are in the mental or physical world; and is as
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unalterable as are these by any human power. And it is just as false
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and absurd to talk of anybody's having the power to abolish the law of
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justice, and set up their own in its stead, as it would be to talk of
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their having the power to abolish the law of gravitation, or any other
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natural laws of the universe, and set up their own will in the place of
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them."</i> [<b>A Letter to Grover Cleveland</b>, p. 88]
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Rothbard and other capitalist supporters of "Natural Law" make the same sort
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of claims (as we will see). Now, why, if they are aware of the fact that
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unlike gravity their "Natural Laws" can be violated, do they use the term
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at all? Benjamin Tucker said that "Natural Law" was a <i>"religious"</i> concept
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I will get cross" does not have <b>quite</b> the same power as "Do not violate
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these rights, they are facts of natural and you are violating nature"
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(compare to "Do not violate these laws, or you will go to hell"). So to
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point out that "Natural Law" is <b>not</b> the same as the law of gravity
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(because it has to be enforced by humans) is not attacking some kind of
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"straw man" -- it is exposing the fact that these "Natural Laws" are just
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the personal prejudices of those who hold them. If they do not want then
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to be exposed as such then they should call their laws what they are
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<a name="secf111"><h2>11.1 Why the term "Natural Law" in the first place?</h2>
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Murray Rothbard claims that <i>"Natural Law theory rests on the insight. . .
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that each entity has distinct and specific properties, a distinct 'nature,'
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which can be investigated by man's reason"</i> [<b>For a New Liberty</b>, p. 25]
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and that <i>"man has rights because they are <b>natural</b> rights. They are
91
grounded in the nature of man."</i> [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 155]
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To put it bluntly, this form of "analysis" was originated by Aristotle
94
and has not been used by science for centuries. Science investigates by
95
proposing theories and hypotheses to explain empirical observations,
96
testing and refining them by experiment. In stark contrast, Rothbard
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<b>invents</b> definitions (<i>"distinct" "natures"</i>) and then draws conclusions
98
from them. Such a method was last used by the medieval Church and is
99
devoid of any scientific method. It is, of course, a fiction. It
100
attempts to deduce the nature of a "natural" society from <i>a priori</i>
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considerations of the "innate" nature of human beings, which just means
102
that the assumptions necessary to reach the desired conclusions have been
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built into the definition of "human nature." In other words, Rothbard
104
defines humans as having the "distinct and specific properties" that,
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given his assumptions, will allow his dogma (private state capitalism)
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to be inferred as the "natural" society for humans.
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Rothbard claims that <i>"if A, B, C, etc., have differing attributes, it
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follows that they have different <b>natures.</b>"</i> [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>,
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p. 9] Does this means that as every individual is unique (have different
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attributes), they have different natures? Skin and hair colour are
112
different attributes, does this mean that red haired people have
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different natures than blondes? That black people have different natures
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than white (and such a "theory" of "natural law" was used to justify slavery
115
masters and so slavery is okay). Of course Rothbard aggregates "attributes"
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to species level, but why not higher? Humans are primates, does that mean
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we have the same natures are monkeys or gorillas? We are also mammals as
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well, we share many of the same attributes as whales and dogs. Do we
119
have similar natures?
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But this is by the way. To continue we find that after defining certain
122
"natures," Rothbard attempts to derive <i>"Natural Rights and Laws"</i> from
123
them. However, these <i>"Natural Laws"</i> are quite strange, as they can be
124
violated in nature! Real natural laws (like the law of gravity) <b>cannot</b>
125
be violated and therefore do not need to be enforced. The "Natural Laws"
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the "Libertarian" desires to foist upon us are not like this. They need
127
to be enforced by humans and the institutions they create. Hence, Libertarian
128
"Natural Laws" are more akin to moral prescriptions or juridical laws.
129
However, this does not stop Rothbard explicitly <i>"plac[ing]"</i> his <i>"Natural
130
Laws" "alongside physical or 'scientific' natural laws."</i> [<b>The Ethics of
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So why do so many Libertarians use the term "Natural Law?" Simply, it gives
134
them the means by which to elevate their opinions, dogmas, and prejudices to
135
a metaphysical level where nobody will dare to criticise or even think about
136
them. The term smacks of religion, where "Natural Law" has replaced
137
"God's Law." The latter fiction gave the priest power over believers.
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"Natural Law" is designed to give the Libertarian ideologist power over
139
the people that he or she wants to rule.
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How can one be against a "Natural Law" or a "Natural Right"? It is
142
impossible. How can one argue against gravity? If private property,
143
for example, is elevated to such a level, who would dare argue against
144
it? Ayn Rand listed having landlords and employers along with <i>"the laws
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of nature."</i> They are <b>not</b> similar: the first two are social relationships
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which have to be imposed by the state; the <i>"laws of nature"</i> (like gravity,
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needing food, etc.) are <b>facts</b> which do not need to be imposed. Rothbard
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claims that <i>"the natural fact is that labour service <b>is</b> indeed a
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commodity."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 40] However, this is complete nonsense --
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labour service as a commodity is a <b>social</b> fact, dependent on the
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distribution of property within society, its social customs and so
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forth. It is only "natural" in the sense that it exists within a given
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society (the state is also "natural" as it also exists within nature at
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a given time). But neither wage slavery or the state is "natural" in
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the sense that gravity is natural or a human having two arms is. Indeed,
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workers at the dawn of capitalism, faced with selling their labour services
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to another, considered it as decidedly "unnatural" and used the term
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"wage slavery" to describe it!
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Thus, where and when a "fact" appears is essential. For example, Rothbard
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claims that <i>"[a]n apple, let fall, will drop to the ground; this we all
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observe and acknowledge to be <b>in the nature</b> of the apple."</i> [<b>The Ethics
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of Liberty</b>, p. 9] Actually, we do not "acknowledge" anything of the kind.
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We acknowledge that the apple was subject to the force of gravity and that is
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why it fell. The same apple, "let fall" in a space ship would <b>not</b> drop
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to the floor. Has the "nature" of the apple changed? No, but the situation
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it is in has. Thus any attempt to generate abstract "natures" requires
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you to ignore reality in favour of ideals.
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Because of the confusion its usage creates, we are tempted to think
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that the use of "Natural Law" dogma is an attempt to <b>stop</b> thinking,
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to restrict analysis, to force certain aspects of society off the
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political agenda by giving them a divine, everlasting quality.
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Moreover, such an "individualist" account of the origins of rights will
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always turn on a muddled distinction between individual rationality and
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some vague notion of rationality associated with membership of the
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human species. How are we to determine what is rational for an individual
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<b>as and individual</b> and what is rational for that same individual <b>as a
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human being</b>? It is hard to see that we can make such a distinction for
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<i>"[i]f I violently interfere with Murray Rothbard's freedom, this may
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violate the 'natural law' of Murray Rothbard's needs, but it doesn't
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violate the 'natural law' of <b>my</b> needs."</i> [L.A. Rollins, <b>The Myth of
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Natural Rights</b>, p. 28] Both parties, after all, are human and if such
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interference is, as Rothbard claims, <i>"antihuman"</i> then why? <i>"If it helps
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me, a human, to advance my life, then how can it be unequivocally
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'antihuman'?"</i> [L. A. Rollins, <b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 27] Thus "natural law" is
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contradictory as it is well within the bounds of human nature to violate
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This means that in order to support the dogma of "Natural Law," the cultists
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<b>must</b> ignore reality. Ayn Rand claims that <i>"the source of man's rights
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is. . .the law of identity. A is A -- and Man is Man."</i> But Rand (like
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Rothbard) <b>defines</b> <i>"Man"</i> as an <i>"entity of a specific kind -- a rational
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being"</i> [<b>The Virtue of Selfishness</b>, pp. 94-95]. Therefore she cannot
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account for <b>irrational</b> human behaviours (such as those that violate
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"Natural Laws"), which are also products of our "nature." To assert that
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such behaviours are not human is to assert that A can be not-A, thus
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contradicting the law of identity. Her ideology cannot even meet its
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<a name="secf112"><h2>11.2 But "Natural Law" provides protection for individual rights from violation by the State. Those who are against Natural Law desire total rule by the state.</h2>
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The second statement represents a common "Libertarian" tactic. Instead of
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addressing the issues, they accuse an opponent of being a "totalitarian"
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(or the less sinister "statist"). In this way, they hope to distract
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attention from, and so avoid discussing, the issue at hand (while at the
208
same time smearing their opponent). We can therefore ignore the second
211
Regarding the first, "Natural Law" has <b>never</b> stopped the rights of
212
individuals from being violated by the state. Such "laws" are as much use
213
as a chocolate fire-guard. If "Natural Rights" could protect one from the
214
power of the state, the Nazis would not have been able to murder six
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million Jews. The only thing that stops the state from attacking people's
216
rights is individual (and social) power -- the ability and desire to
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protect oneself and what one considers to be right and fair. As the
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anarchist Rudolf Rocker pointed out:
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<blockquote><i>"Political [or individual] rights
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do not exist because they have been legally set down on a piece of paper,
222
but only when they have become the ingrown habit of a people, and when any
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attempt to impair them will be meet with the violent resistance of the
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populace. . . .One compels respect from others when he knows how to
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defend his dignity as a human being. . . .The people owe all the
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political rights and privileges which we enjoy today, in greater or
227
lesser measure, not to the good will of their governments, but to their
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own strength."</i> [<b>Anarcho-Syndicalism</b>, p. 64]
230
Of course, if is there are no "Natural Rights," then the state has no
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"right" to murder you or otherwise take away what are commonly regarded as
232
human rights. One can object to state power without believing in "Natural
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<a name="secf113"><h2>11.3 Why is "Natural Law" authoritarian?</h2>
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Rights, far from being fixed, are the product of social evolution and
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human action, thought and emotions. What is acceptable now may become
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unacceptable in the future. Slavery, for example, was long considered
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"natural." In fact, John Locke, the "father" of "Natural Rights," was
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heavily involved in the slave trade. He made a fortune in violating what
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is today regarded as a basic human right: not to be enslaved. Many in
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Locke's day claimed that slavery was a "Natural Law." Few would say so
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Thomas Jefferson indicates exactly why "Natural Law" is authoritarian
247
when he wrote <i>"[s]ome men look at constitutions with sanctimonious
248
reverence, and deem them like the ark of the Covenant, too sacred to be
249
touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more
250
than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment. . .laws and
251
institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. . .
252
as that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are
253
made, institutions must advance also, to keep pace with the times. . .
254
We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him
255
when a boy as civilised society to remain forever under the regimen
256
of their barbarous ancestors."</i>
258
The "Natural Law" cult desires to stop the evolutionary process by which
259
new rights are recognised. Instead they wish to fix social life into
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what <b>they</b> think is good and right, using a form of argument that tries
261
to raise their ideology above critique or thought. Such a wish is opposed
262
to the fundamental feature of liberty: the ability to think for oneself.
263
Michael Bakunin writes <i>"the liberty of man consists solely in this: that
264
he obeys natural laws because he has <b>himself</b> recognised them as such,
265
and not because they have been externally imposed upon him by any
266
extrinsic will whatever, divine or human, collective or individual."</i>
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[<b>Bakunin on Anarchism</b>, p. 227]
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Thus anarchism, in contrast to the "natural law" cult, recognises that
270
"natural laws" (like society) are the product of individual evaluation of
271
reality and social life and are, therefore, subject to change in the light
272
of new information and ideas (Society <i>"progresses slowly through the moving
273
power of individual initiative"</i> [Bakunin, <b>The Political Philosophy of
274
Bakunin</b>, p. 166] and so, obviously, do social rights and customs). Ethical
275
or moral "laws" (which is what the "Natural Law" cult is actually about)
276
is not a product of "human nature" or abstract individuals. Rather, it is
277
a <b>social</b> fact, a creation of society and human interaction. In Bakunin's
278
words, <i>"moral law is not an individual but a social fact, a creation of
279
society"</i> and any <i>"natural laws"</i> are <i>"inherent in the social body"</i> (and so,
280
we must add, not floating abstractions existing in "man's nature"). [<b>Ibid.</b>,
283
The case for liberty and a free society is based on the argument that,
284
since every individual is unique, everyone can contribute something that
285
no one else has noticed or thought about. It is the free interaction of
286
individuals which allows them, along with society and its customs and
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rights, to evolve, change and develop. "Natural Law," like the state,
288
tries to arrest this evolution. It replaces creative inquiry with dogma,
289
making people subject to yet another god, destroying critical thought with
292
In addition, if these "Natural Laws" are really what they are claimed
293
to be, they are necessarily applicable to <b>all</b> of humanity (Rothbard
294
explicitly acknowledges this when he wrote that <i>"one of the notable
295
attributes of natural law"</i> is <i>"its applicability to all men, regardless
296
of time or place"</i> [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 42]). In other words,
297
every other law code <b>must</b> (by definition) be "against nature" and
298
there exists <b>one</b> way of life (the "natural" one). The authoritarian
299
implications of such arrogance is clear. That the Dogma of Natural Law was
300
only invented a few hundred years ago, in one part of the planet, does not
301
seem to bother its advocates. Nor does the fact that for the vast majority
302
of human existence, people have lived in societies which violated almost
303
<b>all</b> of their so-called "Natural Laws" To take one example, before the
304
late Neolithic, most societies were based on usufruct, or free access
305
to communally held land and other resources [see Murray Bookchin, <b>The
306
Ecology of Freedom</b>]. Thus for millennia, all human beings lived in
307
violation of the supposed "Natural Law" of private property -- perhaps
308
the chief "law" in the "Libertarian" universe.
310
If "Natural Law" did exist, then all people would have discovered these
311
"true" laws years ago. To the contrary, however, the debate is still
312
going on, with (for example) fascists and "Libertarians" each claiming
313
"the laws of nature" (and socio-biology) as their own.
315
<a name="secf114"><h2>11.4 Does "Natural Law" actually provides protection for individual liberty?</h2>
317
But, it seems fair to ask, does "natural law" actually respect individuals
318
and their rights (i.e. liberty)? We think not. Why?
320
According to Rothbard, <i>"the natural law ethic states that for man, goodness
321
or badness can be determined by what fulfils or thwarts what is best for
322
man's nature."</i> [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 10] But, of course, what may
323
be "good" for "man" may be decidedly <b>bad</b> for men (and women). If we take
324
the example of the sole oasis in a desert (see section <a href="append134.html#secf42">4.2</a>) then,
325
according to Rothbard, the property owner having the power of life and
326
death over others is "good" while, if the dispossessed revolt and refuse
327
to recognise his "property", this is "bad"! In other words, Rothbard's
328
"natural law" is good for <b>some</b> people (namely property owners) while
329
it can be bad for others (namely the working class). In more general
330
terms, this means that a system which results in extensive hierarchy
331
(i.e. <b>archy</b>, power) is "good" (even though it restricts liberty for
332
the many) while attempts to <b>remove</b> power (such as revolution and the
333
democratisation of property rights) is "bad". Somewhat strange logic,
336
However such a position fails to understand <b>why</b> we consider coercion to
337
be wrong/unethical. Coercion is wrong because it subjects an individual
338
to the will of another. It is clear that the victim of coercion is lacking
339
the freedom that the philosopher Isaiah Berlin describes in the following
342
<i>"I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces
343
of whatever kind. I wish to be an instrument of my own, not of other
344
men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved
345
by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which
346
affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a
347
doer -- deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon
348
by external nature or by other mean as if I were a thing, or an animal, or
349
a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals
350
and policies of my own and realising them."</i> [<b>Four Essays on Liberty</b>,
353
Or, as Alan Haworth points out, <i>"we have to view coercion as a violation
354
of what Berlin calls <b>positive</b> freedom."</i> [<b>Anti-Libertarianism</b>, p. 48]
356
Thus, if a system results in the violation of (positive) liberty by its
357
very nature -- namely, subject a class of people to the will of another
358
class (the worker is subject to the will of their boss and is turned
359
into an order-taker) -- then it is justified to end that system. Yes,
360
it is "coercion" is dispossess the property owner -- but "coercion" exists
361
only for as long as they desire to exercise power over others. In other
362
words, it is not domination to remove domination! And remember it is
363
the domination that exists in coercion which fuels our hatred of it,
364
thus "coercion" to free ourselves from domination is a necessary evil
365
in order to stop far greater evils occurring (as, for example, in the
366
clear-cut case of the oasis monopoliser).
368
Perhaps it will be argued that domination is only bad when it is involuntary,
369
which means that it is only the involuntary nature of coercion that makes
370
it bad, not the domination it involves. By this argument wage slavery is
371
not domination as workers voluntarily agree to work for a capitalist (after
372
all, no one puts a gun to their heads) and any attempt to overthrow
373
capitalist domination is coercion and so wrong. However, this argument
374
ignores that fact that <b>circumstances</b> force workers to sell their liberty
375
and so violence on behalf of property owners is not (usually) required --
376
market forces ensure that physical force is purely "defensive" in nature.
377
And as we argued in section <a href="append132.html#secf22">2.2</a>, even Rothbard recognised that the
378
economic power associated with one class of people being dispossessed
379
and another empowered by this fact results in relations of domination
380
which cannot be considered "voluntary" by any stretch of the imagination
381
(although, of course, Rothbard refuses to see the economic power associated
382
with capitalism -- when its capitalism, he cannot see the wood for the trees
383
use of coercion and violence -- see section <a href="append138.html">8</a>).
385
Thus, "Natural law" and attempts to protect individuals rights/liberty and
386
see a world in which people are free to shape their own lives are fatally
387
flawed if they do not recognise that private property is incompatible with
388
these goals. This is because the existence of capitalist property smuggles
389
in power and so domination (the restriction of liberty, the conversion of
390
some into order-givers and the many into order-takers) and so Natural Law
391
does not fulfil its promise that each person is free to pursue their own
392
goals. The unqualified right of property will lead to the domination and
393
degradation of large numbers of people (as the oasis monopoliser so
394
graphically illustrates).
396
And we stress that anarchists have no desire to harm individuals, only to
397
change institutions. If a workplace is taken over by its workers, the owners
398
are not harmed physically. If the oasis is taken from the monopoliser, the
399
ex-monopoliser becomes like other users of the oasis (although probably
400
<b>disliked</b> by others). Thus anarchists desire to treat people as fairly as
401
possible and not replace one form of coercion and domination with another --
402
individuals must <b>never</b> be treated as abstractions (if they have
403
power over you, destroy what creates the relation of domination, <b>not</b>
404
the individual, in other words! And if this power can be removed without
405
resorting to force, so much the better -- a point which social and
406
individualist anarchists disagree on, namely whether capitalism can
407
be reformed away or not comes directly from this. As the Individualists
408
think it can, they oppose the use of force. Most social anarchists think
409
it cannot, and so support revolution).
411
This argument may be considered as "utilitarian" (the greatest good for
412
the greatest number) and so treats people not as "ends in themselves"
413
but as "means to an end". Thus, it could be argued, "natural law" is
414
required to ensure that <b>all</b> (as opposed to some, or many, or the
415
majority of) individuals are free and have their rights protected.
417
However, it is clear that "natural law" can easily result in a minority
418
having their freedom and rights respected, while the majority are
419
forced by circumstances (created by the rights/laws produced by applying
420
"natural law" we must note) to sell their liberty and rights in order
421
to survive. If it is wrong to treat anyone as a "means to an end",
422
then it is equally wrong to support a theory or economic system that
423
results in people having to negate themselves in order to live. A respect
424
for persons -- to treat them as ends and never as means -- is not compatible
425
with private property.
427
The simple fact is that <b>there are no easy answers</b> -- we need to weight
428
up our options and act on what we think is best. Yes, such subjectivism
429
lacks the "elegance" and simplicity of "natural law" but it reflects
430
real life and freedom far better. All in all, we must always remember
431
that what is "good" for man need not be good for people. "Natural law"
432
fails to do this and stands condemned.
434
<a name="secf115"><h2>11.5 But Natural Law was discovered, not invented!</h2>
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This statement truly shows the religious nature of the Natural Law cult.
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To see why its notion of "discovery" is confused, let us consider the Law
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of Gravity. Newton did not "discover" the law of gravity, he invented a
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theory which explained certain observed phenomena in the physical world.
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Later Einstein updated Newton's theories in ways that allowed for a better
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explanation of physical reality. Thus, unlike "Natural Law," scientific
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laws can be updated and changed as our knowledge changes and grows. As
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we have already noted, however, "Natural Laws" cannot be updated because
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they are derived from fixed definitions (Rothbard is pretty clear on this,
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he states that it is <i>"[v]ery true"</i> that natural law is <i>"universal, fixed and
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immutable"</i> and so are <i>"'absolute' principles of justice"</i> and that they are
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<i>"independent of time and place"</i> [<b>The Ethics of Liberty</b>, p. 19]). However,
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what he fails to understand is that what the "Natural Law" cultists are
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"discovering" are simply the implications of their own definitions, which
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in turn simply reflect their own prejudices and preferences.
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Since "Natural Laws" are thus "unchanging" and are said to have been
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"discovered" centuries ago, it's no wonder that many of its followers look
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for support in socio-biology, claiming that their "laws" are part of the
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genetic structure of humanity. But socio-biology has dubious scientific
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credentials for many of its claims. Also, it has authoritarian implications
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<b>exactly</b> like Natural Law. Murray Bookchin rightly characterises
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socio-biology as <i>"suffocatingly rigid; it not only impedes action with the
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autocracy of a genetic tyrant but it closes the door to any action that is
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not biochemically defined by its own configuration. When freedom is
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nothing more than the recognition of necessity. . .we discover the gene's
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tyranny over the greater totality of life. . .when knowledge becomes
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dogma (and few movements are more dogmatic than socio-biology) freedom is
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ultimately denied."</i> [<i>"Socio-biology or Social Ecology"</i>, in <b>Which way for
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the Ecology Movement?</b> pp. 49 - 75, p. 60]
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In conclusion the doctrine of Natural Law, far from supporting individual
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freedom, is one of its greatest enemies. By locating individual rights
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within "Man's Nature," it becomes an unchanging set of dogmas. Do we really
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know enough about humanity to say what are "Natural" and universal Laws,
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applicable forever? Is it not a rejection of critical thinking and thus
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individual freedom to do so?
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<a name="secf116"><h2>11.6 Why is the notion of "discovery" contradictory?</h2>
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Ayn Rand indicates the illogical and contradictory nature of the concepts
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of "discovering" "natural law" and the "natural rights" this "discovery"
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argument creates when she stated that her theory was <i>"objective."</i> Her
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"Objectivist" political theory <i>"holds that good is neither an attribute of
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'things in themselves' nor man's emotional state, but <b>an evaluation</b> of
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the facts of reality by man's consciousness according to a rational standard
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of value. . . The objective theory holds that <b>the good is an aspect of
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reality in relation to man</b> - and that it must be discovered, not invented,
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by man."</i> [<b>Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal</b>, p. 22]
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However, this is playing with words. If something is "discovered" then it
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has always been there and so is an intrinsic part of it. If "good" <b>is</b>
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"discovered" by "man" then "good" exists independently of people -- it
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is waiting to be "discovered." In other words, "good" is an attribute of
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<i>"man as man,"</i> of <i>"things in themselves"</i> (in addition, such a theory also
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implies that there is just <b>one</b> possible interpretation of what is "good"
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for all humanity). This can be seen when Rand talks about her system of
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"objective" values and rights.
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When discussing the difference between <i>"subjective,"</i> <i>"intrinsic"</i> and
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<i>"objective"</i> values Rand noted that <i>"intrinsic"</i> and <i>"subjective"</i> theories
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<i>"make it possible for a man to believe what is good is independent of man's
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mind and can be achieved by physical force."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 22] In other
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words, intrinsic and subjective values justify tyranny. However, her
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<i>"objective"</i> values are placed squarely in <i>"Man's Nature"</i> -- she states that
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<i>"[i]ndividual rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law"</i>
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and that <i>"the source of man's rights is man's nature."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 320,
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She argues that the <i>"<b>intrinsic</b> theory holds that the good is inherent
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in certain things or actions, as such, regardless of their context and
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consequences, regardless of any benefit or injury they may cause to the
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actors and subjects involved."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p. 21] According to the <b>Concise
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Oxford Dictionary</b>, <i>"intrinsic"</i> is defined as <i>"inherent,"</i> <i>"essential,"</i>
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<i>"belonging naturally"</i> and defines <i>"nature"</i> as <i>"a thing's, or person's,
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innate or essential qualities or character."</i> In other words, if, as
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Rand maintains, man's rights <b>are</b> the product of <i>"man's nature"</i> then
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such rights are <b>intrinsic</b>! And if, as Rand maintains, such rights
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are the <i>"extension of morality into the social system"</i> then morality
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itself is also intrinsic.
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Again, her ideology fails to meet its own tests -- and opens the way for
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tyranny. This can be seen by her whole hearted support for wage slavery and
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her total lack of concern how it, and concentrations of wealth and power,
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affect the individuals subjected to them. For, after all, what is "good"
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is "inherent" in capitalism, regardless of the context, consequences,
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benefits or injuries it may cause to the actors and subjects involved.
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The key to understanding her contradictory and illogical ideology lies in
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her contradictory use of the word "man." Sometimes she uses it to describe
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individuals but usually it is used to describe the human race collectively
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(<i>"man's nature," "man's consciousness"</i>). But "Man" does not have a
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consciousness, only individuals do. Man is an abstraction, it is individuals
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who live and think, not "Man." Such "Man worship" -- like Natural Law -- has
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all the markings of a religion.
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As Max Stirner argues <i>"liberalism is a religion because it separates my
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essence from me and sets it above me, because it exalts 'Man' to the same
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extent as any other religion does to God. . . it sets me beneath Man."</i>
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[<b>The Ego and Its Own</b>, p. 176] Indeed, he <i>"who is infatuated with <b>Man</b>
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leaves persons out of account so far as that infatuation extends, and floats
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in an ideal, sacred interest. <b>Man</b>, you see, is not a person, but an ideal,
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a spook."</i> [<b>Op. Cit.</b>, p.79]
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Rand argues that we must evaluate <i>"the facts of reality by man's consciousness
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according to a rational standard of value"</i> but who determines that value?
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She states that <i>"[v]alues are not determined by fiat nor by majority vote"</i>
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[p. 24] but, however, neither can they be determined by "man" or "man's
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consciousness" because "man" does not exist. Individuals exist and have
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consciousness and because they are unique have different values (but as we
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argued in section <a href="secA2.html#seca219">A.2.19</a>, being social creatures these values are generalised
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across individuals into social, i.e. objective, values). So, the abstraction
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"man" does not exist and because of this we see the healthy sight of
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different individuals convincing others of their ideas and theories
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by discussion, presenting facts and rational debate. This can be best
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seen in scientific debate.
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The aim of the scientific method is to invent theories that explain facts,
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the theories are not part of the facts but created by the individual's mind
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in order to explain those facts. Such scientific "laws" can and do change
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in light of new information and new thought. In other words, the scientific
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method is the creation of subjective theories that explain the objective
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facts. Rand's method is the opposite - she assumes "man's nature," "discovers"
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what is "good" from those assumptions and draws her theories by deduction
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from that. This is the <b>exact</b> opposite of the scientific method and, as we
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noted above, comes to us straight from the Roman Catholic church.
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It is the subjective revolt by individuals against what is considered
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"objective" fact or "common sense" which creates progress and develops
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ethics (what is considered "good" and "right") and society. This, in
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turn, becomes "accepted fact" until the next free thinker comes along and
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changes how we view the world by presenting <b>new</b> evidence, re-evaluating
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old ideas and facts or exposing the evil effects associated with certain
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ideas (and the social relationships they reflect) by argument, fact and
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passion. Attempts to impose <i>"an evaluation of the facts of reality by man's
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consciousness"</i> would be a death blow to this process of critical thought,
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development and evaluation of the facts of reality by individual's
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consciousness. Human thought would be subsumed by dogma.
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